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**In not more than three pages discuss the stages of insurgency**.

**Pre insurgency Stage**
A conflict within the pre insurgency stage is difficult to detect because most activities are underground and also the insurgency has yet to make its presence felt through the use of violence. Moreover, actions conducted within the open can easily be called as a nonviolent political activity. During this stage, insurgent groups start to organize: leadership is starting to appear, and also the insurgents are demonstrating a grievance and getting known, starting to bring new members and train them, and buying arms and supplies.
**Pre-existing Conditions**
Insurgent groups can use history, society problem, political issues, or economic faults to bring out hate among a group of the people to support for his or her cause. These conditions, most of which are worse if they affect one low grade disproportionately, include:
A recent set back of disagreement has left lingering hate against the government or bad vibes among groups which establishes violence as an accepted means of resolving political disputes.
Recent or ongoing conflicts in neighbouring states that generate refugees who could become recruits, make weapons available, or establish ungoverned spaces within the neighbouring countries that will function sanctuaries for insurgents.
Societal factors sort of a robust warrior or conspiratorial culture or a youth bulge (a high proportion of 15- to 25-year-olds relative to the adult population), which could provide a pool of potential recruits.
**Grievance**
During the pre-insurgency stage, insurgents identify and publicize a grievance around which they'll look for supporters. Insurgents seek to make a compelling narrative the story a celebration to an armed struggle uses to justify its actions so on realize legitimacy and favour among relevant populations. Specific indicators that insurgents are seeking to mobilize the population around a grievance might include:
Forming of websites or the passing or pasting of flyers, pamphlets, or other materials that generate popular discussion of the hate.
Media articles or opinion pieces on the problem.
Embracing of the hate by legitimate political or social organizations.
Demonstrations within which the problem plays a prominent rioting role.

**Government Reaction**
The government’s reaction during this and thus the subsequent stage is perhaps the foremost important determinant of whether a movement will become an insurgency. During these early stages, a possible insurgent group is weak, disorganized, and in danger of nonviolent government countermeasures. For these reasons, however, the govt. is probably visiting err either by dismissing the matter and failing to handle the grievances behind the unrest—which gives the insurgents unchallenged space to organize—or by overreacting and cracking down hard—which can remove the population and bring support for the insurgent groups.
**Incipient Conflict Stage**
A struggle enters the incipient conflict stage when the revolters begin to use violence. Often these initial attacks provide analysts the primary conscious of the potential for an insurgency. The target government, however, frequently scatter insurgent actions because the work of criminals, or terrorists, which increases the prospect that the government will employ smart measures.
The incipient stage is that the foremost dangerous phase for insurgents; they need made their presence known through attacks, but they're still weak and organizing. An incipient insurgency must balance the requirement to conduct attacks to demonstrate its viability, publicize its cause, rally supporters, and provoke a government overreaction while limiting its exposure to security forces. Insurgents may emphasize highly asymmetric and terrorist tactics, like kidnappings, small bombings, assassinations, and night letters during this phase. Understanding the characteristics, capabilities, and actions of both the insurgents and thus the government can help analysts assess whether an incipient conflict is probably visiting babble or they are being serious about their actions.
**Open Insurgency Stage**
At this stage, little question exists that the government is facing an insurgency. Politically, the insurgents are clearly speaking out to state authority and attempting to take control over territory. Militarily, the insurgents are staging more frequent attacks, which have probably become more violent, and complicated and involve larger numbers of fighters. because the insurgency becomes more active, external support for the belligerents probably becomes more obvious, if it exists.
Resolution Stage
Some insurgencies progress steadily through the life cycle stages; many grow in fits and starts, occasionally getting worse to earlier stages; it all remain mired in one stage for several years. In theory, an insurgency will eventually reach a conclusion, either an insurgent victory, a negotiated settlement, or a government victory. A minimum of 130 insurgent conflicts have occurred since war II estimations vary widely and go as high as nearly 300 insurgent-government conflicts and a minimum of 24 were ongoing as currently 2011.
 **Stalemated or Stagnant Insurgencies**
Many insurgencies linger for years or decades as low-level security nuisances to the governments they oppose. Often during these stretches, the goals of the insurgency will shift or evolve. In some cases, the insurgents become more thorough, in others, more moderate. Sometimes, the insurgency becomes an end unto itself for the fighters providing the only way of aspiring to their lives, status which will otherwise be unattainable for them, and income from criminal activities related to the insurgency. In some cases, it's difficult to differentiate whether the group’s primary motivation remains political or has become criminal a change that reduces the prospect of resolving the conflict through negotiations or political reform.

**REFRENCES:**

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[**https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599**](https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599)

[**https://www.scribd.com/document/169492299/Guide-to-the-Analysis-of-Insurgency**](https://www.scribd.com/document/169492299/Guide-to-the-Analysis-of-Insurgency)