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200 LEVEL

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In not more than 3 pages, discuss the tactics employed in counter-insurgency operations?

Counter-insurgency is defined as the comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Counterinsurgency (COIN) includes military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions by a government designed to defeat an armed movement by a non-state opponent aimed at the overthrow or territorial change of an incumbent government (US Army Field Manual 3-24 2006, 1-1). Military and paramilitary means may be viewed as a direct approach that aims to physically eliminate or neutralize the rebels (Nagl 2002). We refer to this as the military approach to counterinsurgency. In contrast, political, economic, psychological, and civic measures may be grouped together as an indirect approach designed to improve the welfare of civilians beyond security concerns, thus winning their hearts and minds and turning civilians away from the insurgency (Nagl 2002). We label this as the aid approach.

**MILITARY APPROACH**

The military approach may be carried out using either selective or indiscriminate violence, which have opposite effects on the dynamics of insurgency. Selective state violence punishes based on individual behavior, targeting only rebels or individuals who aided rebellion. Intuitively, such violence has a suppressive effect on insurgency, as it makes participation in rebellion costlier relative to neutrality or loyalty to the state. The use of selective violence thus deters civilians from joining or aiding the rebellion (Kalyvas 2006). In contrast, indiscriminate state violence punishes civilians based on their affiliation with a group, e.g., their village or ethnic group, regardless of whether individuals took up arms or assisted rebels in any way. Indiscriminate violence makes loyalty to the state costly, sometimes even costlier than neutrality, which means it effectively encourages civilians to join the rebellion (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Even when civilians do not join the rebels they can assist them by providing or withholding information from the government about the rebels. In particular, when civilians are aggrieved at the government because of indiscriminate state violence, they are more likely to withhold private information about the rebels from the government, thus preventing the government from using selective violence. This leads to further growth of the insurgency (Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011, Condra and Shapiro 2012). Empirically, this logic has been supported by multiple studies, and practitioners of counter-insurgency have also recognized the importance of avoiding state indiscriminate violence (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2006; Petraeus 2006; Sepp 2005).

**AID APPROACH**

Aid strategy relies on operations to persuade civilians to support the central government by delivering political, economic, and development benefits that come in the form of direct aid, employment, medical care, infrastructure, and other non-violent projects (U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide 2009, 14-15). In this sense the word “aid” is used as a short cut to describe any services provided to civilians aimed at improving their welfare. Not every aid program is created equal. Some programs increase support and cooperation from civilians, which in turn allows the government to decrease insurgent attacks. Other programs seem to have no impact on insurgency dynamics. For instance, in the Iraq war, scholars compared the large-scale infrastructure building projects managed by USAID and small-scale programs managed by battalion commanders designed to provide local public goods. They concluded that small-budget programs designed to address specific local needs of communities were more effective at increasing civilians’ support and cooperation than large-budget programs that were attempting to affect change beyond one local district ([Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011](http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/4/11.html#berman2011) [Berman et al. 2013](http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/4/11.html#berman2013)).

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