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**COURSE CODE; POL102**

**COURSE TITLE; POLITICAL SCIENCE**.

ASSIGNMENT;

1. How can a Lebanese retain or lose his or her newly acquired Nigerian citizenship.
2. Social contract theory explains the evolution of states, what other theories explain the same and their strengths.

 ANSWERS

 **Lebanese nationality law** governs the acquisition, transmission and loss of Lebanese citizenship. Lebanese citizenship is the status of being a citizen of [Lebanon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon) and it can be obtained by [birth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jus_sanguinis) or [naturalisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalisation).  A Lebanese man who holds Lebanese citizenship can automatically confer citizenship to his children and foreign wife (only if entered in the Civil Acts Register in the Republic of Lebanese.

###  ACQUISITION OF LEBANESE CITIZENSHIP.

###  By marriage

A foreign woman who marries a Lebanese man may apply for Lebanese citizenship after having been married for at least one year and their marriage has been entered in the Civil Acts Register in the Republic of Lebanon.

A foreign wife of a Lebanese citizen can apply for naturalization while resident overseas after one year of marriage to a husband who is a Lebanese citizen, and close ties to Lebanon.

The non-Lebanese husband cannot acquire Lebanese citizenship by marriage to a Lebanese woman. It has been argued that to enable the Lebanese wife to pass Lebanese citizenship to a non-Lebanese husband would lead to a flood of Palestinians acquiring citizenship.

### Birth in Lebanon

Birth in Lebanon does not in itself confer Lebanese citizenship. Therefore, *jus Solis* does not apply.

### *Jus sanguinis*

 A child born to a Lebanese father or whose paternity has been declared acquires Lebanese citizenship by descent, irrespective of the nationality of the mother, and irrespective of her marital status.

A child whose Lebanese citizenship depends on paternal links loses citizenship when those are cut

 LOSS OF LEBANESE CITIZENSHIP

###  Loss due to adoption

A Lebanese child adopted by foreign parents is considered to have lost Lebanese citizenship.

#### **Annulled adoptions**

Where a former Lebanese citizen lost citizenship due to adoption by foreign parents and that adoption is later annulled, the Lebanese citizenship is considered to never have been lost.

### Loss due to birth abroad

A Lebanese citizen born abroad to a Lebanese father and holding at least one other nationality loses the Lebanese citizenship at age 25

* She/he has never been announced to the Lebanese authorities,
* She/he has never written to the Lebanese authorities expressing her/his desire to retain Lebanese citizenship,
* She/he (or her/his guardians) have never sought to procure Lebanese identity documents for her/him, i.e. a passport or an identity card,
* Equally, the child of a person who thus loses Lebanese nationality equally loses Lebanese nationality,
* Exceptionally, a person who has been prevented, against their will, from taking the necessary actions to retain Lebanese citizenship may undertake the required actions within a delay of one year following the cessation of such delays.

### IF YOU ARE THE CHILD OF A RESPONSIBLE PARENT WHO CEASES TO BE A CITIZEN

If you are the child of a responsible parent who ceases to be citizen, the Minister can revoke your citizenship in some situations.

These are the cases in which a dual citizen can lose their citizenship.

1. Social contract theory explains the evolution of state.

 **Social contract**, in political philosophy, an actual or [hypothetical](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypothetical) compact, or agreement, between the ruled and their rulers, defining the rights and duties of each. In primeval times, according to the theory, individuals were born into an anarchic state of nature, which was happy or unhappy according to the particular verse.

**TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT**

Hobbes insofar as he described the state of nature as one in which the rights of life and property were generally recognized under natural law, the inconveniences of the situation arising from insecurity in the enforcement of those rights. He therefore argued that the obligation to obey civil government under the social contract was conditional upon the protection not only of the person but also of private property. [Sovereigns](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Sovereigns) who violated these terms could be justifiably overthrown.

Du Contrat social

The social contract theory held that in the state of nature humans were unwarlike and somewhat undeveloped in their reasoning powers and sense of [morality](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morality) and responsibility. When, however, people agreed for mutual protection to surrender individual freedom of action and establish laws and government, they then acquired a sense of [moral](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral) and civic obligation. In order to retain its essentially moral character, government must thus rest on the consent of the governed, the volonté générale .

The more perceptive social-contract theorists, including Hobbes, invariably recognized that their concepts of the social contract and the state of nature were unhistorical and that they could be justified only as [hypotheses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypotheses) useful for the clarification of timeless political problems.

### JOHN RAWLS’ A THEORY OF JUSTICE

In 1972, the publication of [John Rawls](https://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/)‘ extremely influential A Theory of Justice brought moral and political philosophy back from what had been a long hiatus of philosophical consideration. Rawls’ theory relies on a Kantian understanding of persons and their capacities. For Rawls, as for Kant, persons have the capacity to reason from a universal point of view, which in turn means that they have the particular moral capacity of judging principles from an impartial standpoint. In a theory of justice Rawls argues that the moral and political point of view is discovered via impartiality. (It is important to note that this view, delineated in A Theory of Justice, has undergone substantial revisions by Rawls, and that he described his later view as “political liberalism”.) He invokes this point of view (the general view that Thomas Nagel describes as “the view from nowhere”) by imagining persons in a hypothetical situation, the Original Position, which is characterized by the epistemological limitation of the Veil of Ignorance. Rawls’ original position is his highly abstracted version of the State of Nature. It is the position from which we can discover the nature of justice and what it requires of us as individual persons and of the social institutions through which we will live together cooperatively. In the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, one is denied any particular knowledge of one’s circumstances, such as one’s gender, race, particular talents or disabilities, one’s age, social status, one’s particular conception of what makes for a good life, or the particular state of the society in which one lives. Persons are also assumed to be rational and disinterested in one another’s well-being. These are the conditions under which, Rawls argues, one can choose principles for a just society which are themselves chosen from initial conditions that are inherently fair. Because no one has any of the particular knowledge he or she could use to develop principles that favour his or her own particular circumstances, in other words the knowledge that makes for and sustains prejudices, the principles chosen from such a perspective are necessarily fair. For example, if one does not know whether one is female or male in the society for which one must choose basic principles of justice, it makes no sense, from the point of view of self-interested rationality, to endorse a principle that favours one sex at the expense of another, since, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, one might find oneself on the losing end of such a principle. Hence Rawls describes his theory as “justice as fairness.” Because the conditions under which the principles of justice are discovered are basically fair, justice proceeds out of fairness.

### Feminist Arguments

For the most part, feminism resists any simple or universal definition. In general though, feminists take women’s experiences seriously, as well as the impact that theories and practices have for women’s lives. Given the pervasive influence of contract theory on social, political, and moral philosophy, then, it is not surprising that feminists should have a great deal to say about whether contract theory is adequate or appropriate from the point of view of taking women seriously. To survey all of the feminist responses to social contract theory would carry us well beyond the boundaries of the present article. I will concentrate therefore on just three of those arguments: Carole Pateman’s argument about the relation between the contract and women’s subordination to men, feminist arguments concerning the nature of the liberal individual, and the care argument.

#### The Nature of the Liberal Individual

Following Pateman’s argument, a number of feminists have also called into question the very nature of the person at the heart of contract theory. The Liberal Individual, the contractor, is represented by the Hobbesian man, Locke’s proprietor, Rousseau’s “Noble Savage,” Rawls’s person in the original position, and Gauthier’s Robinson Crusoe. The liberal individual is purported to be universal: raceless, sexless, classless, disembodied, and is taken to represent an abstract, generalized model of humanity writ large. Many philosophers have argued, however, that when we look more closely at the characteristics of the liberal individual, what we find is not a representation of universal humanity, but a historically located, specific type of person. C.B. Macpherson, for example, has argued that Hobbesian man is, in particular, a bourgeois man, with the characteristics we would expect of a person during the nascent capitalism that characterized early modern Europe. Feminists have also argued that the liberal individual is a particular, historical, and embodied person.

##  Race-Conscious Argument

*The Racial Contract*, is a critique not only of the history of Western political thought, institutions, and practices, but, more specifically, of the history of social contract theory. It is inspired by Carole Pateman’s *The Sexual Contract*, and seeks to show that non-whites have a similar relationship to the social contract as do women. As such, it also calls into question the supposed universality of the liberal individual who is the agent of contract theory.

Mills’ central argument is that there exists a ‘racial contract’ that is even more fundamental to Western society than the social contract. This racial contract determines in the first place who counts as full moral and political persons, and therefore sets the parameters of who can ‘contract in’ to the freedom and equality that the social contract promises. Some persons, in particular white men, are full persons according to the racial contract. As such they are accorded the right to enter into the social contract, and into particular legal contracts. They are seen as fully human and therefore as deserving of equality and freedom. Their status as full persons accords them greater social power. In particular, it accords them the power to make contracts, to be the subjects of the contract, whereas other persons are denied such privilege and are relegated to the status of objects of contracts.