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The African union mission in Somalia has been operating for over twelve years in one of the world’s most complex and challenging security environments.

AMISOM is one of many international actors supporting the federal government of Somalia to stabilize the country, including the Africa union, united nations, European union, and others. AMISOM is often not fully in control and most rather rely on and find the right division of labor between actors.

This has consequences for assessing AMISOM’s effectiveness because the mission has not played the leading role in responding to Somalia’s fundamental problem; a political crisis characterized by disagreements over governance structures, often interrelated armed conflicts fought over a variety of issues.

In January 2007, the African union launched its fourth peacekeeping operation, the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM’. It was deployed to Mogadishu essentially in support of the Ethiopian government’s preferred faction in Somalia’s ongoing civil war.

The new CONOPs entailed a force headquarters of approximately 85 officers in Mogadishu, four land sectors and a marine sector.

In October 2013 the African mission together with the federal government of Somalia forces made considerable progress in capturing the remaining parts of Mogadishu occupied by the militant groups. The Kenya defense force had captured Gedo, juba and Kismayo. AMISOM’s mandate expired on 31 October 2014 and the UN security council requested the AU to increase AMISOM’s troop strength.

It was made mentioned that AMISOM performed fairly well in terms of having real impact in managing the Somali conflict situation. The mission shared most of the challenges that are associated with African peace operations, these constraints made it difficult for AMISOM to fully realize its mandate during the period of the study.

The tenuous security situation in Somalia does not allow the mission to permanently halt the violence or end the conflict and some Somalia saw the African mission as a party to the conflict because of its supports for illegitimate and externally imposed transitional administration processes, and the federal government of Somalia.

During the mission’s first three years in Somalia AMSOM’s operational achievement were limited to patrolling Mogadishu and providing protection, AMISOM also aided the federal government forces in a military offensive to retake some parts of Mogadishu and to prepare the basis to implement the phases of CONOP. AMISOM liberated Mogadishu on 9 December 2012 and most part of central and southern Somalia. The military feat enabled the African mission to gain control, the mission had been able to collect weapons from some warring partied and provided escort to humanitarian relief operations as well as helping in the distribution of relief materials to the local population and providing healthcare for the wounded and sick. AMISOM’s intervention in the conflict has brought fragile peace to Somalia, while positive peace is yet to be achieved. The improved security situation has enabled the country engage in democratic governance, AMISOM has aided the federal government establish local administration structures in the liberated areas.

The AMISOM challenges; it was stated that AMISOM is operating in a conflict environment that was initially characterized by statelessness. The stateless nature of Somali state explained the state collapse with no identifiable government that represent the whole country and commands the allegiance of the entire Somalia people, but the federal government were accorded recognition by the international community to assume this position and it functioned as its inability to operate as a de jure authority in Somalia contributed to the suspicions toward external parties.

In these conflicts the African mission found itself with the dilemma of how to really function as a peace mission in the clear absence of a peace to keep the stateless order led to and increased weaponization in Somalia society, for personal interest and power.

Militarization of the society and clan politicization, and also the splintering of the armed insurgent groups negatively affected any hope of forging national reconciliation which is also needed in order to achieve broader political consensus for peaceful resolution of the war.

The failure of AMISOM and federal government forces to secure the whole of Somalia territory and completely stabilize the liberated areas increases fears and uncertainly in the country. The dangerous security situation in some part of Somalia, mostly the rural area is slowing down some actions and also reducing their potential to contribute to AMISOM.

In response to this strategic lift capability problem of the AU, NATO, assisted in the deployment of the troops, while countries like the united states, the United Kingdom and France helped the mission with some logistical requirement.

It was stated that AMISOM was not well resourced for its operational tasks, AMISOM was inadequately equipped to the extent that the troops lacked concrete shelters and bunkers for protection and consequently relied on sandbag even in high risk areas.

Among the AMISOM challenges is figuring out how to leave. In early 2009 after the Ethiopian withdrawal and the election of the new transitional president, sheikh sharif sheikh ahmed. Within Somalia opinion has been divided.

In April 2009, Ban KI Moon set out four options intended to help achieve the UN’s strategic objective in Somalia.

AMISOM has made large contribution to peace and security in Mogadishu during its 30 months, while its personnel did engage in some humanitarian activities and protection of key infrastructure. When a greater degree of stability did return to Mogadishu in early 2009 these was not because of AMISOM but rather a combination of the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the wider diplomatic activity that resulted in Sheikh Ahmed’s election and his subsequent ability to engage a wide range of parties and enact sharl’a law.