**SARBANES-OXLEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND STRATEGIC**

**DIVIDEND DECISIONS**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

The past decade brought to the public’s attention record-breaking bankruptcy filings in

the U.S. While many of these failures occurred in association with the downturn in the market,

many did not. Some, for example, were the result of significant fraud. Regardless of the causes

of these substantial bankruptcies, and particularly in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom

collapses in the early 2000s, a strong consensus emerged among policymakers and industry

observers that existing management practices and government oversight were insufficient to

promote a well-functioning and sound security market.

It is commonly understood that the separation of ownership and control leads to potential

agency-related problems (see Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen, 1986; and Jensen and Meckling,

1976). These costs have persistently challenged market participants and regulators to engineer

governance controls to mitigate any potential for managers to expropriate wealth from their

stakeholders. Independent of government regulation, external market pressures have forced firms

to develop internal and external governance measures to allow a firm’s stakeholders to more

accurately monitor and measure its performance. However, the perceived lapse in these

mechanisms led the U.S. Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Among other

requirements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act demands firms to have audit committees comprised of

independent directors and forces financial officers to certify that the firm’s financial statements

are accurate. Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company Accounting

Oversight Board to oversee, regulate, inspect, and discipline accounting firms in their roles as

auditors.

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Corporate governance, as defined by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), refers to the ways in

which investors ensure that they will receive maximum return on their investments.1

Fundamental components of an effective governance structure include managerial ownership,

size and composition of the board of directors, CEO and directors’ compensation schemes, audit

controls, and an external market for corporate control (Keasey and Wright, 1997). In general,

effective governance controls agency conflicts between management and investors in two ways.

First, the free-cash flow problem of a firm can be reduced through dividend policy, stock

repurchases, capital structure decisions, and investment in long term projects. Second, the

likelihood of management entrenchment can be reduced, thus strengthening shareholders’ rights.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of government regulation with

respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the existing agency relation between corporate governance

measures and dividend policy. Specifically, our research question is: Does the relation between

dividend payout policies and various measures of governance and firm-specific characteristics

change after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley? Empirical results show that prior to the Sarbanes-

Oxley Act, shareholders’ rights, board size, and the proportion of outside directors are

statistically significant factors in explaining a firm’s dividend policy. Following Sarbanes-Oxley,

however, regulatory changes have structurally altered the impact that governance measures have

in explaining dividend policies.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews selected literature. Section III

discusses and summarized the data and methodology, while Section IV presents the empirical

findings and robustness tests. Section V provides concluding remarks.

1 Some other definitions of corporate governance are: “the design of institutions that induce or force management to

internalize the welfare of stakeholders,” (Tirole, 2001) and “the complex set of constraints that shape the *ex-post*

bargaining over quasi-rents generated by the firm.” (Zingales, 1998).

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**II. REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE**

Two significant agency costs affected by dividend policy are those associated with free

cash flow and managerial entrenchment. The role of an effective corporate governance structure

is to ensure that managerial decisions are continually monitored. This can be achieved internally

by the monitoring and auditing of managers and externally via the market for corporate control.

To help mitigate agency costs associated with the free cash flow problem, dividends may

be used to force managers to return to the capital market when they are faced with valueincreasing

investment opportunities (Rozeff, 1982).2 Easterbrook (1984) echoes this view,

arguing that investment bankers work on behalf of shareholders to monitor managers and ensure

sound corporate governance. Similarly, Lloyd, Page, and Jahera (1989) find that greater market

scrutiny, measured by the number of analysts following a particular firm, is associated with a

higher dividend payout.

Other research has focused on the importance of growth opportunities on dividend policy.

Wasteful spending on value-destroying projects is more likely to impact firms with fewer growth

opportunities, while firms with substantial growth opportunities are likely to be investing in

positive net present value projects. In support of this hypothesis, Gaver and Gaver (1993) find

that dividends are inversely related to growth opportunities.

Shareholders’ rights have also been known to influence dividend policy. La Porta, Lopez-

De Salinas, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) examine dividend policies across countries with

differing legal protections. Globally, they find that those countries which provide stronger

protection of minority shareholder rights have firms that pay higher dividends. Additionally,

high growth firms are also shown to pay lower dividends in the countries with stronger

protection. In lieu of legal protection, another measure of shareholder rights is the Gompers

2 For a recent review of the theoretical and empirical research on dividends, see Bhattacharyya (2007).

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Governance Index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). Using this metric, Jiraporn and Ning

(2006) find a positive relation between the Gompers Governance Index and dividend payout.

They conclude that shareholder rights have a significant influence on dividend payout ratios,

with more restrictive shareholder rights being associated with higher dividend payout. This,

again, supports the view that firms that restrict shareholder rights cannot totally escape the

scrutiny of the markets.

Another key component of effective corporate governance is mitigating problems

associated with managerial entrenchment. The market for corporate control is one means for

monitoring and disciplining management, thereby affecting agency costs and dividend payout

(Jahera and Page, 1991). That is, one can argue that the most effective means for minimizing

agency costs is for management to maximize firm value. By ensuring that a firm is fully valued,

that firm becomes less of a takeover target. In other words, it is no longer a bargain. However,

agency costs do indeed exist and many mangers seek to deter or block hostile takeovers by

adopting antitakeover amendments (see Page, Jahera, and Pugh, 1996). Proponents of

antitakeover measures contend that such protection enable management to focus on longer run

decision without the constant threat of a hostile takeover. Opponents argue that such measures

only serve to entrench weak or ineffective management.

Alternatively, Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Kehr (2005) test the theory that

dividends serve to reduce agency costs. They follow standard event study methodology to

examine stock price reaction around dividend increase announcements. Controlling for

blockholders and poison pills as measures of agency costs, they find no evidence that the

announcement of a large dividend increase results in lower agency costs.

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**III. DATA and METHODOLOGY**

*A. Data*

The primary focus of this paper is to investigate the impact of regulatory changes on the

relation between a firm’s dividend policy and governance structure. To do so, we use data from

the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) data files over the period 1998 - 2004.3 The

dataset includes a number of measures of governance, such as the governance index (Gompers *et*

*al.*, 2003), the size of the firm’s board, the proportion of independent outside directors, and the

percent of insider ownership. The percent of insider ownership is calculated from ExecuComp

and we use firm-level control data from Compustat. Because the governance index is only

calculated every other year, our dataset includes the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.

*B. Model*

The empirical model for our analysis is similar to the model used by Jiraporn and Ning

(2006) . The specific model we use is of the following form:

*i t i t i t i t i t Dividends Payouts Governance Firm* , 1 , 2 , 3 , , =α + β + β + β +ε . (1)

The dependent variable, *Dividends*, is measured as cash dividends paid divided by the book

value of assets. We use this more stable measure of dividend payout, as opposed to the more

tradition dividends-to-earnings approach. The dividends-to-earnings measure is more volatile

due to the variability of earnings. The *Payout* vector contains data for share repurchases to

control for other means of cash distributions. The *Governance* matrix includes a variety of

corporate governance mechanisms. One measure of governance is the governance index,

introduced by Gompers *et al.* (2003). This measure quantifies the strength of shareholders rights

by accumulating points for provisions across five categories: tactics for delaying hostile bidders;

3 Data for the governance measures from the IRRC database dates back to 1990. However, as noted by Jiraporn and

Ning (2006), the database only included large corporations before 1998. Therefore, we only use data beginning in

1998.

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voting rights; director/officer protection; other takeover defenses; and state laws, where the

lower the value of the index, the stronger the shareholder rights. Two more variables of

governance are included to capture the influence and importance of board structure. The first

measure is board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; and Denis and

Sarin, 1999), and the other is the proportion of independent outside directors (see Hermalin and

Weisbach, 1991; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997; Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith, 1997;

and Bhagat and Black, 2001). A final measure of governance is the percent of inside ownership,

measured as the percent of shares owned by the top five officers. These variables are all

mentioned in prior research related to dividends and agency effects.

In keeping with earlier works, we control for firm-specific variables contained in *Firm*.

One control measure is the size of the firm, measured by the log of total assets. To control for

financial performance, we use operating income scaled by sales. Furthermore, growth

opportunities may also influence the amount of dividends paid, so we use the market-to-book

ratio, where market value is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the

market value of equity. We also utilize the investment-to-sales ratio. Investment is measured as

the sum of research and development expenditures and capital expenditures, and provides an

alternative proxy for growth opportunities. Lastly, since risk and leverage have been shown to

influence agency costs and cash distributions, we control for the debt ratio.

**IV. RESULTS**

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the overall sample period, as well as for each of

the four individual years. The final column shows the difference between 2000, the period

preceding Sarbanes-Oxley, and 2004, the period following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. For

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the payout variables, the mean (median) level of dividends and repurchases is 0.0114 (0.0021),

and 0.0272 (0.0018), respectively. Over time, the level of repurchases tends to drop, but there is

no significant difference in means from 2000 to 2004. Dividends, however, remain relatively

stable, with only a marginal difference in means from 2000 to 2004.

The mean and median levels for the governance index, board size, proportion of outside

directors, and percentage of managerial ownership are 8.9718 (9.000), 2.1607 (2.1972), 0.6338

(0.6667), and 42.5608 (8.7350), respectively. Notably, from 1998 to 2004, both the governance

index and the proportion of independent outside directors monotonically increased and the

differences in means and medians between the years 2000 and 2004 are significant at the one

percent level. During the same time frame, the percentage of managerial ownership

monotonically decreased and the difference between means and medians for the years 2000 and

2004 are significant at the one percent level. Board size remains relatively stable, though means

and medians for the years 2000 to 2004 are significantly different at the ten percent level.

Table 1 shows some significant changes in firm characteristics over time, as well.

Between 2000 and 2004, the size of the sample firms significantly increased, while leverage and

operating income significantly decreased. The average change in market-to-book significantly

decreased also, though the median change is insignificant. The opposite is true for investment,

where the mean change is insignificant and the median change is a significant decline.

Table 2 contains simple correlations among the variables, as well as their associated

levels of statistical significance. All four measures of governance – governance index, board

size, proportion of outside directors, and percentage of managerial ownership – are significantly

correlated with dividends. In addition, while the governance index, board size, and proportion of

outside directors are positively related to dividends, they are also significantly related to most of

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the other variables. The percentage of managerial ownership is negatively related to dividends,

but also significantly related to many of the other variables. These correlations reveal the need to

control for various governance mechanisms and firm-specific factors when studying dividend

policy.

Table 3 presents our empirical results. There are six models presented in the table: two

specifications for the overall sample period, two for the years prior to Sarbanes-Oxley (1998,

2000, and 2002), and two for the year following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (2004).

We first note that the coefficients on firm-specific variables are consistent with the

empirical findings of other studies. Firms with higher levels of repurchases tend to payout more

in dividends, suggesting that repurchases and dividends are not complimentary policy variables

(Jiraporn and Ning, 2006). Contrary results are apparent for the impact of leverage. Firms with

higher levels of debt typically payout fewer dividends, consistent with the finding that firms who

enter into contracts with creditors have controls limiting the firm’s ability to make cash

disbursements (Smith and Warner, 1979; and John and Kalay, 1982). Profitability and growth

opportunities have a significantly positive relation with dividend payouts.

The impact of governance measures on dividends is positive and significant. Consistent

with Jiraporn and Ning (2006), our results show that, for the overall sample, as shareholder rights

weaken, as measured by a higher governance index, companies tend to payout higher portions of

dividends. In essence, these results support the substitution hypothesis that firms are

compensating shareholders with higher levels of dividends for their inability to control the firm.

In addition, larger boards and greater representation by independent outside directors tend to

further increase cash dividends.

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Turning to the main focus of our study, we examine how the relation between dividend

policy and governance mechanisms is affected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that the

agency relation substantially changed following this exogenous regulatory change. Indeed, while

the governance index is positive and significant in relation to dividend payouts before 2002 when

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed into law, the governance index is statistically insignificant in

explaining dividends following 2002. This exogenously imposed accountability has seemingly

changed the agency cost of shareholders’ rights and investors are no longer demanding

compensation for their limited control. In addition to the governance index, the results show that

the proportion of outside directors also no longer appears to influence dividend policy, though

the size of the board still does. This is consistent with the view that Sarbanes-Oxley sufficiently

increased the level of oversight and monitoring of managers through audit committee

independence and accountability to the point that independent directors are no longer a

significant factor in determining a firm’s optimal dividend payout.

To check the robustness of our results, we run additional specifications. These results are

presented in Table 4.4 One possible explanation of our results is that they may be driven by the

percentage of managerial ownership. Management with larger portions of their wealth tied to the

firm may be more likely to redistribute cash back to investors. Therefore, we include the

percentage of managerial ownership and we find that our results are robust and the percentage of

managerial ownership has no statistical power in explaining dividends.

In Table 4, we also examine the effect of using market values, rather than book values.

We replace the log of book value of assets with the log of market value of assets and we replace

the book value debt ratio with the market value debt ratio. Again, we find that while governance

4 One may question whether a potential of endogeneity problem exists with our analysis. It is pointed out by Jiraporn

and Ning (2006) that governance tends to explain dividends but dividends do not explain governance.

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measures explain dividends prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, they do not after the Act is passed into law.

Finally, we replace the market-to-book ratio with the investment-to-sales ratio in Table 4. This

ratio provides another forward-looking measure of a firm’s growth opportunities. Though this

variable is less significant in explaining dividend policy, our results do not change. Our results

are consistent with the agency relation being changed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

**V. CONCLUSION**

It is widely recognized that agency costs borne by the separation of ownership and

control influence the managerial decision process. It is also well documented that the degree of

management entrenchment acts as a deterrent to sound and efficient business decisions. Poor

governance and disclosure has contributed, at least in part, to large financial failures. In contrast,

some studies show that the level of corporate governance promotes better management practices.

To date, however, there is little evidence on how regulatory policy impacts the potential agency

conflict within firms.

In light of the financial crises over the last decade, an emerging consensus between

policymakers and industry participants is that a new approach to governance and regulation

needs to be applied. In response to this need, the U.S. legislature has provided regulation

addressing auditor and audit committee independence, information disclosure, and managerial

accountability.

Using data from the IRRC, ExecuComp, and Compustat, we measure the impact of

regulatory changes on the agency relations of a firm’s dividend policy. The relation between

dividend payout policies and various measures of governance and firm-specific characteristics

does significantly change after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. We find that the agency

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relation between governance measures and a firm’s dividend policy are statistically significant

before the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, following Sarbanes-Oxley, the

relation between a firm’s governance and dividend policy changes. In particular, shareholders’

rights and the proportion of outside directors are no longer significant in explaining a firm’s

dividend policy. This implies that investors, who demanded compensation for limited control

over a firm, seem to rely more on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to serve as an effective internal control

to force managers to operate a firm in their best interests. One explanation may be that greater

transparency and accountability resulting from Sarbanes-Oxley has indeed had an early effect on

agency costs. As more time passes, future research can examine whether the effect is simply a

short-term anomaly or a long lasting effect.