NAME: MARTIN SOMTOCHUKWU CHRISTABEL

DEPARTMENT: LAW

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**QUESTIONS**

1. How can a Lebanese retain or lose his or her newly acquired Nigerian citizenship.
2. Social contract theory explains the evolution of states, what other theories explain the same and their strengths.
3. Lebanese nationality law governs the acquisition, transmission and loss of Lebanese citizenship. Lebanese citizenship is the status of being a citizen of Lebanon and it can be obtained by birth or naturalization. Lebanese nationality is transmitted by paternity. Therefore, a Lebanese man who holds Lebanese citizenship can automatically confer citizenship to his children and foreign wife. Under the current law, descendants of Lebanese emigrants can only receive citizenship from their father and women cannot pass on citizenship to their children or foreign spouses. On 12 November 2015, the parliament of Lebanon approved a draft law that would allow “foreigners of Lebanese origin to get citizenship”, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Gebran Bassil announced on 5 May 2016 the beginning of the implementation of citizenship law for Lebanese diaspora. Whether the constitution if Lebanon permits the renunciation of Lebanese citizenship, circumstances under which a Lebanese can renounce his or her citizenship, whether Lebanon would consider as legal renunciation of Lebanese citizenship, the statement made by a person of Lebanese origin to the Columbian authorities in 1974 that he relinquished his or her Lebanese citizenship in order to obtain Columbian citizenship. According to Citizenship Laws of the World, a person who wishes to renounce his or her Lebanese citizenship is required to send a letter of renunciation to the nearest Lebanese embassy or consulate. The embassy or consulate will send the letter of renunciation to Lebanon for approval and will notify the applicant of the decision. This information was corroborated by a representative of the Embassy of Lebanon, in Ottawa, in 18 September 2003 telephone interview. The current law discriminates against women married to foreigners, their children and spouses, by denying citizenship to the children and spouses. The law affects almost every aspect of children’s and spouses lives including legal residency and access to work, education, social services, and health care. It leaves some children at risk of statelessness. Lebanon should end all forms of discrimination against Lebanese women, their children, and spouses in the nationality law. “Parliament should urgently amend a French mandate-era nationality law that has been causing untold hardship for more than 90 years with no justification”, said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights watch. “Recent steps to provide access to basic rights like education and work to the children and spouses of Lebanese women are a step in the right direction, but confusing and piecemeal measures are no substitute for equal citizenship. Lebanon’s 1925 nationality law allows the foreign spouses of Lebanese men, but not women, to obtain citizenship after one year. The law also grants Lebanese citizenship only to children born to a Lebanese father, those born in Lebanon who would not otherwise acquire another nationality through birth or affiliation, or those born in Lebanon to unknown nationalities. Children of Lebanese mothers with unknown paternity therefore have greater claims to citizenship than those with Lebanese mothers and a known foreign father. Human Rights watch spoke with fifteen Lebanese women married to foreigners and noncitizen children of Lebanese mothers, who uniformly described barriers to basic by the Lebanese government. The noncitizen children and spouses must reapply for legal residency in Lebanon everyone to three years. They need a permit to work in Lebanon, are barred from or face barriers to many professions, and report discrimination in the job market. They are denied access to national health insurance and government subsidized medical care, even though they must pay into the system if they work. They also face bureaucratic hurdles in enrolling public schools and universities. While individual ministries have made incremental decisions to ease access to some basic rights, like education and work, these are piecemeal and subject to change. A lack of information about the current procedures and rules compounds barriers to accessing basic rights. Lebanon should amend the nationality law to grant citizenship to the children and spouses of Lebanese women and end discrimination under its nationality laws, human rights watch said. In the interim, the Ministries of Labor, Health, and Education should adopt and publicize decisions treating spouses and children of Lebanese women on par with Lebanese citizens, to ensure they are not denied basic rights and services. Human Rights watch wrote to the Ministries of Labor Health, Education, Interior and social affairs on August 24, 2018 about the issue. On September 24, the Ministry of Labor responded by confirming that the children and spouses of Lebanese women need a valid work permit to work legally in Lebanon, unlike the spouses and children of Lebanese men, and outlining the process by which they can do so. The Ministries of Health, Education, Interior, and social affairs did not respond to human rights watch’s correspondence. Lebanese active have campaigned for two decades to amend the nationality law, including through organizing by the local NGOs Collective for Research and Training on Development Action (CRTDA) and Masir. For years, politicians have contended that allowing women who married Palestinians living in Lebanon to confer their citizenship to spouses and children would disrupt Lebanon’s sectarian balance. However, a 2016 census of Palestinians in Lebanon found just 3,707 cases of a Palestinian head of household married to a spouse of a different nationality. These stated justifications are also clearly discriminatory, Human Rights watch said, as they are not applied to Lebanese men who marry foreigners as many as four wives for Muslim men.
4. Social contract, in political philosophy, an actual or hypothetical compact, or agreement, between the ruled and their rulers, defining the rights and duties of each. In primeval times, according to the theory, individuals were born into an anarchic state of nature, which was happy or unhappy according to the particular version. They then, by exercising natural reason, formed a society (and a government) by means of a contract among themselves. Although similar ideas can be traced to the Greek Sophists, social-contract theories had their greatest currency in the 17th and 18th centuries and are associated with such philosophers as the Englishmen Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau. What distinguished these theories of political obligation from other doctrines of the period was their attempt to justify and delimit political authority on grounds of individual self-interest and rational consent. By comparing the advantages of organized government with the disadvantages of the state of nature, they showed why and under what conditions government is useful and ought therefore to be accepted by all reasonable people as a voluntary obligation. These conclusions were then reduced to the form of a social contract, from which it was supposed that all the essential rights and duties of citizens could be logically deduced. Theories of the social contract differed according to their purpose: some were designed to justify the power of the sovereign, while others were intended to safeguard the individual from oppression by a sovereign who was all too powerful. According to Hobbes, the state of nature was one in which there were no enforceable criteria of right and wrong. People took for themselves all they could, and human life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. The state of nature was therefore a state of war, which could be ended only if individuals agreed to give liberty into the hands of a sovereign, who was thenceforward absolute, on the sole condition that their lives were safeguarded by sovereign power. Locke differed from Hobbes insofar as he described the state of nature as one in which the right of life and property were generally recognized under natural law, the inconveniences of the situation arising from insecurity in the enforcement of those rights. He therefore argued that the obligation to obey civil government under the social contract was conditional upon the protection not only of the person but also of private property. Sovereigns who violated these terms could be justifiably overthrown. When, however, people agreed for mutual protection to surrender individual freedom of action and establish laws and government, they then acquired a sense of moral and civic obligation. In order to retain its essentially moral character, government must thus rest on the consent of the governed. The more perceptive social-contract theorists, including Hobbes, invariably recognized that their concepts of the social contract and the state of nature were unhistorical and that they could be justified only as hypotheses useful for the clarification of timeless political problems. Social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view that persons’ moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. Socrates uses something quite like a social contract argument to explain to Crito why he must remain in prison and accept the death penalty. However, social contract theory is rightly associated with modern moral and is given its first full exposition and defense by Thomas Hobbes. After Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the best known proponents of this enormously influential theory, which has been one of the most dominant theories within moral and political theory throughout the history of the modern West. In the twentieth century, moral and political theory regained philosophical momentum as a result of John Rawls’ Kantian version of social contract theory, and was followed by new analyses of the subject by David Gauthier and others. More recently, philosophers from different perspectives have offered new criticisms of social contract theory. In particular, feminists and race-conscious philosophers have argued that social contract theory is at least an incomplete picture of our moral and political lives, and may in fact camouflage some of the ways in which the contract is itself parasitical upon the subjugations of classes of persons. In moral and philosophy, the social contract is a theory or model that originated during the age of enlightenment and usually concerns the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual. Social contract arguments typically posit that individuals have consented, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority in exchange for protection of their remaining rights or maintenance of the social order. The relation between natural and legal rights is often a topic of social contract theory.