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**Is there a Manifestation of Order or Disorder in the Present World?**

**INTRODUCTION**

Order is a rare island, it is an archipelago. Disorder is the common ocean from where island emerge. Order is central to the notion of an international society. Without order there can be no society. And without society there can be no civilized life. Or so at least resonates one of the most central themes of the English School, which has recently seen a strong renaissance in international relations scholars. Two assumptions are thus essential to this tradition of thought: that order does indeed exist in international politics, and that this order is desirable. Both assumptions are, at least to some extent, commonsensical. Of course, some type of order exists, even in an allegedly anarchical post-national realm. Otherwise there would be nothing but endless chaos and conflict. And, of course, order has its positive dimensions, for it provides the basis for stability and the rule of law.But common sense is not always as commonsensical as it seems, or at least not as unproblematic and value-free. This certainly is the case with English School assumptions about international society.

World order is an international-relations term describing the distribution of power among world powers. As a segment of international relations, world order has been explained in different ways. It has been defined as totality of norms, procedures and institutional entities shaping and patterning international society at any point in time. World order means a system of structures sustained by various rules and norms regulating international economic and political cooperation and transactions. Put simply, it has a goal, a structural arrangement and a belief system all of which are isomorphically linked with views on human nature, and refers to the world of our making. It is also seen as a concept that deals with the maintenance of peace in the world and to the establishment of a condition in which wars do not pose a threat to the survival of mankind.

There are different world orders based on different ideas and ideologies overlapping and sometimes existing simultaneously. In analyzing world order, the compositions of acting units are not states alone. Human beings and states are the basic units and indispensable part of world order, which constitute a complex network of human beings on the one hand and of sovereign states on the other.

**The present world order**

The theorists of the liberal international order understand it as an “open and rule-based international order” that is “enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism”. As noted by Ikenberry ‘after the Second World War the nations led by the United States and its partners built a multifaceted international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity’.

Looking at the world at the end of the Second World War, one could argue logically that history was moving in a progressive and liberal internationalist direction. Moreover, this order won the Cold War and that victory, in turn, promoted a global shift towards democratic politics and free-market economics. Liberal order got its prominence with the victory of Second World War and it has been successful in the establishment of a political order in the form of United Nations along with an economic order in the form of Brettonwoods institutions. To a certain extent, the system this order created ‘flourished’, sustaining seven decades of progress, great powers’ peace, and economic growth. The order is believed to have brought a good degree of stability since 1945. Countries in the developing world such as East Asian such like China is both steadily increasing its participation and influence in the the liberal order’s institutions including contributing to the United Nations peacekeeping function.

However, although the liberal international order still exists today, scholars have argued that the liberal international order is either sick or gasping for breath. To some scholars, is in cris**i**s or dilapidated. Several questions loom large over this discourse: how many people were actually part of this so-called international liberal order? How ‘international’ was it really; and how ordered?

For instance, the international order formed after World War II provides important benefits to the United States (US) as well as other countries. The UN, NATO, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU) and other postwar institutions all help to provide economic stability and international security, contributing to unprecedented levels of prosperity and the longest period in modern history without war between major powers. US leadership helped to create this system and US leadership has long been critical for its success. Although the US has paid a significant share of the costs of this order since its inception, it has greatly benefited from its rewards. Indeed, the US has gained disproportionate influence on setting the rules of international exchange and security cooperation in ways that reflect its interests around the globe. All this is at stake and is dangerously threatened by President Donald Trump.

In addition, the partners in the liberal order such as Britain have shown negative commitment to the order. Britain’s decision to leave the EU, and a myriad of other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the long postwar project of building a greater international community. Liberal democracy itself appears to be in retreat, as varieties of ‘new authoritarianism’ rise in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Across the liberal democratic world, populist nationalist and xenophobic strands of backlash politics have proliferated. After triumphantly declaring the end of history in 1989, scholars like Francis Fukuyama now fears that the world is moving from a ‘democratic recession’ toward a ‘**democratic depression**.’ In the January 2018 publication by Freedom House (a US state-funded non-profit organisation), it stated that even the so-called ‘democracy is in crisis.’

To others, this liberal international order has become a bit dilapidated. While the structure still stands, the paint is peeling and walls are cracking. Even at its best, the liberal international arrangements have never fully lived up to their promises, and benefits have not always been distributed equally or fairly. For instance, slowing growth, increasing inequality, poor responses to transnational problems such as terrorism and climate change, intra-regional/state conflicts, etc include the litany of current problems facing the liberal order.

In a comprehensive assessment, RAND analysts highlight a series of key developments since 2014 that suggest that the liberal international order could be in much more peril. These events include Russian aggression in Ukraine, the vote in the UK to leave the European Union, the election of Donald Trump as US President, and the ongoing influence of far-right political parties in Europe. Further, Donald Trump is unexceptional is his rejection of 'globalism' given that many of his predecessors did the same but with better window dressing, as it were. As Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim have argued, President George W Bush "broke" the international order by invading Iraq on fabricated grounds; he even imposed steel tariffs in 2002 in a foreshadowing of what Trump has recently undertaken under his own administration and Ronald Reagan as president pulled out of UNESCO 34 years ago. President Eisenhower went so far as to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the South China Sea in the early 1960s.

The notion of the 'liberal international order' can be read as a successful experiment of nationalism in disguise. It also portrays an order of internationalism that does not truly seek solidarity between countries, or a pursuit of equal allies. These are acts/actions of deglobalisation, and against the cooperation that liberal order stands for. With illiberalism on the rise, there are fears that this could be the decade when the international liberal order will finally die. But that may not be entirely true, according to other scholars. While the global liberal democratic order is most certainly down, it is far from out. It has stated that democratic governance is still spreading. As at 1989, there were 52 democracies. By 2009, at the start of the Obama administration, the number had risen to 87. Today there are over 103 democracies, accounting for over 60 percent of the world's population.

**CONCLUSION**

Although the post-war liberal international order continues to enjoy some elements of stability, it is increasingly threatened by major geopolitical and socioeconomic trends that are calling into question the order's fundamental assumptions. While liberal internationalism could be argued to have a future, it is certain that the order is weakening, but can still be restored and revived. Logically, it has been argued that despite the upheavals and destruction of World War II, economic depression, and the rise and fall of fascism and totalitarianism, the liberal international order still survived. It is likely to survive today’s crises as well. But, to do so this time, as it has done in the past, liberal internationalism will need to be rethought and reinvented.

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