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Building on Lessons Learned from Security Operations

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

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In memory of

My mother, Mrs Ramotu Aduke Gbadamoshi

and

Mr Oyedokun Bolanle Ismail, Mrs Bolanle 'Shola Sherifat (née Sulaiman) and Miss Kate Ebelechukwu Ijeh

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List of Abbreviations

AAPC	All-African People's Conference
AATUF	All-African Trade Union Federation
ACDS	African Chiefs of Defence Staff
ADF	African Defence Force
ADO	African Defence Organisation
AEC	African Economic Community
AFISMA	The African-Led International Support Mission in Mali
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AHC	African High Command
AHG	Assembly of Heads of State and Government
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMDS	African Ministers of Defence and Security
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APC	All People's Congress
APCs	Armoured Personnel Carriers
APF	EU's African Peace Facility
APPMs	Burundi's Armed Political Parties and Movements
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CIAS	Conference of Independent African States
CIDO	Civil Society and Diaspora Unit of the AU Commission
CIMICC	Civil Military Coordination Center
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
C2	Command and Control Structure
C^3IS	Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems

CMD	Conflict Management Division
CNDD	Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy)
CoC	Codes of Conduct
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
CPX	AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DCs	Demobilisation Centres
DDF	Darfur Development Front
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DFS	UN Department of Field Support
DLF	Darfur Liberation Front
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
DSD	Defence and Security Division
EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECCASBRIG	ECCAS Brigade
ECOBRIG	ECOWAS Brigade
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FAB	Forces Armées Burundaises (Burundian Armed Forces)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOMAC	Multinational Force of Central Africa
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for Liberation of Mozambique)
FRODEBU	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi)
FTX	Field Training Exercises
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoNU	Government of National Unity

GoS	Government of Sudan
GPA	General Peace Agreement
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSP	Heavy Support Package
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
IPEP	The OAU's International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events
ISF	International Stabilisation Force
JCC	Joint Ceasefire Commission
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JSCM	Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism
LDCs	Less-Developed Countries
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement
LPA	Lomé Peace Agreement
LSP	Light Support Package
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MAPEX	Mapping Exercises
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MILCONs	Military Contingents
MILOBs	Military Observers
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MIOC	AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros
MISCA	The AU-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NARC	North African Regional Capability

NASBRIG	NARC Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCSD	National Council for the Salvation of Darfur
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMC	Observation and Monitoring Centre
OMUs	Observation and Monitoring Units
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P-5	Five Permanent Members of UN Security Council
PALIPEHUTU	Parti pour la liberation du people Hutu (Party for the Liberation of Hutu People)
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PCRD	AU's Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PDAAs	Pre-Disarmament Assembly Areas
PDC	Parti Democratic Chretien (Christian Democratic Party)
PDF	The African Protection and Deterrent Force
PF	Policy Framework
PLANELM	Planning Element
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department
PSO(s)	Peace Support Operation(s)
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PSOF	Peace Support Operation Facility
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capacity
RECs	Regional Economic Community(ies)
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance
RM(s)	Regional Mechanism(s)
RoE	Rules of Engagement
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RPI	Regional Peace Initiative
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	SADC Brigade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Detachment
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement

SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSU	Sudanese Socialist Union
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Somalia's Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions
TGoB	Transitional Government of Burundi
UAR	United Arab Republic
UAS	Union of African States
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slovenia

UNTAET	United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UPR	Uniting for Peace Resolution
UPRONA	Union pour le Progres National (Union for National Progress)
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

Background, questions and major arguments

The end of the Cold War brought about a new geopolitical setting that allowed the ignition of many armed conflicts in different parts of the world, but especially in Africa. Africa, which during the Cold War was a valued arena for Washington and Moscow in the pursuit of their hegemonic interests, lost its relevance in the superpowers' political and military calculus in the immediate post-Cold War international system following the collapse of the Soviet behemoth. Immediately after the Cold War, the African security environment was very complicated as well as disturbing because threats to peace and security remained a major problem with deadly consequences as witnessed in Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan (Darfur), Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to mention a few. Armed conflict constituted (and still constitutes) one of the major obstacles to Africa's socioeconomic development that makes the continent's future look relatively bleak. At the dawn of the 21st century, the international community saw Africa as a continent in despair due to the persistence of conflict in some African states, the regression of socioeconomic indicators, and poor governance and democratic deficits, which made the continent to miss the path towards sustainable development.

The negative socioeconomic and humanitarian impact of armed conflict in Africa was such that, in the first two decades of African independence (1960–1980), the continent witnessed eight civil wars, with an additional ten in the decade that followed. Also in 30 years of independence (1960–1990), more than 6.5 million deaths were recorded in African conflicts (Stedman 1996; see also Francis 2006a). During the first four decades of independence (1960–2000), there were about 80 forceful changes of government in sub- Saharan Africa (SSA), while a large number of SSA countries witnessed various forms of conflicts—ranging from small-scale low-intensity conflicts to large-scale civil wars—during this period (Adedeji 1999: 3).

At the dawn of the new millennium, one-and-a-half-dozen African states faced armed rebellion, while 19 countries experienced variously stable political conditions. The prevalence of conflicts in Africa at the end of the Cold War engendered the growth in numbers of child soldiers, refugees, and internally displaced person (IDP). Estimates have shown that out of 300,000 child soldiers in the world at the beginning of the new millennium, Africa's share was 120,000 (40 per cent of the global total) that spread across 13 SSA countries (Sesay and Ismail 2003: 9). Also, since the beginning of the new millennium, the direct and indirect cost of armed conflicts in Africa is estimated at approximately $900 billion (Williams 2013a).

The majority of African conflicts of the 1990s were complex and intrastate in character where groups, often non-state actors, found solace in ethnicity and religion, as rallying points to challenge the authority of the state in achieving, most often, parochial rather than national goals. The unregulated character of these conflicts made them more complicated to solve since the statutory security forces often confronted non-state actors with little or no central authority and unified command structure. Many of these conflicts involved the targeting of peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers (Vogt 2005: 24). The unregulated character of internal armed conflicts of the 1990s increased the number of civilian deaths due to a reliance on dirty war tactics and absolute disregard for international humanitarian law by the combatants. Dirty wars seek victory through horror rather than through battlefield strategies (Nordstrom 1992: 261). Above all, the post-Cold War African civil conflicts are characterised by a combination of profit-seeking/making and criminal activities, sheer barbarity, foreign military interventions, ethnic hatred, and, in most cases, the absence of clearly defined objectives by the warlords. Due to the complexities of these conflicts, some African states, especially in the 1990s, virtually lost their status as the sole custodian of the legitimate use of physical force in the territories they claim to control.

Furthermore, two new trends now emerge in the analysis of the post-Cold War African security environment. The first trend is that, rather than being the most endemically violent region in the world (Kaplan 2000), Africa is presently witnessing a significant reduction in the number of armed conflicts and large-scale political violence. For, the increase in African civil wars of the 1990s was not sustained and it, indeed, declined in the early 2000s. By the late 2000s, civil wars on the African continent were about 50 per cent compared to the mid-1990s (Strauss 2012: 179). This means that the increase in the number of conflicts on the continent in the first 30 years of African independence spiked in the early 1990s and since then reduced significantly. Strauss (2012: 182) noted that "starting in the early 2000s there were on average eight to ten wars in any given year, which is about half the number of wars in sub-Saharan Africa in the early-to-mid 1990s." During this period, some deadly and long wars as well as fratricidal regional

wars, especially in the Horn of Africa also spiked (Strauss 2012; Vines 2013). The second trend is a change in the character of internal armed conflicts in Africa. While it is undeniable that civil wars have been an important feature of the continent's post-colonial history, they are still the major form of political violence in Africa. Today's civil wars are, more often than not, small-scale and fought on the peripheries of the state; insurgents tend to be weak in terms of military power/capability and are always factionalised. Contra the insurgencies of the Cold War years that developed into structured conflicts, today's insurgencies are small in size, lacking cohesion, internally divided, poorly structured, and unable to hold significant territory or capture state capitals. Rebel groups have powerful and strong transnational networks and move across national borders. Thus, today's civil wars involve extremism, transnational crime, and asymmetrical tactics. Some of these rebel groups are *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, M23 rebels in eastern DRC, *al Qaeedah* in the Islamic Maghreb, and *Ansar al Dine* in Mali's North. Besides, there is also a decline in the prevalence of mass killings of civilian population and genocide in today's African civil wars. African wars on average are not more brutal towards civilian compared to other regions of the world (Strauss 2012).

The above-discussed African conflicts' realities and the complexity of some of today's African internal armed conflicts pose challenges to the United Nations (UN) – the chief custodian of international peace and security – in resolving these conflicts on an enduring basis. The African security situation raises critical questions about the ability of the UN to perform the arduous task of maintaining international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. The UN's efforts to resolve these conflicts through its peacekeeping operations have, in some cases, not been very effective in finding solutions to these conflicts in Africa, especially in the 1990s. Historically, the UN has deployed many peace missions to complex internal armed conflicts in Africa, often with regional dynamics and different levels of extra-African involvements. These complex African conflicts, as Gelot, Gelot and de Coning (2012: 19) stated, proved difficult to resolve and, in most cases, the countries are in transition, fragile, and weak, while the possibility of relapsing into deadly conflict looms large in the horizon. Such countries as the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone have relapsed into violent conflicts after or during the deployment of UN peace operations (ibid.). The UN's and US's bitter peacekeeping and peace enforcement experiences in Somalia's civil war in the 1990s and their inglorious exit from that country led to increased wariness in many key Western countries about sending their soldiers to participate in UN peace operations in African conflicts or directly intervening in such conflicts. Rather, they prefer to invest in building African national and institutional capacities to manage their own conflicts. Furthermore, the five permanent members of the UN Security

Council (P-5) – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia – were not willing in intervention in protracted African civil conflicts; thereby limited the UN's involvement in such African conflicts as in Southern Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Liberia. This is, in part, because, as Gelot, Gelot and de Coning recount:

> These civil wars raised the prospect of peace enforcement, and the prevalent view in the UN circles at the time was that "pre-conditions for success" of peace operations included the consent of the warring parties (at a minimum, host state consent), commitment to a comprehensive peace agreement (peace to keep), a clear mandate with a specified end-date and international support. UNSC members unwilling to intervene justified their position on the grounds that all of these preconditions were not in place. (2012: 19)

The inability of the UN peacekeeping operations to successfully resolve some of these internal armed conflicts on a permanent basis instigated the need for Africa to take primary ownership of and provide solutions to its conflicts and guarantee the continent's security.

Africa's first attempt at regionalisation of conflict management started with what is known as Pan-Africanism (see Chapter 2). The divisive politics among African leaders during the period of decolonisation and immediately after political independence in the 1960s, in terms of lack of consensus between the radical leaders and their moderate counterparts in relation to the former's proposal for the establishment of a Joint African High Command (JAHC) to confront external aggression to the continent, denied Africa the opportunity to have a form of pan-African security architecture for conflict management. And due to Africa's limited strategic relevance to the West, especially in the immediate post-Cold War period, the UN's miserable failures in some African conflicts, and the need for Africa to guarantee African security through African capabilities, the baton was passed to Africa's institutions (both regional and sub-regional) to establish security mechanisms for conflict resolution. While these efforts are laudable, Francis (2006b) flawed regionalisation of conflict management in Africa on two major grounds. First, regional conflict resolution efforts, especially in Africa, are reactive rather than being proactive to conflicts; peace operations are deployed after conflicts have started. The Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) peace and intervention operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s are examples of reactive approach to security challenges in West Africa. Second, the regional conflict management approach's reactive nature has led to improvisation and *ad hoc* arrangements, leading to inadequately planned and resource-constraint peace missions. At the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union or AU) Summit in Cairo in 1993, African leaders agreed to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management and Resolution (the OAU mechanism) under the coordination of the Central Organ. The OAU mechanism was to take all appropriate measures to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The mechanism was tested in some African conflicts, notably in Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo. Under this security regime, the OAU deployed peace observer missions to Burundi and Rwanda without much success. In the case of Burundi, despite the financial constraint that the mission faced, the observers remained in the country in spite of the imposition of sanctions and the disengagement of the international community (Francis 2006b). Overall, the OAU security architecture for conflict management failed to have any significant impact in African conflicts. This is due to a number of factors that made the OAU mechanism ineffective and not operational, amongst which were financial and human resource constraints and the fact is that there was an absence of an effective collaboration between the OAU mechanism and sub-regional peace and security structures.

The OAU's poor record in conflict management and the compelling need for Africa to police its conflicts and manage security led to the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act (the Act) by African leaders in 2000, which gave birth to the AU in 2002 (Aftrican Union 2000). The adoption of the Act provides a better context for realising the objective of having peace and stability in Africa through addressing the complex linkages among peace, stability, security, conflict and development. African leaders realised that conflicts associated with armed violence are obstacles to the continent's socioeconomic development. This realisation informed the adoption of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (the PSC Protocol),[1] which led to the establishment of a formal institutional framework for conflict management —The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)[2] (African Union 2002). The AU Constitutive Act is the first international treaty to recognise the right of an organisation to intervene militarily in its member states' internal affairs. The APSA is a new attempt, in its comprehensiveness and as an all-encompassing approach to security, which sets out to facilitate timely and efficient responses to violent conflict situations. While the APSA is encouraging – and a welcome development, as it hopes to enable a more politically engaged AU – there are still many hurdles in building an effective pan-African security mechanism that can respond as rapidly and effectively as possible to many security problems confronting Africa (Aning and Atuobi 2009: 92).

Since the adoption of the AU Act and the PSC Protocol, the intervention commitment of the AU has been reflected in its proactive stance on African peace and security challenges. In 2003, the AU deployed a peace operation in Burundi (the African Mission in Burundi—AMIB) in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and, in fact, the APSA institutional structures were not properly established at the time. Despite the challenges that confronted the mission, AMIB was able to stabilise Burundi's security

situation and made the deployment of UN peace mission possible. Shortly afterwards, AMIB was followed by the AU-mandated peace operations in Sudan (the African Union Mission in Sudan – AMIS), in the Comoros (the African Union Military Observer Mission in the Comoros – MIOC),[3] in Somalia (the African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM), as well as the hybrid mission in Darfur in collaboration with the UN (the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur – UNAMID). Recently, the AU authorised new peace missions in Mali (the African-led International Support Mission in Mali – AFISMA) and in the CAR (the African Union-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic – MISCA). Since its foray into peace operations in 2003, the AU has deployed more than 40,000 peacekeepers (Williams 2013a). Some of these AU-mandated peace operations have been taken over by the UN through the process of re-hatting African peacekeepers into the multidimensional UN peace operations. This new development calls into question the nature of the relationship between the UN and the AU in peace and security matters.

The relationship between the UN and Africa's regional and sub-regional organisations – the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – remains central to the issues of security management and peacekeeping in Africa, and the nature and development of this relationship need some analysis. Following the end of the Cold War, and with a newfound spirit of cooperation among the UN Security Council members, particularly among the P-5, Boulden (2013) stated that two distinct and linked trends are visible in the UN Security Council politics. The first is a drive – from both inside and outside the UN Security Council – towards greater cooperation with regional organisations and actors in the area of international peace and security. Second, there are more UN Security Council's debates and discussions on conflicts in Africa. This development is understandable, given that the African continent is where the UN has had some devastating security management (and peacekeeping, in particular) experiences and some successes as well (ibid.). Thus, enhancing UN and AU interaction and cooperation is important for the two organisations. To start with, in January 1992, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented his report, "An Agenda for Peace," to the UN Security Council. Boutros-Ghali's Agenda is part of the UN effort to strengthen the UN's capacity to deal with the unresolved problems of the Cold War years as well as the new set of problems in the post-Cold War period. In this important document, Boutros-Ghali outlined a number of recommendations to reinforce the capacity of the UN to deal with the increasing problems of peace and security in the post-Cold War period. Part of Boutros-Ghali's recommendations was the urgent need for the UN to engage in what he called "preventive deployment:" "a rapid-reaction UN force to enable action without the need to seek new troops for each mission, heavily armed peace enforcers for dangerous missions, and the strengthening of regional peacekeeping bodies to lighten the burden on the United

Nations" (Adebajo 2011: 10– 11, see also Boutros-Ghali 2003). In the Agenda, the UN Secretary General emphasised the importance of the UN/regional institutions partnership in matters relating to conflict prevention and resolution as stipulated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. While urging the UN to make better use of regional organisations, Boutros-Ghali failed to call for a formal relationship with these institutions or to outline and present a plan for deepening cooperation. Instead, as Bellamy (2011: 146) stated, the UN and regional institutions were to engage in informal consultations and joint undertakings, with the expectation that these cooperation would imbue regional institutions efforts with greater degree of legitimacy and simultaneously give the impression of greater participation in international decision-making. The high hope that a united post-Cold War Security Council would guarantee international peace and security and help the UN peacekeepers to fill Africa's post-Cold War security vacuum was dashed with the peacekeepers' dismal performances in Somalia, Angola and Rwanda among others (Adebajo 2011). Based on these disappointing performances, Boutros-Ghali released the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" in January 1995. Boutros-Ghali's Supplement described the forms that the increase in practical cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements was taking as, namely, consultations, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. Also, Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi Annan, in his 1998 report on African conflicts, stated that the legitimacy of the UN depends upon the leaders of the African continent and member states of the UN to find ways to act on their commitment to human security, including in Africa. These efforts by the UN Secretaries General underline the importance of strengthening UN-AU interaction and cooperation, particularly on peace and security matters.

In today's international relations – where interdependency rather than isolationism has been in vogue – the UN and AU cooperation and partnership in peace and security issues is a key priority for the UN. There is now the acceptance of reality that the world body needs the support of the AU and the RECs on the African continent for the UN to realise its own mandate. The UN-AU relationship and cooperation is imperative, as, in recent times, the major powers see Africa as strategically important. Strengthening the UN's relationship with the African Union becomes important because following the end of the Cold War, such African organisations as ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) started showing increased willingness to rapidly authorise and man very complex and difficult peace operations in Africa, and the fact is that the UN itself needs local partners (Aning and Abdallah 2012).

The UN Charter provides for cooperation between the UN and regional arrangement (Article 52[1]). Article 17(1) of the PSC Protocol recognises Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the basis for AU relations with the UN and the Protocol also calls for cooperation between the AU Peace and Security

Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council. On the basis of the provision of the UN Charter and the recognition of the importance of the UN-AU partnership, there has been an increase in the political debates between the two organisations on peace and security matters. The discussions between the two organisations inform the setting up of a number of panels to advise on what can be done to enhance this important relationship. In September 2003, Kofi Annan commissioned the UN High Level Panel to examine the challenges to international peace and security and to recommend how the UN could contribute to addressing those challenges more effectively. The High Level Panel was expected to understand the challenges of the UN-regional cooperation. Its December 2004 report[4] initially seemed to give priority to the relationship between the UN and Africa. Despite the fact that the panel deliberated and discussed matters with African security actors, officials, and civil society organisations (CSOs) to gain their perspectives on the relationship with the UN, Adebajo (2011: 12) stated that, at the time, it was felt that this was a clear sign of the blue ribbon commission's desire to focus on the UN's tie with Africa actors and institutions; unfortunately, Africa was given a lesser priority, as the panel's report devoted only 5 paragraphs out of 302 to Africa's most important peacekeeping challenges.

In March 2005, Kofi Annan presented his report, "In Larger Freedom" to the UN General Assembly. In the report, Annan called on donors and partners to devise a Ten-Year Capacity-Building Plan with the AU. The intention was for the plan to assist the pan-African institution to build its capacity for peace operations and African security management. The report, like the December 2004 High Level Panel's, called for the UN financial support for Africa's regional organisations. Consequently, and also in the spirit of fostering cooperation between the UN and AU, in November 2006, Kofi Annan and the AU Commission Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, signed a declaration: "Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union." This declaration aimed to enhance the relationship between the UN and the AU and also to strengthen the UN's system-wide engagement with the AU and the RECs in order for the AU to overcome Africa's multifaceted problems, including, of course, peacekeeping, and peace building. As part of the world body's effort to strengthen its relations with regional organisations,in 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged the UN Security Council to properly define the role of regional organisations and to guarantee that a structured system of cooperation is put in place to ensure coherence of international and regional responses to existing and emerging conflicts (Aning and Abdallah 2012). In April 2008, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1809, which dealt with African peace and security. In the resolution, the council recognised the importance of strengthening the capacity of regional and sub-regional institutions in their conflict prevention and management activities and also acknowledged the importance of the need to enhance the predictability,

sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations in their UN-authorised peacekeeping operations.[5]

Following the resolution, there was an AU/UN panel on ways to strengthen cooperation between the two organisations. The panel, headed by former EU Commission President Romano Prodi, recommended ways to strengthen the relationship between the UN and the AU. The panel found an anomaly, an increasingly unwelcome trend in which organisations that lack the required capability bear "the brunt in terms of providing the international community's initial response, while others more capable have not engaged. This inversion of responsibility is generating a trend of benign neglect in which interests rather than capabilities prevail" (Adebajo 2011: 13).[6] The panel argued that deploying peace missions in dangerous environments without the required capability is nothing but an ingredient for peacekeeping failure. To end this trend, the panel proposed the enhancement of strategic relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU PSC and suggested that the UN provide adequate and sustained resources to the AU peace operations, including UN funding of AU peace operations that are mandated by the UN for six months before the AU peacekeepers are rebadge into UN peace operations. The panel also recommended the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to finance such missions (ibid).

As part of the recognition of the roles of regional organisations in peace and security matters, and the imperative of the UN to strengthen its relationship with them for the credibility of UN peace operations, the 2009 UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support's report, "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," called for an improved burden-sharing and interoperability with regional organisations and for a renewed global peacekeeping partnership among the UN Security Council members, contributing states, host countries and UN Secretariat. This is a partnership in which various actors have a shared understanding and objectives of peace operations and a stake in their outcomes. This is the kind of peacekeeping partnership that UN peace operations depend upon for their legitimacy, sustainability and global reach (UNDPKO/FS 2009: 6–7; see also Aning and Abdallah 2012: 24)

The political debates between the UN and the AU, and the calls for increased strategic partnership and collaboration between the organisations by the various panels, as well as the efforts of UN Secretaries General and the AU Commission Chairpersons, have led to increasing efforts to deepen cooperation and collaboration, and to formalise the relationship between the two organisations. As part of the UN's effective steps to enhance its relationship with the AU, the UN established the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in July 2010, headed by an Assistant Secretary General. The establishment of this office is a positive development in an effort to integrate the mandates of different UN offices to the AU, viz, the UN liaison office, the UN's AU peace and support team, the UN planning team

for AMISOM, and the administrative functions of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) for UNAMID (Aning and Abdallah 2012; Gelot, Gelot and de Coning 2012). The enhancement of UN-AU strategic partnership is important for the success of peace operations in Africa and for the credibility of UN peacekeeping. The recognition of this important reality has resulted in the inauguration of the AU-UN Joint Task Force on Peace and Security on 25 September 2010. The establishment of this task force is expected to enhance the partnership between UN headquarters and the AU Commission in Addis Ababa and, above all, it now also serves as a platform where Senior AU and UN officials discuss and exchange ideas on matters of common concern and agree on common actions, including peacekeeping (Aning and Abdallah 2012).

The political debates between the UN and AU and other African sub-regional organisations on the need to enhance their strategic partnership and cooperation in peace and security matters and the complexities of some of today's conflicts have, in part, led to the emergence of a new trend in peacekeeping in Africa, where a range of international institutions, such as the UN, the European Union (EU), ECOWAS, the AU, the RECs, and individual states, conduct peace operations in Africa. One major characteristic of this new networked pattern in the international security architecture and peace operations is that it involves increasing close collaboration between international and regional organisations to manage African security and guarantee international peace and security overall (Freear and de Coning 2013; Gelot, Gelot and de Coning 2012). This new trend, described by Williams (2013a) as "partnership peacekeeping" entails African states contributing most of the personnel (military, police and civilian – substantive and support components) for peace operations with other institutions and bilateral partners (largely key Western countries) assisting the missions with finances, strategic airlift, training, planning and equipment (Boutellis and Williams 2013). There is also an increase in UN peace operations in Africa. According to Williams (2013a), since mid-2006, the UN has spent more than $36 billion and has around 70,000 peacekeepers in its 11 peace missions across Africa.

It is against the backdrop of the foregoing discussions that, in this book, I examine the AU's role as a conflict management and peace consolidation actor in Africa, especially as it relates to its peace operations. Therefore, this study's overarching research question is: What can be learned from the African Union peace operations in the process of guaranteeing African security, and following on from this, how can the AU build on these lessons to produce better peace outcomes from its operations in the future? Specifically, I address the following research sub-questions that fall under the umbrella of the study's overarching focus: first, considering the patterns emerging from recent African conflicts, what problems are associated with UN peacekeeping operations in Africa that have attempted to manage these

conflicts? Second, is the APSA an appropriate instrument for transcending the continent's security quagmires? Third, are AU regionalised peace operations adequate for finding durable solutions to the post-Cold War African armed conflicts? Fourth, is the so-called hybrid peacekeeping operation (i.e., the alternative hybrid peacekeeping model), in which the AU and the UN institutions have a joint command and control (C2) structure in a peace mission, the appropriate strategy to overcome African security quandaries? And finally, how should peacekeeping in Africa develop?

At its broadest level, this book explores the potency of the UN's role in maintaining international peace and security with reference to peacekeeping operations in Africa. Accordingly, keeping the records of over six decades in mind, the study interrogates the problems associated with UN peacekeeping in relation to successfully resolving the post-Cold War armed conflicts on the African continent. I undertake an analysis of the rise of AU regionalism by charting the shift from the OAU to the AU in order to explain the emerging peace and security architecture in Africa. Furthermore, I examine the rationales for the new security mechanism – the structures the AU is developing to achieve these objectives – and also interrogate whether this amounts to the building of an African peacekeeping capacity. In addition, the AU peacekeeping role is discussed through a review of its peace operations in Burundi (AMIB), in Somalia (AMISOM), and in Darfur (UNAMID). Also, I examine whether these peace missions were/are successful or not in finding solutions to African conflicts. Finally, I explore how African regionalised peacekeeping should develop, discuss the lessons learned, and consider the challenges that lie ahead. This book examines the AU peace and security role in a historical context by looking at the evolution of the AU regionalism and the organisation's peacekeeping, especially in the first decade of the AU's existence (2002–2012). A decade offers a credible timeframe for a meaningful assessment of the AU's performance in its peace operations. While this study employs a historical approach to analyse its subject, it is important to stress that two of the three peace operations examined in this study (AMISOM and UNAMID) are still ongoing; thus, the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 cover the period up to December 2013. I address some of the new developments in the two ongoing peace missions to underline the direction in which peace operations in Africa are heading.

The book shows that while the AU has demonstrated strong commitment towards implementing the APSA, it is overshadowed by its capacity limitations and the lack of political will among AU member states. This scenario has been a challenge to the AU's "African solutions to African problems" agenda and the AU's inability to run totally successful peace operations. The results and analyses of this study suggest that while AMIB performed remarkably in its operation in Burundi, the same cannot be said of AMISOM (although the peace operation is still ongoing). Furthermore, the study challenges the effectiveness of the hybrid peacekeeping model, which is seen by

scholars writing on UNAMID as being a successful model for peacekeeping in Africa. The findings and interpretations in this book take a slightly different view based on the inherent problems associated with the model, which UNAMID is presently experiencing. My principal argument is that the APSA and AU peace operations offer a hypothetical solution to African security problems, which needs further fine-tuning before it can effectively deliver.

The AU's peacekeeping cannot work properly under current conditions, independently and only with African efforts and resources, which are not always forthcoming from African member states. The case studies show that the AU's peacekeeping requires substantial inputs from the UN, and also additional assistance from the wider international community. This is important to realise if the AU is to be considered an effective and credible peacekeeping and security actor. However, international support to the AU is not enough by itself to guarantee peace in Africa. The main implication of this realisation is related to the fact that for the AU's 'African solutions' idea to be effective, African leaders need to play more significant roles through their sincere commitments, actions, strong political will, and funding contributions to support the AU and APSA. This is the only means through which the institution will, of necessity, cultivate strong international political support for the APSA and for the continuation of AU peace operations. In other words, Africa must demonstrate its commitment fully before it can expect the UN and the international community to invest heavily in African security management.

The book concludes that peacekeeping in Africa will be effective when the AU continues to develop its peacekeeping capacity and experience, by learning from and in genuine partnership with the UN, to deploy stabilisation forces to conflict zones within the continent and produce favourable outcomes. When the African peacekeeping capacity is developed further, the AU will be able to keep peace in dangerous environments via rapid deployment and maintenance of its forces before the UN forces and those of other international peace and security actors are brought in to support their initial efforts. The prognosis is that the AU and the RECs can expect many more peacekeeping roles in the future unless African leaders seriously address the problems associated with human security and socioeconomic development. An overall observation from this study is that the future role of the AU in security management will be enhanced if it was to focus much more on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy as a dissuasive strategy first, rather than having to engage in peacekeeping deployment with respect to armed intervention, which is very capital intensive, and also risks serious injuries and the loss of peacekeepers' lives.

This volume contributes to the growing body of policy analysis and academic scholarship on peacekeeping, especially in Africa, and extends the frontier of knowledge and understanding in this field of study. The

analyses of the book will form the basis for instituting dynamic policies for improving the efficacy of AU peace operations, the organisation's peacekeeping capacity, and the decision-making role of the RECs in relation to peacekeeping operations. It is hoped that specific political and administrative policy suggestions on how to enhance the AU's peacekeeping performance and capacity developed in this book will be useful to the institutions' officials and other stakeholders concerned with African peace and security, civil society organisations (CSOs), and international as well as local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) working with African communities, especially at this important period when the AU is developing its comprehensive, self-sufficient peace operations capacity with emphasis on both military and civilian inputs.

Methodological and analytical frameworks

This study is based on field research conducted in four African countries – Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana and Ethiopia – between January and May 2011 and in Australia between July and November 2011, during which interviews were conducted and questionnaires administered to 54 people. The overall purpose of the field research is to 'get close to the data' (Williams and May 1996) in order to answer the research questions. During this field exercise, I had the opportunity to engage with and interview AU and UN officials (both civilian and military), diplomats, military peacekeepers, as well as individuals at civil society organisations. A number of leading peace and security academics in some of the African and Australian institutions were also interviewed to diversify the research participants so as to ensure research credibility and reliability. At the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, I interviewed prominent officials in charge of each peace mission; they provided comprehensive data for analysis. Also, I conducted desk research at the AU Commission library. Through this field research, I had the opportunity to test the authenticity of the information that appeared in the literature and find further data to address the research questions. Field research diaries were kept throughout the exercise; these became valuable tools, especially during the data analysis phase of the research, as they allowed me, when reflecting on interview transcripts, to check and recheck information gathered in the field. Ethical issues involved in social research, particularly those relating to confidentiality and anonymity, were strictly adhered to during the exercise. Thus, in this book, only the institutional affiliations and positions of respondents are mentioned and not their names.

Following on from the foregoing analysis, I adopted a qualitative, empirical methodology of data gathering and analysis. The research methodology combined the collection of information from in-depth interviews, written open-ended questionnaires, the construction of detailed case studies, and personal observations made in the field. Information gleaned from reviewing

the literature was compared against findings collected during field visits. The use of case studies, and interviews in particular, added value to the analytical and evaluative perspective of this study. The methods and techniques adopted helped to incorporate important views of key informants, who played a role in the formulation and implementation of the security mechanisms. Through the qualitative findings from the field, underpinned by a robust exposition and interpretation, the empirical findings were linked to the key issues and themes under investigation.

Evaluating the effectiveness of peace operations

How should the effectiveness of peace operations be measured? This is a difficult question to answer, for there is a lack of consensus on what peace operation success means. Also there are many value dimensions across which the effectiveness of peace operations can be evaluated. Many peace operations are deployed to achieve many objectives reflecting different value dimensions. For example, how do we measure a peace mission that completely failed to restore peace and stability to its theatre of operation, but was able to provide humanitarian assistance to, and to some extent, save the lives of, the local population, as was the case of the UN- and US-led peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia in the 1990s. Different conclusions will be reached since peacekeeping successes and failures depend on what the evaluator is examining and taking into consideration (Diehl and Druckman 2010). If evaluators prioritize and favour humanitarian assistance and saving lives as the core goal of a peace mission, then the UN- and US-led operations in Somalia were a success story. On the other hand, if restoring security to Somalia and establish a functioning Somali government were the key objectives of the missions, the conclusion would be that the operations were a complete failure. The problems of evaluating the effectiveness of peace operation become embedded because as Diehl and Druckman (ibid.: 2) argued, "even with a clear set of preferences, it is sometime difficult to determine whether the prescribed goals have been achieved."

Furthermore, such peacekeeping scholars as Otunnu and Doyle (1998) focus their attentions on the factors that produce peacekeeping success in order to find out what works and what doesn't. There is also attempt by some international institutions such as the UN to adopt a method of evaluating peace operation by examining past practices of selected peace missions to comprehend the positive and negative aspects of the operations. The primary objective of this approach is to change policy in order to prevent a repeated failure (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 5). This method offers comprehensive explanation of 'lessons learned' for correcting the mistakes of the ongoing peace missions, or such lessons learned can be the basis for improving the planning and conducting future peace operations in order to produce favourable outcomes (Johnstone 2005). Using

the lessons learned method is also problematic since success in this respect also depends on the benchmarks used. Poor criteria for measuring success will result in lessons that are not usable and useless. Also different criteria for success may lead to different conclusions. Diehl and Druckman (2010: 5) argued that "Conclusions drawn on only one set of standard will lead policy makers to adopt certain policies without being aware of the full consequences of those policies. Thus using different standards of success – within and across operations– is appropriate because decision makers vary in their goals." The problem of evaluating the effectiveness of peace operations becomes embedded because peace operations are deployed to different conflict contexts. A peace mission deployed to an intrastate conflict might, as Howard (2008) argued, need completely different standards than its counterpart would when dealing with an interstate conflict. The implication is that all peace operations should not be measured by using the same standard; different operations perform different tasks, and this requires specific yardsticks to find out whether a peace operation is successful or not. Thus, "[a] one-size-fit-all approach may lead analysts to miss successes or failures that are specific to the kind of missions performed or the contexts in which mission operate" (Diehl and Druckman 2010).

After having discussed and considered the difficulties in measuring peacekeeping success, it is acknowledged that there is no approach that fully explains the whole gamut of issues involved in evaluating peace operations' successes and failures. Aware that the choice of approach to measuring peace mission success invariably determines outcomes, and that there is no consensus among scholars on what peace operation success means, I adopt two criteria to evaluate the case studies in this book. First, I question the extent to which AMIB, AMISOM and UNAMID are/were able to achieve their mandate, and second, whether the peace operations are/were able to create a stable and secure environment in their theatres of operations. These two criteria offer the opportunity to assess the missions' performances and challenges in order to determine successes and failures of these missions, which are evaluated in line with the conditions for successes such as consent, willingness and sincerity of parties to the conflict, cooperation from important outside actors, and time of peace mission's deployment, among others. Also, I paid particular attention to what Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008) call a triangular area of tension in African peace operations – namely, the AU's ambitions, its peacekeeping capacity, and its member states' political will and agendas – in assessing the operational performance of these missions in their theatres of operations.

Overview of the book

This study is reported in six chapters. It begins with an introduction where I cover the methodological issues with regards to the framework of

analysis for the case studies and the methods for evaluating effectiveness of peace operations – the principal purpose of this study – and is followed by Chapter 1, which covers the background issues. In Chapter 1, I explore key literature that is important to the overall focus of the study in order to fathom the subject of inquiry: peacekeeping. Also, I briefly examine the history of the evolving concept and practice of peacekeeping. Here, I analyse the changing nature of peacekeeping to uncover the shift from the traditional peacekeeping model to contemporary peace operations with multidimensional tasks. An examination of the new context of peacekeeping is imperative to understand the nexus between, and the influence of, peacekeeping mandates and mission outcomes. The UN peacekeeping experiences in African conflicts are also examined in this chapter. Here, I examine the backgrounds and dynamics of each of the selected African conflicts as well as the UN peace missions' roles in resolving these conflicts. I examine both the internal and external factors that affected the outcomes of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa in term of their shortcomings and successes. While successes are noted, I am more interested in the missions' failures and the reasons for them. This is important because information on such shortcomings is relevant to suggesting improvements for future peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa, which can be based on the lessons learned. I proceed to analyse the problems associated with UN peacekeeping with respect to armed conflicts across Africa in the post-Cold War period. I do this in order to explore reasons why UN peacekeeping has not been overly successful in managing or containing a number of Africa's intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, some literature on regionalisation and regional peace operations is explored to question the imperative (or otherwise) of regionalisation of peace operations in Africa, and to also set the stage for the empirical chapters of this book.

In Chapter 2, I comprehensively examine African Union regionalism. I discuss the transformation of the OAU into the AU by African leaders and the reasons for this decision in the face of the fluid political and security landscapes in Africa. The chapter analyses the rise of regionalism in Africa from the time of Pan-Africanism to the AU and situates these institutions within the changing international orders of the Cold War right up to the current neo-liberal order. After examining the development of pan-African peace and security architecture since the formation of the OAU in 1963, I then examine the AU Constitutive Act to explain the organisation's objectives and principles, and various organs and institutions. Chapter 3 is a comprehensive study of the APSA. In this chapter, I look at what the AU wants to achieve with this security mechanism and the structures it is developing to achieve these self-imposed tasks. Since the AU has given itself a peacekeeping role in order to fill certain gaps that exist with this function in Africa, I interrogate the strengths and weaknesses of the APSA, which are probed further in subsequent chapters to question how reliable

the AU's peace operations might be in relation to resolving Africa's conflicts and what lessons can be learned from them for future peace operations in Africa.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine AMIB and AMISOM respectively. My main tasks are reviewing the AU's peacekeeping role in Africa's armed conflicts as well as examining specific failures and successes of these missions and then providing explanations. I also explore whether the APSA constitutes a useful strategy through which to address contemporary internal armed conflicts and complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa. These discussions and critiques were influenced not only by the literature but also the studies carried out on the ground during fieldwork. In Chapter 6, I examine the UNAMID operation in Darfur. I interrogate whether the new UN/AU partnerships in peace operations are resulting in sustainable peace in Africa. I also assess the performance of UNAMID based on interrogating the field data with the literature to uncover lessons to be learned from the hybrid mission for future peace operations in Africa.

The book concludes by setting out important recommendations, and research questions are revisited and addressed in relation to interpreting the research findings. The lessons learned from each case study were presented in order to propose how AU peace operations can be enhanced for better performance and more positive outcomes. This was done on the basis of the literature and the data collected during field studies, which were examined together in considering all my research findings.

1
Conceptual Framework and Some Background Issues

Introduction

There is controversy and a lack of consensus among scholars and practitioners about the theory and practice of peacekeeping. Although the concept of peacekeeping as a tool of managing international conflicts evolved in the early years of the UN, its application in the post-Cold War international arena has undergone many changes. Also, peacekeeping activities have been stretched to include many tasks that were not envisaged by its founders. The end of the Cold War and the new context of conflicts characterised by the shift from interstate wars to predominantly intrastate ones have occasioned the growing rate of deployment of an increasing number of UN peacekeeping missions across the globe. This new development attests to the international community's commitment to dealing with threats to peace and security. Peacekeeping missions have increased in size, scope, and strategies with complex mandates. Contemporary peace operations have moved beyond the interposition of forces and ceasefire monitoring and observation to include an increasing number of non-military functions in such places as Cambodia and El Salvador. In spite of the metamorphosis in the nature and practice of peacekeeping, the UN peace operations have not been able to resolve some internal armed conflicts, especially in Africa, on an enduring basis, as with the deadly trilogy of Angola, Rwanda and Somalia in the 1990s.[1]

In this chapter, I examine the concept and evolution of peacekeeping. I also investigate UN peacekeeping experiences in Africa with a view to examining its successes and failures in resolving the post-Cold War African conflicts that have ravaged the continent over the past few years and the reasons for these performances in different contexts of African conflicts. I interrogate whether the UN peace operations have been successful in securing a path to durable peace in Africa in the post-Cold War period. Regionalisation and regional peace operations within the framework of the African institutions, both the AU and the RECs are also explored in order to question the benefits

and the drawbacks of this approach to conflict management based on the pro and con arguments of its advocates and sceptics respectively. Therefore, I start by conceptualising peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping: definition and evolution

The concept of peacekeeping defies easy operational definition, as there are arguments and counterarguments among peacekeeping scholars and practitioners honouring different theoretical perspectives (Diehl 1994; Kondoch 2007). In its traditional form, peacekeeping involves the deployment of military personnel to conflict theatres with the responsibilities for supervising the buffer zones and monitoring ceasefire agreements. According to McLean (1996: 321), peacekeeping is the use of "international military personnel, either in units or as individual observers, as part of an agreed peace settlement or truce, generally to verify and monitor ceasefire lines." The essence of traditional peacekeeping is to help develop confidence in the peace process, and its success depends on the principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force (except in self-defence) (Diehl 2008). In contemporary peace operations, the tasks of peacekeepers have been expanded beyond their role under the traditional model.

A case in point is the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that has been deployed since 1964 to prevent fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus. The troops were deployed in a neutral area that separates the belligerents. Despite the fact that UNFICYP has performed creditably in observing the maintenance of the ceasefire agreement and maintaining the buffer zone as a confidence building measure, which prevented the conflict from escalating through the involvement of the then superpowers, the peace mission has also been engaging in tasks such as food distribution, provision of essential social services, and human rights promotion (Månsson 2005). The UN for its own part defines peacekeeping as:

> An operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the "enforcement action" of the United Nations under Article 42. (United Nations 1990: 4)

Having provided a snapshot of peacekeeping, it is now important to locate its place and evolution in the UN Charter.

The UN was established in 1945 to promote international peace and security. The establishment of the UN was important because of the failures of its

predecessor, the League of Nations (the League), to avert the Second World War and the human catastrophes that followed. Consequently, the UN was to correct some of the weaknesses of the League, especially in the area of pacific settlement of dispute and the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN was originally designed and planned to achieve international peace and security through a framework of collective security as stated in Chapters VI and VII of its Charter. The two chapters form the body of norms and principles around which the collective security acts. Chapters VI and VII[2] of the UN Charter are paramount because the provisions of these two chapters deal with situations that are regarded as threats to international peace and security. First, in Chapter VI, prospective member states of the organisation must respect and subscribe to Article 33 of the UN Charter. The UN Charter enjoins member states to maintain the high standards of international behaviour and settle their dispute by peaceful means (Article 33 (1)). Thus, Chapter VI centres on the modalities for pacific settlement of disputes by means of enquiry, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, and also by resort to "regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means" (Article 33). Chapter VII calls for peace enforcement against states that use force in international relations if actions taken in pursuit of Chapter VI fail. Peace enforcement measures might include the application of economic sanctions, arms embargoes and the use of force as a last resort. The Charter contends that the combined strength of all member states should be used to punish belligerents. Collective security systems require that member states should give up a proportion of their freedom to act independently. The degree of action permitted would be limited to the right of self-defence until the UN Security Council assumed responsibility. Collective security is a system, either regional or global, where member states agreed, in principle, that the security of one is the concern of all, and in this regards, to join resources and forces together in responding to an act of aggression. The whole idea of collective security is based on states renouncing the use of force in international relations and agreeing instead to settle their disputes peacefully and with a willingness to respond collectively to any act of aggression (Baylis 2001: 264).

AQ: the word 'Chapter' have been capitalized only when it is followed by a number.

Under the UN Charter, the UN Security Councill remains central in making decisions on security matters, especially the determination of the existence of threats to peace. Therefore, the use of military force could only be authorised by the UN Security Council with the help of the UN Military Staff Committee. The P-5 played a very important role in the establishment of the UN and as a result, the Charter empowers them with the right of veto on such matters. This means that collective use of force by the UN could be applied only if, where and when there was a consensus among the P-5. Despite the important place and role of the UN Security Council in international peace and security matters, other organs of the UN do have inputs into this endeavour; the United Nations General Assembly especially also

has the secondary function of settling disputes (Article 39, see also Boulden 2013). The General Assembly has in the past made effort to induce the UN Security Council to apply sanctions against recalcitrant states. The General Assembly has also exercised its power by recommending collective measures in situations of eventual breach of the peace or act of aggression, especially when the Security Council failed to exercise its primary responsibility. This was exemplified by the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution (UPR) by the UN General Assembly in 1950, authorising the deployment of peace enforcement operation to Korea when the council was incapacitated in making a decision due to the East-West rivalry (Forrester 1993). The purpose of the UPR was to provide the UN Secretary General with responsibility for collective security measures and simultaneously to decentralise the UN system itself.

The envisioned unanimity among the UN member states, especially the P-5, and the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, proved to be ill-advised and erroneous . Two fundamental false assumptions of the UN founders crippled the effectiveness of the UN Charter and proper functioning of the organisation. First, it was thought that aggression would be in the form of interstate conflicts, and second, there was the assumption that states are bound to obey and follow norms of the international system in their international relations since they operated through their governments (Fetherston 1994: 3). This vision when related to the evolution of peacekeeping is inaccurate because in the contemporary international system, most conflicts are internal armed conflicts and championed by non-state actors. Also, for most of the UN's existence, especially during the Cold War, the envisaged cooperation among the P-5 did not materialise. This is because the UN Security Council was envisioned to be an organ by means through which the Great Powers could exercise a joint directorate over international political affairs, as long as they could agree upon joint policy and action, but unfortunately, the council failed to operate in the clear absence of such agreement. Therefore, the Charter failed to correctly anticipate the shape and balance of the post-Second World War environment. Despite the existence of these two routes to maintaining international peace and security, lack of cooperation in the UN Security Council renders the council ineffective, and this greatly damages the mechanisms available for conflict management and also has negative effects on the entire UN system. As Adisa and Aminu (1996: 85) rightly observed: "that consensus (among the P-5) proved difficult to achieve in the era of the Cold War which was marked by mistrust and disagreements among the superpowers. The descensus threatened to immobilise the UN and constrained the organisation's ability to respond to and seek to mitigate problems arising from conflict situations." Consequently, the UN Security Council was unable to resolve many international disputes contrary to the aims of the Charter's mechanism.

Therefore, lack of cooperation among the P-5 resulted in the adoption of peacekeeping as a conflict resolution mechanism, since it is not foreseen by the founders of the UN and also does not appear in the UN Charter (Kondoch 2007; O'Neill and Rees 2005; Thakur and Schnabel (eds) 2001; Weiss 2007). The recurring impasse resulting from the veto-wielding powers of the members of the UN Security Council actually led to the fashioning of the traditional peacekeeping model as a conflict containment strategy. Bassey (1993) argued that despite its extensive application, peacekeeping is not reflected in the theoretical substructure of the UN Charter. Instead, it has evolved as an experimental compromise between collective security and permanent paralysis, both of which have confronted the UN as a result of Cold War politics. The peacekeeping approach (or "preventive diplomacy" to use Dag Hammarskjöld's category), Bassey (ibid.: 23) concludes, "represents a different formulation of the UN role in the field of peace and security from those envisaged in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. It has, nevertheless, added a new dimension to the traditional diplomatic instruments of negotiation, conciliation, and mediation." Since the envisaged consensus among the P-5 proved difficult to achieve during the Cold War, the lack of agreement threatened to ground the organisation's ability to respond to conflict situations. It was within this context that traditional peacekeeping (a halfway house between Chapter VI and VII) evolved.

Traditional peacekeeping is a conflict containment instrument that involves disinterested[3] external assistance to intervene and encourage the belligerents to extricate themselves from military action. Classical peacekeeping operations involved two kinds of missions: unarmed observer missions and the peacekeeping force. The latter involves the use of soldiers but in a non-combat way. Peacekeepers' orientation, attitudes, and actions are preferably non-forceful. Instead, peacekeeping impulse is based on consent. The non-violence ethic in conflict resolution distinguishes it from peace enforcement (Adisa and Aminu 1996: 86). In this regard, peacekeeping that deviates from the traditional intentions is seen to be nothing more than organised violence via armed intervention delicately shrouded in the peaceful guise of a UN mandate, when in fact it actually describes war rather than peace.

The UN peacekeeping operations during the early period were traditional in nature, which is closely associated with the interpositioning of troops between the antagonistic parties *after* the ceasefire had been agreed upon. Traditional peacekeeping is designed to avoid the direct confrontation between the superpowers in regions of conflict during the Cold War period. The UN first ventured into this operation in 1948 when it dispatched unarmed military observers, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), to Palestine to monitor and ensure compliance with a truce negotiated by Count Folke Bernadotte during the first Arab-Israeli war (Goulding 1993). In 1949, the mandate of UNTSO changed to helping the warring parties supervise the application and observance of the four

General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab countries (Bello-Fadile 1992: 9). Also in 1949, when India and Pakistan were at loggerheads over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to supervise the ceasefire between the two countries. Traditional peacekeeping attempts to contain violence rather than find durable solutions to end conflicts; that is, it is too preoccupied with treating the symptoms rather than dealing with the causes of conflicts. The danger of the traditional peacekeeping approach is that it has proved to prolong the duration of peacekeeping operations, as they lack any built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was usually slow to progress. Most of the missions mounted by the UN between 1945 and 1988 involved military force with security-driven mandates; that is, peacekeeping forces were interposed between the former combatants, and they monitored ceasefires. During this period, the missions were conducted with the consent of the concerned parties.

AQ: Page 23: paragraph 1, Line 4, please italicize--we are unable to locate this change.

Peacekeeping in its proper sense began in 1956 with the involvement of the UN in the Suez crisis, which erupted as a result of the Anglo-Israeli-French attack on Egypt. The UN established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt (Adebajo 2011). The UNEF experience was a success story because it ended the destructive war, and for more than ten years, it effectively kept peace in that part of the world. UNEF established a basic set of principles and standards, which have served as the basis for the creation of all other missions. UNEF I and II[4] represented a progression in the evolution of peacekeeping, for they were created to secure a ceasefire (a more complex task), which contrasted these operations with previously mentioned ones. In the case of UNEF II, the mission was able to douse tension, diffuse hostility, reestablish a buffer zone between the belligerents, and eventually insulated the crisis from the influence of a confrontation between the superpowers. Despite the considerable optimism created by the UNEF experiences for the prospects of peacekeeping, traditional peacekeeping operations are all characteristically the same, and they are not meant to offer permanent solutions to conflicts. Finally, the proliferation of internal armed conflicts following the end of the Cold War puts new demands on peace missions, and eventually traditional peacekeeping gave way to the more complex and multitasked peace operations with expanded mandates.

The end of the Cold War established new parameters, which removed obstacles that had hitherto restrained peacekeeping operations. This is because the USSR, which had previously been suspicious of UN peacekeeping, abruptly changed its position and lent its support (Weiss 2007). The situation opened up opportunities for direct superpower involvement in peacekeeping through an atmosphere of collegiality in the UN Security Council, which obviously had the effect of improving the capability of the

UN to deal more directly and effectively with international security problems. The progressive developments in the UN Security Council in general and peacekeeping in particular made Boutros-Ghali (1992: 89–90) declare that the new era had brought new credibility to the organisation as the end of the ideological war had led to an impressive expansion in the demand for peacekeeping support. As a result, in less than five years, between 1985 and 1989, five new peace operations were established and by 1994, 24 new operations were established in different parts of the world (Adisa and Aminu 1996: 90). This was far more than the number of operations initiated by the UN in the previous 40 years.[5] As well, there is the growing complexity and magnitude of the mandates and tasks of the new missions. Post-Cold War peace operations involved multi-component missions in which civilian and post-conflict rebuilding activities occupy an important place. That is, peacekeeping has moved from limited functions to full-fledged state-building operations. For example, most of the UN-authorised peace operations after the Cold War are mandated to undertake security sector and justice sector reforms (Piiparinen 2012; see also Dobbins et al. 2005). Therefore, the UN-mandated peace operation, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) (1989–1990) that worked for Namibia's independence became the institution's first major multidimensional peace operation that was mounted in the post-Cold War era. UNTAG represents a new direction in peacekeeping since it gave it a new complexity, for peacekeeping had now transcended the Westphalian conception that relied on limited engagement to end interstate conflicts and moved towards the post-Westphalian order in which it had to wade into the terrain of engaging within states to manage intrastate conflicts. Thus, the UN had progressed from a *status quo* orientation to become the architect of political transition as demonstrated in the cases of Timor Leste (East Timor) (Howard 2008; Smith with Dee 2003), Cambodia (Coulon and Liégeois 2010; Dobbins et al. 2005; Richmond and Franks 2011) and Namibia (Adebajo, 2011; Howard 2008; Malone and Wermester 2000). In Cambodia, the UN peace mission (the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – UNTAC) was authorised (under UN Security Council Resolution 745), between 1992 and 1993, to implement the Paris Peace Accords of October 1991 (Howard 2008). The tasks of UNTAC were to implement the 1991 accords, which was in agreement with the de facto government in Cambodia at the time and other warring factions (Coulon and Liégeois 2010: 10). In line with its mandate, UNTAC administered Cambodia (a sovereign state that was in turmoil after many years of armed conflict), organised general elections and restored a democratically elected civilian administration in the troubled Asian country (Doyle 1995; Doyle, Johnstone and Orr 1997). Among its achievements, UNTAC was able to promote and safeguard human rights across the country (Doyle 1995).

The UN deployed a peace mission in East Timor (the United Nations Mission in East Timor – UNAMET) in June 1999 after many years of

subjugation of the territory (East Timor) under the Portuguese and later Indonesian colonial rule. UNAMET was mandated to conduct a referendum to determine the future of East Timor (Chopra 2002). The inability of UNAMET to accomplish its tasks successfully, due to a number of challenges that confronted the mission, paved the way for the deployment of an UN-authorised multinational peace enforcement mission (the International Force in East Timor – INTERFET) in September 1999 to provide peace and security in East Timor and support UNAMET (Howard 2008; Smith with Dee 2003). UNAMET failed to prevent post-referendum violence, and the mission eventually collapsed. INTERFET was required to oversee and end the violence. INTERFET was also mandated to provide the right environment for transition via a UN administration that would facilitate a smooth process of change to independence. After restoring security to the territory, the UN deployed the United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) between October 1999 and May 2002 to exercise total responsibility for the administration of the territory and prepare the colony for independence. UNTAET was able to be de jure authority of East Timor and successfully transited the territory to statehood in May 2002 (Goldstone 2004; Ian and Mayer-Rieckh 2005).

The cases of Namibia, Timor Leste and Cambodia established a new direction in UN peace operations. In brief, the tasks of post-Cold War peace operations are now multidimensional with emphases placed on peace implementation, transitional administrations and post-conflict peace-building, instead of conflict freezing associated with the traditional peacekeeping missions of the Cold War era.

The United Nations peacekeeping experiences in Africa

Since its involvement in the Suez crisis, the UN had intervened in quite a number of African conflicts with mixed results. The first recorded UN peacekeeping deployment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was in response to the crisis in the Congo (now DRC) between July 1960 and June 1964. The operation was not only one of the largest but also one of the most controversial and the most difficult operations undertaken by any international institution during the early period. On 30 June 1960, after initial opposition to the Congolese demands, Belgium agreed to and granted independence to the Congo. Within days of becoming an independent state, the Congo was at the verge of disintegration. The Congolese soldiers mutinied. The rebellion was on the grounds that the newly elected members of government were corrupt and enriching themselves, a situation that contrasted with their (i.e., the soldiers') poor working conditions and low salary. Consequently, foreign nationals, Belgians in particular, were attacked. There was an enticement of a mass exodus of settlers as well as Belgian officers and administrators that were in the country working with

the new government (Dobbins et al., 2005: 6–8). The political and security situations in the country became tense. A former senior UN official, Urquhart (2001: 4), described the tense political and security situations: "Events in the first days of independence went at a dizzying pace. The army mutinied and threw out its Belgian officers, Europeans were roughed up and there were reports of white women being raped. The Belgian population panicked and left ... Public administration, law and order evaporated and were replaced by chaos and anarchy." Instead of saving the Congolese state from destabilisation and collapse, Belgium sent troops to the Congo to protect its nationals and its huge interests. This singular act by Brussels was seen as a violation of the Treaty of Friendship between the Congo and Belgium. The crisis had rocked the boat of the Congolese government under Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu and, particularly, the country's embryonic sociopolitical and economic institutions had collapsed. On 11 July 1960, Moïse Tshombe, the elected president of the richest province in the Congo, Katanga, announced the province succession and declared independence. According to Dobbins et al. (2005), Katanga's succession deprived the central government of the Congo of export revenue from copper extracted from this rich mining area of the country. On behalf of the Congolese government, Lumumba appealed to the UN for assistance and requested the world body to deploy troops to restore law and order. On 13 July 1960, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, acting under Article 99 of the UN Charter "that empowers him to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security" called a meeting of the council. Hammarskjöld subsequently received the mandate of the council authorising him to deploy UN forces to the Congo. Authorised under the UN Security Council Resolution 143 (of 14 July 1960), the peace mission – the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was mandated to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo; assist the government in maintaining law and order; provide technical assistance; maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo; prevent the occurrence of civil war and secure the removal from the Congo of all foreign military. The interjection of ONUC into the Congolese conflict was intended to insulate it from external interference. The precarious security situation on the ground compelled ONUC to be involved directly in Congolese internal affairs, as the mission was later authorised to use force (under UN Security Council Resolution 161) against the rebels in Katanga. The peace enforcement actions of ONUC led to suspicion of the UN position since its troops became involved in and were being used to suppress the Katanga secessionist movement. The offensive military actions against the rebels meant that ONUC moved from its original peacekeeping mandate to that of peace enforcement. The political wrangling and power tussle between Kasavubu and Lumumba worked against ONUC.

The Marxist-Leninist oriented governments of Ghana, People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union supported Prime Minister Lumumba. As a result of a power tussle between Kasavubu and Lumumba, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba on 5 September 1960. This situation saw the Cold War politics being played out in top gear, especially in November 1960 when the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly accepted Kasavubu's delegation instead of Lumumba's, as recognition of the legitimate representative of the Central Government of the Congo. Soon afterwards, Lumumba was arrested, transferred to the Katanga authorities and killed. The death of Lumumba in the presence of the UN was the major failure of ONUC, as this development blemished the UN's image and puts its impartiality in doubt (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000; Dayal 1976). Notwithstanding, ONUC was able to bring peace back to the Congo because it helped the country to survive the birth pangs of independence. ONUC, which at its peak counted over 20,000 troops, cost the UN its Secretary General, Hammarskjöld, who was killed in a plane crash in northern Rhodesia on a peace mission to the Congo (Dobbins et al., 2005). ONUC was a new enterprise; it engaged politicians from three-dozen countries for four years and put the UN's future at risk. All this said, despite ONUC's challenges, it was able to achieve its goals. This is because, as Adebajo (1995: 381) stated, ONUC denied the globetrotting Cold War circuit an early performance of its mutually assured destruction on an African stage (see also Coulon and Liégeois 2010: 5).

The UN involvement in Angola and Namibia coincided with the end of the Cold War and unprecedented activism by the UN Security Council. Angola is one of the African countries that experienced a long and brutal civil war with devastating consequences. The Angolan war represented the height of the fragmentation that is blamed on ethnic divisions, rivalry among the leaders and deep ideological differences. The period before Angolan independence (especially between 1961 and 1974) was characterised by violent clashes where three major liberation movements – the *Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola* (MPLA), *Frente Nacional de Libertacão de Angola* (FNLA), and *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) – fought the Portuguese forces and also one another since the three liberation movements could not agree on the power-sharing formula. Lack of understanding among the liberation movements did not allow Angola the opportunity to have a unified nationalist movement to confront the Portuguese colonial authority. Furthermore, the liberation movements were ethnic-based with traditional affiliations with certain geographical areas of the country. MPLA enjoyed the support of the Kimbundus – the second largest ethnolinguistic category based in northwest of the country, the FNLA was supported by the Kikongos in the North along the frontier with Zaire (now DRC). UNITA commanded enormous loyalties of the Ovimbundus, which is the largest ethnolinguistic group with its headquarters in Huambo. Attempts to reconcile the parties and their leaders were not successful (Badmus 2003).

In January 1975, the famous Alvor Agreement, signed by the leaders of the three movements – Holden Roberto of FNLA, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA and Agostinho Neto of MPLA – came into force. The agreement called for a peaceful transition to independence, formation of coalition government of the three movements, and fixing 11 November 1975 as the date for total independence. Soon afterwards, fighting broke out between MPLA and FNLA with increasing level of deaths and destructions, and in July 1975, MPLA successfully defeated and ejected FNLA from Luanda, the Angolan capital; this incident drew UNITA into the fighting (Badmus 2003). The tense political and military situations led to the bid for external support by the three movements. The USSR supported MPLA, while Cuba and China stepped up their assistance in training MPLA fighters and supply of weapons respectively. The United States, apartheid South Africa, some European countries and Mobutu's Zaire became UNITA's strong financial and military backers. This situation ultimately heightened the already tense security situation as the bid for external support by one party made the other groups feel insecure and through efforts to enhance their own security, provoked fear and counter measures, negative spirals ultimately end in pre-emptive attacks and increase military activities. On 11 November 1975, MPLA unilaterally proclaimed independence and the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola. Simultaneously, both FNLA and UNITA announced their intention of forming a joint government, which also claimed legitimacy. In a successful military campaign, the MPLA expelled UNITA from its Huambo base on 11 February 1976, and on the same day, the OAU recognised Angola as a member state, and it was also accorded recognition by Portugal. Angola also became a member of the UN in 1976. Despite MPLA military success as well as its acceptance by the international community, peace continued to elude Angola.

By the end of the Cold War, the three decades old war had destabilised Angola; more than half a million people had lost their lives, 3.5 millions Angolans were internally displaced, 300,000 people and more than 70,000 people had become refugees and amputees respectively, and the country was littered with more than 10 million land mines and its infrastructural facilities destroyed (Howard 2008: 36–37). The defeat of UNITA and its South African backer at Cuito Cuanavale by the combined forces of Angola and Cuba in November 1987 served as a turning point in the conflict. UNITA's defeat and the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as USSR president and his determination to end all protracted ideological wars in Africa and other regions of the world compelled both the MPLA government and UNITA to negotiate peace that ultimately led to the tripartite agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba in New York in December 1988. The agreement encouraged the Security Council to adopt Resolution 626 that established the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I). UNAVEM I was a peacekeeping force established to verify the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops

from Angola (Fortna 1993).[6] The peace mission successfully oversaw the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from the Angolan territory. Second, in spite of the encomium that was given to UNAVEM I for successfully accomplishing its tasks, the same cannot be said of its successor, UNAVEM II. In 1991, Portugal, the United States and the USSR negotiated the "Bicesse Accords." The accords did not include "provisions for an adequate transition process with third-party guarantees to ensure that both sides adhered to their promises" (Howard 2008: 37). The UN was gradually drawn into the process of monitoring the implementation of the accords, especially monitoring the elections, under a new peacekeeping operation. Therefore, UNAVEM II was mandated to oversee the implementation of the Bicesse Accords between the MPLA and UNITA. The mission was also responsible for the conduct of the 1992 general elections. UNAVEM II was non-functional, as its activities were hindered by the uncompromising attitudes of the protagonists as well as the institutional rigidity of the UN itself. Sesay (1995: 10), in his analysis of the situation, submits:

> In the Angolan case, the "unsuccessful" execution of the mandate of UNAVEM II could not restore the much needed peace to that unfortunate territory, once Savimbi, a key actor in the conflict, refused to accept the "free and fair elections" ... Much of the problem has to do with the resources available for such conflict management activities by the UN ... the resources were surely inadequate.

Thus, the failure of UNITA to accept defeat at the general elections, coupled with the belligerents' insincerity took Angola back to the path of destabilisation as UNITA started rearmament in earnest. The succeeding peace mission, UNAVEM III, was mandated to, among other things, oversee the power-sharing arrangement between UNITA and MPLA, which was in line with the Lusaka Accords of 1994 (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000). The same reasons that led to the ineffectiveness of UNAVEM II also accounted for the failure of UNAVEM III. This is because, despite all the evidence that revealed Savimbi's rearmament of his soldiers, the UN became dormant, a situation that worsened because of its decision to scale down its operation, which was eventually disbanded in 1999.

The traumatic failures of the UN missions in Angola, especially the collapse of UNAVEM II in 1992–1993, raised serious arguments as to whether such failures could be blamed on inertia on the part of the UN, or conditioning by the prevailing structure in the Angolan context at the epoch and the uncompromising attitudes of the key actors in the conflict (Anstee 1996; MacQueen 1998). Some scholars see the failure as an avoidable tragedy and blamed it on the UN itself. According to Clapham (1999: 5), this situation can be attributed to the reduced scale of the UNAVEM II operation, a product of financial constraints, and the eagerness to find a quick-fix solution to the

war, especially for the United States. The fulcrum of these scholars' argument is that the UN could be blamed for its involvement in implementing a peace accord, when it played no significant roles in its negotiation, which resulted in an imperfect accord, with the UN having observer status. The key argument here is that the failure of UNAVEM II is a clear indication of the complexity of the post-Cold War African civil wars and challenges that they posed to the UN with respect to its peacekeeping activities. This is because implementing peace agreements between warring parties in internal wars requires new approaches and more resources. Casting the blame on the UN is understandable given the success of UNAVEM I, which supervised the agreement between the states and encouraged the erroneous belief that such successes could easily be accomplished. This view was then transferred erroneously again to the vastly more difficult task of implementing a peace accord between parties to a civil war (Francis 2006b: 104). On the contrary, the structuralist contention was that the failure of UNAVEM II was inevitable since its (UN) intervention was highly untimely in a conflict setting where there was no peace, anyway, to keep. Aside from this, the UN peacekeeping operations in Angola were channelled through security/military driven mandates with virtually no recognition of the fundamental roles of civil society agency and the local populations. The argument thus far is that the Angolan case reveals a scenario where the UN attempted to address the burning security and political issues and the root causes of the war separately. The Angolan case shows the disconnection among peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. This is why Goulding (1999: 161) argues that the UN has been more involved in peacekeeping than peacemaking in Africa, which largely explains why UN peacemaking efforts have often failed to materialise into results on the ground in theatres where they have deployed peacekeeping missions.

Turning to Namibia, a country that experienced a bitter liberation struggle that was championed by a liberation movement, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). South West Africa (as Namibia was then known) was a German colony that was established in 1884. The colony came under the control of the then Union of South Africa when it seized and captured the territory in 1915 as part of South Africa's contribution to the First World War (Du Toit 2003). In 1920, the League of Nations granted the Union a mandate over the territory. According to Adebajo (2011: 105):

> In the territory of South West Africa, as in South Africa, whites were co-opted and compromised by the (apartheid) system and granted privileges based on skin that then gave them a stake in the survival of the system. Apartheid policies were effectively transplanted from South Africa after 1948, creating two racial groups that were doomed to be in perpetual conflict with each other.

When the League of Nations was dissolved, South Africa refused to let the UN have mandate over the territory. Rather, the South African authority

proposed the incorporation of the territory of South West Africa into South Africa's politico-economic and legal systems. In 1950, the Hague-based International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against South Africa's continued control of the territory. The apartheid regime gathered and turned the black majority in its colony into reserves while providing political representation only to white inhabitants (see generally Adebajo, 2011; Kaela 1996; Sparks and Green 1992; Jabri 1990). The UN rejected the South African proposal, refused to recognise South Africa's continuing occupation of the territory, and called for the rights of the people of Namibia to determine their future through vote. In 1966, the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory and voted to assume control over the administration of the territory. The UN Security Council subsequently endorsed the UN General Assembly's decision. In 1967, the General Assembly established the UN Council as a legal authority to administer the territory until independence (Adebajo 2011). In 1971, the ICJ ruled South Africa's claims on and occupation of South West Africa illegal and called for its immediate withdrawal.

From 1966 on, SWAPO decided to confront South Africa, and subsequently took up arms against it. The informal Western Contact Group on Namibia, comprised of the United States, France, Britain, West Germany and Canada, was created in March 1977. In 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 435, which called for the establishment of UNTAG to oversee elections and supervise Namibia's transition to independence.[7] UNTAG's deployment was prevented for more than a decade by South Africa. The most significant reason for the delay was the linkage that South Africa and United States established between the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. On 22 December 1988 in New York, Angola, South Africa and Cuba signed a trilateral agreement, as well as a bilateral one between Cuba and Angola. Under the agreement, Cuba agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola by 1 July 1991, with the UN deploying UNAVEM to Angola to monitor Cuba's withdrawal, UNTAG would deploy to Namibia, and April 1989 was designated as the implementation date for Namibia independence.

The warming of relations in the UN Security Council, especially among the P-5, encouraged the council to adopt Resolution 629. The resolution called for the establishment of UNTAG, with the task of supervising an overtly uncontentious transition. UNTAG's primary assignments included overseeing the implementation of Resolution 435 of 1978, concerning the conduct of elections, transition to independence, and the disengagement and complete withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Also, UNTAG was to implement the peace agreement between apartheid South Africa and SWAPO. This was a complex task and portrays a new direction in peacekeeping. This is because, as Howard (2008: 52) recounts, UNTAG was the first UN mission to engage in multidimensional peacekeeping since

ONUC, and its primary objective and purpose in overseeing a democratic transition were political. Furthermore, UNTAG introduced a new dimension to peacekeeping – UN "civilian policing" being an example of this (see also Francis 2006b: 103). Despite the inadequate number of peacekeepers involved, as well as the mission's lack of required logistics, UNTAG received the commendation of the international community for a job well done when the country became independent on 21 March 1990 (see Zürcher 2011). The success in Namibia was not an easy ride, because although UNTAG eventually got going to carry out some aspects of the operation relatively well, the achievement of independence for Namibia was not one of the mission's peacekeeping successes; it was something that happened by default – a by-product of UN efforts rather than planned outcome (Clapham 1999: 4).

Mozambique presents a classical case of a relatively successful peacekeeping operation due to the existence of a web of external and internal factors that worked to its advantage. The complex nature of the Mozambican civil war, which involved elements of ideology, ethnicity and external involvement, appeared to be unsolvable but was brought to an end due to the role played by the UN and especially its peacekeeping mission in the country, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Shortly after Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the country descended into ignominy with the outbreak of civil war between the Marxist-Leninist oriented FRELIMO government and the resistance movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). During the war, both Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa supported and sustained RENAMO's war efforts. In the course of the civil war, the country suffered devastating consequences: 2 million Mozambicans fled to neighbouring countries as refugees; 3 million people were internally displaced; the Mozambican society was awash with weapons, with over 6 million AK-47s proliferating in the country at that time (Dobbins et al., 2005; Smith 1995). Furthermore, the Mozambican economy was in complete shambles and depended heavily on neighbouring states and international assistance (Alden 2001; Berman 1996). In 1990, an unofficial mediator, the Rome-based NGO, the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio community, with diplomatic resources from the Italian government, facilitated contacts between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. After 24 months of negotiations, precisely in October 1992, the government of Mozambique and RENAMO signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in the Italian capital, Rome. The peace agreement called for a ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and democratisation of the Mozambican polity through multiparty elections. The UN became involved at a later stage to verify that the belligerents had implemented the agreement and to help in elections. The UN Security Council, under Resolution 797 of 16 December 1992, authorised the deployment of ONUMOZ: a force of approximately 7,000 and 354 military observers (Dobbins et al., 2005: 98). ONUMOZ was mandated, among

other things, to monitor and verify the demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of the armies and irregular armed groups on both sides; monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces; monitor Mozambique's police; protect election monitors; and report human rights abuses. ONUMOZ was similar to UNAVEM II in Angola in that the UN played virtually no major roles in the negotiations that led to the signing of the GPA. The UN involvement in implementing a peace agreement that it was not fully involved in reaching is regarded as a source of the ensuing problems. The UN's participation in peace negotiations started just four months before the signing of the GPA. Although ONUMOZ had a very difficult and uncertain beginning, it benefited from the UN's institutional memory regarding UNAVEM II.

AQ: We have kept 'special representative' in lowercase across the text. Secretary General has been uppercased.

ONUMOZ's success was due to the postponement of the implementation of the serious portions of the peace agreement, and subsequently the UN was able to save the overall peace process in that country. Clearly, what makes the Mozambican case exceptional is the political acumen of the UN Secretary General's special representative, Italian Aldo Ajello, in linking the informal process through which the GPA had been negotiated with the formal process of peace implementation. The informal process recognised civil society agency and the centrality of the local population in the peace process. Furthermore, Ajello was able to secure the cooperation and assistance of his Italian government to provide $35 million to help RENAMO's democratic transition (Francis 2006b: 105), and the special representative paid $300,000 a month to the leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, for his cooperation with the UN, for more than 12 months (Synge 1997: 60).

Apparently, the success of ONUMOZ could not be achieved in Angola, especially under UNAVEM II, because of Angola's situational context, which worked against the peace operation. In Angola, UNITA controlled vast parts of the diamond mining area, which translated to strong financial muscle to carry out its war against Luanda. This was not the situation with RENAMO, and most significantly, Angola is a resource-rich country, which attracted and encouraged external actors, corrupt entrepreneurs, and corporations with selfish interests to be more involved in the war.

AQ: You have asked that this be changed to 'situations'; however we feel that singular is correct here.

The political crisis that engulfed Somalia culminated with the overthrow of President Siad Barre in January 1991.[8] The post Barre Somali state became unstable due to the rivalries between the two major adversaries, Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aideed. A dreadful political and military situation and a looming humanitarian emergency compelled the UN to intervene (Seybolt 2008). The UN intervention in Somalia is widely regarded as most controversial and an unmitigated disaster (Sabaratnam 2011) because the UN intervened in a conflict setting where there was no peace to keep. The first UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established in April 1992 with a traditional mandate, but its many challenges led to a development in which a peacekeeping operation was mounted outside the UN system. The US-led multilateral intervention, the United Nations International Task

Force (UNITAF) was authorised by the UN Security Council to use force to implement its mandate. The increase in the force level applied in Somalia under UNITAF was seen as being part of the problem of mounting an armed intervention with a mandate to use force under the guise of peacekeeping. Ohanwe (2000) argued that the resources that could have been used for long-term development of the Somali state were wasted on arms and in sending a large military contingent. This huge force was an obstacle to local initiatives and political reconciliation. UNITAF's military attack on Aideed forces damaged the relations between the peacekeepers and the local populations, as the latter's confidence in the former disappeared. UNITAF was regarded as being partisan and not considered as a neutral force. Following frequent attacks on peacekeepers by various Somali armed groups, most of the troops contributing countries (TCCs) were disillusioned with the operation and later withdrew their troops. Resolution 814, of 26 March 1993, also under Chapter VII, returned the command and control (C2) of UNOSOM II to the UN, and called for political settlement and national reconciliation. UNOSOM II operated under a changed mandate. An enforcement action mandate was authorised to restore law and order to Somalia. The enforcement action of the UN raised critical issues here. According to Vogt (1997: 62), since the enforcement measures were not conducted as a full Chapter VII operation, the military support for a Chapter VII operation was never made available. This is because a Chapter VII mandate was given to a force that was formed to perform peacekeeping roles. Equally problematic in UNOSOM II's operations was the lack of enough personnel to execute the enforcement action; it finally had to pull out of Somalia with neither peace nor order restored in the country.

The UN involvement in Somalia shows that peace enforcement action can be counterproductive, as this kind of UN action in Somalia did become complicated, making the whole security situation worse and eventually damaging the organisation's reputation and its self-proclaimed impartiality. The problems related to the enforcement actions in Somalia were largely responsible for the UN's reluctance to respond in a timely and effective manner in a planned intervention to prevent genocide in Rwanda.

The involvement of the UN in Rwanda was another disaster. The operation demonstrates the failure of the UN in capitalising on past experience, especially its peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia. The Arusha Peace Agreement between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) encouraged the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 872, establishing the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR was mandated to provide a secure environment for the installation of a new democratic government, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and monitoring of the demilitarised zone. The Arusha Agreement, negotiated between July 1992 and August 1993, called for the international community's assistance to guarantee the

fragile peace agreement and Rwanda's security while the transitional government was being put in place. UNAMIR was intended to collaborate with the OAU, which already had a neutral military observer group in Rwanda. International pressures on President Habyarimana to implement the agreement led to his assassination in April 1994 by Hutu militia,[9] a situation that plunged the country into a spiral of organised killings (genocide). The killing of the president and the eruption of armed violence provided the proximate cause for the attack on Tutsi by extremist Hutu militias in April 1994. The UN had been alerted about all of this but chose not to act upon it, partly because there were few willing TCCs, but instead the UN Security Council authorised a withdrawal from Rwanda. When the killings continued unabated through June 1994, the UN Security Council mandated France to intervene, in what was known as *Opération Turquoise* under Chapter VII.

Though UNAMIR II was re-established, the bitter truth here is that the incidents in Rwanda and the UN inaction was a big blow to the organisation's image and credibility. The Rwanda case highlighted that the UN lacked the political will to handle and resolve internal conflicts, especially those that are spiralling rapidly towards near total collapse of state authority. This is because instead of reinforcing its military presence, the organisation withdrew from its activities in the country when ten Belgian soldiers were killed. The Rwanda debacle is regarded as one of the proximate contexts for the regionalisation of conflict management under the AU.

The UN became involved in the implementation of the accord far too late, which accounted for its failures in Rwanda. The settlement was based on a naïve belief that the parties in Rwanda's conflict would abide by the provisions of a complex agreement that required them to work together amicably. From another perspective, UNAMIR's failure could not be entirely blamed on the peacekeeping force that was assigned to implement an apparently unworkable peace accord, but the institutional rigidity of the UN itself needs deeper scrutiny. This is because of the UN Secretariat's refusal to allow UNAMIR to play a completely different role instead of its original mandate of applying a liberal ideology of peacemaking to a quickly deteriorating situation (Clapham 1999). The decision of the UN not to strengthen its peacekeeping force to protect civilian populations and its eventual withdrawal also could be blamed on the major powers, because these states were not willing to embark on another offensive peace operation in Rwanda and risk losing their soldiers as the United States experienced in Somalia.

The outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1989 saw the deployment of the Nigerian-led peacekeeping and intervention force – the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to resolve the conflict. The UN deployed its peace mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1993. UNOMIL was a product of the UN Security Council Resolution 866 with the mandate to monitor and verify the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement, under

the overall supervision of ECOMOG. Tanzania and Uganda granted the OAU request by contributing troops to ECOMOG in 1993, in line with the Cotonou Agreement, which called for an expansion of ECOMOG forces with UN and OAU troops (Adebajo 2002: 56). Furthermore, to show its commitment to finding lasting peace in the conflict, the UN Secretary General appointed Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers as his special representative in Liberia in November 1992. Gordon-Somers consulted with the West African leaders and these consultations, as Addo (2005: 22) stated, underlined the political stakes of some member states of ECOWAS in the peace process. It also stressed the need for ECOWAS and Liberia's armed groups to recognise and accept the UN as a credible and impartial peace and security actor that needed to be allowed to assume an important role in the Liberian peace process.

The deployment of UNOMIL along with ECOMOG represents the pioneer UN peacekeeping experience in Africa in term co-deployment, which Francis (2006b: 106) described as providing new framework for burden and responsibility sharing between the UN and regional organisations. Despite the fact that UNOMIL/ECOMOG co-deployment produced tangible results that led to organising successful elections in 1997, Liberia relapsed into civil war in 1999 when a rebel movement, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), launched an armed attack from neighbouring Guinea in the North. Soon afterward, another rebel movement, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), emerged in the South. Between 1999 and 2003, both President Charles Taylor's government and the rebels fought fiercely for the soul of the country with the negative consequences of many deaths and societal dislocations. Regional (ECOWAS's) pressure, coupled with the United States', forced Taylor to step down and go into exile in Nigeria. A peace conference in Accra, Ghana in August 2003, attended by all the protagonists, produced a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA). The CPA called for the establishment of a National Transitional Government of Liberia. The West African peacekeeping efforts started with the deployment of a battalion from Nigeria, which later became the advanced elements of a 3,600- person ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Benin and the Gambia contributed troops to ECOMIL.[10]

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) took over from ECOMIL and re-hatted the West African peacekeepers as part of a UN multidimensional peace operation. Mandated by the UN Security Council, UNMIL is to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the Liberian peace process, provide assistance for security sector reform (SSR), as well as facilitate humanitarian and human rights assistances. UNMIL, with a force strength of up to 15,000, was able to stabilise the country and secure Monrovia, despite the fact that there were reports of occasional violence in some parts of the country. Between December 2003 and October 2004, UNMIL disarmed and demobilised 101,449 fighters.

The UN succeeded in holding elections in October and November 2005: an election that produced Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the country's president. Despite this achievement, the SSR and reintegration of ex-fighters into local communities was slow to progress due to lack of funds from the UN. Insufficient fund for SSR and the reintegration of ex-fighters increased fear of future security in the country. Thus, the UN failed to learned lessons, because one of the major reasons why Liberia relapsed into civil war in 1999 is failure to undertake SSR and give the ex-fighters means of engaging in livelihood activities. Despite these shortcomings, in 2009, the UN's Liberia demobilisation programme of 101,000 ex-fighters was completed, but this success was overshadowed with widespread youth unemployment in the country (Adebajo 2011).

In neighbouring Sierra Leone, the UN intervened in the country's ten years of civil war to keep the peace, first with the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), later with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with an expanded mandate (Adebajo 2002). The war in Sierra Leone, between the government and Fodah Sankoy's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), started in March 1991. At the initial stage of the war, the RUF was able to overpower the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLMF),[11] while the rebels captured diamond mines, the mainstay of the country's economy. By 1995, the RUF forces laid siege to the capital city, Freetown. The UN's inaction compelled the government to rely on a private military company, Executive Outcomes, to provide security, especially to defend Freetown. By late 1995, Freetown was liberated, and the rebels' headquarters were destroyed. Peace talks between the belligerents were initiated and resulted in the general elections held in February 1996 in which Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president. The ecstasy that went with the advent of democracy was cut short by a coup that ousted Kabbah (Addo 2005; Gberie 2004a).

The return of the military provided a platform for an alliance formation between the newly constituted Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF, while opposition to military rule by the international community increased. Then the Nigerian-led ECOMOG reinforced its presence in Sierra Leone and began a military offensive against the combined forces of the AFRC and RUF. The ECOMOG intervention succeeded in reinstalling Kabbah in February 1998. However, the problem did not end there, as the RUF rebels had only technically withdrawn from the battlefield and never abandoned their mission to seize the gemstone mines and control the central government (Adebajo 2002, 2011; Badmus and Ogunmola 2009; Ogunmola and Badmus 2006).

While ECOWAS had been instrumental in peacekeeping and intervention efforts right from the outset of the war, the UN became involved in February 1995 when UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali appointed Berhanu Dinka as his special representative in Sierra Leone. The special envoy was to work

in close collaboration with the OAU and ECOWAS to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the war. Prior to 1995, the UN only supported all the activities of ECOWAS without physical and direct involvement. The UN Security Council responded to the overthrow of President Kabbah with the adoption of Resolution 1132, which imposed an oil and arms embargo on the country. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1181 on 13 July 1998, paving the way for the establishment of UNOMSIL, under General Joshi Subhash from India, to, among other things, monitor the ceasefire agreed upon in the Conakry Peace Plan. These tasks and mandates were based on the erroneous belief that the RUF would respect the peace agreements. Once the agreement began, "UNOMSIL lacked the appropriate means to halt the slide into war even though it was supposed to be international society's guarantor of the peace" (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 142). This is an accurate view of the situation, as it was because UNOMSIL and ECOMOG forces watched helplessly when Freetown fell to the RUF in January 1999.

Furthermore, the UN, ECOWAS, OAU and friendly governments, all engaged in another round of negotiations. Then came the much-publicised Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA), which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and implementation of DDR programmes and provisions made for the observance of a move to peace (Fawole 2001). Moreover, at its 4054th meeting in October 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 for the establishment of UNAMSIL with 2700 troops[12] under General Vijay Jetley from India. UNAMSIL's principal mission was to see that the parties to the conflict adhered strictly to the terms of the LPA. UNAMSIL was also mandated to collaborate with ECOMOG. Ironically, the latter provision became the Achilles heel of the LPA's implementation, as UNAMSIL and ECOMOG officers were at loggerheads and excelled in buck-passing over alleged involvement in illegal possession of diamond gemstones. Despite mutual suspicion that marred the UNAMSIL and ECOMOG collaboration, the UN and ECOWAS were able to forge a common front in the implementation of the LPA. This resulted in a division of labour between the two organisations. While ECOWAS was saddled with the political aspect of conflict resolution and contributed the bulk of peacekeepers in UNAMSIL, the UN Security Council contributed financial resources and additional troops and performed political oversight functions (Adebajo 2011). Despite the fact that UNAMSIL suffered some setbacks, it was able to maintain the fragile peace in Sierra Leone, especially between 2000 and 2001. Due to the Bamako peace conference of March 2000, which put the accent on the post–conflict peacebuilding mechanism, UNAMSIL was able to disarm and demobilise quite a number of combatants while the UN was very instrumental in rehabilitating them into civil society (Ukeje 2003).

Nevertheless, UNAMSIL was bedevilled with constraints in its operations. Amongst these problems were financial and logistical constraints, coupled

with poor knowledge of the terrain by the peacekeepers (Adebajo 2011; Olonisakin 2008).[13] The rivalries between the ECOMOG and UNAMSIL headships resulted in a verbal war between the two peacekeeping groups. Worse still, UNAMSIL lost some soldiers to the RUF while the rebels kidnapped about 500 peacekeepers in May 2000. These incidents revealed the concealed vulnerability of the peacekeepers despite a Chapter VII mandate of UNAMSIL that enabled it to take offensive measures if the situation demanded such measures to be taken. Added to this flaw was the lack of political will, consensus, and inadequate funding of the operation, and the clear absence of legitimacy of the peacekeeping force. Apparently, UNAMSIL's failure can be compared to UNOSOM II, when there is a gulf between means and ends; that is, the peacekeeping force mandate expanded, but it lacked the resources to perform these gargantuan tasks. The Sierra Leonean civil war ended after a decade of fratricidal fighting. In September 2004, the responsibility for maintaining law and order was transfer to the Sierra Leonean authorities. In December 2005, the UN withdrew is troops from the country and replaced UNAMSIL with an integrated office in Sierra Leone (ONIOSIL) in January 2006 to coordinate international peace consolidation efforts and to support the Sierra Leonean authorities with the organisation of elections in 2007.

Côte d'Ivoire, once known for its political stability, descended into civil war following the failed coup d'état against the government of President Laurent Gbagbo in September 2002. Between independence in August 1960 and December 1993, the country was under President Félix Houphouët–Boigny, who operated an autocratic and patrimonial political system (Adebajo 2011; Akindès 2004). Under Houphouët–Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire was a one-party state, while political sphere was conscripted leaving the *Parti democratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) the only party in the country. The Ivorian leader had total control over the Ivorian political system while he, in continuation of the French colonial policy, opened the country's borders to immigrant populations. The immigrants, principally the Burkinabès and Malians, formed the core of cheap labour working in the cocoa, coffee, banana and pineapple plantations. The peaceful coexistence between and among different Ivorian ethnic groups (the Akan, the Mandé, the Krous, and the Voltaic people, collectively known as the Gur) and foreigners started waning, as from the 1980s, due to the decline of the Ivorian cocoa–based economy (Adebajo 2011). The death of the Ivorian leader in December 1993 heated up the polity. His successors, Henri Konan Bédié, General Robert Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo (in that order), failed to successfully manage and preserve Houphouët–Boigny's political legacy.

The demise of the president brought a crisis of succession, and this ultimately led to the institutionalisation of a state-sponsored xenophobic policy of l'*Ivoirité* by the Bedie–led government, and continued under Gueï and Gbagbo. The ideology of l'*Ivoirité,* in which the concept of citizenship is

central, is taken to mean "ideal Ivorian" or "undiluted Ivorian." Jean Pierre Dozon (2000) stated:

> the ideology of l'*Ivoirité* had a bicephalous internal component. For northerners, it called into question their origin, or rather something that would make it floating or doubtful and suitable to make the second class citizens: which the Islamic obedience of the majority often seemed to confirm by identifying them tendentiously of being stateless persons. The other side of the ideology of l'*Ivoirité* is its selective nature within the southerner's population where the Akan was adjudged the best to rule according to a nebulous classification that was deeply rooted in colonial policy.

Thus, it is clear that l'*Ivoirité* was conceived and designed purposely as a strategy of political exclusion with the self-serving interests of protecting the Akan hegemony and the domination of political power by the Baoulé (the dominant ethnic group among the Akan people) to the exclusion of others. L'*Ivoirité* discriminated against Ivorians of mixed parentage (Akindès 2004) and "foreigners" or migrants, a majority of whom were born in Côte d'Ivoire or had lived there for many years. Therefore, with the institutionalisation of l'*Ivoirité* as a state policy, former Ivorian Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara was disqualified and excluded from contesting presidential elections. Ouattara's disqualification was based on a reported allegation that one of his parents was born in Upper Volta (present day Burkina Faso). The exclusion of Ouattara brought about the wrath of his northern Muslim supporters, who felt alienated. Gbagbo won the presidential election, which was boycotted by most people in the north of the country, in late 2000. He subsequently dismissed about 200 soldiers, mostly northern, from the army. These tensions eventually culminated in a coup attempt largely by northern officers in September 2002 (Adebajo 2011). As a result of the failed coup, the country was divided in two: the government-controlled South and the rebel-controlled North.[14] Soon afterwards, the conflict turn out to be brutal, with many dead, while its socioeconomic and humanitarian impact on Côte d'Ivoire and neighbouring countries became enormous. The regional dynamics of the conflict were such that Gbagbo accused both Burkina Faso and Charles Taylor's Liberia of supporting the rebels and destabilising his country, while Monrovia also fingered Gbagbo for backing MODEL, which was fighting Taylor's government. Moreover, both the Ivorian government and the rebels employed the services of Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters with negative consequences of heightened tensions along Ivorian-Liberian border. Thus, the intractability of the conflict saw ECOWAS's mediation efforts in top gear. The West Africans' peacemaking interventions in Ghana and Togo, coupled with France's, produced the Linas-Marcoussis accord in January 2003. The accord called for a ceasefire, the establishment of a

Government of National Reconciliation, with the mandate to disarm the rebels and organise elections (Ogunmola and Badmus 2004). Subsequently, France deployed *Opération Licorne*, with nearly 4,600 troops to monitor the ceasefire. Soon afterwards, ECOWAS deployed ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in early 2003, with troops from Ghana, Benin, Niger, Togo and Senegal. ECOMICI was equipped and bankrolled mainly by Paris, with other logistics and financial support, from Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Then the UN's involvement came with the UN Security Council authorisation of a political assistance mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI). In February 2004, MINUCI gave way to a 6,240 strong UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) with the mandate to implement the Linas-Marcoussis accord, disarm 26,000 rebel fighters and 4,000 government forces, and in collaboration with the *Licorne* troops, maintain a "zone of confidence" between the government and the rebel forces. ECOMICI troops were re-hatted later and became part of the UNOCI contingent comprising military and civilians (Adebajo 2011: 153).

Despite constant attacks and limits on the freedom of movement of UN peacekeepers by the government-backed militias and angry youths that were in support of Gbagbo, UNOCI succeeded in organising elections in October 2010. The elections ended in a stalemate when Gbagbo lost the election and refused to step down. ECOWAS, AU and UN and the broader international community recognised Gbagbo's political rival, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, as the winner and asked Gbagbo to quit. With Gbagbo's refusal to hand over power to Ouattara, Côte d'Ivoire's memberships of ECOWAS and AU were suspended, while ECOWAS threatened Gbagbo with force to help Ouattara, who had the legitimacy to assume the presidency. During this period, the country witnessed fierce ethnic and religiously motivated battles between the pro-Gbagbo's South and pro-Ouattara's North. At the UN, the P-5 were divided, with the United States and France demanding that Gbagbo leave, while both Russia and China, driven by their economic interests in Côte d'Ivoire, supported Gbagbo. With the political impasse, coupled with UNOCI's sparse attention to the post-election crisis when it stuck to the holy trinity of traditional peacekeeping despite its Chapter VII mandate, rebels, under the name the Republican Forces (with the help of the French soldiers and UNOCI forces) captured Gbagbo in April 2011. All said, it is important to emphasise that, although UNOCI played significant roles in Côte d'Ivoire, it failed to protect civilians during the post-election crisis, in which an estimated 1,500 people were killed and about one million people were internally displaced (Adebajo 2011).

From the analysis of the UN peacekeeping experiences in the post-Cold War African conflicts, it is apparent that the records are mixed. While the UN has failed on a number of occasions – as its high-profile failures in Somalia and Rwanda have shown – it was able to achieve successes in such places as Namibia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique. The reasons for most of

these failures are multifaceted, ranging from wholly security-driven and inadequate mandates, confusion over the rules of engagement, lack of political will, inadequate resources and logistics, and lack of civil society agency involvement among others. I examine these challenges in details in the next section.

Problems of UN peacekeeping in Africa's armed conflicts

The UN peacekeeping record in African conflicts is mixed of shortcomings and successes. The sources of fundamental problems that confront the UN's effectiveness in solving some of the post-Cold War Africa's internal wars is located within the context of the way peacekeeping was conceptualised and its *ad hoc* nature and also the problems posed by the nature of internal wars.

First, the basic rules of traditional UN peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence) seems to be less relevant in civil wars and also in the face of the demands of the post-Cold War world. In a virulent civil war situation, it becomes difficult to establish and maintain a ceasefire. State failure has resulted in state collapse with no recognised functioning state authority to negotiate with in the first place, coupled with the existence of numerous non-state armed groups that filled the vacuum created by the absence of a functioning government and state institutions, as in Somalia. In this war context, the United Nations is very unlikely to obtain the consent of all parties before launching a peacekeeping operation. Aside from the problems of consent and impartiality, the principle of non-use of force in peace operations has also been subjected to intense debate as to whether or not peacekeepers should use force in combating situations where there is increasing hostility towards UN personnel from at least one of the parties to the conflict. Since the changing contours of peacekeeping requires peacekeepers to be involved in a multiplicity of tasks and sometimes to enforce peace in hostile civil war situations, the use of limited/partial force could be regarded and interpreted as an unavoidable departure from traditional peacekeeping operations occasioned by, and necessary in responding to, virulent internal wars. Explaining the importance of the use of force by peacekeepers, Neethling (2009: 4) contends that UNPROFOR is the first force to include mechanised infantry battle groups for the purpose of high-intensity combat operations. Also, members of multinational forces began applying force to disarm rival factions. While the shift from traditional peacekeeping to contemporary peace operations has necessitated the use of force by peacekeepers, it is important to emphasise that such action poses dangers to the UN's impartiality, and it has the propensity to undermine the sovereignty of the state in question.

The second recurring challenge to UN peacekeeping in internal armed conflicts, particularly in Africa, could be described as operational problems. The UN peacekeeping operational problems emanate from the creation and

interpretation of peacekeeping mandates at the UN headquarters. More often than not, mandates are too nebulous, not really taking into account the complexity of conflict they are meant to resolve, especially where belligerents' consents to peace operations are not forthcoming, particularly in Somalia in the 1990s. Unclear mandates are often understood differently by the TCCs, while vague mandates jeopardise the key principles of peacekeeping. According to Malone and Thakur (2001: 12), the importance of having clear mandates that match up with resources (both military and financial) and establishing performance yardsticks has long been recognised, but they are seldom followed.

The mandates of the peace missions, which provide legitimacy to intervention, must be feasible and achievable. A realistic and achievable mandate is one with provisions based on a worst-case threat assessment and more importantly reflects political reality on the ground. Such a realistic mandate needs to clearly state the mission's purpose and tasks, the roles of the special representative of the UN Secretary General, and conditions under which force may be used. Mandate becomes achievable once it is well matched with the political realities of the situation, mirroring the stakeholders' commitment (which includes the parties to the conflicts) and sufficient resources to achieve its mandate. Feasible mandates are a prerequisite for a successful peace operation because mandates rooted in pragmatic worst-case planning have a higher propensity to secure peace and save human lives (Smith with Dee 2003). Any intervention without an achievable mandate is tantamount to self-immolation and could be regarded as morally irresponsible. For a peace mission to be successful in achieving its objectives, it has to be based on clear, feasible and pragmatic political goals. A peace operation has the tendency to succeed when it is conceived in political term as being opposed to military terms with a final end-state and exit strategy. It should be realised that there is a clear-cut dichotomy between end-state and end-date interpretations. This is because:

> There is an understandable temptation for member states to declare victory early and to confuse initial with sustainable success. The end-state and exit strategy should be clear from the start of the mission, but the end-date may require continual adjustment based on the mission's progress and the ability of the local authorities to assume the responsibilities of nationhood. It may take some time, therefore, before an end-date can be confirmed, and too great a focus on an early end-date may increase the prospect of a failed state. (Smith with Dee 2003: 100)

What this portends is that for any successful peace operation, military activities must always support political objectives. This is probably why Clausewitz argues that war is the continuation of power politics by other means. In a nutshell, military action is the means to an end not an end in itself.

UN peacekeeping is also challenged in the areas of logistics and coordination. In many UN operations in African conflicts, especially at the end of the Cold War, there have been inadequate communications between the Force headquarters and UN headquarters. Control and chains of command remain ambiguous and complicated in many peace operations where peacekeepers rely on operational guidance from their national authorities rather than from the UN mission Force Commander, a situation that undermines the degree of UN control over field missions. Using systematic comparative analysis, Howard (2008: 2), in her study of UN peacekeeping and civil wars, unveils the fundamental issue of command, control and communication in peace operations, and she argues that UN peace missions are more likely to be successful when the peacekeepers are actively learning from the conflict environment in which they are operating. The kernel of Howard's argument is that UN peacekeeping succeeds when there is a substantial degree of autonomy from UN headquarters on the part of field missions. This has the advantage of allowing field personnel to fiddle with the post-civil war environment. By contrast, UN peacekeeping failures emanate from operational instructions originating in UN headquarters, which are always devised in relation to higher-level political disputes with little relevance to the civil war in question (Howard 2008). Howard's argument explains why UNOSOM II failed to achieve its mandate. Finally, she surmises that the way out of this problem for UN peace operation is that future reforms should be oriented towards devolving decision-making power to the field missions. Peacekeeping is also challenged by the lack of coordination between civilian and military components in field missions despite the complementarity and mutually reinforcing roles of the two sides in peace operations. They are motivated by different goals and instructed by different chains of command.

Another important problem confronting peacekeeping that has been largely overlooked in peacekeeping studies concerns culture and the impact of cultural differences on peace operations. UN peace operations are multinational in composition and executed in a transnational way across many, and often diverse, cultures. Every member of a peacekeeping mission (both military and civilian) is regarded as part of a cultural framework that provides the context within which their beliefs and actions are constructed and interpreted (Duffey 1998: 18). The intermixing of different cultures often creates problems of understanding in UN peace operations, impairs operational effectiveness and has a negative impact on missions' outcomes. Each UN peacekeeping force is multinationally composed with different states, each with its own operational procedures, rules of engagement, military doctrines and strategies, training (Holt and Shanahan 2005: 30), and this poses serious challenges in the relationship between the military and civilian components in peace operations that have organisational cultural variations, especially in relation to decision-making and operation

methods. Also differences in the cultures of peacekeepers and local populations have fundamental impacts on the success and failure of UN peace operations in Africa's wars. Lack of proper understanding of the social and cultural dynamics of conflict environment by peacekeepers and decision makers at UN headquarters has the propensity to spell doom for peace operations. Thus, peacekeepers need to take into account and be sensitive to the customs of local populations. Howard's analysis captures the problems of UN peace operation in Africa when she asserts:

> UN peacekeeping tends to be more successful when the peacekeepers are actively learning from the environment in which they are deployed. In other words, rather than seeking to impose preconceived notions about how the missions should unfold, peacekeeping is at its best when the peacekeepers – both civilian and military – take their cues from the local populations, and not UN headquarters, about how best to implement mandates. (2008: 2)

Lack of proper understanding of Somalia's conflict environment and the culture of the local population partly explain the peacekeeping and peace enforcement failures of the UN and the United States in the 1990s, where what could be described as "culturally inappropriate strategies of intervention" were conceived and implemented in a conflict setting where the UN lacked understanding of local culture and customs. To avoid the reoccurrence of this situation in future operations, the UN needs to put emphasis on pre-deployment training of peacekeepers, to formulate culturally sensitive peacekeeping policy, and to educate peacekeepers on the cultures of local populations. Moreover, UN peace operations are widely regarded as unreliable in Africa because of late response to African conflicts.[15] UN interventions were not prompt in Somalia and Rwanda, while Khartoum's obstructions to the deployment of UN peacekeepers (UNAMID) are noted; it took more than four years between the outbreak of conflict in Darfur and UN peacekeeping involvement (see Chapter 6).

Financing UN peacekeeping is problematic and becomes one of the principal challenges to the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. The quantitative and qualitative increase in peace operations has increased the costs of peacekeeping. But funding UN peacekeeping proves more difficult due to lack of political will, since most member states do not pay their share of peacekeeping costs when due, or they pay in arrears. In 2013 for example, 81 per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget was covered by the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the EU member states (Tardy 2013). Despite the lack of political will, peacekeeping is highly cost effective when compared to money spent by states on armaments. It is estimated that, between 1948 and 1992, the UN spent $8.3 billion on peacekeeping; this amount remains insignificant compared

to about $30 trillion spent on national security needs by states, globally, during this period (Renner 1993: 29). Lack of financial backing has led to a peacekeeping budgetary crisis that has compelled the world body to cut its peacekeeping budget from $3.5 billion in 1994 to $3.2 billion in 1995, with a further cut to $1.3 billion in 1996 (Deen 1997: 17). It was further reduced to $1 billion in 1998; it later increased in the 1999–2000 period and reached almost $3 billion in the budgetary cycle from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001 (UN Department of Public Information 2001). But due to increased demand for peacekeeping, the UN peacekeeping budget was nearly $7 billion in the 2007–2008 periods (Neethling 2009: 7), while the approved resources for the period from 1 July 2009 to June 2010 cost $7.87 billion (UN Department of Public Information 2010). From July 2013 to June 2014, the peacekeeping budget amounted to $7.54 billion (Tardy 2013). This has serious impact on UN peacekeeping effectiveness, especially in Africa. For as Vogt (1997) suggests, with reference to Somalia, sometimes a peacekeeping mandate is not backed up with sufficient resources. Financing peace operations need to be taken seriously by UN member states in order to overcome a possible UN peacekeeping budgetary crisis that poses vexing challenges to UN peace operations, especially in Africa. This is one of the principal recommendations of the Brahimi Report on United Nations Reform of 2000. All these need to be improved upon for UN peace operations in Africa to succeed, and also serve as lessons for the AU in its efforts to operationalise APSA and expand its peacekeeping agenda and capacities.

Regionalising peace operations

My epistemological point of departure in the regional peace operations' discourse is to, first, examine what regional organisations are and highlight their legal basis in the UN Charter. Then, I examine the strengths and weaknesses of regional arrangements involved in mounting peace operations, especially in Africa based on the pro and con arguments of the various advocates and sceptics of regional peace operations. To start with, what are these regional organisations?

The regional organisations

Regional agencies/arrangements formed part of the UN system right from its inception in 1945. In the lead up to the UN's formation, especially during the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, a regionalist vision and conception of the post-Second World War international order was championed by the Latin American states. The effort of the Latin Americans was to counter the globalist idea of world order as a way of checking the hegemony of Great Powers and, especially the United States and its veto powers, which could make them defenceless in case of an armed aggression against any member of the South American region

(Arend 1996: 9–10; Durward 2006: 358). Therefore, the Latin Americans' insistence on the inclusion of regionalism in the UN framework was predicated on the belief that such efforts would promote the idea of collective defence rather than collective security where a coalition (group) of states will stand against a common external threat. Fawcett (2003: 13) described the quest for regionalism in the UN framework as a "Vehicle of Containment" of the Great Powers. While regional arrangements found a place in the Charter, the global idea/vision eventually formed the basis of the UN system and its Charter that makes the UN Security Council the custodian of international peace and security, and the role of regional agencies become subsidiary to UN Security Council's in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Regional agencies within the Charter's framework undertake a broad range of roles, especially their primacy over peaceful settlement of dispute (Article 33 (1)). In addition, they may be called upon by the UN Security Council to act under Article 53 (1), to conduct enforcement action under the council's authority, but it also warns that such enforcement shall not be conducted by regional arrangement without a Security Council mandate. However, Article 54 of the UN Charter stresses that the council must be kept abreast of regional agencies' activities, especially in the sphere of peace and security. Although, regional conflict management roles of regional arrangements are stated in the Charter, the recent trend has been that regional arrangements embark on peace operations and enforcement actions without the Security Council's authorisation, a practice that deviates from the founding principles, and is a derogation, under the UN Charter.[16] This practice is prevalent in Africa, where ECOWAS, for example, deployed peacekeeping and intervention forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone without UN Security Council's mandate. This situation may have prompted Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 305) to argue that "despite this relatively clear framework, in practice the legal bases both for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations and for peacekeeping and enforcement action by regional organisations have not been made clear within the resolutions of either the UN Security Council or the organisations concerned."

AU: We have capitalized "council" when it is part of "Security Council" or "UN Security Council" but lowercased when it is "the council/a council". Hope this is ok.

While this problem is noted, it becomes more challenging because a regional organisation does not have a conceptual definition/clarification in the Charter,[17] which raises the issue of conceptual ambiguity, allowing different types of organisations with different memberships and agenda/mandates, as per peace and security, to operate under the broad rubric of regional arrangements, as well as posing challenges for the legal basis for cooperation among UN and regional agencies. Lack of definition of the regional organisation has resulted in different interpretations of what it means from the point of view of scholars and peacekeeping practitioners. Equally problematic, as Angelov (2010: 601) highlights, is that there is lack of consensus as to which regional organisations can be considered able to function under regional arrangements based on the UN Charter. For his part, Pugh

(2003: 31) argued that the idea of a regional organisation's involvement under the UN Charter is restricted to formal international organisations that "occupy a security space between national and global levels" while Durward (2006: 352) maintains that regional organisations are those agencies that "act in the interest of a region." The main point of divergence in these definitions is that Pugh's is much narrower, for it excludes ad hoc coalitions and is not in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter. On the other hand, Durward's definition draws attention to the fact that regional organisations can conduct operations outside their geographical sphere, meaning outside the region in which they are located or from which they originate. Although this study is not about developing a conceptual framework for regionalisation, nevertheless it postulates that a valid regional organisation must conform to Article 52 (1) of the UN Charter, which stipulates: "such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." Therefore, based on different perspectives on and interpretations of regionalisation, I adopt Gorman's (2008: 4) definition of a regional peace operation: "The deployment of military, police and civilian personnel by any formally mandated organisation that can plausibly operate under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, irrespective of whether it operates within or outside its geographic theatre, but excluding any ad hoc coalition of the willing."

Having provided a conceptual framework for analysing regionalisation and regional peace operations, I focus next on the pro and con arguments of regionalised peace operations in relation to the African region.

Questioning regional peace operations in relation to Africa

The growing instances of armed conflicts around the globe following the end of the Cold War provided a context for the upsurge of regional operations. Angelov (2010: 602–606) provides a bifocal perspective on the increase in regional peace operations as being both demand and supply-driven. His argument is that the new international political context demands a greater role for regional organisations in maintaining peace and security due to a plethora of deadly armed conflicts, especially in the immediate post-Cold War context. The new international political environment saw UN activism in peacekeeping with an increasing UN Security Council's enthusiasm to mandate complex missions but unfortunately by outstripping the UN's ability and resources to undertake "UN-led military and military-related field operations" (Durch 2006: 597). Angelov's supply-driven argument is about the keenness of regional organisations to maintain peace and security based on the principle of subsidiarity and the strengths of regional bodies in peacekeeping in comparison with the UN.

Regional organisations' greater involvement in peace operations leads us to the debates of sceptics and optimists in relation to the practicability and effectiveness of regionalised peace operations with African experiences.

Having been involved in many peace operations in virulent African conflicts, it is important to examine whether these African institutions have done so well securing Africa and to highlight the advantages and problems of regional peace operations. While regionalisation of peace operations is recognised by the UN Charter, such regio-sceptics as Boutros-Ghali (1992),[18] Dorne (1998) and Urquhart (1999) contend that such an approach should not be seen as a substitute for UN-led peacekeeping missions. According to the sceptics, although the burden-sharing argument advanced by Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* (1992) that "regional actions, a matter of decentralisations, delegations and cooperation with United Nations efforts as means of easing the burden on the Council" is appealing, the regional approach to conflict management is not the best option due to some inherent problems associated with it. In fact, Boutros-Ghali (1999) is vociferous in condemning this approach as dangerous, for it is an idea that goes against the internationalist foundation of the UN, while Williams (2008) in his critiques of the "African Solutions" idea unveils the problems of regional peacekeeping. First, the argument advanced by advocates of regionalisation of peacekeeping that a regional organisations' geographical closeness to conflict theatres and regional actors' familiarity with the roots of the conflicts and sociocultural and historical affinity give regional institutions comparative advantages over the UN in being able to quickly respond to regional conflicts is debunked by regional-sceptics. They contend that the advantages of geographical and cultural proximity, although they deliver the benefits of being able to provide regional organisations and actors with a clear understanding of conflict patterns and the belligerents and of the best context-specific management options, arguably have always been counter-productive. Critics like Ibok (2000) argue that close proximity always leads to tension, and it undermines the spirit of impartiality among neighbours, which in the long-run increases conflict intensity, as regional actors become involved. Regional-sceptics such as Dorne (1998), Ghebremeskel (2002) and Jackson (2000) question the sincerity and intentions of regional actors in regional conflicts because they tend to put their national self-interests, in terms of political and military gain, above regional interests. Reinforcing the above argument on the interface between the impartiality of regional peacekeepers and national interests of a regional super power, Coulon and Liégeois (2010: 21) contend that it is difficult for regional institutions to meet the condition of impartiality, for the regional hegemon(s) will seldom be indifferent to the outcome of a conflict breaking out within their area of interest. Hence, the argument follows that a regional power can hardly be credited with the impartiality needed to play the role of a third party. The criticisms against the Nigerian-led peacekeeping and intervention operations in Liberia, which Adebajo (2003a) referred to as "hegemonic peacekeeping," and also in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, seem to uphold the regional-sceptics argument (see Ogunmola and Badmus 2006) for Nigeria,

the regional hegemon, was criticised for using the ECOMOG operations to further its own interests.

The regional-sceptics argue that the existence of regional hegemonic power players within a region and/or sub-regional formation makes nonsense of regionalised peace operations. It is obvious that regional hegemons provide regional institutions with leadership and resources in peace operations; overreliance on regional hegemonic powers is problematic, as the ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) experiences have shown. The dependency of ECOWAS on Nigeria and SADC on South Africa could be regarded as the source of uneasiness for these institutions. Drawing on this argument, Franke (2006a: 3) asserts that it is not only that the peace and security agendas of regional (and sub-regional) institutions are being influenced by the domestic realities and national interests of these hegemonic states instead of the collective interests of member states of regional groupings, but also it will be difficult for regional organisations to respond to conflicts that involve hegemonic states. This was the situation in which Nigeria intervened in Sierra Leone without the approval of ECOWAS. The West African institution's approval came three months after Nigerian troops had entered Sierra Leone, and this unilateral action makes the organisation a tool of Nigerian domination in the eyes of ECOWAS member states (Adebajo 2003b; Berman and Sams 2000). This makes regionalism even more difficult to negotiate when there are recognised hegemonic players who have demonstrated that they are willing to act unilaterally.

Many regional-sceptics blame the futility of African-authorised peace operations on the weak economies and underdeveloped nature of African states. This relates to the fact that many (if not all) African organisations lack the required capabilities or experience to organise and lead multi-dimensional peace operations without external support. Equally, most regional organisations lack peacekeeping capacities (experience, resources and bureaucratic structures) to be effective and credible peacekeeping actors (Goulding 2002; Guéhenno 2002; Williams 2008: 321). Many African countries lack resources and technical aspects of contemporary peace operations in the areas of training, logistics, interoperability and sustained readiness.

Contrasting with the regional-sceptics' arguments, optimists have raised many points in defence of regional peace operations, as they see nothing wrong in regional actors viewing conflicts through the lens of narrow national self-interests as long as intervention is legitimate. Advocates contend that regional actors' interventions can be motivated by the desire to halt the spill over effects of regional conflicts onto their territories and also to prevent the massive influx of refugees. Once regional intervention aims at preventing or at least mitigating the contagion effects of conflicts,

optimists assert that intervention is legitimate. Franke (2006a: 5) argues forcefully that "by having a greater stake in the resolution of the conflict such countries are likely to be more determined, exhibit greater staying power and accept occasional humiliation more easily than a neutral and more distant outsider."

In defending regional peace operations, especially in Africa, Juma and Mengistu (2002) argue that it is easier to muster political will (and more expedient decision-making) to intervene among regional actors than among the international community, and thereby to fill the gaps created by the catastrophic track records of the international community's interventions in African conflicts. The new security architecture being developed by the AU attests to the increasing viability of and reliance on regionalised peace operations in Africa. The debate between the regional-sceptics and optimists in relation to regional peace operations within the framework of the APSA, AU's peace operations, and in line with the African Solutions idea, will be fully developed and discussed in the analytical chapters of this book, which are organised into case studies that examine the APSA and various peacekeeping operations in a bid to better understand peace and security mechanisms in Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the concept, evolution and practice of peacekeeping. It then analysed UN's peacekeeping experiences in Africa and the effectiveness (or otherwise) of regional peace operations in relations to African institutions. By doing so, I established that the UN's peacekeeping record in dealing with African conflicts are a mixture of successes and failures due to a number of problems that these missions had to contend with. I also established that the patterns of Africa's armed conflicts, and also those in different parts of the world, pose significant challenges to peacekeeping. Going by the way it was conceptualised, the holy trinity of the traditional peacekeeping model is not always applicable when dealing with today's conflicts, especially in the African context. The application of these principles to contemporary African conflicts often results in UN peacekeeping failures. The failures of UN peacekeeping in some African conflicts, such as Rwanda and Somalia, due to problems inherent to the UN as an organisation, coupled with the seemingly lack of interest of the major powers or the rest of the world to send their troops to UN peace operations in Africa, explain the need for Africa to look inward to provide solutions to its problems. This is one of the main reasons for the transformation of the OAU into the AU. Furthermore, regionalisation and regionalised peace operations offer some benefits to address conflicts, especially in the African context, but its sceptics have made compelling arguments against this approach to

conflict management. Accordingly, this book examines the extent to which regional peacekeeping operations are capable of effectively managing African conflicts through Africa's efforts and forces. Therefore, in the next chapter, I examine the rise of African Union regionalism and set the stage for the analysis of the emerging peace and security architecture in Africa in Chapter 3.

2
The Rise of African Union Regionalism

Introduction

From the end of the Cold War, despite the perceived marginalisation of Africa in the post-Cold War international system, there are two discernible trends in the regionalisation of conflict management in Africa. The first development is the growing partnership between the UN and Africa's organisations in burden and responsibility sharing in maintaining regional peace and security in Africa. The second development is the emergence of what could be described as assertive regionalism on the African continent.[1] These two trends, put together, have had great impact on and have shaped Africa's political and security landscapes, especially in the area of peace operations. Inquiry into and understanding of both these developments are important to this study. This understanding is possible through an examination of the rise and roles of the leading pan-African organisation – that is, the OAU and its successor, the AU – in addressing African conflicts through regional security frameworks.

To this purpose, I examine the emergence of African Union regionalism and regional peace and security issues in Africa in this chapter. I analyse the historical contexts within which the AU evolved, and the reasons for the transformation of the OAU into the AU in the face of the manifold debilitating political and security developments in Africa. Therefore, I explore the history of the OAU by charting its course right from the period of Pan-Africanism and the struggle for decolonisation in Africa. Through this retrospective journey, the chapter engages in the discussions of the OAU's security structures for addressing African conflicts. This is important because a clear understanding of the OAU's successes and/or failures in establishing the appropriate security frameworks for maintaining regional peace and what lessons can be learned from these efforts in order to explain why the transformation into the AU was imperative at the time. Through the lenses of the neorealist perspectives on regionalism, I investigate the extent to which the OAU/AU regionalism has been able to tackle Africa's security challenges.

I also introduce the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in this chapter, while I devote the next chapter to a comprehensive study of this security mechanism to ascertain the degree to which the budding regionalisation of conflict management in Africa provides a framework for building an effective regional peace and security system on the continent.

Regionalism as a framework for regional order, peace and security

The phenomenon of regionalism provides a useful analytical framework to study Africa's efforts in maintaining regional security. The concept of regionalism has gained wider currency in the international political economy literature,[2] but regionalism as related to international politics and peace and security matters is often associated with neorealist scholars (Lamy 2008: 126) with their state-centric interpretation of regional integration. Bach (2003: 22) defines regionalism as "idea, ideology, policies and goals that seek to transform a geographical area into a clearly identified social space. (It) also relates to the construction of an identity and carries as a result, a strong cognitive component." A regional integrationist project entails the creation of official arrangements and institution-building together with the implementation of agreed upon programmes and strategies. Neorealist perspectives on regionalism are based on the assumption of the existence of regional security threats that need to be confronted by regional hegemon(s) for the stability of the region. Since neorealism leans heavily on the state-centric representations of regional integration, it assumes that states are the primary actors in international relations and enter into security cooperation as a strategy to counter external security threats. To the neorealists, regionalism in the state's calculation is a useful political tool to achieve its national interests and maximise power.[3] Since international politics is characterised by the states' struggles for power, prestige and wealth in a competitive international system and amid conditions of global anarchy, states are motivated to join regionalist projects because of the benefits, either in term of relative or absolute gains, that they expect to derive from such projects. Therefore:

> Due to the existence of security complexes, regional hegemons may assume the role of security provider or guarantor, and hence control regional stability and order. The regional hegemon may also provide "protection" from assumed security threats, but this inevitably creates power asymmetries because the weaker states in any regional security or military alliance may have to accept subordinate roles. (Francis 2006a: 119)

The leadership roles played by the dominant state in a regionalist project are to ensure regional stability. Regional hegemon derives its power from economic and military dominance. The stability of the system is threatened

when the hegemon loses its dominant position (Kohout 2003). While the preservation and continuation of its domineering status becomes the priority of the hegemonic state, these self-imposed roles can be counterproductive as power relations are not static. The disequilibrium occasioned by the changing power distribution against the hegemon often results in the rise of a challenger. Also friction may ensue among members of the regional integration project, for small and weaker states of the regional arrangement may form a common front to check the hegemonic ambitions of the dominant state. To avoid this situation, the regional hegemon commits and expends a significant proportion of its resources to maintain the status quo. Also due to the exorbitant cost of maintaining the system, the situation results to declining growth rates, and eventually makes the hegemon lose its leadership position. With the weakening of the resource base of the hegemon, power shifts to other states (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1966).

The neorealists agreed that regional organisations have little influence on state actions and international relations. This assumption seems to be at variance with the prevailing situation in Africa. This is because, as Francis (2006a: 119) rightly argued "the emerging economic and security regionalisms have developed an institutional form and life of their own and have demonstrated time and again the ability and capacity to influence states' actions and interstate relations, especially in the field of regional peacekeeping and peace support operations."

The post-Cold War international system has necessitated the emergence of a new regionalism approach. Like the old regionalism that started in the 1950s, the new regionalism is rooted in the global transformation that involves, according to Hettne and Söderbaum (2002): (1) the move from bipolarity towards a multipolar or perhaps tripolar structure, with a new division of power and new division of labour; (2) the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a more permissive attitude on the part of the United States towards regionalism; (3) the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of interdependence and globalisation; (4) the changed attitudes towards (neo-liberal) economic development and political systems in the developing countries, as well as in the post-communist countries (see also Hettne and Söderbaum 1998). The new regionalism thesis confronts Westphalia's state-centric interpretation of international relations in that while the position of the state is still very significant in the international system, it should be seen as an important but not as sole actor in the international system. The new regionalism approach recognises the significance of non-state actors in the regionalisation process. Contrary to the official, state-sponsored regional process, the new regionalism paradigm places emphasis on a series of informal socioeconomic, cultural and political, and security linkages led by the market and society that constitute a new form of regionalisation process. This informal, bottom-up – as opposed to top-down – form of regionalism provides possible solutions to

the numerous socioeconomic, political, environmental and developmental problems confronting states and human society. The insights gained from the regionalism and hegemonic theses can be used to explain the AU's roles in African security and the rationale behind the conduct of some hegemonic states in intra-African international relations.

Pan-Africanism, competing regionalisms and the road to the Organisation of African Unity

Africans quests for collective identity and dignity, human freedom and decolonisation, are rooted in what is known as Pan-Africanism that eventually resulted in the formation of the OAU on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Pan-Africanism represents an ideological framework and a movement that seeks to achieve a pan-African unity. It served, during its heyday, as a political weapon in the struggle to liberate Africa from the shackles of European colonialism. It was believed that the idea of African unity would be used to mobilise the African people to confront Western imperialism and bring about a genuine self-rule on the continent (Amate 1986; Esedebe 1994). While pan-Africanism was employed as a framework to deconstruct colonialism, it also served, starting from the late 1950s and early 1960s, as a vehicle to find appropriate solutions to a plethora of security and developmental problems faced by the newly independent African states (Sesay 2008: 10). However, the pan-African unity project was confronted with challenges, as two conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable traditions emerged within the pan-African movement, especially in the political discourse of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

First, there were those leaders who subscribed to the idea of an organic political union of independent African states, with the United States as a model. Kwame Nkrumah, the founding president of Ghana, championed this radical regional integration idea, which the so-called progressive African leaders at the time such as Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Kéïta of Mali also supported. To prove their point on the negative consequences of colonialism on Africa and the importance of a political union, the radical leaders argued that the division and the artificial boundary-splitting of African countries were senseless, as they had been arbitrarily drawn and foisted on Africa by the European colonialists. This arbitrary creation of African states was, Nkrumah opined, antithetical to Africa's political and socioeconomic development, for such a partition of the continent into numerous fragile nation-states would lay the foundation of societal disunity, political and ethno-religious conflicts with all their fissiparous traits of economic underdevelopment, poverty and marginalisation (Nkrumah 1963). Consequently, Nkrumah called for the establishment of a political union to coordinate the continent's economic, military and sociocultural activities in order to guarantee Africa's future. The progressive leaders believed that African

unity could be best achieved through the formation of an All-African Union Government, for in the absence of a political union under a pan-African authority, the continent's balkanisation would make Africa a fertile ground for the European colonialists and the super powers' spheres of influence, and this situation would encourage vertical as opposed to horizontal links, since African countries would have close cooperation with their former colonial masters at the expense of intra- and inter-African integration, with the overall negative consequence of putting African unity in jeopardy. This group of leaders rejected the idea that African unity and integration could be achieved via the establishment of multiple and competing sub-regional groupings in Africa. This is because such a sub-regional bloc system would serve as a framework to divide the continent with even more European competition for spheres of influence in order to further their self-interests in Africa. Thus, a continental political authority could safeguard African interests and independence, and prevent the neo-colonial design of the erstwhile colonial powers.

To realise the African unity objective, Nkrumah hosted numerous conferences, among which were the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) (April 1958), the All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) (December 1958) and the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) (1959). These efforts served as a pathway to the emergence of a number of regional institutional constructs, which were expected to serve as the foundation of a United States of Africa. First, there was the emergence of the Ghana-Guinea Union in 1959. Mali later joined the union in 1960, and it became the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (later known as the Union of African States – UAS). In 1961, the UAS member states met in Casablanca, along with the United Arab Republic,[4] Morocco, Libya and Algeria;[5] adopted and formed what was known as the African States of the Casablanca Charter (also known as the Casablanca group of states). The UAS aimed at developing and strengthening cooperation between member states of the union politically, diplomatically, economically and culturally and also to harmonise the domestic and foreign policy of members. Despite the UAS's lofty goals, it was majorly preoccupied with political, military and diplomatic activities while the socioeconomic functions were relegated to the background. This leaning towards security and political issues was even confirmed with the inclusion of the proposal for the establishment of a Joint African High Command (JAHC) in the Charter of the Casablanca Powers.

From a different perspective, the second group was against the idea of a continental government for Africa. Instead, they called for a gradual (or a functionalist) approach to integration. This group, variously known as the Monrovia, Brazzaville or Lagos Group,[6] viewed Nkrumah's continental government and federalist visions for Africa as attempts to actualise the personal ambition of the Ghanaian leader to rule Africa. Consequently, the group called for Africa's close collaboration in non-contentious areas in

the sociocultural, economic, education, health and agricultural domains. The Monrovia group's conception of cooperation was that African unity represents nothing more than an agreement among African states to safeguard their newly won political freedom in interstate relations. According to this group, African unity should not be interpreted to mean political integration of independent states within the context of a constitutionally unified continent, but "unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity" (Chimelu 1977: 1964). In a nutshell, the conservative Monrovia group preferred regional socioeconomic cooperation and functional integration that would, hopefully, serve as the building blocks of African unity. According to Barnett (1998), these conflicting traditions and the ideological divide within the pan-African movement compelled African leaders into a symbolic competition with one another, each trying to outwit the others in terms of pan-African credentials.

Despite the differences in ideology, the African unity goal and the pursuit of ending colonial rule served as glue that bound African leaders and pushed forward the zeal to form a continental organisation that is the OAU, to act as a vehicle for the realisation of these objectives. As Franke (2007) emphasises, although not all African governments and liberation movements buy the basis of the African unity idea, the pan-Africanism rhetoric served as an instrument of anti-colonial struggles and created a sense of self-confidence, and therefore, the political basis for inter-African cooperation. It was also envisaged that the OAU would provide a genuine platform and catalyst for the newly independent African countries' participation in international relations.

The institutionalisation of pan-Africanism: the Organisation of African Unity – vision, aims and institutions

The OAU formation could be described as the manifestation of the institutionalisation of pan-African ideas and ideals, and Africa's foremost attempt at regionalism. The OAU was the product of a development that took at least six years. The pan-African organisation originated from a social movement towards African unity that expressed itself in many organisational forms from 1957. The OAU epitomised an end result of the efforts at finding a middle ground, a compromise of some sort, between the completely opposing perceptions and visions of African unity (Wallerstein 1966). The OAU compromise was a positive development for Africa as the previously opposing groups, in their self-destructive rivalries, agreed to take some important steps to harmonise their numerous policies into a common document on African integration. This compromise would not have been possible without the *volte-face* of some members of the Casablanca group (especially Sékou Touré) having realised that their radical posture/conception of integration would slow down the pace of inter-African cooperation.

Without any iota of doubt, the OAU was a product of a compromise, seen in the African political literature as a victory for the Monrovia group because its gradual approach to integration and the quest for safeguarding political sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states were entrenched in and formed the core of the OAU Charter when it was adopted in 1963. Nevertheless, I argue that the OAU compromise should not be seen and interpreted as a failure, and even did not portend one for the Casablanca bloc, as the founding OAU Summit retained the African unity aspirations as the principal driving ideology of the organisation. The OAU regionalism, as Nweke (1987: 134) argued, represents a solution to the problems of African cooperation. This cooperation was achieved through a fragile compromise by refocusing African diplomacy from destructive political and ideological issues to those that are relatively noncontroversial in which African countries share a common interest.

With the OAU formation, Africans heaved a sigh of relief with the hope that the new pan-African organisation would provide solutions to Africa's problems. This much optimism could easily be deciphered when one looks critically at the OAU's objectives, mandate and institutions. Article II of the OAU Charter specified the organisation's five objectives of which I discuss three that are directly relevant to this study. First, the OAU was established to *promote the unity and solidarity of the Africa states*. Since the search for African unity formed the basis of pan-Africanism/pan-African movement, African leaders believed that the pan-African unity objective needed to be kept alive in order for Africa to be insulated from the negative consequences of Cold War politics. The search for African unity is crucial because it served as a "confidence-building measure aimed at minimising the attempts by the superpowers to manipulate African states and avoid debilitating interstate conflicts as a result of the ideological differences of African states" (Sesay 2008: 11).

The OAU's second objective was to *defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states*. This goal is rooted in the colonial origin of state formation on the black continent. African states are products of colonialism, as the colonial powers, forced by their economic goals, bequeathed largely multiethnic nation-states to numerous countries on the continent. The colonial creation of African states failed to consider the complex sociological realities of the pre-colonial African societies and the socioeconomic and political forms of interactions among numerous ethnic formations during this period. This failure explains why many states on the continent experienced ethno-religious and ethno-political upheavals in the immediate post-independence period. This is because the glue that bound different ethnic nationalities became fractured, with different segments of the African nation-state questioning the basis of the "social contract" after independence (Badmus 2006: 272). Due to the African states' feebleness, the OAU founding fathers realised the dangers posed by the fragile character of African states; hence, the inclusion of the goal of respect for

the independence and territorial integrity of the OAU member states in the organisation's Charter was to preclude territorial and ethnic irredentism and subversive activities by the powerful states against their weak counterparts. By placing emphasis on the sovereign equality of African states, African leaders were determined to build a defence wall around and save the continent from the influence of the Cold War politics as the super powers' interference in intra-African relations could have negative effects on the African unity project that still remained fragile at the OAU's formation.

Another major objective of the OAU was the *eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa*. The framers of the OAU Charter were of the view that Africa's independence would be incomplete unless all other territories under colonial rule were liberated. The fear of insecurity by the newly independent African states was understandable given the subversive actions of the white minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies, especially in Mozambique and Angola. Therefore, African states resolved, through the OAU, to end colonial rule in Africa by peaceful means or through armed struggles under the coordination of the newly established OAU Liberation Committee in situations where the struggle for independence failed by diplomatic, persuasion and other peaceful means (Amate 1986).

In terms of the organisation's principles, these are found in Article III of its Charter. The principles are "(1) the sovereign equality of all member states; (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; (3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable rights to independent existence; (4) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; (5) unreserved condemnation of political assassination in all its forms, as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state; (6) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories, which are still dependent; and, (7) affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all."

An examination of these principles reveals that some of them are those of international society, especially those dealing with sovereignty, self-determination and non-intervention as reflected in Article II of the UN Charter. The inclusion of these principles in the OAU Charter was to inculcate the universal ideals based on the UN Charter in Africa's international relations within the OAU framework. These principles put more of an accent on functional cooperation in intra-African relations rather than complete political integration. For example, such a principle as the peaceful resolution of disputes was based on the belief that peaceful coexistence among African states was a necessary precondition for any socioeconomic development on the continent. The principle, it is believed, would dampen the fire of incessant interstate conflicts in Africa. To achieve these objectives, the Charter established several decision-making and decision-supporting bodies and their nature, powers and structure were invariably influenced

by the organisation's objectives and principles. These bodies were (a) the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government, (b) the Council of Ministers, (c) the General Secretariat, and (d) the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the OAU Assembly, AHG) was the OAU's highest decision-making authority. The AHG, which met at a summit at least once a year, represented the member states. The OAU Assembly's decisions were arrived at through consensus, or if this failed, by a two-thirds majority. Although the AHG was the highest political authority, such authority should not be seen as sovereign, because, more often than not, during the OAU's existence (1963–2002), the OAU Assembly's authority was challenged, as those decisions affecting the core national interests of member states, especially those relating to sovereignty and territoriality, were largely ignored and, at best, not implemented. Furthermore, the AHG was responsible for the approval of the OAU budget and admission of new members, among others. The AHG's power and authority was very much limited by its functions. The most important of these was to discuss matters of general concern to member states with the goal to coordinate and manage the organisation's general policy, and also to review the structure, functions, and acts of all the organs and any OAU specialised agencies.

The Council of Ministers was made up of the member states' foreign ministers or any other representatives as appointed by the member states' governments. The council met twice a year, and it was tasked to prepare the assembly's summit conferences and implement the decisions of these meetings. The Council of Ministers represented the OAU executive organ. The OAU Secretary General directed the affairs of the OAU Secretariat in accordance with Article XVI of the organisation's Charter. The Secretary General was to provide the main focus and direction of intra-African cooperation. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established to assist the organisation achieve its principle of peaceful resolution of disputes between African states. Despite its importance, the commission was largely marginalised and remained inactive until 11 December 1967, when its initial meeting was held. Obviously, the main theatres of the politics of intra-African functionalism were not the commission's irregular meetings, but the three other organs, especially the AHG and the Council of Ministers (Nweke 1987: 140).

The genesis and evolution of Africa's security architecture

In the last two sections, I analysed the background contexts of Africa's attempts at regionalism, based on the macro-conception of Africa as a single region that eventually culminated in the formation of the OAU through the complete transformation of Africa's geographical area into an identified sociopolitical space. This task of providing the historical accounts of

Africa's arduous journey towards the realisation of the pan-African unity goal through regionalism, and the structure and organisation of the OAU provides detailed information for understanding how the attempts at and conflicting perceptions of the modality of realising the African unity goal as reflected in the ideological positions of the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups had and have a profound impact on Africa's growing yearning for the institutionalisation of Africa's security architecture.

Africa's efforts at institutionalising a framework for intra-African security cooperation have their genesis in Pan-Africanism. As the quests for political independence increased, African leaders realised the need to establish a pan-African military force to confront the imperial powers, especially if independence failed to materialise by peaceful means. The need for pan-African security cooperation was much debated at the various pan-African movement meetings but the campaign received a serious political boost during Accra's AAPC in 1958 when Nkrumah called for the establishment of a continental defence arrangement as encapsulated in his JAHC idea. The JAHC, in Nkrumah's view, could protect African states against external aggressions, support the liberation movements in their armed struggles, and also provide a peacekeeping role (Imobighe 1989: 7). The JAHC idea was embodied in the African Charter of the Casablanca Powers signed in January 1961.

Despite the promises of Nkrumah's JAHC, the idea was greatly opposed by the Monrovia group because there was the feeling in the latter camp that the JAHC idea would, sooner or later, develop into the centralisation of military power, edging Africa towards unified political governance. Instead, they called for a gradual approach to defence cooperation. Based on the differing perceptions of both groups, the Monrovia group called for the creation of a simple Joint Defence Command with an advisory function in lieu of a unified supranational defence structure as advocated by the Casablanca Powers. At the time of the OAU foundation meeting, neither the Casablanca group nor the moderate Monrovia group was able to realise its own idea of African Defence cooperation, thereby paving the way for the OAU to establish a Defence Commission, to be responsible for Africa's defence needs, as one of the five specialised commissions of the OAU.

The OAU security architecture: from defence commission to a defence force through a defence organisation

The Defence Commission was established to coordinate and harmonise the OAU member states' general policies in achieving their commitment to cooperation for defence and security (Article II, 1 (c) and 2 (f), OAU Charter 1963). Its establishment was seen as part of the OAU compromise where the majority Monrovia group conceded to the Casablanca Powers' idea of establishing a form of African Defence cooperation. But, instead of Nkrumah's idea of a unified defence structure, the Monrovia group favoured a far less

authoritative Defence Commission. Imobighe (1989: 83) noted that it would be wrong to believe that other OAU members (especially those who belonged to the Monrovia group) were not interested in having some form of security cooperation in Africa, but where they differed concerns the extent of such cooperation, as the majority of the OAU member states were unwilling to surrender their sovereignty to any supranational defence arrangement. The establishment of the Defence Commission failed to realise the objectives of its creation. The first problem related to its functions, which were not clearly spelt out in the OAU Charter. The functions of the OAU Specialised Commissions – of which the Defence Commission was a member – were only stated in the Charter as being carried out in "accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers" (Article XXII, OAU Charter 1963). With these provisions, the commission was expected to perform the defence functions embodied in Article II, 1 (c) and 2 (f) of the Charter.

As the founding OAU Summit failed to define the nature, scope and degree of cooperation that the OAU should adopt in relation to security issues, it was completely left to the Defence Commission to fashion out its own modus operandi to achieve its objectives. Although it was tasked to coordinate and harmonise the OAU member states' defence policies in order to help the organisation to execute its defence roles, the divisive politics that predated the OAU's formation apparently grounded the commission in performing its defence responsibilities. Its failures can be deciphered when one considers the security challenges facing Africa at the time, which it was incapable of acting upon at these critical moments involving Africa's security quagmires.[7] Furthermore, the problems of the continent's underdevelopment and the existing defence pacts that linked some African states, especially the Francophone countries, to their former colonial powers, and the incessant political upheavals in many African states, negatively affected the commission in performing its functions and retarded the speed of progress to have some form of defence cooperation in Africa.

Due to the challenges confronting the Defence Commission, there were renewed efforts, during the first meeting of the commission in Accra in October/November 1963, to resuscitate the idea of a security structure. The meeting was to define the purpose, rules of procedures among other issues of the commission's responsibilities. During this meeting, five countries – Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea and Mauritania – submitted proposals of which only two, Nigeria and Ghana, directly focused on the pattern of defence and security cooperation that Africa should adopt (Imobighe 1989). Although the Nigerian and Ghanaian proposals dealt with the issue of defence cooperation, they held two differing positions. Ghana submitted a comprehensive proposal for a unified military structure under the auspices of an African Union Government; it called for the establishment of a defence structure under the control of one military authority and a Supreme

Command Headquarters to be responsible to the OAU AHG (Franke 2006b). Also, the Ghanaian proposal envisaged the creation of four joint-service regional headquarters with the task of defending Africa's four free zones – North, East, Central and West – a Joint Service Strategic Reserve Command that would be in a state of readiness to confront any military aggression in any part of the continent, and a joint military intelligence organisation, military research and development organisation, and so on.[8]

Despite the elaborate nature of the Ghanaian proposal, the majority of the delegations attending the meeting rejected it, as there were concerns that a unified military structure would jeopardise African states' independence. Besides, the cost of maintaining such an ambitious military structure would be too expensive considering the nature of the continent's economy and Africa's lack of technical capability, manpower and equipment to effectively support such a structure (Gutteridge 1964: 160–161). Rather, the conference supported the idea of loose defence cooperation. The Nigerian proposal called for the establishment of a permanent military headquarters within the OAU Secretariat. Lagos proposal differed from Ghana's because it placed the provision and command of the force during emergencies at the OAU's disposal. The Nigerian authorities proposed that such forces be raised as and when the need arose. Also the availability of the forces was a function of the willingness of the OAU member states to make available the size of the force they were ready to contribute to the military structure.

The deadlock was finally broken when Nigeria co-sponsored a revised Ghanaian proposal that suggested the creation, at the OAU Secretariat, of a small permanent headquarters to perform the Defence Commission's planning and liaison duties, and also to advise the commission on the appropriate method of troop generation during emergencies within the stipulated time.[9] All these efforts did not give Africa a collective defence structure beyond a declaration of intention by delegates to the meeting. At the 2nd ordinary meeting of the commission in Freetown in February 1965, a significant milestone was reached, as the proposals for the establishment of the African Defence Organisation (ADO) were adopted. Under ADO, each OAU member state was expected to reserve one or more units of its national military forces to be placed at the OAU's disposal for specific operations. The national armed forces earmarked for ADO would remain in and be maintained at the expense of their countries of origin. Besides, these forces would only be mobilised at the express request of one or more OAU member states experiencing extra-African threats or suffering from serious internal troubles or in conflict with other OAU member states (Amate 1986: 174). Furthermore, the ADO armed forces' mobilisation by the OAU was to be approved by the Council of Ministers. As good as the idea of ADO might have looked, and despite the fact that the subsequent OAU Summit in Accra in September 1965 adopted the Defence Commission's recommendations on ADO, no concrete efforts were made to implement them.

Since the commission meeting in Freetown, no significant development was visible in its activities until December 1970, when it held another meeting in Lagos against the backdrop of the Portuguese invasion of Guinea in November 1970 and the threats posed by white minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The cause of the ebbing of the commission's activities in African security affairs is possibly related to the overthrown of Nkrumah, the architect of the Africa defence cooperation idea, and the OAU Assembly's seeming lack of interest in the commission's activities. The Lagos meeting, while considering the threats posed to Africa's security and the OAU inability to act in response to the Portuguese invasion of Guinea, recommended a regionalised defence structure based on the existing division of Africa into four geographical zones and once again rejected the idea of JAHC. Under the regionalised defence arrangement – proposals that were extensively debated at the Addis Ababa meeting of the commission in December 1971 – each regional unit would be made up of one or more units of national armed forces within each African region that would be placed at the OAU's disposal for specific operations. The proposals also called for the establishment of a defence secretariat that would coordinate a regional unit to be composed of a regional defence chief, his deputy, and representatives from various national armed forces. The switch from an African-wide defence system to an ad hoc arrangement based on the regions was because of the OAU's inability to mobilise and deploy troops on a continental basis. It was believed that the ad hoc arrangement would enable regional actors to manage regional conflicts with regional capabilities (Imobighe 1989: 92).

Major developments in Africa in the mid-1970s rejuvenated interests in the imperatives of a pan-African force, which again became the subject of discussion during the 31st Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Khartoum, Sudan in July 1978, where the council called for the "reactivation of the OAU Defence Commission to consider the desirability of establishing an Inter-African Military Force under the aegis of the OAU."[10] And with the approval of the Council of Ministers Resolution on the Inter-African Force of Intervention by the 15th OAU Summit held in Khartoum, the 6th Ordinary Session of the Defence Commission held in April 1979 in Addis Ababa collectively agreed to establish an Inter-African Military Force under the aegis of the OAU – to be known as the OAU Defence Force – which was, among other responsibilities, to deter extra-African aggressions against the OAU member states and provide peacekeeping roles in a situation of conflict between member states. These recommendations were adopted by the Council of Ministers at its 33rd Ordinary Session and approved by the 16th OAU Summit held in Monrovia in July 1979. While these developments served as a great opportunity for Africa to have a pan-African military force, the OAU AHG decided to refer the OAU Defence Force plan for further study on its financial and legal implications. This frustrating development led Franke (2006b: 8) to argue that "Once again, as soon as the

states' shock over their vulnerability and thus the felt need for action had receded, so had their enthusiasm for tackling all the political obstacles and severe practical, structural, institutional, technical, logistical, financial and operational difficulties associated with the creation of a Pan-African force."

And, he noted:

> While it is certainly true that various leaders' personal conceptions of African unity played an important role in the repeated attempts to establish a Pan-African military force, the security situation on the continent at any one time was the all-important determinant. Every serious discussion on such a Force since 1965 had been triggered by an incident of insecurity (and had eventually ebbed away again with the memory of that incident and its particular imminence). Without such an accompanying unifying threat to overcome the enormous introversion of African states, proposals for military cooperation or even integration did not stand a chance against the continent's many vested interests. (Franke 2006b: 8)

This was the delicate state of African security, and the OAU's inability to establish a reliable pan-African security architecture when the organisation was confronted with insecurity posed by the civil war in Chad, led it to respond with the deployment of its first-ever peacekeeping mission in late November 1981. The deployment of the OAU peacekeepers was seen as a positive development because in the past, the organisation had shied away from being involved in peacekeeping operations (Imobighe 1996: 241). This is not to argue that the OAU had not been involved in the management of African conflicts, but peacekeeping had not been part of its conflict management package. The deployment of the OAU peacekeeping mission to Chad raised optimism, as it was regarded as a significant move towards the final institutionalisation of an effective and reliable African security architecture. These high hopes were dashed, as the operation ended in fiasco with the peacekeepers' inglorious exit in June 1982 without bringing peace to Chad.

Problems ranging from lack of interoperability to an unclear peacekeeping mandate through to the problem of finance were responsible for the OAU's peacekeeping failure (Sesay 1991: 21). Apparently, the organisation's failure in its first peacekeeping mission and the lack of consensus among member states on the establishment of a pan-African high command negatively affected the continent's performance in creditably tackling the African security challenges, which eventually led to the devolution and the emergence of regionalised security architectures. The idea was championed by West Africans through ECOWAS armed intervention in the Liberian civil war in August 1990 and subsequently led to the creation of a security mechanism in West Africa – the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the ECOWAS

Mechanism) for providing collective security in West Africa to fill the void created by the OAU's unsatisfactory responses to African security issues.

The collapse of the bipolar international order and the emergence of the African Union

The end of the Cold War caught Africa by surprise, as the continent was unprepared for the sudden changes in the international system and their consequences for the continent. Since the OAU was established in the Cold War environment, the superpowers' confrontations had influenced its Charter and, as a result, the organisation was largely prepared to achieve Africans' burning desires at that time, when decolonisation was fundamental. At the end of the Cold War, the problems facing Africa differed markedly from those that the OAU was established to solve. These contemporary challenges called into question the practical relevance of the OAU in providing the much-needed answers to these problems. Since the post-Cold War global realities differ from the environment in which the OAU was established, the transformation of the OAU into the new AU became necessary. The post-Cold War environment where the OAU found itself seems to justify Cervenka's assertion that "there are times in the life of human institutions when a factor or a combination of factors not only brings out the strengths and weaknesses of that institution, but pointedly makes the necessity for restructuring of that institution a matter of urgent consideration if that institution is to continuously serve the purpose of its creation" (1977: 18).

From the preceding analysis, the following questions demand answers: Why was the transformation of the OAU into the AU necessary? Or as Sesay rightly asked (2008: 12): Why did African leaders not simply reform the OAU to reflect the new concerns of Africa and the international system after the end of the Cold War? I adduce a number of reasons to explain why the OAU's metamorphosis into the AU was required. First, the OAU was established to realise the pan-African idea of African unity in the fight against colonial subjugation. In this area, the organisation had remarkable success as significant amounts of its resources were diverted to this cause which, by the time of its dissolution in July 2002, only Western Sahara was not a self-governing territory, despite the fact that it was a member of the OAU. The pan-African organisation was so successful in the area of decolonisation that, by the late 1980s, the apartheid authorities in South Africa had started working towards the dismantling of the racist regime that finally culminated in Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990. By 1990, it became clear to African leaders that the issue of decolonisation had become a thing of the past, as colonial rule had disappeared from Africa's political map.

Second, at the end of the Cold War, there were changes in the character and methods of armed conflicts in Africa (see Chapter 1). The post-Cold War African wars are complex, featuring non-state actors, and they involved the

mega use of force, which, in some cases, take a genocidal path as witnessed in such places as Rwanda in 1994 and arguably the Darfur region of Sudan (Aboagye 2007a: 2; Badmus 2009c). Intrastate African conflicts also involve the ruthless use of child soldiers (Abdullah and Rashid 2004) and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) (Badmus 2005, 2009a; Sesay and Ismail 2003). Due to their complexity, intractability and sheer brutality, they often induce complex humanitarian emergencies, societal dislocations and the eventual collapse of state institutions. They were not easily amenable to the OAU conflict management structures since priorities were accorded to external threats and interstate conflicts in the OAU Charter. Consequently, the OAU failed to have a significant impact in resolving these conflicts, a situation that was blamed on the organisation's lack of required institutional mechanisms, political will among OAU member states, adequate financial resources, and technical capability.

Furthermore, in the post-Cold War international system, Africa's strategic relevance to the superpowers greatly reduced. African regimes, especially autocratic leaders that previously enjoyed the political patronage and protection of the superpowers in return for unalloyed support, came to realise their precarious positions in the face of the ever-increasing opposition to their regimes from their political opponents, who were previously operating clandestinely. With the loss of the superpower protection, coupled with the dwindling financial and military support for Africa's dictators, it became clear to many African authoritarian rulers that they can no longer ignore their political opponents if they really wanted to survive. With the superpowers' "retreat from Africa" (Ibe 2001), Africa's larger than life leaders realised that their days were numbered, as the continent was embroiled in unimaginable political turmoil. Since the chances of getting the superpowers' support were fading, Africa's authoritarian regimes realised the need to open up the hitherto constricted political space for popular participation (Badmus 2006), and also the need for the OAU's transformation to reflect this new development and to put a new African face out towards the external environment. Besides, the post-Soviet international system brought new challenges and concerns to Africa, which the OAU was not created to cope with. Globalisation, respect for human rights, the persistence with democracy and good governance, accountability and transparency have become the defining features of Africa's relations with the West. Legitimisation depends now on the notions of liberalism, pluralism, human rights and good governance among others. The unipolar international order demands that countries of the world (including African states) embrace these values as a precondition for foreign aid on which most African governments are increasingly dependent (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 36; Weiss 2007: 59–60).

Another major challenge for Africa and, indeed, the OAU, were the issues that concerned endemic poverty and hunger, underdevelopment, diseases

such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and their negative consequences on the continent. Since the African states were ushered into the international system as passive participants and in unequal exchange relations, Africa's economic picture during the period is best described by Obasanjo, who referred to it as the 4 D's: derelict, despondent, disillusioned and detached from the mainstream of the global economy. Most of Africa's socioeconomic indicators were, Obasanjo wrote (1993: 53), such as to give a picture of Africa losing its share in world trade and manufacturing, while its (Africa) relative global proportions in poverty, infant and maternal mortality and illiteracy are increasing. Africa's growing marginalisation is put in perspective by its declining share in world exports, imports and foreign direct investment among others. If the picture painted by Obasanjo was discouraging – to put it kindly – then the post-Cold War Africa's socioeconomic records are quite frightening. The continent has the highest number of least developed countries in the world. Africa is poorer than it was in the 1960s (Nyong'o 2002: 19), and its share of world trade is only 3 per cent. It has less than 2 per cent of the global GDP and has a trade-to-GDP ratio of more than 60 per cent (African Development Bank 2002: 5). The combined total income of the sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries "is equal to Belgium's, with a median GDP of just over $2 billion, about the output of a town of 60,000 people in a rich country" in the developed North (Quoted in Sesay 2008: 14). Furthermore, Africa's debt crisis compounded the deteriorating economic situation of the continent. In 2004, Africa's external debt totalled $330 billion in nominal terms, which is equivalent to 50 per cent of the continent's GDP (Mkwezalamba and Chinyama 2007: 6). Regarding foreign direct investment (FDI), the continent has been on the margin. The flow of FDI to Africa has taken a downward trend. The decline in investment is more noticeable when FDI flows to Africa (including South Africa) fell from $10.5 billion in 1999 to $9.1 billion in 2000. In the particular case of SSA, FDI has dropped from $8 billion in 1999 to $6.5 billion in 2000. This economic scenario puts Africa's share of global FDI at less than 1 per cent in 2000 (Adejumobi 2003: 7; UNCTAD 2001: 19–20). Furthermore, Africa experienced fall in FDI flow in the decade that followed, which continued into 2011 (UNCTAD 2012: 1 and 4). Finally, Greg Mills (2004, cited in Sesay 2008) writes that Africa surpasses other regions in terms of it experiences with negative impacts of globalisation. The continent has lost about $150 billion in capital flight, with around 40 per cent of private wealth held outside Africa, a higher percentage than any geographical region in the world.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is now ravaging Africa and its telling effects on human resources and wellbeing are enormous. SSA is the most affected region in the world, home to about 22.4 million people living with HIV/AIDS in 2008, while a total of 1.9 million cases of new infections were reported in 2008, and an estimated of 1.4 million Africans lost their lives during the same year (UNAIDS/WHO 2009: 21). The HIV/AIDS pandemic has continued

to have huge impacts on SSA's socioeconomic life. More worrisome is that the majority of those affected are the most productive segment of the population, who are expected to contribute more to the socioeconomic development of SSA and Africa as a whole. The number of women infected with HIV is estimated at 60 per cent of the SSA's total (Garcia-Calleja, Gouws and Ghys 2006; UNAIDS 2008), children infected numbered 3 million,[11] and Africa has the highest number HIV/AIDS orphans in the world.

The above-discussed developments and the problems brought about by globalisation put Africa at the fringe of the international political economy; the OAU proved incapable of galvanising the necessary support and mobilising African states to address these problems. Africa struggled to really define its place and role in the new international system. Hence, it dawned on African leaders that for the continent to be relevant in the emerging unipolar international system, they needed to replace the OAU in order to face these new challenges. But, before I examine how the OAU was eventually transformed, I look critically at how Africa responded to the new security environment that compelled the OAU to internally restructure, redefine its objectives and develop new approaches to Africa's security challenges. Therefore, I turn next to the examination of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution[12]

Against the backdrop of Africa's post-Cold War security environment, the OAU peacekeeping failure in Chad and the ignition of internal armed conflicts with regional dynamics in a number of African countries, the continent needed to find solutions to its problems through institutionalised approaches to conflict prevention and resolution that could transcend its age-old system of highly ineffective ad hoc responses. At the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1993, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (the OAU Mechanism) that would enable Africa to take a more proactive stance in African conflicts was officially adopted. The OAU Cairo Declaration could be regarded as the beginning of Africa's second generation peace operations strategic policy in a bid to redeem Africa's lost period where protracted armed conflicts had become part of life (Aboagye 2007a: 3). The mechanism emphasised conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution. Thus, it sought to anticipate and prevent conflict situations from developing into full-scale wars. In terms of structure, the OAU Mechanism provided for two main organs: the Central Organ and Conflict Management Division (later renamed the Conflict Management Center). Modelled on the Bureau of the AHG (the Bureau), the Central Organ was the mechanism's decision-making body. It was comprised of 16 countries elected annually on the basis of geographical representation.[13] The Central Organ considered issues before the OAU, especially those affecting peace and security,

and offered the OAU Secretary General the required political leadership to commence appropriate actions to address these issues. In this respect, the mechanism saw both the Secretary General and the Conflict Management Center as its operational arms. The Central Organ consulted with parties to the conflict to take all appropriate initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The Conflict Management Center was to support the Secretary General in implementing the strategies to achieve the mechanism's goals.

Apart from the two important organs identified above, the mechanism also created the OAU Peace Fund, a separate source of finance to assist its conflict management efforts and, hopefully, overcome the perennial financial crisis that was associated with the OAU. The Peace Fund had a positive impact on developing the human and material resources of the Conflict Management Center, which, going by the mechanism, should reinforce the position of the Secretary General. It also provided avenues for the international community to support the OAU's peacekeeping activities. Although the Peace Fund has to raise revenue from African and external sources, Muyangwa and Vogt (2000: 1) argued that three issues have become obvious since its inception. First, Africa's conflict management needs were beyond the resources of the fund. Second, OAU member states' failures to meet their financial obligations hampered the operationalisation of the mechanism. Third, the success of the fund is guaranteed only if it is financed on a regular and long-term basis.[14] Nevertheless, the fund had raised the OAU's financial standing. Between 1993 and 1998, it was able to raise $28 million, while the fixed 5 per cent of the organisation's budget was increased to 6 per cent from the 1998–1999 fiscal year.

The OAU had applied the mechanism in many conflict situations with not very much success, especially in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sierra Leone, the Comoros and Ethiopia/Eritrea border dispute. The organisation proved itself, relatively, relevant in some conflict situations in Africa. Despite the promises of the mechanism, it became highly ineffective in the face of Africa's political and socioeconomic realities at the time. Truly, the mechanism became marginalised throughout Africa. The organisation's lack of adequate financial, technical and other resources rendered it powerless in resolving these conflicts on an enduring basis. Nothing concrete was achieved by its very limited involvements in conflicts in Angola, the Great Lakes Region and Sierra Leone. Even in situations where the OAU intervened, no serious peace operations were ever mounted. Aside from expressing concerns over lack of progress in implementing some peace processes/agreements and the deployment of observer missions, the mechanism's involvement in African conflicts was unsuccessful overall (Mlambo 2006: 43). Finally, Aboagye (2007a: 4) criticised the mechanism for the OAU failing to build a durable peace and security because of political sclerosis and operational anaemia. Operationally, the OAU's peacekeeping failed to achieve peace because of the "ad hoc-ism" of its approaches, which included lack of adequate and

guaranteed funding, restricted mandates and an insufficient number of troops deployed. The OAU was a colossal failure in its peacekeeping operation, as part of its wider security policy because of the changes in the character of African conflicts after the Cold War that demanded new regional approaches to multidimensional peace missions.

Furthermore, the Rwandan genocide also reveals the poor record of the OAU in conflict management and the weaknesses of its security mechanism. The tragic event led to serious attempt by African leaders to bear substantial responsibility for African security challenges. Consequently, the OAU set up an International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events (IPEP), with the broad mandate to examine the events leading to the genocide and the failures of the Genocide Convention, as well as to make recommendations for redress and action to prevent future occurrences (Murray 2001). Presented to the African leaders during the OAU Summit in Lomé, Togo in July 2000, the report blamed the genocide on the failures of the UN system and of the OAU to act in decisive manner to the event, as well as the lackadaisical and reluctant role of the United States and many European countries, principally France and Belgium. The panel found that the political will of the international community to intervene and prevent the genocide was absent. The inquiry argued that the international community knew well that something terrible was under way in Rwanda but stood by and did nothing. Thus, "the world carried a heavy responsibility for the event in Rwanda ... Instead, the world leaders chose to play politics and to pinch pennies as hundreds of thousands of innocent Rwandans needlessly died." The UN's failure to act responsibly coupled with that of the key Western states (especially France, which has special relations with Rwanda, Belgium, Rwanda's former colonial master, and the United States) is clear evidence that African lives are not as highly important and valued as other lives. This is because the UN evacuated Western nationals while the people of Rwanda were left to their fate. This act exemplified the double standards and implicit racism of the UN – the principal custodian of international peace and security. While the report recognised the failure of African states and OAU to prevent the genocide, it also emphasised the fact that the OAU could not be able to effectively prevent the genocide and save lives of innocent civilians without the support of the international community. The lackadaisical attitude of the UN and the broader international community to the genocide meant that Africa was on its own. Therefore, the panel emphasised that Africa must assume greater responsibility for African conflicts. This situation made it pertinent that the OAU Mechanism needed to be strengthened. In order to prevent future occurrences, the panel tasked Africa and the OAU with monitoring states' compliance with international standards on refugees and setting up procedures in order to be able to respond to conflict situations in timely manner, including developing its conflict mechanism

and early warning system. Thus, the IPEP report was very important and critical in informing the reform of the OAU/AU peace and security mechanisms, including the drafting of Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which empowered the AU to intervene in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Towards a pan-African search for greater unity: The politics of the African Union's creation

With the OAU's failures to provide solutions to the new challenges facing Africa and its seeming lack of requisite capability to meet future demands, coupled with the marginalisation of its conflict mechanism, the need to transform the OAU into a new organisation increased, as well as the awareness of the need for greater unity increased in Africa's political circles and diplomacy. The creation of the AU was not free from realpolitik problems, as there were competitions and clashes of interests among African "super" states such as Nigeria, South Africa, Libya and Algeria,[15] each vying for a leadership position on the continent. To understand the politics of the AU's creation and how the divergent perspectives of the leading African states on the OAU reform, were accommodated, I examine the underlying motives of some of the leaders of these hegemonic states that influenced and/or determined their states' positions in intra-African international relations.

First, the efforts of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddaffi to achieve a greater African unity and the creation of an AU were motivated by his ambition to come out of the woods. To be sure, quite a number of issues and realpolitik interests gave Gaddaffi the opportunity to promote the African unity project. Tripoli's relations with the West had, for many years, been very cold, as Gaddaffi's international image was very poor. The former Libyan strongman was regarded as a controversial leader who was alleged to support terrorist organisations. Libya and Gaddaffi were pointed at as the financiers and supporters of the two men – Abdelbaset Ali al Megrahi and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah[16] – said to be responsible for the Lockerbie bombing that killed 270 people on 21 December 1988 (Bates 2008). As a result, the UN sanctions against Libya and its international ostracism, coupled with Gaddaffi's face off with the United States, which resulted in the bombing of two Libyan cities, Benghazi and Tripoli, in 1986, tarnished his reputation. The post-1989 international system saw Gaddaffi strive to redeem his image through, first, the handover of the two suspected Lockerbie bombers for international trial at the Hague and, second, his compensation of the relatives of the police officer killed in a shootout incident at the Libyan diplomatic mission in London during the 1980s. While making efforts to polish his battered image at the global level, Gaddaffi did not lose sight of an attempt at African unity, which resurfaced in the mid-1990s (Browne 2005: 2). The former Libyan leader, in his determination to realise the African Union/unity dream and encourage

other African states to support the project, reportedly bankrolled it, paying 30 per cent of the debts of 10 African countries[17] and contributing $1 million to the fund towards the transformation of the moribund OAU into the AU (Morais and Naidu 2002: 112). The key question now is, What explains Gaddaffi's turn towards Africa and his emergence as the chief financier of the African unity project? The reason is best explained by Francis (2006a: 26):

> The African Union project provided the perfect opportunity to launch his "charm offensive" to "legitimise" him as an international statesman. By all indications, Gaddaffi's promotion of the African Union project as a political instrument had both public and private faces. He used the African Union project to serve the general interest of Africa, but, at the same time, his vested interests. It seems the only credentials Gaddaffi has to lead the African Union project are his renowned anti-imperialist and quasi-socialist views, his high international profile as a controversial leader and the huge financial resources he is willing to spend on such a programme.

While Gaddaffi was preoccupied with redeeming his lost credibility and the new leadership role that he found in the African Union project, there were two major developments in Africa in 1999. In that year, Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki were elected presidents of Nigeria and South Africa respectively. As South Africa's leader, Mbeki came with his own vision of African unity and OAU reform as encapsulated in his doctrine of "African Renaissance," which was first presented in his speech to the South African Constituent Assembly on the occasion of the adoption of the new South African constitution in May 1996 (Maloka 2001; Vale and Maseko 1998).[18] The African Renaissance was a call for the reconstruction of African identity and provided the constructive counterpoint to the Afro-pessimistic views held in some quarters. Mbeki's African Renaissance doctrine was aimed at the sociocultural, political and economic rebirth of Africa and the enhancement of the continent's place in international affairs. Through this globalist perspective, and its pan-African interpretation, which situates the notion within the broader pan-Africanism, which called for "African solutions to African problems," the idea serves as a vehicle to galvanise Africans to come together to find answers to Africa's multiple problems. This notion spurred renewed interests of the people of the continent in the reappraisal of the African unity project and also in the radical reform of the institutionally deficient OAU in order to provide the required solutions to the continent's problems.

Olusegun Obasanjo, a former Nigerian military leader (1976–1979), also came on board with a grand vision of the African unity project. Since he had handed power voluntarily to a civilian administration in Nigeria in 1979, Obasanjo had been at the forefront of the struggle to democratise the African political space through his Africa Leadership Forum (ALF)

project, which promoted good governance as well as inculcated a democratic ethos in Africa's political landscape with strong focus on civil society participation. As a respected African leader with enormous international credibility, Obasanjo developed a good working relationship with African and other extra-African intergovernmental organisations and development partners such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which, in turn, supported his project. Obasanjo and the ALF were able to establish a major pan-African initiative – the Kampala African Leadership Document, which proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) – purposely to develop a strategic vision for Africa in the post-1989 international system and also to redefine the concept of security (Badmus 2008a, 2009b; Deng and Zartman 2002).[19] It is true that Mbeki and Obasanjo had their own visions for African unity and the need to reform the OAU, but they realised that the AU project was a gargantuan task that would be difficult to accomplish by a single state relying on its visions, strategic interests and foreign policy postures. Rather, this project needed to involve the collective support and will of the African people, states and leaders. Both Abuja and Pretoria saw the urgent need to harmonise and merge their OAU reform packages, for there was a commonality on the key principles of the OAU reform (democracy and good governance, peace and stability, respect for the rule of law and human rights) in their proposals. Hence, the two leaders resolved to provide the joint leadership and political will to drive the OAU reform process. This understanding between Nigeria and South Africa, two hegemonic states in their respective subregions with enormous resources, helped to speed the move towards the dissolution and replacement of the OAU, as clearly demonstrated by the relative ease with which African leaders agreed to amend the OAU Charter during the organisation's 4th Extraordinary Summit in Sirte in Libya in September 1999.

One point of note is that despite the importance of the Sirte meeting – as it marked a defining moment and turning point in the history of institutionalising the pan-African unity idea – it was not the first attempt at OAU reform, as there had been moves towards this reform as far back as 1979 when there was a call for the amendment of the OAU Charter in order for the organisation to meet the challenges of the time. Despite the establishment of the Committee on the Review of the OAU Charter, it is disheartening that the committee's numerous meetings and deliberations practically produced no tangible result, as it was unable to make real changes in the Charter until the 1998 OAU Summit in Burkina Faso, where African leaders firmly resolved, through the Ouagadougou Declaration, to involve civil society groups in their growing yearning towards the establishment and consolidation of effective democratic systems. The Ouagadougou Declaration marked a paradigm shift because, instead of the traditional focus on political issues,

it recognised the imperatives of a sound economy as one of the basic prerequisites for Africa's sustainable development. The 35th Summit of the OAU, held in Algiers in July 1999, was preoccupied with two important themes, *viz*: "Collective Security and the Problem of Conflicts in Africa" and "The Challenges of Globalisation and the Establishment of the African Economic Community," tabled by Nigeria and South Africa respectively. The Algiers Summit was very important because it discussed the future of the continent in relation to the summit's themes, and during this meeting, African leaders also resolved, with vigour, on the need to urgently reposition Africa to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

At the invitation of Gaddaffi, the 4th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU was convened in Sirte in September 1999 to deliberate on how to amend the OAU Charter in order to make the organisation more effective. Consequently, African leaders decided to establish an African Union in accordance with the goals of the OAU Charter and the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (African Union 1999). Among the objectives of the Sirte Declaration, African leaders aimed to effectively address the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and the world: fulfilling the people's aspirations for greater unity in conforming with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and eliminating the scourge of conflicts. At this stage, a team of experts was tasked to prepare the first draft of the AU Act (as well as the draft Protocol Establishing the Pan-African Parliament) for the OAU Secretariat. The Sirte Declaration could be seen as a compromise, accommodating differing interests and competition proposals. Therefore, as, MØller (2009: 8) asserts, the new organisation represents a striking deal between the neo-Casablancans represented by populist Gaddaffi, and the pragmatic neo-Monrovians, represented by Obasanjo and Mbeki; these were three of Africa's potential hegemons.

In line with the Sirte Declaration, the OAU Summit held in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000, approved the Act, and through the unanimous agreement of the member states, the AHG adopted a decision declaring the establishment of the AU at the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held between 1 and 2 March in Sirte. Furthermore, African leaders agreed, through the decision establishing the AU, first, that the AU legal requirements will be completed upon the deposit of the 36th instrument of ratification of the Act (Packer and Rukare 2002: 371) and, second, that the constitutive legal document would, in line with its Article 28, enter into force "thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU" (African Union 2000). The two-thirds requirement was met when, on 26 April 2001, Nigeria became the 36th country to deposit its instrument of ratification with the OAU Secretariat, and on 26 May 2001, the Act entered into force, exactly 30 days later. The AU was officially launched during the July 2001 OAU/AEC Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, but the African

leaders agreed to dissolve and replace the OAU with the AU during the next meeting, fulfilling the 12-month transitional period as stipulated in Article 33 (1) of the Act.

The AU finally replaced the OAU on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa with much optimism that the new pan-African unity project will break with the OAU past and provide much-needed solutions to Africa's manifold challenges in the 21st century. The questions that need to be addressed now are, How and to what extent does the AU represent a departure from its moribund predecessor? Can the AU's objectives and principles, structures and organisation provide the answers to the continent's socioeconomic, security and political problems? I answer these questions by examining the AU constitutive framework.

The constitutive act of the African Union

In the previous section, I examined Africa's quest for greater unity by looking at the politics of the AU's creation and how the divergent perceptions of the neo-Casablancans and the neo-Monrovians on OAU reform and African unity were accommodated through the fusion of their respective projects. Since the AU was established to provide strategic responses to the contemporary challenges facing Africa, it is important to examine some of its objectives and how the AU is institutionally designed, and also the powers and financial capabilities at the organisation's disposal to effectively carry out its duties to achieve these objectives. This task will be accomplished through analysis of the Act. The rationale for the AU's creation are clearly spelt out in the Act's Preamble, which states that the AU represents a practical expression of the dreams of "generations of pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African states" by the desire to tackle the "multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world," and a consciousness that "the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to the socioeconomic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda" ("Preamble of the Act," African Union 2000).

Objectives and principles

The AU's objectives and principles are found, respectively, in Articles 3 and 4 of its constitutive framework. These objectives, 14 in all, are clear indications of the African leaders' determination to confront the continent's 21st century challenges in that, while the Act retains most of the OAU's objectives, new ones were added especially those that concern the promotion of good governance, human and peoples' rights, sustainable development and

good health. These new objectives indicate that the African leaders want to break with the past and make the AU capable to solve Africa's problems. Specifically, the promotion of good governance and human and peoples' rights protection are considered important because these are the issues that, in the post-Cold War period, define Africa's relations with the West, and development partners/agencies that now tie their aid and technical assistance provisions to Africa based on African governments' records on human rights protection and good governance. The AU also seeks the involvement of civil society organisations and the people of Africa in its activities. This principle, embodied in Article 4 (c) of the Act, represents a break from and improvement on the moribund OAU that was, throughout its existence, concerned with state centrism and Westphalian interpretation of international relations within the liberal theoretical tradition. Under the AU regime, civil society groups can participate, under certain conditions, in such sensitive issues as conflict prevention and management.

Pursuant to the principle of the African peoples/civil society organisations' participation in its activities, the AU established an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which included representatives from civil society groups across the continent (Assogbavi 2008; Mutasa 2008). Additionally, a Civil Society and Diaspora Unit (CIDO) was established within the office of the AU Commission Chairperson to monitor the organisation's efforts on civil society initiatives. Sesay (2008: 18) contends that African leaders were very much in a hurry to provide answers to Africa's problems and also cautious to steer clear of some of the problems that rendered the OAU ineffective. Unfortunately this is not the case because the Act retains some of the OAU principles. These include the: (1) respect for borders existing on achievement of independence; (2) non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another, and (3) prohibition of the use or threat to use force among member states of the Union (Article 4).

It is true that the Act reiterates the objective of defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the member states (Article 3b), and the principle of non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another member state (Article 4g), but these do not prevent the AU intervention in internal conflict situations. This is because Article 4 (h) gives the AU the right "to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." This Article represents one of the cornerstones of the credibility of the AU. In addition, other important principles in the Act unequivocally endorsed the AU's rights of legitimate intervention in domestic conflict situations. These principles include:

- Peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 4e);
- The right of member states to request interventions from the Union in order to restore peace and security (Article 4j);

- Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance (Article 4m); and,
- Respect for the sanctity of human life (4o).[20]

Although the Act provides for broad and impressive principles that will, hopefully, help the AU to transcend the problems that constrained the OAU's effectiveness in providing solutions to Africa's problems, it is doubtful whether the new AU regime will be able to provide the much-awaited answers to the continent's manifold quagmires especially in the areas of interventions in domestic conflicts. For, the fact that the right of intervention will need a broad consensus of AU's Assembly raises the risk of inaction. For, African leaders were fond of not involving the OAU in internal conflict situations for fear that it will repeat the same in case of internal upheaval in their own states confirms the risk. Besides, Article 4 (j) that allows member states to request interventions from the AU to restore peace and order within the territory of a member state could be regarded as good intentions of the African leaders that could prove difficult to put into practice. But its practicality is a function of the willingness of member states to request such an AU intervention in internal conflicts. The question that Article 4 (j) raises is: Will any African government request for such intervention to settle local disputes considering their democratic legitimacy deficit and poor human rights records? At another level, I argue that, in the event of such request, there is the danger that such an AU intervention may be used to keep authoritarian governments in power in situations of internal political upheaval.

Another notable principle of the Act is its condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa (Article 4p). Dubious elections and unconstitutional changes of government, coupled with authoritarian rulers with poor human rights records, as Sesay (2008) contends, were regular features of Africa's political scene, especially under the OAU regime while the organisation was incapacitated to take any concrete step against these states, and the result was that they went unpunished. Under the AU regime, the Act not only empowers the Union to reject any government that comes to power by unconstitutional means but also bans such a government from participating in AU activities. Furthermore, Article 4 (p) was given a boost when the 36th OAU Ordinary Session rejected military coups and unconstitutional changes of government as an unacceptable development in Africa. Consequently, African leaders issued a Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government where what constitute an "Unconstitutional Changes of Government" were listed as follows:

- Military coup d'état against a democratically elected Government;
- Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government;

- Replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissidents groups and rebel movements; and,
- The refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.

Thus, this principle and declaration empowered the AU not to recognise the military backed ascendancy of Faure Gnassingbé to the presidency in Togo in February 2005 after the death of his father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma. Strong AU condemnations put serious pressures on Faure to step down. Although elections were held in which Faure won under dubious circumstances, the fact that the AU was able to hold Togo accountable for its undemocratic behaviour and to hold elections was a major achievement for the organisation and are clear departure from the practice of the OAU.

Organs and institutions

For the AU to achieve its objectives, the Act provides for elaborate organisational arrangements. Article 5 (1) specifies these organs to be: (1) The Assembly of the Union; (2) The Executive Council; (3) The Pan-African Parliament; (4) The Court of Justice; (5) The Commission; (6) The Permanent Representatives Committee; (7) The Specialised Technical Committees; (8) The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and lastly (9) The Financial Institutions. It was envisaged that subsequent Assembly Summits would establish new institutions as and when deemed necessary (Article 5 (2)). Despite these comprehensive institutional arrangements, the Act fails to take into account two key suggestions for OAU reform: the recommendation for the establishment of an African Security Council and a Standby Military Force. These inherent flaws were rectified during the inaugural AU Summit in July 2002 when the AU Assembly adopted the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002) with the Peace and Security Council as the standing decision-making body for conflict management in Africa. Since Chapter 3 of this book is devoted to APSA, in this section I only focus on the AU's organs that are relevant in African conflict management, viz, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the AU Assembly), the Executive Council (the Council), the AU Commission, the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Other bodies, such as the Court of Justice and the financial institutions, among others, also play indirect roles in the AU conflict management work, through the linkage between development and security; they also involve in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities of the AU.

The AU Assembly is the organisation's highest decision-making body and its supreme organ. It is composed of the Heads of State and Government of the 54 member states that meet annually in an Ordinary Session but also meet at Extraordinary Sessions, which can be called by a two-thirds majority of the member states. The Union Assembly makes decisions under

the same terms as the OAU AHG in that decisions and resolutions need to have the support of a two-thirds majority, while questions of procedure only require a simple majority. This makes the AU Assembly, in procedural terms, identical to the OAU AHG. The Assembly also bases its decisions on the reports and recommendations of other AU's organs. The Assembly, in addition to its traditional function of approving the organisation budget, takes decisions on matters relating to membership and others as was the case under the OAU, is empowered to appoint and terminate the appointment of Judges of the Court of Justice (Article 9 (h) of the Act, African Union 2000), and also determines the AU's common policies. The Assembly also directs the Executive Council in dealing with conflict situations in Africa. An advisory organ, the ECOSOCC, assists the Assembly.

The second most important organ is the Executive Council.[21] Comprising the Foreign Ministers of member states, the council meets twice a year with the possibility of Extraordinary Sessions and is responsible for the preparation of the Assembly Summits and ensures that decisions of these meetings are complied with. Article 13 of the Act empowers the council to make decisions on policy in areas of common interest to member states. The Council, answerable to the Union Assembly, is assisted by two organs, namely, the PRC and, in instances where it needs assistance requiring expert knowledge, the specialised technical committees (Article 14 of the Act, African Union 2000). The PRC, which deals with day-to-day matters, serves as the Secretariat of the Council. It consists of AU ambassadors from member states and meets at least once a month to prepare drafts for the council's agenda and recommend the decisions that the council should take. Article 21 of the Act allows the PRC to create working groups or subcommittees to assist in carrying out its duties.

The AU Commission is the Secretariat of the Union; it is under the headship of a Chairperson assisted by a Vice-Chairperson and eight commissioners. The Union Assembly appoints these officials for a four-year term, which is only renewable once, and the Assembly is also empowered to sack any member of the commission with a two-thirds majority decision. The appointment of these officials has to take into account the geographical spread of the continent (Eastern, Western, Central, Northern and Southern Africa) (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008: 18). The commission performs both tasks as a preparatory and an executive body. The commissioners are each responsible for their own sectors, such as peace and security. The Secretariat of the Union reports on its activities to the council. In addition, seven specialised committees are subordinate to the AU Commission, and these committees support the its activities. A critical look at the Secretariat of the Union shows that it was patterned after the EU, but as MØller (2009: 12) argues, this resemblance is not 100 per cent because the EU Commission is, in reality, the embodiment of supranationality and has enormous power, whereas this is not the case with the AU Commission that does not have much power.

The PAP was established as a body to represent the African peoples and organisations and also serve as a platform for their participation in and taking decisions on African affairs. Based on the equal representation principle, the PAP consists of five representatives from member states, whether small or large. A president heads the African Parliament with four vice-presidents, of whom, there must be one representative from Southern, Western, Eastern, Northern, and Central Africa. The African Parliament meets twice a year, but a request from at least two-thirds of its members can make it meet more often. Under the Act, the PAP is expected to serve as an institution with full legislative powers, but presently, it only has an advisory role (Article 17 of the Act, African Union 2000; Tavares 2010).

Undoubtedly, the Act established a comprehensive organisational set up for the AU but how and to what extent are these organs able to realise the AU's objectives? While these institutions are vital instruments for achieving the AU's goals, they will achieve nothing in the absence of the African leaders' political will. As MØller (2009: 11) contends, if leaders are committed to an organisation, the problems facing such institution will be resolved quickly. But if the political will is not there, even the best organisational arrangement will not succeed. This is why Sesay (2008: 21) forcefully argued that for the AU's new institutions to be successful, they need the political will and commitment of African leaders, as well as adequate financial resources.

The AU is a relatively young organisation, and it is not too early to assess its performance after a decade of its existence. The developments in its peace operations in Darfur, especially with the re-hat of the AU peacekeepers and their transformation into the UNAMID operation and AMISOM unmask the delicate divisions among African states, which are pointers to the likelihood that the AU will be hamstrung by the same problems that rendered the OAU ineffective. A closer examination of the AU institutional arrangements reveals that most of these new organs are highly unlikely to be of immediate relevance to Africa considering the continent's present political, sociocultural, and economic realities. This is because these new institutions are replicated in Africa because they work well in other parts of the world, especially in Europe. To this point, Sesay (2008: 21) argues that the continental organisation seems to have committed "political and institutional mimicry," for it established in Africa institutions that are created in other regions of the world, especially in Europe, based on the assumption that they will serve Africa's interests since they had performed creditably there. He concluded that this situation portends the continent's frantic move to be on the same level with other regions of the world in many areas in which it is at the moment lagging behind.

Presently, Africa lacks the financial, technical and political resources needed to support these complex institutions for them to work effectively. It is very surprising how the PAP that is supposed to represent the majority of the African people would be democratic and work well when its members, drawn

from the AU member states' national parliaments, were voted in through flawed national elections. The point that I am making here is that if elections at the member states' national parliaments are not the true voice and will of the people, then how will the future African lawmakers be genuine representatives of their people and countries as well? Fraudulently elected representatives in member states' national assemblies will do more harm than good to the continent and its people. Equally important are the three financial institutions provided for by the Act – the African Investment Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank. It is doubtful whether these institutions will succeed, considering first the gloomy African economic situations, and second, the failures and collapse of national banks in member states. Besides, following Sesay's (2008) argument, why would African leaders believe that the new financial institutions would succeed when the existing pan-African financial institution, the African Development Bank, is being crippled financially? For these and other reasons, the AU has a heavy and ambitious agenda that requires strong political will and enormous financial and technical capabilities to have powerful and effective AU institutions that are, unfortunately, lacking at present.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the AU in context of regionalism by charting its course right from Pan-Africanism through the OAU stage of this evolution and have explained the reasons for the transformation of the OAU into the AU in the post-Cold War period. Through the neorealist perspectives on regionalism, I showed how and to what extent the OAU regionalism has been able to tackle Africa's security challenges. It is evident in this chapter that the divisive politics and personality clashes among African leaders in their quest for preeminent positions in intra-African diplomacy that predated the formation of the OAU have negative consequences on the continent's attempts at institutionalising a reliable and effective pan-African security architecture to guarantee the continent. While Africa's failures to establish a reliable security mechanism, and its reliance on ad hoc approaches to security quagmires, have a negative impact on African security management, I contend that these frustrating attempts at institutionalising this structure laid the foundations for the APSA and the African Standby Force concept embedded in the new security mechanism under the AU framework. The question to ask now is, "To what extent does the new AU APSA guarantee the continent will be free from intra-African security threats?" I answer this question in the next chapter through analysis of the AU security mechanism and its burgeoning peacebuilding agenda.

3
The African Peace and Security Architecture

Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I examined the contexts underlying the evolution of the APSA, namely: the nature of African security environment and the inability of the OAU to satisfactorily institutionalise a security mechanism to solve Africa's manifold security problems and guarantee basic security for African citizens. These appalling situations have, for many years, forced the continent to look for and rely on the broader international community, especially the UN, to solve its conflicts and deal with security. These efforts have not always been successful, as epitomised by the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[1] Since the transformation of the unwieldy OAU into an ambitious security regime, the AU, there have been significant developments on the continent with the clear demonstration of Africa's willingness through its pro-activeness in terms of its leaders' readiness to tackle the continent's security quagmires (Aning 2008: 9). Africa's new zeal for security management has led to first, the establishment of a formal institutional framework for conflict management, the APSA, through the AU's adoption, in 2002, of the PSC Protocol, which represents a fundamental paradigm shift in Africa's approach to conflict management, and second, increasing collaborations between the UN and the AU in peace and security matters.[2] Thus, the APSA becomes Africa's first continent-wide regional peace and security system; it represents African efforts to manage African security, for it provides an opportunity for the continent to break away from the age-old practice of overreliance on the international community to solve African conflicts (Kasumba and Debrah 2010: 12).

The PSC Protocol states the rationale for, and delineates the interlocking components of, the APSA, in which the PSC is the principal decision-making organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The PSC is supported by a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise (PoW), a Peace Fund (the Fund), an African Standby Force (ASF) including a Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the AU Commission

(through the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Commissioner for Peace and Security and his/her Peace and Security Directorate [PSD]). All of these components aim to provide an all-encompassing set of instruments to address African security needs by the African actors (Tavares 2010; Vines 2013).[3]

In this chapter, I examine the AU's burgeoning peacebuilding and security agenda. The main themes of discussions are the APSA's institutional structures and their continuing implementation. I employ descriptive and analytical approaches to examine these structures, focussing attention on their compositions, functions, powers and operational activities, and also on the AU Commission's capacity building and what this implies for the AU peace operations. The chapter gives an account of APSA and provides the information that serves as the necessary parameters to assess its (APSA) (in) effectiveness in providing a collective responsibility for common security in a fluid African security environment by looking at AMIB, AMISOM, and UNAMID in subsequent chapters. Therefore, this chapter provides the basis to understand how the AU matches rhetoric with reality: that is, how the AU's goals match up with its present capacity for peace operations and what the chasms are that this grandiose security mechanism creates. The APSA's evaluation is to identify its strengths and weaknesses and the challenges to its full operationalisation. An understanding of these gaps will make it possible to better channel synergies of efforts among the AU, RECs, UN and partner countries.

The African peace and security architecture: overview and institutional structures

Although the APSA has evolved over a period of four decades right from the period of the OAU's formation, the 4th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in September 1999, where African leaders agreed to transform the OAU could be described as the proximate background context to the establishment of Africa's new security infrastructure. The approval of the AU Constitutive Act in July 2000 represents a significant change in the vision, goals, and responsibilities entrusted to the AU. Although the AU still upheld the principles that directed its feeble predecessor, which placed a premium on sovereignty, *uti possidetis*, "African solutions to African problems," non-interference in member states' internal affairs, and non-use of force and peaceful settlement of African disputes (see Chapter 2), the Act brought in enormous normative changes especially in the areas of peace and security, human rights and democracy, respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional governments and intervention. In fact, with the Act, peace and security become the primary issues on the AU agenda. These new normative principles form the basis on which the PSC Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) were to be

enacted.[4] Indeed, as Engel and Gomes (2009) argued, both the PSC Protocol and CADSP could be seen as the APSA's legal foundation.

As I mentioned earlier, one remarkable aspect of the Act that represents a clear departure from the OAU is the new principle of the AU's right of intervention. According to Article 4 (h) of the Act, the AU has the right to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the Article was amended in 2003 by the Protocol on Amendments to the Act, to cover other "serious threats to legitimate order" and Article 4 (j) provides for "the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security." With the provisions of the various sections of Article 4 of the Act, Africa has moved away from unqualified respect for state sovereignty to an approach where the duty to protect populations and the right to intervention shapes Africa's security management agenda. The importance of the Article (especially Article 4h) for post-Cold War African security needs is that it does not merely commit to the promotion of African security: it shows Africa's determination to avoid a repetition of Rwanda's experience. While the Article creates the legal foundation and justification for armed interventions, it also imposes an obligation on Africa's foremost institution to intervene in order to prevent the occurrence or stop the perpetration of atrocious international crimes in Africa (Dersso 2010a).

For the AU to be able to respond to threats and breaches of peace on the African continent, its Act's new norms need to be supported by institutional structures that will enforce and make these norms a reality. One of the major flaws of the AU Constitutive framework is that it fails to give proper direction in the area of institutionalisation of the conflict management structures for the AU, as it only states that the AU Assembly shall give directives to the Executive Council on the management of African peace and security.[5] This lacuna and lack of direction was rectified through two channels. The first was the decision adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the OAU's AHG held in Lusaka in July 2001. During this summit, African leaders approved the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism as one of the AU organs in line with Article 5 (2) of the Act.[6] The second was through the adoption of the PSC Protocol in July 2002.[7] The PSC Protocol gives Africa a comprehensive security mechanism that is constructed around the PSC through its preeminent position as the APSA's most pivotal body and highest authority responsible for Africa's peace and security matters and is supported by other components. While the AU plays a leading role in African security, the RECs are the pillars of the APSA, for the development of the AU security mechanism is a function of the commitment of the RECs. The APSA's roles are interlocking and operate in a sequence to ensure that peace and stability reign on African soil. The information gathered and analysed through the multilayered African early warning system are set to launch the APSA into operation. The CEWS informs the relevant bodies



Figure 3.1 The African peace and security architecture.

on the developments in Africa that have the propensity to disrupt peace based on data collected. Then the AU Commission Chairperson, through the Commissioner for Peace and Security, using the CEWS's information, plans appropriate courses of action that the situation demands and simultaneously advises the PSC on the potential threat(s) to African security. Then the PoW comes into play through preventive deployment of the AU presence, hopefully before the breakdown of law and order. It is when the PoW's advisory and conflict prevention efforts fail that the ASF is deployed (see Figure 3.1 for pictorial representation of the APSA Framework).

The Peace and Security Council

At the heart of the APSA lies the PSC. The PSC is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The council defines and directs the AU conflict management agenda (Vines 2013). It is equally responsible for the overall implementation of the CADSP purposely to protect the sanctity of human life and to lay out the conditions for sustainable development in Africa.[8] The PSC Protocol acknowledges that the PSC is to function in accordance with, and within the framework of, the UN's major role as the principal custodian of international security, and also the UN's acknowledgment of the obligations of regional organisations (Preamble; African Union 2002). According to Article 7 of the PSC Protocol, the PSC is tasked, in consultation with the AU Commission Chairperson, to promote African peace, stability and security, anticipate and prevent conflict, promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities, and promote democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, among other things (see Badmus 2014).

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The PSC has enormous powers to make decisions on its own on a wide range of security related issues in Africa, ranging from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peacebuilding. But, in serious crisis situations, such as the ones specified under Article 4 (h) of the Act, or when action is needed in a non-consenting member state, the AU Assembly jointly makes the decisions upon the PSC's recommendations (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008; Powell and Tieku 2005). The council is also responsible for facilitating close collaboration with the RECs, regional mechanisms (RMs), and the UN.

The PSC was inaugurated on 25 May 2004[9] after the AU Executive Council had elected 15 member states to the council.[10] The council functions at three levels: heads of state, ministers and permanent representatives. The council meets at least twice a month – but as often as required – at the permanent representatives' level. The ministers and heads of state each meet at least once a year, while the chairmanship of the PSC rotates monthly among its members in the alphabetical order of their names. Since its inauguration, the PSC's permanent representatives have met frequently to discuss African security challenges and how to deal with them. In terms of composition, fifteen countries sit on the council, of which five – one country each per geographical region (Central, East, North, Southern and West Africa) – are elected to serve for a three-year term, while the remaining ten serve for two years (Article 5 (1), PSC Protocol, African Union 2002; Sturman and Hayatou 2010). This is to ensure continuity, and despite the fact that the PSC is patterned after the UN Security Council arrangement, no state that sits on the council is a permanent member or has veto powers. This arrangement is to ensure greater flexibility for the AU to make prompt decisions. The PSC pronouncements, which are binding on all member states, are made by consensus, and failing that, decisions on procedural matters require a

simple majority while those on all other matters need a two-thirds majority vote of its voting members.[11] The council excludes member countries that are party to a conflict from participating in its deliberations, especially when the agenda concerns them.[12] Also, it is important to emphasise that despite the fact that the PSC is modelled after the UN Security Council, in the African Peace and Security Council, the agenda is set by the AU Commission, and the AU Commission staff drafts the communiqués. This situation is different in the UN Security Council, where all resolutions are sponsored and drafted by member states. Furthermore, the AU Executive Council, when electing the PSC members, applies the principles of equitable regional representation and rotation. Election of states to the PSC is also a function of their financial, military and political commitments to the AU and their respect for constitutional rule, human rights, full accreditation at the AU headquarters, and the UN.[13] Member states are eligible for immediate reelection at the expiration of their term. Although this arrangement, as MØller observes (2009: 13), may look more democratic than that of the UN, it does not give potential hegemonic states an influence matching their capacities. This scenario may have negative consequences for the AU in the future. If relatively economically powerful African countries like Nigeria and South Africa are not elected members of the PSC, it is possible that they could keep their generous contributions to AU peacekeeping efforts to the prescribed minimum – for example, as retaliation – with negative consequences for such missions and African security as whole, as the AU depends heavily on the excess contributions of these countries for its activities.

Conceptually, the structure of the PSC looks impressive, and its operational procedures are innovative, especially in its regional/geographical representation, despite the fact that it mimics that of its predecessor, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism. The problems associated with the rotation principle under the OAU Mechanism, which automatically allowed countries in each subregion to succeed one another in alphabetical order, are avoided. The principle gave some countries that were inappropriate and not capable of shouldering the responsibilities that membership placed upon them the opportunity to become participating and contributing members (Golaszinski 2004). Through this principle, Zimbabwe became a member of the Central Organ in 2003 despite the poor human rights record of Robert Mugabe's government. Clearly, there is an improvement under the AU security regime, for the prospective candidates for the PSC will now be elected based on a two-thirds majority vote cast in a secret ballot. The implication of this is that any state aspiring to be a member of the PSC will still need the support of countries beyond its subregion. The PSC Protocol also requires each REC to submit a list of five candidate countries for its three places on the council. This, together with the criteria mentioned earlier that candidate countries need to meet, seem to be very rigorous election procedures and processes.

But does the AU actually adhere strictly to these criteria when electing members of the PSC? The answer is emphatically No. Since its inauguration in 2004, the AU's PSC has been constantly featuring a number of authoritarian states, a worrying situation that bears negative consequences on the domestic legitimacy of and international confidence in the PSC. Golaszinski (2004: 3), when analysing the composition of the inaugural PSC in relation to the requirements of democracy and good governance, argues that it is very likely that only South Africa, out of the five AU member states elected to serve for a three-year term on the PSC, would qualify in respect of human rights, and major African countries like Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria are likely to fail the test.[14] The situation has gone from bad to worse, judging by the increasing number of less democratic states that sit on the council, especially Ethiopia and Zimbabwe (Vines 2013). Truly, this is an enormous concern because most of the PSC members do not hold tenaciously to the AU's "new identity" and they do not adequately meet important criteria to be members.[15] The frightening situation raises two fundamental questions. First, since the PSC could be described as "Autocrats United"[16] rather than the "African Union," how will the council work towards realising the idea of a democratic, peaceful and conflict-free Africa? Second, how will the APSA's goals be realised when the council is beset with these internal squabbles and contradictions? I answer these questions by looking at the PSC's operational activities.

Since its inauguration, the council has had mixed results – shortcomings and achievements – in its crucial political decisions in response to peace and security challenges in Africa. Most of these responses have concerned condemnation and the use of political and economic sanctions against unconstitutional changes of government, particularly against the Central African Republic (2003), Guinea Bissau (2003; 2012), São Tomé e Príncipe (2003), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009) and Niger (2010) (Badmus 2014; Eriksson 2010; Moolakkattu 2010; Okumu 2009; Sturman 2009; Vines 2013; Williams 2008, 2009a). Such actions have also been taken against Côte d'Ivoire (during the post-election crisis of 2010–2011), Mali (2012), Egypt (2013), and Libya. The objective of these sanctions is to stigmatise the governments that seized power through undemocratic means. The AU seeks the support of such other multilateral institutions as the RECs, the UN, and the EU when sanctioning undemocratic governments and states (Vines 2013). Peace operations have also been authorised and deployed in Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, the Comoros, the CAR and Mali. In 2013 alone, the council held a total of 61 meetings and issued 70 statements and communiqués. While these efforts are commendable, the PSC has been subjected to an avalanche of criticisms about its unequal application of the AU norms and sanctions.

The cases of Togo, Somalia and Sudan illustrate this dilemma, which could also be explained, in part, by the negative consequences of the undemocratic

composition/character of the council. Togo, an elected member of the PSC, was suspended due to the palace coup it experienced following the death of the president in February 2005. The AU's chorus of disapproval and its efforts, combined with the ECOWAS's, brought about a reversal of the coup and returned the country to constitutional rule. Such countries as Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali also have had their AU memberships suspended until democratic order was restored. This is a great achievement for the PSC, but it has been overshadowed by the PSC's responses to the situations in Somalia and Sudan (Darfur), which present strong tests for the council in the implementation of its operational procedures. At the invitation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Ethiopian military forces intervened in Somalia and forced the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) out of Mogadishu in December 2006 and early 2007 (see Chapter 5 for details). Despite Ethiopia's justifications of self-defence and helping the TFG in establishing its control and legitimacy, Addis Ababa's action, coupled with the fact that it lacked the PSC authorisation, contravened the AU's norms (Wakengela 2011; Yihdego 2007). Being a member of the PSC and a party to the conflict, Ethiopia ought to have been suspended, but to the contrary, the country continued to maintain its seat on the council. Thus, Ethiopia's presence and its participation in the council's deliberations on the situation in Somalia was, by any yardstick, a breach of Article 8 (9) of the PSC Protocol, as Addis Ababa became its own judge in a conflict in which it was a party. Obviously, this is disgusting and an eyesore to the international community. Also, Sudan, through its PSC membership, thwarted the council's efforts to discuss the war in Darfur. Khartoum frustrated the PSC in holding such deliberations, especially when Sudan chaired the council. These scenarios are worrisome for two reasons. First, the presence of anti-democratic states on the council reduces the moral weight of the PSC's decisions against countries that contravene the AU norms. Second, the undemocratic make up of the PSC allows the council to violate its own legal document, the PSC Protocol, in the conduct of its business. These inconsistencies in the enforcement of norms need to be critically addressed if the PSC is truly to serve the purposes for which it was established.

The African Standby Force

The African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) 2nd Meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1997 envisioned and recommended that the OAU be endowed with the early response capability to respond to African security crises in advance of the UN intervention. The meeting laid the conceptual and technical foundations of the ASF when it recommended that the proposed African early response capacity should be based on a standby arrangement with each of the identified five African sub-regional groupings contributing a brigade-sized contingent. The requirements of the proposed African force – headquarters

capacity, standard operating procedures (SOPs), logistics, training, force generation capacity and funding – were also identified by the African military chiefs (African Union 2003a; Bachmann 2011: 24). The ACDS's recommendations were given a political boost when the 1st Ordinary Session of the AU adopted the PSC Protocol. As a political document, the protocol only gave a skeletal structure of the ASF without going into detail about how the African force would be developed and operationalised. Nevertheless, Article 13 (1) of the PSC Protocol states that for the PSC to deploy peace missions and intervention forces, there is the need for the establishment of an ASF. The proposed African force would be made up of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components that would be based in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. This Article laid the basis for the civilian and military experts to work on the establishment, development and modalities of the ASF. The experts finally drafted the "Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC)" (The Policy Framework – PF) as an important document in the conceptual development of the ASF (Kent and Malan 2003: 73).

Pursuant to Article 13 (1) of the PSC Protocol, the ACDS in their 3rd Meeting at the AU headquarters in May 2003 adopted the PF (African Union 2003a; de Coning 2004: 21).[17] Also, the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the ASF (Roadmap I), which specified the time schedule for the development of the various ASF's components, was adopted in 2005 (African Union 2005a). The formation of the ASF, which is regarded as the implementing arm of the PSC's decisions, is extraordinary, as it symbolises Africa's continuing effort to police its own conflicts (Neethling 2005a: 71). As one of the most pivotal and ambitious APSA's components, the ASF is envisioned to empower the AU to conduct prompt and robust peace missions in response to complex emergencies that may occur in Africa that require quick military deployments (Vines 2013). Article 13 (3) of the PSC Protocol mandated the ASF to perform a wide range of functions, including:

- Observation and monitoring missions
- Other types of peace support missions
- Intervention in a member state in line with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act
- Preventive deployment to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after peace agreements are achieved
- Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation
- Humanitarian assistance in situations of conflict and major natural disasters
- Any further functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly of Heads of States

Therefore, the ASF contingents are intended to carry out peace operations across the entire range of missions from classical peacekeeping operations to complex multidimensional peacebuilding missions.

The PF stipulated that the ASF is to be made up of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components, in each of the five African subregions – North, Southern, East, West and Central Africa – corresponding to the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Brigade, also known as the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Brigade (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Brigade (ECOBRIG), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Brigade (ECCASBRIG) or Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC). Each REC contingent should be up to a brigade-size (around 5,000 troops), while the sixth brigade will be based at the AU headquarters. This arrangement will provide the AU with combined force strength of 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The PF identified six possible conflict and mission scenarios that the ASF is likely to face and under which it could be deployed (Neethling 2005a&b):

- Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission – deployed within 30 days from the issues of an AU mandate.
- Scenario 2: AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission – deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution.
- Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission – deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution.
- Scenario 4: AU regional peacekeeping for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (peacebuilding) – deployed within 30 days of an AU resolution.
- Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission, including those involving low-level spoilers – deployed within 90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.
- Scenario 6: AU intervention, example in genocide situations, where the international community does not act promptly – deployed within 14 days, with robust military force. (African Union 2003a: para 1.6, 2005a)

Conceptually, the ASF is not a standing armed force but rather a standby army constituted through a standby arrangement that is made possible through the pledges of the AU member states to earmark specific contingents (military, police and civilian personnel) for the RECs/RMs (de Coning 2004: 24). Then each REC forms its standby brigade and develops its registers. The RECs ensure that they acquaint the AU with their efforts in terms of capabilities they are able to build, including their updated rosters (Dersso

2010a). There is no question, the regional brigade forms part of the ASF, but they are based in their countries of origin in readiness for deployment at appropriate notice (de Coning 2004; Marshall 2009). This means that the ASF are called up and jointly deploy to a theatre of operation only when the decision about such deployment is made. While the African force is based in their countries of origin, they do participate in pre-deployment activities that are arranged by each REC (Dersso 2010a: 7). These activities are to ensure their readiness for deployment at short notice. The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) at the AU Commission is its coordinating mechanism and is envisioned to command a continental-wide integrated communication and information system linking the brigades to the AU Commission as well as the RECs/RMs headquarters.

In line with the possible conflict and mission scenarios above, the AU proposed very complex schedules for addressing these scenarios. For Scenarios 1 to 4, it was recommended that the deployment of peace operations should be completed within 30 days. For Scenario 5, peace operations should be deployed in 90 days, with the military component being able to completely deploy in 30 days. For Scenario 6, the AU is expected to deploy a strong military intervention force in 14 days, due to the gravity of the situations envisaged under this scenario (African Union 2003a, 2005a).

The PF and Roadmap I designed the development and operationalisation of the ASF in two phases because of the enormity of its activities and the efforts required. Phase I was to be implemented by 30 June 2005, but was extended to 2008 due to a delay in its take off. During this phase, the AU was to establish strategic-level management capability (i.e., a planning element – PLANELM) at the AU Commission to manage the deployment of Scenarios 1 and 2, and a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3. By the end of this phase, the regions should have had strategic and brigade-level headquarters and reinforcement capacity to manage a Scenario 4 mission (African Union 2003a; Bachmann 2011). According to the PF, the PLANELM of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) at the AU Commission should be composed of a full-time, 15-person staff and be supported by a start up five-person capability in the RECs'/RMs' PLANELMs (Kent and Malan 2003). The AU PLANELM was tasked with managing the ASF pre-deployment procedures and processes. The AU was to establish the ASF foundational policy documents, especially those dealing with doctrine, command, control, communications and information systems (C^3IS), SOPs, logistics, training and evaluation. Additionally, by 30 June 2005, the AU should establish and centrally manage standby rosters of 300–500 military observers (MILOBs) and about 240 individual police officers. The AU also intends to establish a standby system with at least two company-level formed police units as well as a civilian roster composed of experts in administration, human rights, humanitarian affairs, governance, and DDR (African

Union 2003a; Bachmann 2011; Dersso 2010a; Holt and Shanahan 2005; Kent and Malan 2003).

During Phase II, which was originally scheduled to be completed by 30 June 2010, the AU was to build its capacity to deal with Scenarios 4 to 6: that is, conducting and managing multidimensional peacekeeping operations, whilst the RECs/RMs were expected to continue developing their capacities to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 missions, thereby giving the AU additional assistance in deploying and managing complex peace operations (African Union 2003a, 2005a: para. 3; Kasumba and Debrah 2010). According to the PF, the RECs are the first ports of call in case of any conflict in Africa, while the AU is to provide an African perspective, working closely with the UN. Copying the UN structure for leadership of peace operations, under the ASF concept, the appointment of a special representative and a Force Commander for peace operations becomes the responsibility of the AU Commission Chairperson, while the MSC advises the PSC and the ASF on all matters relating to military and security requirements.

One important observation in the early development of the ASF is that it exclusively focuses on the military aspect of peace operations, while the civilian dimension did not receive the desired attention. As de Coning (2010: 8) argued, one of the major remaining challenges confronting the ASF is the urgent need to develop its civilian and police components so that the multidimensional nature of the AU peace operations can be realised. Although de Coning's comments were made in 2010, efforts have been geared towards rectifying this inadequacy as far back as 2006 when the AU developed the "Policy Framework on the ASF Civilian Dimension" (CP framework), a document that later became an important policy guide developed for the civilian component of the African Standby Force (African Union 2006). While the CP framework situates the civilian dimension policy in the framework of other high-level AU policy guidance, the ASF foundation documents, especially the document on the force Doctrine, help to focus attention on the multidimensional nature of the African Standby Force (de Coning 2007, 2010).

Following these developments, the 2nd Meeting of the African Ministers of Defence and Security (AMDS) in March 2008 promised to ensure that the civilian and police/*gendarmerie* dimensions of the ASF would receive adequate attention (African Union 2008a). Within this context, Roadmap II was adopted at the Consultative Meeting among the AU Commission, the RECs/RMs and the PLANELMs of the ASF Regional Brigade in Addis Ababa in July 2008. Roadmap II specified the areas that need further development (headquarters capacity, logistic depots, strategic lift, the rapid deployment capacity and others) during the remaining short period (July 2008–June 2010) left for the full operationalisation of the ASF (African Union 2008b).

Many efforts have been expended towards the development of the African Standby Force, notably in the areas of recruitment of staff for the PLANELMs at the AU Commission and the RECs to bolster the AU capacity

in planning successful peace operations. Also the ASF foundation documents were produced, adopted, and subsequently approved in March 2008 to continue guiding the operationalisation of the ASF.[18] A detailed memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the AU Commission and the RECs during the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2008 to facilitate and increase collaborations and coordination between Addis Ababa and the various RMs in the area of peace and security and also to expedite the moves towards the full development of the African Standby Force. The signing of the MoU was in response to the African leaders' call for greater cooperation and regular consultations between the AU and the RECs during their November 2007 Summit in Accra. Among the areas covered by the MoU are information sharing, regular meetings, as well as the provision of liaison officers to serve as bridges between the AU and the RECs. Since the signing of the MoU, regular meetings have been held between the AU and the RECs/RMs on the ASF development. In addition, under the famous AMANI Africa Cycle, efforts have been made to assess the operational readiness of the standby force by undertaking a chain of Level I, II and III decision-making exercises.[19] The AMANI Africa Cycle, officially launched on 21 November 2008 at the AU-EU Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa, is the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) instrument, using EURORECAMP[20] as a tool, to help the AU in the ASF operationalisation through training and by evaluating AU decision-making processes and competencies. In practical terms, it involves bolstering the AU political and strategic capabilities by setting up the procedures, processes and permanent mission structures, including political decision-making, commitment of force and guaranteeing predictable funding. The AMANI Africa Cycle culminated in October 2010 with the conducting of the continental Level II decision-making exercise known as the AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise (CPX). According to the AU Commission Chairperson, this exercise assessed progress made to date. The exercise also provided the opportunity to identify areas that need to be addressed in the development of the ASF.[21] Under the AMANI Africa II Support Programme, which covers the period between 8 May 2012 and 31 April 2015, the EU is expected to contribute €5.2 million to cover expenses relating to training and planning activities, of headquarters during the field training exercise, post-exercise activities and human resources (African Peace Facilities 2012).

In spite of these efforts, the development of the ASF was challenged by a number of problems that hampered realising its initial full operationalisation in 2010. Problems ranging from regional differences to questions about mandating modus operandi and coordination, institutional capacity building, funding, logistics and training slowed the pace of progress towards the full development of the African Standby Force. These problems were identified and will be critically addressed in the phase of the ASF implementation that covers the period between 2011 and 2015. Also the AU planned

an Africa-wide rapid deployment for testing by December 2014 (Vines 2013). There are clear disproportions in the readiness of the RECs/RMs in terms of their capabilities for peace operations. While ECOWAS and SADC are making progress in this endeavour, other regions are lagging behind. I will return to these challenges later.

The African Union Commission

Within the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Department (PSD) shoulders gargantuan peace and security responsibilities. According to the PSC Protocol, the AU Commission, through its Chairperson, the Commissioner for Peace and Security and his PSD, supports the PSC in the latter's efforts to promote peace and security in Africa. The department carries out the decisions of the PSC and ensures compliance. The PSD manages the AU's goals and implements the CADSP, the AU's Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) that seeks to achieve long-term sustainable development beyond stabilisation, among other things.[22] The department strategically and operationally directs the AU's peace and security activities. While responding to crisis situations in Africa, it keeps the PSC abreast of the developments in peace operations; it serves as a bridge between the PSC and the RECs and between the RECs and the UN as well as other relevant international organisations and AU partners. The PSD comprises four divisions, all of which work towards the AU's goal of promoting stability in Africa: the Conflict Management Division (CMD), the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), the Peace and Security Council Secretariat, and the Defence and Security Division (DSD). The CMD is responsible for the operationalisation of certain aspects of the APSA, especially those dealing with the CEWS, the PoW, and the MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The CMD, which is described as the operational policy arm of the PSC (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008: 24), is comprised of an early warning unit and a conflict management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction unit. These units are structured to develop policy options, support and coordinate activities dealing with the prevention and management of African conflicts, and implement post-conflict reconstruction and development. The PSOD is comprised of two units – the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee and the Operations and Support Unit. The PSOD is responsible for the operationalisation of the ASF and the MSC. These tasks include the elaboration of relevant policy documents and coordination with appropriate African structures and the AU's partners.[23] The division is responsible for AU peacekeeping as it plans, mounts, manages and supports AU peace operations.[24] The PSOD's tasks are akin to that of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). While this is true, the parallel between the division and DPKO should not be stretched too far because the staff strength of the PSOD is just a fraction of that of the DPKO (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008: 24). The Peace

and Security Council Secretariat gives the needed operational and administrative support to the Peace and Security Council to facilitate its work. The Secretariat acts, according to the AU, as the custodian of the institutional memory on the council's activities. The PSC Secretariat also facilitates the council's relations and dealings with other institutions on matters relating to African peace and security.[25]

The continental early warning system

The PSC Protocol calls for the establishment of a continent-wide early warning system as part of the APSA, to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts[26] through gathering and analysis of information that will help the AU to prevent conflicts in a timely manner. The CEWS operates as the early warning component of the APSA, building on the RECs'/RMs' early warning mechanisms. Its idea is to boost the AU capacity to prevent conflict by providing the Chairperson of the AU Commission with information and enabling him/her to use the valuable data gathered, through the CEWS, to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to African peace and security and also to recommend the best course of action (Wane et al. 2010).[27]

Structurally, the CEWS consists of the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) known as the "Situation Room" housed at the CMD at the AU Commission, and the Observation and Monitoring Units (OMUs) of the RMs. According to Article 12 (2b) of the PSC Protocol, the Situation Room is to be linked directly to the RMs' OMUs through appropriate means of communication. The OMUs are to continuously collect and process data at their respective levels and transmit them to the Situation Room. The AU takes prompt actions in response to the data collected through the multi-levelled African early warning system about a threat of violent conflict that has the propensity to disturb African security.

The AU has made giant strides towards the operationalisation of the CEWS since 2003 and has been working with states, the RECs/RMs, academic institutions, research centres, the UN, and its agencies as well as civil society groups. The AU has worked on the institutional development of the CEWS to the extent that it has implemented an important aspect of the data and information-gathering infrastructure. Furthermore, in line with its coordinating role, the CEWS is working on the harmonisation of the practices of the various RMs' early warning mechanism activities (African Union 2008c).

The Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise was officially inaugurated on 18 December 2007 to support the PSC's efforts and those of the AU Commission Chairperson, particularly in the area of conflict prevention.[28] It functions as an advisory body to the PSC and supports it through the use of good offices and research, among other things, to promote peace and stability in Africa. The panel echoes the AU's commitment to an "African solutions" agenda (Jegede

2009: 418) and takes an innovative African approach that reflects established African traditions of conflict resolution that put primacy on wisdom, goodwill and the abilities of elders (African Union 2010; Murithi and Nwaura 2010: 79–80). In addition to its advisory roles, Article 11 (4) of the PSC Protocol states that the PoW shall, at its own initiative, pronounce itself on issues dealing with maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Hence, in the performance of its duties, the PoW may act either at the request of the PSC or the AU Commission Chairperson, or at its own volition. This gives the PoW a degree of latitude to operate even though its functions are within the APSA's framework. In terms of its membership, Article 11 (2) of the PSC Protocol states:

> The Panel of the Wise shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made (an) outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. They shall be selected by the chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation, and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years.

In line with the PSC Protocol, in January 2007, the AU Commission Chairperson selected the following five people to serve on the panel for a three-year period and recommended to the assembly:

- Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary General of the OAU (East Africa),
- Miguel Trovoada, former president of São Tomé e Príncipe (Central Africa),
- Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Algeria (North Africa),
- Elisabeth K. Pognon, president of the Constitutional Court of Benin (West Africa),
- Brigalia Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (Southern Africa).[29]

The assembly approved the AU Commission Chairperson's recommendations at its 8th Ordinary Session in January 2007,[30] while the PSC, at its 100th meeting on 12 November 2007, adopted a detailed set of modalities for the functioning of the panel (the Modalities),[31] and called for the document to be reviewed after the operationalisation of the panel and, on a regular basis afterwards, and amended when necessary (African Union 2007a). While the PoW does not have a mediation role, as it can only assist and advise teams engaged in official negotiations, Section II (1) of the Modalities states that the PoW may undertake various activities in coordination with the PSC and the AU Commission Chairperson. The PoW supports and complements the PSC's effort, also through the special envoys and other emissaries. The

inaugural meeting of the panel was held on 20 February 2008 (El Abdellaoui 2009).[32]

The PoW has met on several occasions to deliberate and act on the situations in the CAR, Somalia, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar and Sudan, and it has equally undertaken confidence building missions to a number of African countries such as the CAR and South Africa. The PoW should be credited for its proactive role in conflict prevention in Africa, considering the relatively short period that it has been in existence as compared to other APSA's components, such as the ASF, that have received enormous AU attention and resources. However, the PoW's role is subject to conceptual ambiguities for, according to a report commissioned by the AU's PSD:

> While the Panel is envisaged to be involved in conflict prevention, it is not clear at what stage of the prevention process it intervenes. In other words, does prevention mean preventing conflict from happening or managing conflicts from escalating? If prevention is understood as the former, then the Panel's role would be somewhat of the advocacy type, and if it is the latter, the Panel might be drawn into a direct mediation contrary to the role envisaged for it in the Modalities document. (African Union 2010: 56)

While lack of conceptual clarity of the PoW's role is a challenge, not appearing in the AU Commission structure limits the panel's activities. Such non-appearance means that its activities are financed through funds provided by external donors rather than from the AU's regular budget. This situation presents the PoW with the twin problems of sustainability and ownership, for donors' funds are not predictable and are attached with too much conditionality. This tends to compromise the African ownership of the PoW.

The Peace Fund

The Peace Fund is the principal source of finance for the APSA. The fund is envisioned as a standing pool on which both the AU and the RECs/RMs can call upon in emergency situations and to meet unexpected priorities.[33] It is financed directly through the requisitions from the AU's regular budget, including arrears of contributions and voluntary contributions from states and private sources within and outside the African continent.[34] The fund has been an established practice since 1993, and under the OAU Mechanism, 6 per cent of the OAU regular budget was allocated to it. Due to poverty of African economies, a number of AU member states find it difficult to honour their financial obligations to the organisation, thereby limiting the AU in its peace and security activities. Between 2004 and 2007, the AU member states' contributions to the fund amounted to an average of 1.9 per cent of the

total resources mobilised, while the remaining amounts were from external partners (African Union 2010; Pirozzi 2009: 16).[35] Also, between 2008 and 2011, African countries' contributions to the Peace Fund totalled only 2 per cent of the resources mobilised (Vorrath 2012). This situation bears negative consequences for AU peace and security activities. The 2007 "High-leveled Panel Audit of the African Union" suggests that there is:

> cause for concern regarding the funding of peace operations in Africa. The Peace Fund remains small and precarious. On average, only 6 per cent of the regular budget is allocated to the Peace Fund. This is a paltry sum viewed against the needs of peacekeeping activities on the continent. The assessed contributions to finance peacekeeping have not been done and the reimbursement within six months of states contributing contingents to peace support operations, as provided for in the Protocol, has not always been honoured. (African Union 2007b)

As a consequence, in August 2009, African leaders decided at the AU summit in Tripoli to gradually increase the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6 per cent to a total of 12 per cent by 2012 to avoid crippling the AU in its peace and security functions (African Union 2009: 3).[36] Earlier, African leaders had adopted a resolution during the AU summit in Maputo, Mozambique, in July 2003, calling on the EU to establish a Peace Support Operation Facility (PSOF) from funds allocated to African countries under the existing cooperation agreements with the European institution (African Peace Facility 2012; African Union 2003b; Aning and Danso 2010; European Union Commission 2010). Consequently, the EU African Peace Facility (APF) was established in March 2004, with the initial sum of €250 million, under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) budget (2000–2007) to support the APSA and Africa's vision of transition from protracted conflicts to sustainable peace.[37] The APF is one of the main sources of finance for the APSA project, which puts the EU at the forefront of international support for the APSA, especially African peace operations and capacity building activities at the levels of both the AU and RECs (African Peace Facility 2012). Due to the AU's wide range of peace and security activities, especially their peace operations in the field, the money was insufficient and was increased four times, to a total of €440 million by 2007.[38] During the first phase, 90 per cent of the APF was directed towards assisting the AU-led peace operations in Somalia, Darfur, the Comoros and the FOMUC mission to the CAR. The remaining 10 per cent was devoted to capacity building for the AU Peace and Security Department. For the 2008–2010 period, the EU decided to replenish the APF in February 2009 by allocating an additional €300 million under the Intra-ACP Initiative Programme of the 10th European Development Fund (2007–2013).

Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the African security mechanism

The establishment of APSA epitomises the African leaders' resolution to prevent, manage and resolve, and therefore take greater ownership of, the continent's security challenges. This focus is based on their conviction that sustainable peace and security is a precondition for African development. The APSA makes a clear departure from the ad hoc responses to specific African security problems as practised under the OAU, as it creates a unifying framework to address these kinds of problems. Within the short period that the APSA has been in existence and, despite the fact that it is still being developed, the AU has been able to respond to and take several initiatives in Africa's trouble spots. This is a positive development that makes the APSA a promising mechanism for solving African security problems. Within the APSA framework, the AU has applied its new norms and standards to condemn the unconstitutional changes of government in some African states as well as having suspended these countries' memberships in the organisation until constitutional order has been restored (Aning 2008: 16; Mlambo 2006: 48–50). It also took decisive steps ranging from peacemaking to the supervision of elections in a number of African countries. As part of the APSA's implementation, the AU deployed peace missions in Burundi, the Comoros, Somalia, Darfur, Mali and the CAR with varying degrees of success. Although some of the AU peace operations have been taken over by the UN through a process of re-hatting AU peacekeepers into the multidimensional UN peace missions, the AU's proactive stance of deploying peace missions to stabilise the security situations in both Burundi and Darfur, and filling in the gaps created as a result of the UN's reluctance to get involved before comprehensive peace agreements were put in place, is a credit to the organisation. These peace and security efforts are clear indications of the AU's pivotal roles in managing African security, which, by extension, signal the appropriateness of the APSA tackling African security challenges. Clearly, all the aforementioned PSC's efforts would not have been possible if not for the way the APSA and its legal foundations, the PSC Protocol and CADSP, were conceived; these legal documents empowered the AU to move away from an unqualified respect for state sovereignty to non-indifference when it comes to violent conflicts on the continent.[39] The AU can now address issues that would have been regarded as purely internal affairs of the affected countries under the OAU regime, such as the coup d'états in Togo and Mauritania. The APSA's broad approach to African security is promising. The APSA is, based on the way it is conceptualised and structured, an appropriate instrument to guarantee African security. The APSA takes full account of the continent's multifaceted security challenges and has devised the required response instruments to tackle these challenges. The APSA's appropriateness can be linked to its structures, since they are not only in

place to deal with peacekeeping but also for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.[40] Despite the fact that the APSA is a promising security framework for guaranteeing African security, its operationalisation still remains the biggest challenge for Africa (Vines 2013).

The AU's recognition of the principle of subsidiarity by cooperating with and building the APSA on the RECs' structures empowers the pan-African institution to gain from the comparative advantages, which the sub-regional organisations have over the larger, continental institution, in relation to the resolutions of conflict. By cooperating and collaborating with the RECs, the AU is able to benefit from the sub-regional agencies' geographical closeness to conflict areas, their local knowledge about the actors, roots of the conflicts, and possible solutions. Also their geographical proximity to conflicts allows the RECs to deploy troops more rapidly (Gelot, Gelot and de Coning 2012), and they are better placed to curb the number of potential spoilers to a peace agreement. Because of the contagion effects of a conflict, sub-regional organisations are more willing to resolve conflicts that erupt in their backyards (Aning 2008; Aning and Atuobi 2009; Francis 2006a). The AU has taken the right step by incorporating the principle of subsidiarity in the APSA's framework, because RECs are indispensable if the AU truly wants to operationalise the APSA based on the comparative advantages that the RECs have. It is obvious that the RECs are – drawing on experiences from West Africa – better positioned to deal with conflicts within their regions, based on the advantages of proximity, and to rely on local knowledge of regional conflicts, among others, than a more distant AU. Additionally, since members of RECs are small in number when compared to the AU, it is easier for RECs to reach decisions on peacekeeping intervention in a timely manner.[41] These comparative advantages offered by the RECs strengthen the APSA as a mechanism that is striving towards realising the African solutions agenda, and the AU's collaboration with the RECs' structures is a precondition for building a network of an African peacekeeping capacity. Despite the fact that strong AU/RECs security collaboration is indispensable for guaranteeing African security, the APSA's recognition of the principle of subsidiarity does not preclude the AU from having strong relations with the wider international community.[42]

Despite the AU's success in establishing this comprehensive security architecture, the major challenge for the APSA is a fundamental chasm between its aspirations and their implementation. This gap poses serious challenges to the APSA's reliance and effectiveness in addressing African security quagmires. First, the AU inherited some of the OAU's norms but also departs from its predecessor with its recognition of democracy, transparency and accountability, respect for human rights, peace and security as well as the right to intervene in a nation's internal conflict situations of the magnitude defined in Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act. Therefore, the AU seems to be a pro-interventionist institution to guarantee human security in Africa.

At the conceptual and theoretical levels, the provision of Article 4 (h) of the Act may look simple, but the problem lies in its application. The reality is that the application will lead to serious tensions within the AU and even put African leaders' political will and the pan-African organisation's intervention capacity to the test, based on the differing national interests and political agendas of the AU member states. According to the PSC Protocol, the activation of this Article requires a statutory two-thirds majority vote of the African Union Assembly, which entails broad consensus among the organisation member countries. Attaining this is a huge task because member states, more often than not, have hidden agendas that contradict the AU's objectives. Lack of consensus among member states of the African Union and African leaders' pursuit of national/personal, rather than continental, agendas are challenges to the pan-African organisation. If there is no broad consensus, and African leaders are not speaking with one voice, there will be serious problems.

Fuelling this area of tension, the AU's new norms, especially its current non-indifference culture, seem to starkly contradict the OAU normative frameworks supporting state sovereignty and non-interference, which nonetheless also feature in the AU Act. This contradiction influences the AU member states' behaviour backed up by their different political agendas. The concept of human security that the AU is professing is even waning within the organisation. Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008: 35), relying on the authority of Tieku (2007), sounds a note of caution:

> There is the risk of a return to the OAU's system of norms based on the sovereignty of the state and non-intervention. The risk is an anti colonial view of human security as a neo-colonialist attempt to impute Western values to African states. Advocates of the principle of human security are not as powerful today as they were at the time of the creation of the AU and the anti-Western rhetoric of their opponents is enticing. This is made clear when comparing the original draft of the AU's joint defence and security policy, produced in the early years of the AU and the recently produced *Non-Aggression and Defence Pact* in which human security is not expressed as an important factor.

Nowhere was this contradiction more evident than the AU's responses to the security challenges in Zimbabwe, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya. In spite of the worldwide condemnation of the crimes committed against the civilian populations in Darfur by Khartoum, which amounted to many human rights violations and required invocation of the Responsibility to Protect principle (Aning and Atuobi 2009; Bergholm 2008: 26), the AU collectively opposed the indictment of President Omar El Bashir of Sudan by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Moolakkattu 2010: 161). The AU's official justification is that the indictment has the propensity to derail the peace

process in that country. In Zimbabwe, the AU took a shocking stance by not condemning President Mugabe's autocratic regime and his dubious election victory in March 2008 (African Union 2008d). Furthermore, African leaders failed to respond in a unified manner over the Libyan crisis in 2011. The AU's tepid response to the conflict as a pan-African interlocutor created a vacuum that was filled later by the League of Arab States through its support of NATO military intervention in the country. The consequence was that the mediation effort of the AU to find political settlement was relegated to the background (Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula 2012; Vorrath 2012). These are examples of the poor conduct of African states contravening African institutions' norms that are even visible at the sub-regional level. The post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (2010–2011) reveals the tension between the concepts of state security and human security, which obstruct the activation of the institution's norms. The ECOWAS's decision to use legitimate force to remove recalcitrant President Laurent Gbagbo (when he lost the presidential election and refused to leave) was not well supported by all its member states, due to their vested interests. Thus, Ghana declined to contribute troops to the proposed ECOWAS force to be deployed in Côte d'Ivoire to enforce the sub-regional institution's decision.[43] One important trend that is visible in the AU's application of sanction is that it is largely limited to small and medium-sized African countries, Côte d'Ivoire being an exception. Writing on the AU's double standards in its application of sanction, Vines (2013: 91–93) stated:

> AU sanctions may have been applied in response to recent coups, but have never been used to penalize extension of presidential term limits or against governments in place that initially seized power through unconstitutional means … Although the AU has responded to coups, in only a few cases has it acted against governments that have chosen to prolong their stay in power. Nor, up to 2011, had it taken action against countries with significant democratic challenges, such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. It has also been minimal in its response to elections with significant deficiencies, such as those held in Equatorial Guinea or Cameroon since 2002.

The cases of Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Zimbabwe and Sudan unveil the questionable character of African leaders in intra-African international relations and obviously negate the APSA objectives. The double standards of African states undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the AU as a security and peacebuilding regime that can effectively tackle African security problems. Moreover, the application of APSA principles is discriminatory and incoherent.

A second major challenge emerges where the AU principles place emphasis on the "African solutions" agenda, which calls on the AU to assume greater

responsibility for providing peace and security to the continent, even above that of the UN (Moolakkattu 2010: 159). The former AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, made this ambition clear when, on 29 October 2010, he reminded the audience during the AMANI Africa CPX in Addis Ababa that the transformation from the OAU into the AU is an expression of African leaders' commitment to play a bigger role in the management of African peace and security. While recognising the importance of partnership with the international community, the former AU Commission Chairperson stated clearly that partnership with the international community is not always a reliable means through which to address African security problems, referring to the painful lessons of Somalia and Rwanda.[44] This is Africa's position on greater ownership of African conflicts, which creates controversy in the relationship between the AU PSC and the UN Security Council in peace and security matters, as it calls into question the legality of the AU-mandated peace missions without the UN Security Council's authorisation when the UN is either unwilling or unable to take appropriate action in a timely manner. The problem arises due to contradictory positions in the relevant AU documents (The Act and the PSC Protocol) and the ambitious tone of the Act.

Article 16 (1) of the PSC Protocol attributes this responsibility to Africa, when it states that the AU has the primary responsibility for promoting peace and security in Africa, while Article 7 (1c & d) of the same protocol establishes the mandating authority of the PSC to act in conjunction with the AU Commission Chairperson, authorise the mounting and deployment of peace operations and lay down general guidelines for the conduct of such missions, including the mandates thereof (Article 7 (1c & d) PSC Protocol, African Union 2002). This provision is contradicted by Article 17 (1) of the PSC Protocol, which recognised the UN Security Council as the chief custodian of international peace and security. Within the framework of the UN Charter, Chapter VIII recognises cooperation between the UN and regional agencies/arrangements and the use of the regional arrangements for enforcement actions under the authority of the UN Security Council. This contradictory position creates a high degree of uncertainty as to which body – the PSC or the UN Security Council – should be primarily responsible for African security.

There is no provision in the relevant AU documents, which fuels this ambiguity and overtly obliges the AU to request prior approval from the UN Security Council. However, Article 17 (2) of the PSC Protocol states that, "where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical, and military support for the African Union's activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter" (African Union 2002).

It is glaringly obvious in the AU documents that Africa recognised the UN's primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security,

but the proactive stance of the AU has also meant that the African institution reserved an interventionist role for itself. The implication of this is that the AU calls upon the world body only when it considers it necessary. It is true that the regional organisation can seek post facto approval for its action, but the danger here is whether the UN will support such action by taking cognisance of Article 53 of its Charter. No norms in the AU Act or the PSC Protocol explain what will happen in the case of the failure of the UN's authorisation of the AU intervention. In March 2005, the AU appeared to agree with the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change when, in the "Ezulwini Consensus" document, it agreed that regional peace operations and armed interventions should be conducted with the UN Security Council's authorisation. The document stipulated further that in emergency situations demanding urgent action, the UN Security Council's authorisation could be granted "after the fact" (African Union 2005b). Obviously, the UN and the AU's close cooperation is germane to achieving security in Africa. Thus, the prevailing wisdom and expectation that Africa's institutions have to decide independently on how and when to deploy peace operations and later seek for UN's endorsement and funding the African peace missions is unreasonable. This problem needs to be critically addressed for the proper functioning of the APSA. Therefore, it is important for the two institutions to clarify when the UN's role could be regarded as being delegated to regional agencies/arrangements.

There is also a wide gap between the AU's ambitions and its institutional capacities to fully achieve the APSA's objectives, at least in the short- and medium-term. The weak institutional capacities of the AU are due to lack of resources, both financial and human. Most of the institutional structures of the APSA are weak, fragmented, and yet to be fully operationalised. Although a good amount of work has been done in the operationalisation of the APSA, the key areas are not yet fully covered. There are structural deficiencies within the AU Commission itself, and they call for a reorganised and strengthened AU Commission for effective implementation of the APSA and providing successful AU peace operations in the future. The AU Commission is deficient in many ways, which was partly revealed by the organisation's poor planning capabilities in relation to AMISOM, as both the UN and EU teams provided technical guidance to the AU Commission with respect to this operation[45] (see Chapter 5 for details). The PSD that is responsible for peace and security works at the AU Commission is severely constrained by weak capacities conditioned by poor funding, which also has severe consequences for the human resource capacity at the AU Commission. In this regard, take staff recruitment procedures as an example, which are not effective with many short-term contract appointments and a low salary scale. The problem of staffing of the AU is even more aggravated by the Maputo Structure, which puts a ceiling on the number of recruitments through the regular budget of the AU. The AU's

funding problem has made the institution rely on external support for its programmes – even those that concern staff recruitment. For instance, most staff in the PSC Secretariat, including the liaison officers, were recruited on short-term contracts through support from various partners external to the continent (African Union 2010: 65). Low staffing levels hinder the AU. In 2012, for example, it employed only 669 people; this number is insignificant when compare to the EU's 33,000 (Vines 2013). These problems create administrative bottlenecks that hinder the AU Commission in the APSA's implementation.

The AU capacity weaknesses extend beyond the institutional building as its peace missions contend with multilayered hurdles due to poor funding and shortage of logistics requirements. No doubt, the AU has taken a bold step in the deployment of a peacekeeping force, but its peacekeepers need resources to work with. These logistics requirements are, at present, lacking in the African Union-led peace missions. AU officials themselves acknowledge the logistics problems for the organisation missions when they write that the availability of troops for peace operations is important, but the pan-African institution needs the capacity to maintain and sustain those troops deployed for peacekeeping operations (Kasumba and Debrah 2010: 18). At present, the AU depends, to a large extent, on external partners for logistics and general service support or management capabilities. The problem with this situation is that it can create complications insofar as the success of an AU peace mission is concerned.[46] The AMISOM and AMIS operations reveal the gravity of the challenges confronting AU peace missions, which seriously limit their abilities to fully implement these missions' mandates. I examine the AU peacekeeping operations in the subsequent chapters.

The lack of economic resources from African states and Africa's overreliance on external partners for the operationalisation of the APSA are frightening and these issues also pose a serious challenge to the AU and its role in keeping Africa free from war. I analyse this challenge from two perspectives: sustainability and African ownership. It is unquestionable that the operationalisation of the APSA has received significant amounts of support from donors that are channelled through various multilateral and bilateral programmes such as the EU African Peace Facility and the UN's 10-year Capacity Building Programme. Africa's overreliance on external support puts the sustainability of the security mechanism in doubt. It is highly unclear to what extent these partners will be willing to continue funding the APSA. Sometimes donors' contributions are highly unpredictable due, in part, to the economic crises that some of them are going through as a consequence of the current global economic crisis (Gelot, Gelot and de Coning 2012). The unpredictability of external donors makes their long-term support to the APSA highly uncertain. Inasmuch as African states fail to secure an independent source of funding for the security architecture, the

APSA's objectives will be difficult to realise. Furthermore, external donors' resources come with many conditions, which might, in many cases at least, not be in the best interests of Africa.[47]

This leads us to the second aspect of the problem, which centres on the question of ownership. Since the AU depends on external resources for its peace and security activities, the extent to which the AU will be able to main legitimacy and credibility in Africa is not certain. The absence of autonomous and adequate African financing of the security architecture creates the problem of ownership for the AU, which is a blow to its "African solutions" motto. The AU or Africa can only claim ownership if all members contribute as promised, and the AU becomes financially independent. If the AU's existence depends on outsiders' funds, then this dependency means no ownership. Moreover, this situation could be interpreted as just being slaves to new masters, who are probably paying for a safe environment in which to extract resources – that is, without the hindrance of war – and most of these profits flee Africa.[48] Besides, donors will interfere with the AU's decision-making process because they are providing the funding. With respect to the funded programmes, mentoring and advice should be favoured instead, as well as an understanding that the AU's activities will fall under UN guidelines for engagement in armed interventions. This is the only way to safeguard the AU's African solutions to African problems agenda.

Other areas where the APSA is weakened concern the disparities in the development and readiness of the regional mechanisms. The internal dynamics within regions and regional incoherencies are obstacles to the full operationalisation of APSA. There is no doubt Regional Economic Communities are the mainstay of APSA and the nature of RECs relationship with the AU is central to APSA's success. Presently the relationship between them and the AU is fraught with difficulties. The exact makeup of RECs is unclear, as the five Regional Economic Communities for APSA's purpose fail to correspond to the existing eight RECs.[49] In East Africa, for example, EASBRIG is being coordinated by IGAD. EASBRIG is composed of troops from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Seychelles and Uganda. The problem is that Rwanda, Seychelles and Madagascar are not IGAD members (Vines 2013). The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have no security arms, but these institutions who now think they have a security role to play have since forced themselves into the PSC. Furthermore, Angola, a member of SADC and a signatory to a memorandum establishing SADCBRIG, is a major player in FOMAC (Central Africa) (Williams 2011a). Vines (2013) argues:

> These regional incoherencies need not mean that peace and security architecture cannot be established, but they make it harder. Moves to

rationalise the regional organisations have been discussed, but there seems little political will to do so. It well suited Angola, for example, to sit in two regions and be able to chose what initiatives to support on an *ad hoc* basis in accordance with its own interests.

The internal political dynamics within RECs and regional incoherencies need to be properly addressed for APSA to succeed. For instance, many West African countries see Nigeria as a regional hegemon. This is evidenced by Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso's oppositions to the Nigerian-led ECOMOG operation in Liberia in the 1990s, despite Abuja's claim of stabilising the subregion. The rivalry between Kenya and Ethiopia over regional leadership is not a positive development for the East African regional security cooperation. The consequence of the competition is that EASBRIG headquarters is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and its planning element is situated in Nairobi, Kenya. This situation is not helpful, as it makes the regional mechanism less efficient than having all elements of EASBRIG in one place. Also the competition for regional leadership between Cairo and Tripoli delays the takeoff of NASBRIG (Vines 2013).

Conclusion

I have analysed the Africa's new security system and its operationalisation. More specifically, I have examined the APSA's institutional structures in order to question whether the APSA is an appropriate and effective security instrument to overcome post-Cold War African security problems. It appears that although the AU has been able to present Africa with a comprehensive security architecture, much more remains to be done to achieve its full operationalisation due to a plethora of challenges confronting the security framework. By evaluating the APSA's strengths and weaknesses, analysis reveals that the APSA offers a hypothetical solution to African security problems, but its reliance and effectiveness is a function of the level of commitments and seriousness of African leaders, defined in terms of political will, resources, and above all, funds committed to the grand vision of realising African solutions to African problems.

As the analysis shows, the idea of a security mechanism is rooted in Africa's growing yearning to police its armed conflicts and threats of war by relying on its own capabilities to prevent and/or manage armed conflict. This is partly due to the perceived lack of interests of the international community in African wars or armed conflicts. Now that the AU has presented itself as a security, peacekeeping and peacebuilding actor, two key questions can be posed. The first is, how effective have the AU peace operations been so far, and what lessons can be learned? The second

and more realistic question that looms is, how can the AU continue to pay for their peacekeeping operations without being overly dependent on the international community? The subsequent chapters answer the first question by examining the AMIB, AMISOM and UNAMID operations. The second question has been discussed here, and ultimately, it remains a major challenge for African peacekeeping.

4
The African Mission in Burundi

Introduction

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first AU-mandated armed peace operation. AMIB's deployment was authorised in 2003 before the inauguration of the AU's Peace and Security Council. The peace mission mirrored the AU's ambition to intervene in African conflicts where the UN was either not too interested or delayed in responding to a volatile security situation in which there was no comprehensive peace agreement. AMIB highlights how the UN and AU could collaborate with one another in dealing with African peace operations. A number of students of African security and peacekeeping have described AMIB as a successful mission, and AMIB has been recommended as a possible model for future peace operations in Africa (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010; Okumu 2009; Svensson 2008).[1] Based on this assertion, I examine AMIB in this chapter in order to assess its achievements and challenges, as well as the lessons that were learned from the mission for improving future peacekeeping operations in Africa. Against the backdrop of the APSA, I address three key questions that emerge from the analysis of AMIB: first, was AMIB truly a successful mission? Second, did AMIB balance the triangular area of tension in African peace operations: namely, the AU's ambitions, its peacekeeping capacity, and the AU member states' political will and agendas? Third, were the optimisms embedded in the APSA in terms of its ability to tackle armed conflicts and guarantee African security realised with the AU's experiences in Burundi?

I address these questions in this chapter, but this cannot be done in the absence of an understanding of the context in which the mission was deployed and operated. As a starting point, I explore the conflict history of Burundi through a periodisation of the country's cycle of conflict. This is followed by a critical examination of Africa's peacemaking interventions that led to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements for Burundi (the Arusha Agreement) in August 2000 and the subsequent ceasefire agreements made between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and

the armed groups in October and December 2002, which provided the basis for AMIB's deployment.[2] I then explore AMIB right from its conceptualisation to its deployment. Furthermore, the mission's positive and negative experiences are examined against its objectives, and the aforementioned triangular area of tension in African peace operations. The evaluation of AMIB aims to investigate the extent to which the APSA's rhetoric has been put into practice. This is followed by the examination of the factors for AMIB's successes or failures, as the case may be. I conclude with a reflection on lessons that were actually learned from AMIB by the AU and other security actors as a prelude to how these lessons were actually applied in the subsequent peace operations of which the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was the immediate successor.

Historical context

The context of Burundi's cycle of violent conflict

Burundi is a small republic in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The country's population stood at eight million people in 2008 with a demographic make up of approximately 85 per cent Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Twa.[3] These ethnic groups have been living in Burundi since its formation many centuries ago. Burundi's first inhabitants were the hunter and potter Twa people, but they were later displaced and dominated by the Hutu agriculturalists who subsequently established a series of small kingdoms until the 15th century, when Tutsi cattle herders arrived in Burundi. The Tutsi dominated and ruled over both the Twa and Hutu and established several small kingdoms (Harley 2004). By the 19th century, Burundi was a Tutsi kingdom with an established political structure. Despite the minority Tutsi dominance, both Tutsi and Hutu cohabited relatively peacefully during the pre-colonial period.

The Burundian conflict is archetypal of what Zartman (1995) called a centralist internal conflict, which centres on the control of state power and apparatuses. A centralist internal conflict is distinguished from a regionalist internal one, where the insurgents fight for secession or regional autonomy. The insurgents' objective in a centralist internal conflict situation is either to replace a government or to be included in the latter in a power-sharing arrangement while the state, represented by the government, either resists being overthrown or agrees to share power with the insurgent group(s). Juxtaposing Zartman's centralist internal conflict argument to Burundi, its conflict is rooted in the unequal distribution of state power and socioeconomic benefits along ethnic lines. The Burundian state institutions were privatised, and the privatisation of the state institutions by ethnic and regional identities has created a disconnection between the state institutions and the population. Despite the Hutu's demographic strength, the minority Tutsi have dominated Burundi's political and economic lives in

both the pre- and post-independence periods,[4] and ethnicity has become an instrument in the hands of the political elite for political and socioeconomic competition. Burundi's key institutions, such as the military and judiciary, are privatised and controlled by a small section of the country's population. Thus, the alienated majority population becomes frustrated because they perceive their interests as being marginalised. The privatisation of the state by the ruling elite has always been exploited through patronage and clientelism (Ndikumana 1998). The Tutsi's control of power on many occasions has caused Hutu uprisings.

The Tutsi's monopoly of state power is a product of history; it was exploited by the colonial administration for its benefit[5] and continued by the leaders of the Burundian post-colony. Literature on Burundi's conflict has identified four periods in the gradation of violence: (1) the transitional disorders leading to independence in 1962; (2) the 1972 Hutu uprisings/genocide; (3) the 1988 ethnic tensions; (4) the violence associated with the introduction of a multiparty system leading to the outbreak of civil war in 1993.

In the late 1950s, Belgium was unwavering in supporting Burundi's transition to independence. Brussels assented to a reform based on the devolution of legislative authority to an indirectly elected council with *mwami (*king) as a constitutional monarchy. The transitional process was augmented with the creation of a territorial guard in 1960 with a reasonable Hutu and Tutsi representation, which became the Burundian army (*Forces Armées Burundaises*, or FAB) after independence.[6] As Burundi moved towards independence, a Tutsi-dominated political party, *Union pour le Progres National* (Union for National Progress, or UPRONA), was formed. UPRONA's rapid departure from its original traditional orientation to a nationalistic agenda along the lines of the developments in neighbouring Rwanda widened the Tutsi and Hutu divide. Thus, Belgian colonial rule moved against UPRONA, branding it a communist party, and established a rival *Parti Democratic Chretien* (Christian Democratic Party, or PDC), which formed the maiden provisional government in 1961 (Boshoff 2010: 4). The Belgians' support for the PDC became counterproductive, as it beclouded the PDC's popularity and boosted the standing of UPRONA, which triumphed in Burundi's first elections in September 1961, while its leader became the country's first prime minister (Bentley and Southall 2005). The assassination of the prime minister by the PDC agents caused a division within UPRONA. What followed was that the country experienced a "pre-emptive counter-revolution" by the Tutsi political class (Eller 2002: 231–232; Southall 2006a&b).

Between 1963 and 1965,[7] the king attempted numerous measures to stabilise the country, one of which was his effort to balance the proportion of Hutu and Tutsi in government. Instability further ensued with the killing of a Hutu prime minister appointed by the king in January 1965 by a Tutsi refugee from Rwanda (Boshoff 2010; Eller 2002). However, the king's decisions to hold new elections to reduce tensions became counterproductive

when he surprisingly appointed a Tutsi prime minister, Leopold Bihumugani, in the 1965 election, which was won by the Hutu. This political development increased the Tutsi-Hutu divide (Boshoff's 2010). The Hutu army officers met this appointment with an attempted coup, which was suppressed by the troops loyal to Michel Micombero, a Tutsi military officer. In the ensuing political turmoil, the king fled to the Congo, the Burundian army was cleansed of all but a handful of Hutu, and Hutu politicians were virtually eliminated. This big blow to the Hutu ended their political aspirations for many years.

Charles Ndizeye succeeded his father as king and revoked the constitution in July 1966, appointing Micombero as prime minister, only to be overthrown later that year by Micombero, who declared himself president, prime minister and leader of UPRONA. In 1969, the military suppressed a coup attempt by the Hutu officers. Thus, the Tutsi's power was entrenched; the gap between the two ethnic groups increased, and the foundation was laid for the 1972 insurrection (Southall 2006b).

The second period in the gradation of conflict is associated with the 1972 Hutu uprisings. In the lead up to the uprisings, it was obvious that there was a division within the Tutsi ruling class, as the 1971 attempted coup by non-southern Tutsi army officers demonstrated.[8] The Hutu capitalised on intra-Tutsi rivalries to attempt a coup with the hope of capturing power. Although Micombero survived the rebellion, his regime became notorious for human rights violations and for excluding the Hutu majority (Boshoff 2010; Svensson 2008). On 29 April 1972, the already tense ethnic relations flared up when Hutu insurgents from Tanzania crossed into south of Burundi and carried out systematic attacks on Tutsi with the aim of genocide (ACCORD 2007; Harley 2004; Manirakiza 1992). The Hutu-instigated violence resulted in the deaths of between 2,000 and 3,000 Tutsi while the deaths of Hutu people from the large-scale military reprisals were between 100,000 and 200,000, and about 150,000 people fled to neighbouring countries, notably Rwanda and Tanzania (Manirakiza 2005: 46).

The enormous carnage that went with the 1972 violence had devastating effects with respect to the collective memories of Burundians. The effects of the carnage were later to reappear during the country's third period in the gradation of conflict, which started in 1988. Four years after the Hutu genocide, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, another Tutsi military officer from the South, overthrew Micombero in a bloodless coup, and he promised political reforms. But throughout his 11 years in power, authoritarianism was the norm, and the Burundian society was still polarised. Bagaza promulgated a new constitution in 1981 – maintaining the country as a one-party state, suppressing political oppositions and curtailing fundamental rights. In September 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, ousted Bagaza's dictatorship in a bloody coup. Buyoya suspended the 1981 constitution, dissolved political parties, dismissed the National Assembly and formed the Military

Committee for National Salvation, which later appointed him president. Another Hutu uprising against Tutsi peasants in August 1988, organised by the Hutu *parti pour la liberation du people Hutu* (Party for the Liberation of Hutu People, or PALIPEHUTU) in the north of the country, caused massive reprisals conducted by the military against the Hutu (Eller 2002; Uvin 1999: 259). In these disastrous confrontations, more than 20,000 people were killed. These tragic events and massive human rights violations were condemned by the international community and were followed by strong external pressures on Burundi for democratic political reforms. Southall (2006b: 204) writes, "Buyoya responded to external demands for liberalisation through a series of further reforms, not least the appointment of a Hutu prime minister and a government composed equally of Hutu and Tutsi ministers, which sought to rebuild national unity."

Besides, the internal political situations at the time also made reforms necessary, for there was increased consciousness within the Burundian society that the ideology of ethnic exclusion of the military rulers was edging the country towards a civil war. By the end of 1988, Buyoya embarked on transformative democratic reform, which culminated in the introduction of multiparty system in 1992. The new democratic experiment was put to the test in June 1993, and a new Hutu-dominated non-armed political party, the *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (Burundi Democratic Front, or FRODEBU) defeated Buyoya's UPRONA, while its leader, Melchior Ndadaye, assumed office as the country's first democratically elected Hutu president and formed a government of national unity. The honeymoon associated with the new democracy was short-lived, as Burundi entered its fourth period in the gradation of violence with the outbreak of civil war.

Burundi's civil war

Burundi's low-intensity ethnic conflict exploded in October 1993 due to the assassination of Ndadaye and other high-ranking officials by the extremist elements within the FAB.[9] The killing plunged the country into a spiral of violence as the Hutu massacred many Tutsi. Ndadaye's assassination created a tense situation that resulted in retaliations by the combination of the FAB, *gendarmerie* and militias in the indiscriminate killings of Hutu peasants and officials. The wave of interethnic killings after Ndadaye's death were "built on ground already poisoned by decades of colonial divide-and-rule, ethnicised violence around independence in 1962, and a failed insurrection in 1972" (Jackson 2006: 3). During this period, between 250,000 and 300,000 lives were lost (Daley 2006; Hara 1999). Since the coup was not supported by the major elements within the FAB, the FRODEBU remained in control of the government (Southall 2006b). The consequences of the inability of the political elite to resolve the crisis that engulfed the country in a timely manner meant that the parliament was deadlocked, and hence the country experienced what has been described in the Burundian political literature

as a "creeping coup," through which the Tutsi elite in the opposition were gradually restored to power with the help of the military (Boshoff 2010: 6; Southall 2006a&b). The creeping coup was characterised by the following: The FAB and local youth were engaged in urban and rural violence to threaten FRODEBU's members, and this hindered the state in performing its duties; the members of UPRONA embarked on a propaganda campaign in which the FRODEBU government was accused of organising a Tutsi genocide; pro-UPRONA judges in the Constitutional Court refused to endorse the National Assembly's election of a Hutu Minister of Agriculture, Cyprien Ntaryamira, as interim president; Tutsi enforced ethnic constraints on FRODEBU (Boshoff 2010; Southall 2006b). Thus, the government was compelled to give successive concessions/powers to Tutsi within the government. The UN played a significant role to break the political deadlock. Immediately after the assassination of Ndadaye, the UN Secretary General appointed Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as his special envoy to Burundi to broker a political settlement. The acceptance of the UN mission by the conflicting parties led to its success in assisting the restoration of political institutions and contributed to the amendment of the country's constitution to make possible the indirect election of the president. With these international efforts, Ntaryamira succeeded Ndadaye as president in February 1994 (Jackson 2006; Ould-Abdallah 2000).

Burundi was further sucked into a conflict vortex in April 1994 when Ntaryamira and his Rwandan counterpart, Juvenal Habyarimana, were both killed when their airplane was shot down over Kigali on their way from a regional peace meeting in Tanzania. This tragic event led to genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, in which about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed (Prunier 2005). With the death of Ntaryamira, Burundi experienced yet another political crisis, and this prompted the UN special envoy to begin negotiations with the parties. By September 1994, he had helped to broker the *Convention de Gouvernement* (the Convention of Government), signed by 13 Burundian political parties, which made provisions for the establishment of a coalition government with a president from FRODEBU and a prime minister from UPRONA. Pursuant to this agreement, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya – a Hutu politician – was appointed president in October 1994 (Boshoff 2010; Devon 2003; Uvin 1999).[10] Afterwards, the transitional arrangement suffered a serious setback. As Ntibantunganya tried to accommodate the demands of the military and control the government, he simultaneously felt the wrath of the radical elements within his FRODEBU party who believed that they had been alienated by a creeping coup, and hence they eventually split to form the *Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie* (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-CNDD). The CNDD established its armed group, *Forces pour la Defense de la democratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy, or FDD). This political development, coupled with UPRONA's withdrawal from parliament and government,

resulted in a new round of violence in which many people were killed or became refugees in neighbouring countries (Uvin 1999: 263).

Africa's peacemaking interventions and the deployment of SAPSD

The assassination of Ndadaye was widely condemned and prompted the international community to intervene to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict and to prevent Burundi from experiencing another genocidal civil war. The leaders of the Great Lakes region were very critical of the political development, which prompted them to hold the first regional conference on Burundi in Kigali, Rwanda. The conference, with the OAU Secretary General in attendance, called for the reinstatement of the democratically elected government and agreement to deploy troops to Burundi to protect the government. After negotiations with the government, the OAU representative secured Bujumbura's consent to dispatch an African force to Burundi (Maundi 2003: 332; Ould-Abdallah 2000: 50). The regional leaders and the OAU were more concerned with the political situation because it could destabilise regional security. The proposed intervention force was intended to reinstate the democratically elected government, as the extremist elements within the FAB aimed at replacing the new democracy with an illegitimate government. Also, the African force was expected to discourage further military takeover of African democratically elected governments elsewhere (Maundi 2003). In line with the agreement with the Burundian authorities, the FAB and other parties in Burundi's conflict, the OAU deployed its unarmed military observer mission (OMIB) in February 1994. The mission was expected to prevent genocide and protect the government. The deployment of OMIB was followed by the OAU and regional actors' spirited efforts to find a political settlement to the conflict.

In November 1995, the leaders of the Great Lakes region announced the formation of a Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (RPI), and former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere was asked to lead the regional peace efforts (Adebajo 2011: 75; Jackson 2006). After extensive contacts with various parties, Nyerere negotiated between FRODEBU and UPRONA in Mwanza from April to May 1996, but these efforts were not successful due to the differing positions of the two parties. However, Nyerere proposed a regional heads of state summit on Burundi in Arusha, Tanzania. The regional leaders, with impetus from the US-based Carter Center, met the representatives of FRODEBU, UPRONA and other smaller parties to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the country. At the meeting, Ntibantunganya was reluctant to accept the regional initiative of sending peacekeeping forces to Burundi, and the idea was completely rejected by the Burundian army (Boshoff 2010: 7). The OAU and UN supported the regional peace efforts, but they failed to stop the Tutsi insurgency. On 25 July 1996, the early successes

of the regional efforts were upset by FAB's overthrowing of Ntibantunganya and reinstallation of Buyoya as president (Adebajo 2011: 75).

Responding to these developments, and with the intention of returning the country to constitutional order, regional leaders imposed economic sanctions on Burundi, a punitive measure that was interpreted by the Tutsi as evidence of Nyerere's support of the Hutu cause (Southall 2006a&b). Consequently, Buyoya withdrew from the Arusha peace process and opted for internal settlement of the political crisis. First, the Burundian authorities unbanned political parties in September 1996 and restored the 1993 parliament. Then Buyoya undertook efforts to generate a national dialogue while he also forged close partnerships for peace among the government, judiciary and civil society organisations. Specifically, he convened direct negotiations with the CNDD in September 1996. By May 1997, the negotiations with CNDD had collapsed, but his engagements with FRODEBU were successful, and by May 1998, the FRODEBU members that remained in the country re-entered the government. Then Buyoya agreed to revive the Arusha peace process (Boshoff 2010; Jackson 2006).

Another round of peace negotiations started in June 1998 when Nyerere convened the Arusha II meeting. These all-inclusive talks were attended by 19 delegations representing the government, national assembly and 17 political parties, including UPRONA and FRODEBU. However, the Arusha talks sparked off splits in the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU when factions that had the allegiances of the majority of their armed wings – the FDD and *Forces nationales de liberation* (National Liberation Force, or FNL) respectively – demanded recognition for these armed groups as independent organisations.[11] With this deadlock, the Regional Initiative decided to continue the negotiations with the political organisations in the absence of PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD to secure a political agreement with the hope that a ceasefire agreement with the military factions would be secured later. According to Southall (2006b: 207) this was a critical moment, for "major elements of the FDD and FNL now remained at war, at odds with the Arusha process ... the talks made uneven progress, constrained by the absence of the larger faction of the FDD and FNL as well as reservations which Tutsi delegations continued to harbour about Nyerere." The former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, became the new facilitator in November 1999, following the death of Nyerere, and this signalled the inroad of Pretoria's diplomacy in the Burundian peace process.

Against all odds,[12] Mandela successfully negotiated the Arusha agreement on 28 August 2000. It was not a comprehensive peace agreement in that only 13 out of the 19 delegations signed it. Both UPRONA and FRODEBU were among the 13 parties that signed it. The remaining six parties that refused to sign were all Tutsi's. Regional pressures were intensified on the remaining parties, and they eventually signed it at a regional summit in Nairobi on 20 September 2000 (Bentley and Southall 2005). The Arusha

agreement established a framework for a transitional settlement of the conflict leading to national elections. Specifically, it envisaged a 36-month transitional power-sharing with the presidency, alternating from UPRONA (Buyoya as interim president for 18 months from 1 November 2001) to FRODEBU (Domitien Ndayizeye, chosen by FRODEBU, from 1 May 2003) to be followed by fresh elections no later than 31 October 2004 (Jackson 2006; Southall 2006a).[13]

The signing of the Arusha agreement did not lead to a reduction in armed conflict. In an attempt to realise the transitional government initiative for Burundi, it was decided that an African force would be deployed to provide VIP protection to returning politicians taking part in the peace process (Devon 2003). The idea of the proposed force suffered a setback when many African states were unwilling to contribute troops because no ceasefire agreement was in place. Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, which had pledged troops, reneged for the same reason. To implement the Arusha agreement, Mandela persuaded the South African government to deploy troops – SAPSD – in Burundi. The planning and deployment of SAPSD was done in haste due to the precarious situation on the ground. This lack of careful planning made SAPSD's operational activities difficult during its initial period of deployment.

The SAPSD's deployment started with the arrival of the advance element in late October 2001. Once completely deployed, its force strength stood at just over 700 men. Southall (2006b: 209) contends that the mission's major challenge in Burundi was as follows: "They had to overcome both the suspicions of the Burundian army, which was concerned that they would impinge upon its autonomy, and of the rebels, who were to go on to accuse them of operating in *de facto* alliance with that military!" Although the mission was initially met with hostile reactions from some of the local population and the FAB, it was able to overcome this challenge and then focused on its assigned functions. The SAPSD operated on a very limited mandate as a protection force, and under the rules of its mandate, troops would be withdrawn in case they become the object of attack. Despite the fact that the mission was deployed in the absence of the UN Security Council authorisation, Bellamy and Williams (2005: 190) attributed its legitimacy to three important factors. First, since the death of Ndadaye in 1993, the UN had been reluctant to send its peacekeepers to Burundi, and the African initiative (and Mandela's in particular) was seen as "helping the UN deflect criticism that it was ignoring Burundi's conflict." Second, the mission was endorsed post facto by the UN Security Council and third, the Burundian government consented to its deployment.

The deployment of the South African troops helped to stabilise Bujumbura, the Burundian capital, but it was not enough to ameliorate the Burundian security situation overall. Since the mission was Bujumbura-based, it neither protected the civilian population nor could it perform a broader

peacekeeping function, while the humanitarian situation continued to worsen. Between October and December 2002, two ceasefire agreements were signed, but the belligerents did not respect them and continuing hostility between the warring parties brought untold hardships to the civilian population. With the deteriorating security and humanitarian situations, the deputy president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, who had been helping Mandela in facilitating the peace process, requested the UN's and donor community's contributions to the initiative of deploying an African force in Burundi (Cilliers 2003). South Africa's proposal was later accepted, and it set the stage for the AU peace operation in Burundi. I now turn to the analysis of AMIB.

The African mission in Burundi

Establishment, objectives and mandate

The signing of the Arusha agreement and the subsequent ceasefire agreements between the TGoB and the armed factions provided the basis for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, despite the ambiguities in the provisions of the various agreements regarding the authorising institution for such a peacekeeping mission. To start with, Article 8 of Protocol V of the Arusha agreement stated that "immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundi Government shall submit to the United Nations (UN) a request for an international peacekeeping force." But under Article III of the October 2002 ceasefire agreement, the signatories (TGoB and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements, or APPMs) agreed that the "verification and control of the ceasefire may be conducted by a UN-mandated mission, or an African Union (AU) [mission]." Furthermore, Article III of the December 2002 ceasefire agreement provided that the "verification and control of the ceasefire agreement shall be conducted by an African mission," a provision that contradicted both the provisions of the Arusha and the October 2002 ceasefire agreements. The inconsistencies in the various agreements regarding which institution was to be responsible for peace operation, coupled with the AU's strong position against war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Africa (Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Framework) and, the fact that the UN would not deploy a peacekeeping force in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, following the Brahimi Commission's recommendations, spurred the AU to authorise AMIB.

The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism during its 91st Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa mandated the deployment of AMIB on 2 April 2003.[14] A number of factors accounted for AMIB's deployment. First, the conflict in Burundi was seen both by the AU and the RPI in the context of the interlocking nature of the wider Great Lakes region's conflict dynamics. Based on this recognition, regional leaders, during their December 2002

Arusha meeting, were convinced that the existence of peace and security in Burundi is a sine qua non for, and a first step towards stability in, the Great Lakes region. Second, and also from the AU's perspective, AMIB's deployment is located within the context of the APSA, for it serves as an opportunity for the AU to showcase the APSA's main imperatives – "Africa must unite," "The responsibility to protect" and "Try Africa first" – and the AU's self-imposed responsibility as a security actor in Africa to the broader international community.

AMIB's deployment was for an initial one-year period and subject to renewal by the Central Organ pending the deployment of a UN mission as envisioned in the agreement between the UN and AU. The Central Organ agreed that AMIB's mandate would be renewed every six months after the expiration of its initial 12-month period. The purpose/end-state of the mission was stated in its mandate as follows: "AMIB will have fulfilled its mandate after it has facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, and the defence and security situation in Burundi is stable and well-managed by newly created national defence and security structures." With this end-state in view, AMIB was assigned a set of objectives that involved supervising the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; creating favourable conditions for the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission; and contributing to political and economic stability in Burundi. To achieve these objectives, the African mission was mandated to perform specific operational tasks. These included the following tasks: establishment, maintenance and liaison between the parties; monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; facilitating the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and Technical Committees responsible for the establishment of a new National Defence and Police Forces; securing identified assembly and disengagement areas; providing safe passage for the parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas; facilitating and providing technical assistance to the DDR processes; facilitating delivery of humanitarian assistance, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons; coordinating mission activities with the UN with their presence in Burundi; and providing VIP protection for designated returning leaders (Aboagye 2004; Boshoff 2010; Boshoff and Dara 2003; Mlambo 2006; Murithi 2009a; Porto 2003; Williams 2011b).[15]

The conceptualisation and deployment of AMIB

AMIB was conceptualised as an integrated peace mission, comprising military contingents (MILCONs) and civilian personnel, and it had a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CIMICC). The civilian component was to help the mission with logistics and administrative support, and promote mutual understanding among AMIB, TGoB and the local population. The special representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Burundi,

Ambassador Mamadou Bah (Guinea), was appointed head of mission (HoM). He was assisted by Ambassador Welile Nhlapo (South Africa) and retired Lieutenant-General Martin Mwakalindile (Tanzania).[16] AMIB was under the overall direction of the HoM. The Head of Mission and the Force Commander were jointly responsible for the provision of progress reports dealing with the implementation of the mission's mandate to the Central Organ. Troop contributions were from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique with a small military observer contingent (MILOBs) of 43 personnel drawn from Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Mali, Gabon and Togo. At the conceptual level, AMIB, once completely deployed, amounted to around 3,335 troops. South Africa agreed to send one battalion, two additional companies and other elements totalling 1,600 troops, while Ethiopia and Mozambique respectively promised to send one battalion and two additional companies, and one strengthened company of approximately 280 troops (Aboagye 2004; Boshoff and Dara 2003). However, at the zenith of the operation, the AMIB force strength numbered only 3,128 troops (Williams 2006: 353). South Africa, which was the lead nation of the mission, appointed a Force Commander Major General Sipho Binda, while Ethiopia assigned Brigadier General G. Ayele as deputy Force Commander of AMIB.

AQ: We have lower-cased use of 'headquarters' across the text, wherever they appear: e.g. UN headquarters, Force headquarters, etc.

With the deployment of AMIB, the mission replaced the SAPSD. The integration of more than 700 SAPSD into AMIB as its advance party on 1 May 2003, and the arrival of advance elements from Ethiopia and Mozambique on 18 and 26 May 2003 respectively, launched the mission into operation. Subsequently, South Africa increased its troops close to its authorised strength of 1,600. AMIB was not fully operational until the arrival of the main bodies of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents between 27 September and 17 October 2003. The Force headquarters was established on 27 April 2003 while the integrated mission headquarters was established on 1 June 2003, following the arrival of the advance elements from Ethiopia and Mozambique. The late arrival of the main bodies of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents, due to financial limitations and the fragility of Burundi's ceasefire, delayed AMIB's reaching close to its authorised strength. The situation became worse due to the AU's decision that the TCCs were to be self-sustaining for the first 60 days of deployment before AU reimbursements. This is a requirement that only a few African TCCs can meet (Svensson 2008: 13). The deployments of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents were made possible with support from the US and UK governments, respectively.

AQ: Use of US/UK here is okay as these are used in adjectival forms.

Furthermore, AMIB's concept of operations (CONOPs) exemplified a division of operational responsibility among the TCCs in a peace mission. Although it was established that AMIB headquarters would be based in Bujumbura, the South African and Ethiopian troops, respectively, were to provide and establish outer protection and inner security for two Demobilisation Centres (DCs) at Muyange (Bubanza Province) and Buhinga

(Rutana Province). The third DC was to be established as the operation demanded. As part of the DDR process, the African mission was envisioned to be able to canton and disarm about 20,000 former combatants. Additionally, the protection of the AMIB participating countries' sustainment convoys and of all other movements, including those of humanitarian NGOs, became the responsibility of the Mozambican contingent. The South African Protection and Reaction Unit were responsible for VIP protection of returning politicians. The AMIB's CONOPs was also based on clear rules of engagement (RoE) and codes of conduct (CoC) that were based on international law, international humanitarian law and the principle of self-defence. Senior AMIB officials drafted the RoE, which focused on the protection of AMIB's personnel and equipment. Furthermore, the HoM, acting in conjunction with the Force Commander was authorised to adjust the RoE but only after due consultation with the AU. The AMIB's CONOPs also emphasised cooperation between the MILCONs and civilian elements; this function of cooperation focused on three important areas: humanitarian support to the civilian populations and former fighters, DDR, and civil-military relations with the government of Burundi (Aboagye 2004).

Having conceptualised AMIB, the key question is, Was AMIB truly a successful peace mission? I answer this by investigating whether AMIB was able to achieve its mandates. And if the answer is in the affirmative, then this begs the question of how the mission was able to accomplish these operational achievements. I balance the arguments of this chapter by examining AMIB's challenges. I then evaluate AMIB's achievements and challenges based on its activities in the triangular area of tension in African peace operations. Measuring peacekeeping success is a very difficult task, since it depends on what the evaluator is examining and taking into consideration (Diehl and Druckman 2010). I adopt two criteria to evaluate AMIB and other peace operations examined in this book: first, to what extent was AMIB able to realise its mandate, and second, was the operation able to contribute to the creation of a stable and secure environment in Burundi.

Evaluating AMIB: operational achievements and constraints

Provision of security in Burundi

Judging by its first objective of supervising the implementation of ceasefire agreements, AMIB could be credited for achieving this important role. The deployment and presence of the African force helped to deter further political violence and stabilised the country with the exception of *Bujumbura rurale* (Bujumbura Rural) where the Rwasa's PALIPEHUTU-FNL remained very active. Aboagye (2004) estimated that about 95 per cent of the entire country was relatively stable at the end of the AMIB operation, a fact also confirmed by Murithi (2009a: 6) when he said, "by the end of its mission, AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in

Burundi." The relative stability of the country brought about by the presence of the AU force was conducive to, and also served as an important factor for, moving the peace process forward. Thus, AMIB halted the escalation of violence and was able to manage the violent aspects of the conflict. The reduction of political violence was replaced by acts of criminality in late 2003, but AMIB was able to handle this, helped to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements between the warring parties, and facilitated the CNDD-FDD's participation in the peace process. In this respect, with its limited resources, the AU committed a significant share of its resources to VIP protection; this was for the leaders of the armed groups returning to Burundi to participate in the peace process. If not for AMIB's intervention, Burundi would have witnessed a more dangerous violent conflict (beyond what it was before the AMIB operation) with far more devastating consequences (Svensson 2008; Williams 2011b: 33). This point is buttressed by Murithi (2008: 75): "In the absence of the AU mission, Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent conflict."

Support for the DDR process

AMIB did not achieve much in terms of its DDR objective. The mission was envisioned to implement the World Bank-funded DDR programme, which involved cantonment and disarming of about 20,000 ex-combatants. Soon after its deployment, AMIB, at the invitation of the World Bank, joined the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and became part of a joint planning group for the implementation of the DDR programme. But due to a number of challenges, including the delay by the TGoB in meeting the World Bank's requirements, it implementation did not commence until December 2004, six months after the expiration of the African mission's mandate. Despite these challenges and its limited resources, AMIB went ahead to implement its DDR-mandated tasks. The first cantonment area was set up in Muyange in June–July 2003. The second cantonment site was not established until towards the end of the AMIB operation in May 2004 (Boshoff and Vrey 2006). The problem here is that the AU lacked resources to sustain its force, and as a result, its mission was unable to canton a large number of ex-combatants. Afterwards, the cantonment area ran out of food and medical supplies and lacked tangible infrastructure. To meet the needs and sustainability of the Muyange cantonment site, the AMIB's HoM used his influence and position to secure assistance from international donors: the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), WHO, EU, and UNICEF. At the Muyange cantonment area, AMIB was able to assemble and disarm 189 members from CNDD-FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Alain Mugabarabona. By November 2003, the number of disarmed ex-combatants increased to 228 (Boshoff and Vrey 2010). In addition to these tasks, AMIB successfully found suitable DC areas

and Pre-Disarmament Assembly Areas (PDAAs). This effort culminated in AMIB's identification of 11 PDAAs. Former fighters cantoned at Muyange were subsequently transferred to the PDAAs in December 2003 and January 2004.

Presence of the UN peace mission

AMIB's third objective stated that the mission was to strive towards ensuring that conditions were created for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. The mission's performance in this respect was remarkable. The security and political situations in Burundi were volatile when AMIB was deployed. The absence of a comprehensive peace agreement meant that AMIB had to operate in a fluid security environment. The African mission mitigated the escalating violent conflict and stabilised about 95 per cent of the entire country by the end of its operation; the UN Evaluation Team recognised this achievement when they concluded in February 2004 that the conditions in Burundi were now appropriate for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545, which authorised the deployment of a UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB, by its French acronym) with an annual budget of $333.2 million. This was in line with the agreement with the AU that AMIB would give way to a UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi. The fact that at the expiration of AMIB's mandate, the UN Security Council was able to authorise the deployment of ONUB to replace the African mission attests to AMIB's success in creating conditions suitable for the presence of a UN peace mission. On 1 June 2004, the UN officially took over the peace mission with peacebuilding and peace enforcement mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. ONUB was mandated to monitor and provide security for disarmament of armed militias. The rebadged AMIB peacekeepers formed their advance party while other contingents were from Nepal, Pakistan and Kenya (Williams 2006). One important point of note is that AMIB helped to stabilise the political and security situations in 2004, and laid the foundations for a more multidimensional peacebuilding process in mid-2004. The ONUB operation ended in December 2006 after it successfully completed its mandate, and the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB by its French acronym) replaced ONUB with the mandate to coordinate international assistance.

AMIB's contribution to Burundi's political and economic stability

In its fourth objective of contributing to political and economic stability in Burundi, the African mission's operational achievement in this regard is partial. Although AMIB helped to manage the conflict, the mission was constrained in many ways, among which were the attacks on civilian populations and the cantonment areas. The December 2003 Human Rights Watch Report blamed both the FAB and the armed factions for deliberate

attacks on the civilian populations in violation of international humanitarian law, including killings, looting and the causing of forced displacement. These challenges negatively affected AMIB's ability to fully realise its objective. Besides, the IDPs based in the eight Burundian provinces and refugees in the three (refugee) camps in Tanzania were supposed to be integrated into society and given their means of engaging in livelihood activities as defined in terms of their accessibility to allocated land. Unfortunately, those disarmed ex-combatants in the DCs were not provided with economic opportunities, and this made their reintegration into society problematic (Murithi 2008). AMIB was unable to accomplish this objective.

A critical look at this mandated objective raised the question: what is the domain of military peacekeepers? Traditionally, the primary role of military peacekeepers is to interpose between belligerents and serve as external guarantors of a ceasefire agreement in order to avert further bloodshed and create an enabling environment in which peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding can take place through the efforts of civilian and humanitarian missions. AMIB, as an integrated peace mission, performed the traditional peacekeeping role but could not, due to its resource limitations, contribute meaningfully to peacebuilding efforts and to some extent this also applies to peacemaking, although the peace process was ongoing behind the scenes.

AU funding, resources and capacities

The AU's achievements in Burundi should not be over-romanticised, since AMIB's experiences raised a number of concerns. AMIB unveiled the resource and capacity constraints often associated with African peace operations, which did not allow the mission to fully implement its mandate. The UN Secretary General, in a report on Burundi, acknowledged, "The financial and logistic constraints under which AMIB is operating prevent the force from fully implementing its mandate."[17] AMIB's lack of required financial resources originated from three sources. First, within Africa, the AU member states were not enthusiastic about providing the requisite funds to the mission. A clear indication of this was the AU MoU, which ruled that the TCCs were to be self-sustained for up to two months of the operation. Based on this self-sustainment concept, both Ethiopia and Mozambique deployed their troops with external support. The implication of the self-sustainment concept of the AMIB operation for the TCCs was that the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents' deployment was delayed, and after their deployment to Burundi, their operational status was affected by financial constraints and uncertainty (de Coning 2004: 24). Second, the AU itself was financially and logistically incapacitated. Its resources limitations were also due to the fact that since its inauguration, the AU had been operating with a budget deficit, which made the institution rely on external donors for its peace operations (Okumu 2009: 105). With these constraints,

the institution was unable to provide sufficient funds for AMIB and relied on financially incapacitated TCCs to fund the deployment and sustenance of their troops. Third, the UN's indifferent attitude towards this problem confirmed its unwillingness to sufficiently fund the operation. This is due to the fact that the AU was newly established and its future was not completely certain. Given the questionable character of the OAU, and with the fact that AMIB was the AU pioneering mission, donors were not enthusiastic in adequately supporting AMIB in the way the AU had expected. As evidence of UN's unwillingness to sufficiently fund AMIB, the AU was asked to reduce AMIB's budget when it was first presented to the UN Security Council because, according to the UN, the budget was too large, and in its opinion, the human and material resources proposed for AMIB by the AU were too ambitious for an African peace operation. In addition to being insufficient, the funds were disbursed very slowly, which was also a source of the problems the AU faced with the AMIB operation (Powell 2005).

The operational budget of AMIB was estimated at around $110 million for one year (Boshoff and Dara 2003: 43). This amount is exorbitant, in the African context, considering the dwindling nature of the economic situation across many African countries. The AU Commission's budget for 2004 was approximately $32 million, which is far short of its estimated operational budget for AMIB (de Coning 2004). At the end of the operation, AMIB's total budget stood at $134 million.

With its financial resource limitations, the AU relied on external donors to fund AMIB's budget. Aboagye (2004: 15) writes, "The pledges from the partners, amounting to some $50 million, fell far short of the budget. Even worse, actual donations into the trust fund amounted to just $10 million, even though this excluded in-kind assistance from the United States ($6.1 million) and United Kingdom ($6 million), to support the deployment of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents respectively."[18] These financial limitations, coupled with the piecemeal approach adopted by the EU and other donors in disbursing the money pledged, hindered AMIB's operational performance. Without question, this situation has shown how uncommitted African leaders are to the AU and the APSA in reality. Thus, AMIB highlights the effects of what Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008) refer to as a triangular area of tension in African peace operations. In fact, AMIB's funding problem was put into perspective by Ambassador Bah, who said that in late 2003, out of the $120 million required to fund the African mission for 12 months, only $20 million had been made available to AMIB (see Williams 2011b: 33).

AMIB was also challenged by the AU's lack of institutional capacity and logistics. Recall that AMIB was authorised when the APSA's institutions were just evolving. These conditions incapacitated the AU in organising deployment. The AU's lack of capacity led South Africa to provide leadership and plan the mission. Besides, the late arrival of the Ethiopian and Mozambican

troops also revealed the AU's lack of logistical resources that hindered the efficacy of the peace operation at the initial stages. The troops would have been quickly deployed if the AU itself had been well-resourced and equipped for its peace operations. The AU's lack of logistics, especially modern equipment, negatively affected the mission's ability to deliver on its revised RoE for civilian protection, as it was unable to move out of secured areas (Powell 2005: 38). Additionally, while the AMIB operation lacked critical equipment from within Africa, the logistics problem was heightened, because even when the UN assisted with equipment, it still took four to six months to arrive.[19]

Given all these challenges that were skilfully negotiated, overall AMIB is a relatively successful peace operation when compared with the previous African peacekeeping operations especially under the OAU regime, for the mission was able to achieve the traditional peacekeeping goals; however, it could not achieve much in its DDR and economic stability mandate. AMIB raised the hope that Africans could manage African conflicts, despite the fact that the APSA's institutions were in the process of being established when the mission was deployed.

Given AMIB's operational achievements and limitations, I return to the question of what factors contributed to AMIB's relative success in Burundi. I discuss these factors that helped to explain the implementation of AMIB's operations in the section that follows.

Contributory factors for AMIB's relative operational success

(Un)Timely deployment of a peace mission and appropriate use of force

AMIB highlighted the significance of timing in peace operations and how the time gap between the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the deployment of peacekeepers could either hinder or help a peace mission to achieve its mandate. In the case of AMIB, the ceasefire agreement of 2 December 2002 provided for the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force in Burundi by 31 December 2002. Although the Heads of State's meeting of the Central Organ authorised AMIB's deployment in February 2003, the mission was not deployed until April 2003, and this also took more than six months: that is, it did not occur until October 2003, before the AU force became fully operational. The late arrival of AMIB aggravated the already charged political situation and created a context for regular ceasefire violations. At this point, it became apparent that the fragile ceasefire was bound to fail. The arrival of AU MILOBs failed to reduce tensions and halt the conflict trajectory. The already-tense security situation soon resulted in the CNDD-FDD fighters' withdrawal from the Muyange cantonment area and the commencement of their looting of goods from the local population – a situation that provoked repressive responses from the FAB, which claimed

that the FDD's withdrawal from the cantonment site was a violation of the ceasefire agreements. Another cycle of violence erupted where many civilians were killed and thousands of others displaced. The security situation started improving with the arrival of the advance elements of AMIB in May 2003. The mission started working towards realising its mandate well before it reached its authorised force strength (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010). What the AMIB operation highlighted in regard to its late deployment is that the longer the delay in deploying a peace mission after the signing of a peace agreement, the larger the possibility of continued conflict. Burundi's scenario corroborates the quantitative findings of Heldt (2001) that the longer the period between the commencement of a conflict and the signing of a ceasefire agreement, and the subsequent deployment of an intervening peacekeeping force, the greater the propensity for the continuation of war. The late deployment would have reverted Burundi back on a self-destruction path if not for the presence of the overstretched and Bujumbura-based SAPSD force. Timely deployment of peacekeepers is a prerequisite for the success of a peace mission. For a peace mission to be successful, the time gap between the signing of a peace or ceasefire agreement and the mission's deployment should be significantly reduced. The Brahimi Report (2000) also emphasises the importance of the first three months following the signing of a peace agreement. During this period, the warring parties evaluate both the operation's credibility and its ability to implement its mandated tasks. The danger is that if the authorising institution (and its peace mission) fail to prove their operational capabilities to achieve their mandate during this period, they risk the withdrawal of the consent and/or cooperation of the belligerents. Also, slow and untimely deployment of a peace mission risks the loss of the impetus for peace.

The AMIB's RoE served as a contributory factor for its relatively limited operational achievements. The RoE limited the AU mission in its application of force. Both the RoE and CoC authorised AMIB to use it only in self-defence to protect its personnel and equipment. The restrictive RoE, as far as the application of force is concerned, was revised to include the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Despite Svensson's (2008) critique of the RoE as being too restrictive, AMIB operated on a clear, appropriate and achievable mandate, and its RoE and CoC were in line with UN principles and standards. Besides, the RoE should be seen as forceful enough for AMIB to be able to perform its operational tasks, judging by its resource constraints. The way in which AMIB responded to the attack on the Muyange cantonment site towards the end of July 2003 signified appropriate use of force by the African troops. AMIB's success in repelling a night attack on the camp resulted in eight dead on the side of the invaders, while AMIB suffered none. No civilian casualty was reported. Boshoff and Vrey (2006: 26) assert: "That such an incident should happen was not an auspicious start for the peace mission. AMIB was ready for the attack, however,

and its response sent a message to the armed parties." The message was clear: AMIB should not be confronted with violent intent; it was indeed a force to contend with if and when such a situation arose as it did in Muyange. After this incident, neither AMIB nor succeeding ONUB experienced any similar threat. Although some high-tension incidents occurred, no attack took place again. AMIB's response to this armed attack was appropriate and adequate. This incident helps to explain that the peacekeeping's principle of non use of force except in self-defence is relative to the situation that presents on the ground. This achievement was based on good diagnosis, on the part of the AMIB mission planners, with respect to the Burundian conflict situation on which the peacekeeping mandate was based.

Lead nation/pivotal state

The AMIB operation also revealed how the determination and commitment of a lead state can fill the gap created by the capacity deficiencies of a peace operation-authorising institution, and make such a peace mission a reality. Recall that the appointment of Mandela as the new facilitator for the Burundian peace process in November 1999 saw the inroad of South Africa's diplomacy and resources in Burundi. Mandela not only successfully negotiated the Arusha agreement, but he also used his good office to secure Pretoria's consent to deploy SAPSD in order to prevent the peace process from falling apart. AMIB would have been an impossible mission without the leadership, and human, military and financial resources from South Africa[20] (Williams 2006). The AU was hamstrung by its lack of resources and also in its force generation inability. A study conducted by a Durban-based NGO, ACCORD found that South Africa played a significant role in the transitional operation and was "the largest force present on the ground, contributing approximately 1,500 troops, which proved a determining factor for the deployment of the mission" (ACCORD 2007: 31). Probably this is why a Swedish defence analyst argued that although AMIB was an African Union mission on paper, in reality it was a mission that wholly relied on the leadership of one single TCC, South Africa (Svensson 2008: 17).

AU/AMIB's cooperation and coordination with African and extra-African partners

The level of cooperation and coordination between a peacekeeping force and the international community is one of the preconditions for a successful peace operation. This factor is recognised by the UN when it contends in its 2000 publication[21] that strong political and economic support by the broader international community is one of the prerequisites for a successful peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping scholars and practitioners such as Bratt (1997), Doyle and Sambanis (1999) and Evans (1993) have argued that a peace mission's prospect of success is greater when the international community, the UN (represented by the P-5 of the UN Security Council),

and the TCCs are in full support of it with the necessary political, diplomatic and economic resources.[22] African peace missions are not exceptions to these findings. The AU's missions are more successful when they receive the requisite support and cooperation from both African and non-African actors. It should be recalled that the OAU's peacekeeping fiasco in Chad was blamed on the withdrawal of French and American support to the OAU peacekeeping mission when Libya withdrew its force in Chad. In the case of AMIB, cooperation with different actors associated with the Burundian peace process was important for its remarkable performance, especially in its mandated tasks of ceasefire agreement implementation and the initiation of DDR programmes. Apart from the cooperation that the mission received from different actors, it coordinated well with them, and this helped to make up for the mission's resource constraints.[23] The OAU/AU has a long history of involvement in the Burundian conflict and peace process. It supported the RPI. The African mission coordinated with other activities embarked upon by African actors (both state and institutional) before, during and after its involvement. An example of these activities was the successful integration of the SAPSD and the AU MILOB contingent that had been in the mission theatre before entering AMIB. Furthermore, South Africa cooperated with the AU and played an important role – as the mission's pivotal nation – in realising the dream of AMIB's deployment and its sustainability. Besides, South Africa provided the initial financing for the Mozambican force – before Maputo would even consider deploying its MILCON in Burundi (Mandrup 2008: 111).

AMIB operated in a fluid security environment aggravated by the continuing threats of attack from the CNDD-FDD, as the AU mission moved into the area under its control. Here, AMIB's cooperation and coordination capabilities were put to the test, because its deployment did not put an end to the peacemaking role of the facilitating team in the Burundian peace process, for peacemaking was still seen as necessary to persuade the remaining belligerents to fully respect the ceasefire agreement and become part of the military technical planning team for DDR (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010). As part of its coordination and cooperation efforts, AMIB established a CIMICC to facilitate support to and coordinate its activities with different UN agencies and international NGOs operating in the theatre of operation. The CIMICC liaised with international NGOs, as well as many humanitarian organisations to ensure effective coordination of all the African peace operation (AMIB) assistance (both military and other support) to the recipient agencies and NGOs. Since AMIB's deployment was based on the understanding that the mission would be replaced by a UN peace mission when the Burundi security situation become normalised enough for such a deployment, the AU established a strategic-level AU/UN engagement purposely to mobilise resources, as well as receive in-theatre administrative and logistical assistance from the UN system. These included technical capacity support

that AMIB received from the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). UN support to AMIB included benefits from MONUC's experience in the areas of public information, headquarters administration and DDR. Also, as part of the operational-level collaboration, AMIB consulted with international agencies such as the GTZ, EU, UNICEF, and World Bank. The consultation was crucial for AMIB to source funds and other assistance for the DDR programme and also in its implementation of the ceasefire agreement tasks (Aboagye 2004: 14). Thus, the AMIB operation established that the peace mission's chance of success is greater when it receives the necessary support of the international community and/or important outside actors. However, in the case of AMIB, the support was not total, as illustrated by the UN's demands for the reduction of AMIB's budget and slow disbursement of pledged money by donors.

Consent and willingness of parties, competent leadership of a peace mission, and the role of local ownership of peace process

The AU benefitted from securing the consent of the belligerents, which helped the political and military components of its peace mission to relate cordially with the warring parties, to some useful extent. The AMIB operation showed that the peace operation was urgently being conceived as part of a political process. Even though there were obvious contradictions in the various agreements, the Arusha Agreement of 2000 and the two ceasefire agreements of 2002 laid the foundations for a peacekeeping operation in the Burundian conflict with the consent of the belligerents, despite the fact that these were not regarded as comprehensive peace agreements. Securing peace agreements with warring parties, coupled with the AU's long-term involvements with and commitments to the Burundian peace process, made the African institution a reliable interlocutor, which helped AMIB in its operational tasks, for the mission was able to have the ears of both the Burundian government and those in opposition.[24] Besides, initiatives from within Africa were the principal sources of mediation. Even with AMIB's deployment, the AU did not relent in its efforts in finding political solutions to pacify the conflict through the implementation of the Burundian peace process, with the main objective being power-sharing between the Tutsi and Hutu political parties.

Securing the belligerents' consent could not by itself be seen as the reason for AMIB being able to implement its mandate, as this would not have happened if not for the involvement of some well-respected African personalities driving the peace process and peace operation. The respect Burundian political players had for peace facilitators, especially Mandela, despite the fact that some Tutsi leaders believed that he was biased towards the Hutu cause, helped to overcome most of the obstacles to the peace process and brought warring parties to the negotiation table. Indeed, the involvement and influence of Mandela's heavyweight diplomatic status

explains South Africa's leadership role in the whole peace process, and also in the remarkable performance of AMIB.[25] Therefore, the African Mission in Burundi highlights the importance of credible political leadership for success in a peace operation. Accordingly, the relative success associated with the mission was also made possible by the credibility, influence and diplomatic acumen of Ambassador Bah, AMIB's HoM. Ambassador Bah not only enjoyed the support of the belligerents but also used his good office to ensure perfect collaboration between the AU and the UN.[26] The AU and its mission's cooperation and coordination with a clear division of responsibilities among the UN, its agencies and humanitarian NGOs (both local and international), as well as African development partners, were all contributing factors to the success of the peace operation.

Besides, the role of the Burundian government in the peace process and the inclusive nature of the peace mechanism assisted it, and this explains the relative success associated with the peace process and AMIB's operational achievements. The Burundian peace process involved a broad spectrum of the Burundian society ranging from the military to civil society organisations (Baranyi and Mepham 2006). Additionally, the government of Burundi was able to own the peace process with the consent of and accountability to the local populace. The Burundian authorities were not only involved in, but were pivotal to the implementation of, the international community's multidimensional peacebuilding processes. According to Boshoff and Vrey (2006: 51), "the political will of the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD have ensured that the short-term goal of the JOP[27] have been accomplished and that the elections have taken place in a stable environment." The Burundian authorities played a role and the people of Burundi got involved in the process, which added value to help forge national reconciliation and post-conflict nation-building.

These contributory factors for AMIB's achievements were recognised by the high-level symposium on "Enhancing Capacities to Protect Civilians and Build Sustainable Peace in Africa," held on 16 March 2006 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In the symposium report edited by Stephen Baranyi and David Mepham, the conference attributed the success of the Burundi peace process to (1) long-term engagement by the OAU/AU, the UN and key African member states such as Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa, including the personal engagement of key individuals, such as the late President Nyerere and former President Mandela; (2) a common vision and principled cooperation among the international actors based on a clear division of labour; (3) predictability of deployments, including the planned transition from AMIB to ONUB; (4) ownership by the government of Burundi throughout the process; (5) the social inclusiveness of the peace process in Burundi, namely the involvement/participation of a wide range of stakeholders, from the army to human rights and women's organisations (Baranyi and Mepham 2006).

Summary and conclusion: lessons learned from AMIB and looking to the future

In this chapter, I have explored AMIB to question the role of the AU as a security actor in Africa, and the optimism embedded in the APSA, in terms of its ability to guarantee African security through a proactive rather than reactionary approach to the continent's security challenges. AMIB was deployed in a very dangerous security environment and at a time when the APSA institutions were just evolving. The mission recorded some successes, notably by stabilising security in the country and thereby creating favourable conditions for the promotion of other important tasks, such as the DDR programme, security sector reform, and other institutional reforms, such as human rights and economic stability. All these positive outcomes can be related to a succeeding UN mission for the advancement of peace in Burundi. Despite these achievements, the challenges facing the AU in relation to mounting and sustaining its peace operations have brought to the fore what Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008) call a triangular area of tension in AU peace operations. As far as the AMIB operation is concerned, the AU has not been able to bridge the gap between its ambition and the capacity to run totally successful peace operations.

The peace operation in Burundi revealed the AU's commitment, as an institution, to implement the peace and security norms embedded in its Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol. The AU and RPI recognised that the existence of peace in Burundi would contribute to and improve the security situation in the Great Lakes region. Consequently, the pan-African institution authorised AMIB, despite the fact that there was no comprehensive peace agreement in place. Without question, the AU peace operation in Burundi demonstrated the pan-African organisation's ambitions and will to deliver on its promises of securing the continent and its people. This commitment could be heard in the words of AMIB's HoM when he said about the deployment, "Burundi is not alone, Burundi is part of Africa ... the AU has a mandate, not only in Burundi but also in any African country and ... the AU should not wait, it must appeal for assistance but before such assistance arrives, it should carry out its mandate."[28] Furthermore, the AU's commitment to implement its security framework is part of the institution's efforts to fill gaps in the continent's peace and security agenda, especially in mobilising a peacekeeping mission in African conflicts when the UN is reluctant to intervene.

The AU's ambition was overshadowed by its capacity limitations and a lack of political will on the part of AU member states. The AMIB's challenges included a lack of resources, logistics, and funding, all of which contributed to the AU's capacity weakness to manage peace operations efficiently. Despite the fact that the maintenance of international peace and security is the responsibility of the international community, the fact that AMIB was

envisaged to give way to a UN peace mission is a clear indication of the AU's acceptance of its organisational weakness as well as its resource and capacity limitations. Besides, the AU member states' unenthusiastic stance in relation to providing sufficient financial support to the mission has raised serious questions about African ownership of and control over the operationalisation of the APSA and AU peace operations. The gap between the AU's ambitions on the one hand and its capacity along with member states' agendas on the other, is a reminder of the regional-sceptics' arguments in terms of the reliability and effectiveness of the AU's integrated peace and security agenda and the running of regional peace operations (see Chapter 1). The triangular area of tension remains a challenge for the AU, to operationalise its peacebuilding agenda and, ultimately, to free Africa from virulent armed conflicts.

In spite of these challenges, it is important to conclude this chapter with a reflection on some lessons that were learned from AMIB's experiences by the AU and other security actors in Africa and the UN for planning future AMIB-like peace operations in Africa. The most pertinent of these are discussed here. The AU's experiences in Burundi underlined the importance of prompt AU interventions in African armed conflicts for peace and stability in Africa. In Burundi, the African Union deployed AMIB first as a stabilisation force in preparation for a multidimensional UN peace mission to be mounted later when the conditions allowed for such a deployment. This is a major achievement, since deployment of a UN mission takes a long time. The prompt deployment of AMIB filled the gap between the outbreak of the conflict and the presence of ONUB, which took over AMIB in May 2004. The importance of AU's prompt intervention in Burundi is buttressed by Murithi (2009a: 15) who argues that "the AU's initial foray into peacekeeping was in many respects the only alternative to a dithering, detached and disengaged international community. Paradoxically, it is only when the situation gets even more untenable that the international community, mainly under the tutelage of the UN, comes in to 'mend' the broken continent." Furthermore, despite the fact that AMIB was constrained in a number of ways, and there was no comprehensive peace agreement in place, the AU's intervening force was prepared to deter the activities of spoilers of the Burundian peace process, as evidenced by AMIB's ability to repel the attack on the Muyange cantonment site towards the end of July 2003.

AMIB suffered from a lack of financial resources. The financial constraint compelled the African Union to rely heavily on international funding partners for assistance for its peace operation in Burundi. Thus, AMIB was donor-driven and donor-dependent demonstrating that the AU did not perform well in the area of financing its mission in Burundi. Excessive reliance on external donors for the sustainability of the AU's missions is problematic, as such a practice risks loss of control over such support, and by extension, its peace operations in the African context. Besides, the piecemeal fashion

in which the donors disbursed pledged funds to the AU for the AMIB operation calls for the AU to look for alternative ways (beside the member states contributions) to fund and sustain its peace missions, pending the arrival of donor contributions, which may take up to six months. The dangers of excessive reliance on external donors for African peacekeeping are illustrated by the Ethiopian and Mozambican experiences in AMIB. Once these contingents were deployed in Burundi, with the assistance of the United States and the United Kindom, their sustainability became South Africa's responsibility. Thus, South Africa's leadership role helped AMIB to be a relative success story. The South African role in Burundi underscored the AU's need for the resources of a lead African nation (or nations) to be involved in the mission for its sustainability, at least for the first few months of African peace operation. AMIB could not have been a relatively successful mission without Pretoria's commitment and resources. Nigeria's leadership role in the ECOWAS's peace and intervention operations in West Africa is also a good example of this effort.[29] In the 1990s, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops were deployed in Liberia and Sierra Leone without proper logistics and financial arrangements in place. Lack of adequate resources did not allow some ECOWAS member states to deploy troops to these missions but Abuja shouldered responsibility as the lead nation of the ECOWAS peace and intervention operations in both countries. The costs of the operations were largely borne by Nigeria. The AMIB and ECOWAS examples underlined the need for predictable funding for African peace operations and for the AU and other African sub-regional organisations to reflect on how best to finance their future peace operations as well as how the larger international community can fund African peace missions expediently and adequately to ensure that the African institutions are not set up to fail during the onset of their peacekeeping roles.

As I mentioned earlier, AMIB was an integrated peace mission that involved both civilian and military components. It showed the importance of perfect collaboration and understanding between the military and civilian components of an integrated peace mission for the success of the operation. Despite the fact that the AMIB's civilian component was not as well developed as its military counterpart, its role was fundamental to AMIB's relative success. The establishment of the CIMICC helped to facilitate support for the international humanitarian agencies and local NGOs, and also helped AMIB to coordinate well with local and external partners.

AMIB has had some successes because it operated on a clear mandate and RoE. Powell (2005: 54) offered a critique of AMIB's mandate when she said, "AMIB was tasked with a mandate it could not possibly fulfil and its resources were not aligned with its requirements." Powell's argument suggests that a clear mandate alone is not enough for a successful peace operation. At the strategic level, mission planners need to operate a peace mission on a realistic and robust mandate to cater for the exigencies on the ground in line

with resources, both human and material, that are required to be at the AU's disposal.[30] In Burundi, AMIB directed its efforts towards the implementation of the key aspects of the peace agreement at the initial stage of the peace mission. These included the release of political detainees as part of confidence building measures, and the establishment of relevant bodies to control arms flow and the activities of irregular forces. Additionally, the AMIB operation underlined the important role of the offices of the special representatives of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The credibility and diplomatic acumen of the political head of AMIB, Ambassador Bah, helped the African mission tremendously in achieving cooperation from the warring parties. The experience, credibility and respect that the Burundian political players have for Ambassador Bah helped the mission to realise its mandate and also helped AMIB and the UN to work together harmoniously in this theatre of operations. Besides, the influence and credibility of the facilitators of the Burundian peace process – Julius Nyerere and later Nelson Mandela – contributed to the success of the mission. AMIB precedent showed that peace processes and operations tended to be successful when the peace negotiators and heads of missions are prominent and sincere personalities with extensive political and diplomatic skill and experience.[31]

Finally, one important method that must be obviously accepted in African peacemaking processes is the local population's recognition and ownership of it. In Burundi, the people of the country owned the peace process in the sense that the representatives of local populations and the Burundian civil society groups/agencies were pivotal in the peace process; post-conflict peacebuilding efforts were people-centred as well. The post-conflict peacebuilding efforts targeted assistance towards those affected by the conflict and armed violence. Ownership of the Burundian peace process by the government and the people of Burundi, and the way the DDR process and national rebuilding were conceptualised in the context of the peace operation, helped AMIB to be a success story overall.[32]

5
The African Union Mission in Somalia

Introduction

Since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in January 1991, political stability and durable peace continue to elude the state and the people of Somalia. The Somali conflict has defied easy resolution due to the interplay of a plethora of endogenous and exogenous dynamics that make third-party peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions daunting. The outbreak of hostilities more than two decades ago and the preceding years of clan-based, armed insurgency that ended Barre's 21-year dictatorship have meant the deaths of tens of thousands of Somalis, while the number of refugees and IDPs is increasing.[1] The war is one of the most protracted in the world, and it has oscillated in terms of its intensity, the nature of belligerents involved, and its dimensions and dynamics (Dersso 2009). Its current phase has pitted the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)[2] against *al Qaeda*-affiliated *Harakat al-Shabab al Mujahideen* (Movement of Warrior Youth) – *al-Shabaab,* for short[3] – *Hizbul Islam* (Party of Islam),[4] and other Islamist militant groups. Due to the complexity of the Somali war, the UN and Western governments are reluctant to involve troops in any peacekeeping operation in Somalia, partly because of the conflict's complex nature and partly because of Somali armed groups' aversion to external intervention forces. The three UN-authorised peace missions in Somalia in the 1990s faced massive challenges, while the last mission – the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) – ended in a fiasco, with dead, mutilated American soldiers dragged along the dusty streets of Mogadishu, in October 1993 (Samatar 2007: 156). This incident saw the United States withdraw its troops from Somalia in March 1994, while other Western states followed suit (Norris and Bruton 2011). Thus, between March 1995 – when UNOSOM II departed – and January 2007, when the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorised AMISOM's deployment, no peacekeeping operation was functioning. Hence, the country was left alone at its own peril during this period. There was a loss of international community interest

in Somalia, as none of the countries that participated in Operation Restore Hope were willing to waste the lives of their soldiers and/or resources any longer (Abraham 2002: 1341; Nduwimana 2013).

The AU deployed AMISOM in response to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD)[5] request for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Somalia to support the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). IGAD's request was at the backdrop of the organisation's inability to realise its initial plan to deploy a 10,500-strong peacekeeping force known as the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). The inability of the organisation to deploy IGASOM was due to lack of peacekeeping capacity and its member states' differing positions on and roles in the conflict.[6] Thus, the PSC, at its 69th Meeting in January 2007, authorised the deployment of AMISOM as a transitional mission with the understanding that it would be re-hatted into a broader UN peace mission that would support the long-term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia when the security situation improved (Freear and de Coning 2013).[7]

AMISOM is a regional defence pact with the Somali government and is the AU's fourth peace operation.[8] It is mandated to support the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their effort to stabilise the country and enter into further dialogue and reconciliation processes. Since its deployment, AMISOM has confronted challenges that initially greatly limited its ability to operate and make a significant impact on the Somali conflict.

In this chapter, I examine AMISOM, considering the AU's peace and security role and the organisation's capacity to deploy, manage and sustain complex peace operations under difficult security circumstances. I specifically question the conflict context in which AMISOM was deployed and the AU's capacities for such operation in a live war-zone, and consider the impact of these difficulties on the mission's outcomes. I then turn to assess AMISOM's performance against its mandate and the APSA, as well as the triangular area of tension in African peace operations. In addition, I address the contributory factors to AMISOM's successes or failures, whichever the case may be. Then, I uncover new insights into the subject of inquiry, which may help to explain some lessons that could be learned from AMISOM for the benefit of future peace operations in Africa. Due to the dynamic nature of the Somali conflict and the fact that the AMISOM operation is ongoing, this chapter's analysis covers the period up to December 2013.

Historical context

Background to the Somali conflict

Somalia's conflict is rooted in and shaped by many historical and contemporary factors that can be broadly categorised into three group: historical, social and political. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Somalis experienced five different colonial rules and subjugations. Linking history to

colonialism, the northern half of Somalia was colonised by the British, and it was then known as British Somaliland until 1960, when it was joined with the Italian colony, then known as the Italian Somaliland,[9] to form the Republic of Somalia (Norris and Bruton 2011: 7). The far north of Somalia, formerly known as Issai and Afar, has since become the Republic of Djibouti, with a large Somali population; it was occupied by the French (Fage 2002) and was once known as French Somaliland. Then, between 1887 and 1895, the Ethiopian emperor, Menilik, conquered and occupied the Ogaden region in the East; this area later became part of Ethiopia. The Darod clans of the Somalis predominantly populate Ogaden. Finally, Kenya, an erstwhile British colony bordering the southern part of Somalia is home to hundreds of thousands of Somali people. Thus, the fragmentation of ethnic Somali into four post-colonial African states – Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia – has created (and is still creating) huge domestic and regional problems for these countries, and it has equally shaped their interstate relations as well as Somalia's ideology of irredentism, which has been one of its core foreign policy objectives towards the remaining three states, especially Ethiopia. The confrontational attitudes and nationalist aspirations, as well as the idiosyncrasies of the leaders of the Somali post-colony in bringing together all Somalis from these countries into a "Greater Somalia,"[10] are all by-products of colonial experiences of state formation in the Horn of Africa.

The social context of the conflict is located in the clan-based social structure of the Somali society. Clan is the foremost element that defines the identity and social relations of the Somalis. They identify by following patrilineal genealogical clan-lines (Chopra, Eknes and Nordboe 1995: 20). Traditionally, clan is the basis for regulating order, intra- and inter-clan social relations, and activities.[11] The significance of clan in the Somali social structure soon led to its politicisation, as it later became instrument in the hands of political players who used it to control the state and its apparatuses. The politicisation of the clan structure in colonial and post-colonial Somalia resulted in its effective utilisation and deployment in the struggles for control of political power and state resources of the modern centralised state, which colonial regimes imposed on Somalia (Dersso 2009: 3). Clan politicisation also contributed to the failure of the Somali leaders to establish genuine democracy and rule of law for the country after independence. Indeed, the politicisation of clans is considered to be the "unintended consequences of the mismatch between the post-colonial state and the nature and structure of Somali civil society based on clan systems of 'decentralised' governance and sociopolitical control" (Dersso 2009: 4. See also Wakengela 2011: 379). Groups of pastoralists with shared ethnolinguistic and religious backgrounds have been living for some time in this loosely defined area known today as Somalia (Elmi and Barise 2006: 32). Within the context of their cultural homogeneity – but lacking any unified political entity – Bayne

(2001: 9) contends that social organisation and relations were premised on nomadic pastoralism with a decentralised democracy based on the complex relationships between and among clans, sub-clans and families.

The political basis of the conflict is located within the context of the 1969 coup d'état that brought Barre to the Somali presidency, and the authoritarianism that was associated with his rule, as well as the regime's overreliance on the Cold War superpowers for financial and military support. Other factors were the introduction of a socialist economic policy by the regime, patrimonialism, and later, clan favouritism, regional power politics, as well as the country's irredentist policy that defined and shaped Somalia's relationship with its neighbours. The combination of these factors explains the origin of the civil war.

Somalia gained independence in 1960 and shortly afterwards, the country experimented in parliamentary democracy with a judicial system based on Islamic *Sharia* law mixed with elements of the Italian and British legal systems (Ohanwe 2000). During the immediate post-independence period, Somalia's politics and political system were characterised by clan favouritism and factional politics. Somalia's clan-based politics resulted in the truncation of this democratic experiment.[12] In October 1969, Siad Barre from the Maheeran sub-clan of the Darod clans seized power in a bloody coup. Immediately after the military takeover, Barre promised to bring reforms to the troubled nation.

During the first anniversary of the coup (21 October 1970), the new ruling military Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) embraced scientific socialism as its driving ideology, when it declared Somalia as a socialist one-party system with financial and military support from the Soviet Union. As part of his scientific socialist political framework, Barre suspended the constitution and embarked on a cultural reversal that went against Somalia's Islamic faith. The military regime abolished the Islamic legal system, *Sharia* law, and it also institutionalised gender equality. The regime banned polygamy and Islamic dress for women (Ohanwe 2000: 132). Indeed, Barre's anti-Islamic policy made Mekki (1994: 56) describe the regime as a curse on the Somali state and also on Islamic culture. Furthermore, the SRC moved against clan-based politics, and the death penalty was placed on those who favoured clan loyalties as the basis of politics, for clan-based politics according to the military leadership, was against socialist norms. As a move towards realising this goal, Barre intentionally discouraged clan representations in government, as was the practice during the past civilian administration.[13] In order to achieve the ambition of creating a Greater Somalia, he supported irredentist armed groups in Ogaden, Djibouti and Kenya.[14]

Barre's nationalist and irredentist aspiration reached its zenith in 1977 when Somalia invaded Ogaden. Before this period, the dynamics of the Cold War politics, coupled with the regime change experienced in Ethiopia, resulted in Cold War style military and political and economic realignments.

The Soviet Union started courting the new military regime in Addis Ababa, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. Moscow saw the Mengistu government as having more communist credentials that would, according to Moscow's calculations, advance the Soviet's Cold War interests in the Horn of Africa than Barre's Somalia, which resulted in Mogadishu flipping its allegiance to the United States for support (Gardner and El Bushra 2004; Lewis and Mayall 2007; Norris and Bruton 2011). The United States was financially helpful to Somalia, despite the regime's poor human rights records, many intra-clan divisions and the endemic corruption associated with Barre's presidency. Nevertheless, Washington did not meet Mogadishu's request for military assistance in its war efforts in the Ogaden region. With dwindling military support from the United States, the Somali forces were routed in the region, resulting in the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees from Ogaden to Somalia. Somalia's military defeat in the region by the Ethiopian forces and the influx of refugees into Somalia combined with a failing economy, low living standards and severe drought. As well, a highly pro-Maheeran Darod clan[15] was in control of the government in Somalia with the directionless nature of Barre's dictatorship, all of which collectively inflamed anti-Barre feelings in the country (Le Sage 2005). By 1978, the regime in Mogadishu had become unpopular and alienated, to the extent that a number of dissatisfied army officers staged a coup, which was defeated by pro-Barre forces.[16] Consequently, the Majerteen clan, to which most of the officers who staged the failed coup belonged, was singled out for reprisal attacks, which led the clan-based armed opposition groups to rise up and organise to overthrow Barre.[17]

Barre's exit, state failure and UN peacekeeping (1991–1995)[18]

The United Somali Congress (USC) finally ousted Barre's regime in January 1991 and his inglorious departure created a political vacuum. There was confusion as to who should lead the country in the absence of unanimity among the coalition of forces that overthrew him. The opposition coalition soon disintegrated, while factional fighting based on clans and subclans ensued, especially in the southern part of the country. During a peace conference held in Djibouti in 1991, the USC's faction, the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), "elected" the USC leader and wealthy hotelier Mohammed Ali Mahdi, who hailed from the north of the country, as the new interim president. His election was highly contested by other warring groups, especially the Somali National Alliance (SNA), the breakaway USC faction of General Farah Aideed. The general considered himself to be the rightful ruler of Somalia, judging by his role in overthrowing Barre (Howard 2008). With increasing oppositions to the new government and despite its recognition by the UN, the Mahdi regime lacked legitimacy to govern, and the interim administration was restricted in its activities, as it was able to control

only some parts of Mogadishu. The conflict between Aideed and Mahdi dealt a final blow to what remained of the Somali social fabric (O'Neill and Rees 2005: 108). Apart from the fact that both Mahdi and Aideed were at loggerhead for the control of Mogadishu, both General Siad "Morgan" and Colonel Omar Jess, two warlords, were at each other's throats for control of Kismayo (a city in southern Somalia). Amidst these political cataclysms, in May 1991 the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared former British Somaliland independent, under the name Independent Republic of Somaliland. Although the proclaimed state has not been internationally recognised, it has continued working as a sovereign state since then and has restored peace, to a large extent, in that area.

By January 1992, when Somalia (represented by the Mahdi government) asked the UN for assistance, the country had become a collapsed state with no functioning government, its infrastructure destroyed, while a stateless order prevailed. By March 1992, the armed conflict had killed about 300,000 people, and an additional 27,000 Somalis were already wounded (O'Neill and Rees 2005: 108). At the same time, a humanitarian crisis had reached an alarming proportion with 70 per cent of the population malnourished (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010: 223). The humanitarian catastrophe was so severe that by June 1992, 5,000 people were dying daily; 1.5 million people were at the point of death, while another 4.5 million people were starving (O'Neill and Rees 2005: 108). Responding to Somalia's request, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 733 (in 1992), which called for, among other things, a ceasefire among the conflicting parties and the imposition of an arms embargo in order to establish security in Somalia.[19] After the UN ceasefire mediation, an agreement was reached with the warlords for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. It is important to emphasise that while Mahdi strongly agreed to UN intervention, Aideed, though he initially agreed, later withdrew his consent. Thus, the UN Security Council, acting under Resolution 751 of April 1992, finally authorised UNOSOM's deployment in May 1992 to monitor the ceasefire agreement and protect the works of humanitarian agencies in order to cushion the effects of the ongoing famine. Also, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, appointed an Algerian diplomat, Mohammed Sahnoun, as his special representative.[20] The security environment was extremely dangerous due to continued fighting and lack of cooperation from Aideed's militias. This situation caused setbacks for UNOSOM, as the mission was unable to operate effectively in the face of unrelenting efforts of the warring factions to loot humanitarian relief supplies (Seybolt 2008: 52–53). Additionally, the UNOSOM force strength (numbering about 3,500 troops) was insufficient to prevent the blockade of food convoys by the warlords and ensure effective humanitarian operations. It then became obvious that a secure environment is a precondition for effective humanitarian assistance operations. Consequently, on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 794, which authorised the deployment of a robust mission: the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), code-named "Operation Restore Hope," a multinational force of some 38,301 troops (including 25,426 American soldiers) under US command, and with a mandate to secure the environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Adebajo 2011: 174). Faced with such a massive show of military force, the warlords and their followers scaled down their atrocious acts against the UN, its personnel, and numerous humanitarian organisations/agencies. Unfortunately, the cooperation was short-lived.

UNITAF was able to deliver food to the helpless Somalis, and the operation thereby relieved famine. It also helped to reduce looting and banditry, rebuild roads and bridges and facilitate the return of Somali refugees (Adebajo 2011). Despite its limited achievements, Operation Restore Hope ran into difficulties. Since UNITAF was a US-led operation, Washington, with its military and economic might, erroneously believed that it could restore security and provide food to the Somalis without any confrontation with the warlords. Moreover, there was a disagreement between the American government and UN Secretariat because Washington refused to acquiesce to the UN Secretary General's repeated demand to disarm the Somali warlords as a possible measure to ensure peace and stability in the country. During this period, Aideed controlled a large part of Mogadishu and had the upper hand, and as a result, he strongly believed that the deployment of UN peacekeepers would disadvantage him, since the presence of blue helmets would change military balance on the ground and deny his political ambition of ruling Somalia. The UNITAF operation became further complicated because Aideed doubted the sincerity of the UN, for Aideed did not trust Boutros-Ghali, whom he considered to be sympathetic to Barre's cause. especially when Boutros-Ghali was deputy foreign minister of Egypt. The questionable sincerity and impartiality of the UN was further heightened when a Russian plane with UN markings delivered military equipment to Ali Madhi in northern Mogadishu (Adebajo 2011; Ohanwe 2000).

UNITAF's efforts in relieving the famine and also in providing security, at least in Mogadishu, was accompanied by negotiations among the warring parties that resulted in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of March 1993 through which the idea of a Transitional National Council (TNC) was agreed upon. The agreement could not restore security to Somalia, for as Clapham (1999) stated, it was nothing but a tactical gesture intended to be abandoned as soon as the participants, principally the warlords, returned home. Besides, the warlords and their factions did not represent a real source of leverage useable by mediators in order to construct a viable political order in Somalia. During this period, the majority of the Somalis, especially the civilian population, had become completely dissatisfied with the UN and its peacekeepers, who had been accused of gross human rights violations, including killing civilians.

With the expiration of UNITAF's mandate on 4 May 1993, the mission was transformed into UNOSOM II with a robust mandate, including disarmament and peacebuilding. As stated in the UN Security Council Resolution 814, the mission was to "[act] under Chapter VII…, assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia…(and) organise a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II." Therefore, the mission objectives were to keep the peace, ensure the rehabilitation and rebuilding of the political institutions and economy of the Somali state, and achieve disarmament.

Not too long afterward, the UN mission, in its efforts to implement its disarmament mandate, was embroiled in the Somali conflict. Efforts to disarm the Aideed militias were met with strong resistance that led to attacks on peacekeepers and the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in June 1993 (Adebajo 2011: 174–175). The challenges UNOSOM II faced in implementing its disarmament mandate showed the limit of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool, for peacekeeping is not an end in itself: rather, it is a means to an end. A peacekeeping operation must be conceptualised and deployed in support of a clear political process and cannot to be seen as its substitute. The problem would have been averted if disarmament had been conceptualised as part of a broader political strategy. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 225–226) shed light on the imperative of peacekeeping as being part of an effective political process in relation to Somalia when they argued that:

> From the peacekeepers it was important to engage the warlords in dialogue, for they could not be ignored, but simultaneously to ensure that they were not treated as the only representatives of the local populace. Since the warlords did not appear to command the loyalty of the majority of locals…The peacekeepers needed to engage more effectively with the local organisations and associations who had a greater stake in peace, and in all likelihood would speak for greater numbers of people whose voices had been marginalised by the fighting. In the case of General Aided, UN peacekeepers chose to confront his supporters without making a credible case for disarmament as part of a viable broader political strategy for Somalia's reconstruction.

Consequently, the UN Security Council adopted the US's championed Resolution 837, which authorised the arrest and trial of Aideed and those responsible for the killing of UN peacekeepers. As Adebajo (2011: 175) recounts, "Somalis were describing the UN at this stage as a warring faction, a militia of the Gal clan: rich and powerful, but dumb." The UNTAF's American Special envoy, Robert Oakley, placed a $25,000 bounty on Aideed's head. In an attempt to capture Aideed, US Rangers were caught in a complex web of heavy fighting with Aideed's supporters and, as a result, 18 American soldiers were killed and desecrated (Samatar 2007: 156) while

AQ: 'US policy'/ 'US forces' is correct.

about 1,000 Somali civilians lost their lives. This incident resulted in the United States's withdrawal from UNOSOM II in March 1994.

The death of the American Rangers in October 1993 had a long-term effect on US policy on international peace operations. In May 1994, President Bill Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25) ruled that the United States would not intervene in crises that might erupt in the future, unless the country's national interests were evidently threatened and the peace mission had clear and limited objectives, including a well-defined exit strategy. The UN mission eventually left Somalia in March 1995, leaving the Nairobi-based UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to monitor the situation in the country.

The UN peace enforcement operation in Somalia civil war and the organisation's exit from the country represented a failure to achieve its most important objective of restoring peace and security to Somalia. The failures of the UN peace enforcement in Somalia originated from a number of sources. First, UNOSOM II was given a complex mandate that was not supported by required resources. That is, a peace enforcement operation was provided with resources needed for a peacekeeping mission. Besides, the haphazard transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II came with its own problem. The US forces refused to be commanded by the UN, and the disagreement among TCCs was further heightened when the Italian troops refused to use force in self-defence as mandated by the principles of traditional peacekeeping. One can conclude that the UN lacks the capacity to carry out peace enforcement in a civil war situation where there is no peace to keep (Francis 2006b: 105).

Moreover, the pursuit of strategic self-interest of the United States in particular was responsible for UN peace enforcement fiasco in Somalia. As Francis (2006b: 105) rightly argued:

> In effect, major power intervention and support for UN peacekeeping may not necessarily have a stabilising effect on UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa. The role of the US, and the imperative to pander to domestic political necessities, demonstrate the potentially destructive role of major power intervention and support for UN peacekeeping in Africa. The argument is that the UN had not learned from the experience of peace enforcement in Congo.

After the UN fiasco in Somalia, the world body and Western powers developed aversion to peace enforcement, and this led to a barrier in sending peacekeepers to Somalia for more than a decade.

Reconstructing stateless Somalia: regional peacemaking interventions and the challenges of the courts

After UN withdrawal from Somalia and the death of General Aideed in 1996, Somalia was left with rival warlords contesting for control, power,

and fiefdoms, with no identifiable armed group(s) able to control the state and establish functioning governing institutions. Between 1997 and 2000, Somalia was without any form of government, while a stateless order prevailed. In 2000, the IGAD-backed Djiboutis initiated a National Reconciliation Conference, which was held in Arta (Djibouti) to establish a transitional charter with a power-sharing transitional government.[21] The Arta Peace Process, supported by a majority of African and Arab countries, resulted in the establishment of a transitional national government (TNG) that was set up to rule for a period of three years. The TNG faced severe oppositions from warlords that refused to recognise the Arta Process, and as a result, the TNG never extended its authority beyond some parts of Mogadishu, and found its authority undermined by Addis Ababa's backing of its opponents (Cornwell 2006). The opponents of the Arta Process soon formed a military alliance – the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) – with the objective of undermining the peacemaking process in Somalia and unseating the Abdiqassim Salad Hassan-led TNG. Indeed, the challenges of the Arta Process were that the agreement failed to receive universal support and had limited effectiveness, despite the fact that some neighbouring states like Yemen formally endorsed the initiative (Murithi 2009c: 146). The problems were compounded because northern Somalia (Somaliland) and Eastern Somalia (Puntland) were working towards the realisation of their own agendas, including declarations of autonomy. Furthermore, the Arta Process was challenged because IGAD members supported parties to the conflict and harboured their own individual agendas as far as the Somali conflict is concerned; in particular, Addis Ababa sought to control IGAD's peace initiative (see Kamudhayi 2004).

Since it was obvious that the TNG was incapacitated to govern effectively and its authority was challenged, efforts were made by IGAD to continue a peaceful negotiation of the Somali conflict. At its 2001 Summit in Khartoum, IGAD mandated that Kenya assume political leadership in negotiating peace. The Nairobi Peace Process formed the foundation of the 2002–2004 Kenya-based Somalia's National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC), which led to the establishment of the Somali TFIs. It included the TFG and Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) with a five-year mandate to rule and prepare the country for general elections by 2009.[22] Abdullahi Yusuf, the former ruler of the autonomous Somali region of Puntland, was elected president of the TFG by the TFP with Ethiopia's backing. Because of the worsening security situation in Somalia, as the warlords were in control of Mogadishu, the TFG started ruling Somalia from Kenya but later moved to the Somali city of Jowhar in June 2005. By early 2006, the TFG had moved its seat to Baidoa (Kasaija 2010).

In light of this political development, and as is common with Somalia's political landscape, the TFG was confronted with a series of challenges to their ability to govern and establish control. Above all, the TFG lacked legitimacy because it did not receive broad support from within Somalia. Many

Somalis saw the TFG as a puppet of external powers, especially considering Ethiopia's implicit support for the administration. Furthermore, many Somalis considered Ethiopia a spoiler in the Arta Process, because it encouraged Yusuf Abdullahi not to recognise the peace process, and masterminded and funded the formation of the SRRC. The primary objective of Addis Ababa's opposition to the Arta Initiative was to keep Somalis divided and their state weak in order to eliminate any threat to its territory from Somalia. Additionally, the TFG's leaders were from the Puntland region that were seen as enemies of the Mogadishu clans. In a nutshell, many people believed that the TFG represents a narrow swathe of interests and clans in Somalia, rather than representing the whole of Somalia (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye 2010; Elmi and Barise 2006).

The TFG's problems were further compounded by internal division within the administration, as two opposing and seemingly irreconcilable groups emerged as early as 2004: (1) the President and his Prime Minister; and (2) The Mogadishu-based Hawiye clan's parliamentarians and cabinet members (Kasaija 2010). The division was due to lack of consensus between the groups on where the TFG would operate from, and also disagreement on the proposed plan to invite international peacekeeping forces to help the TFG. As Kasaija (2010: 265) noted:

> Whilst the President and his allies pushed for the TFG to operate from the provisional capitals of Jowhar and Baidoa due to the insecurity in Mogadishu, the Mogadishu based parliamentarians and cabinet members perceived this to be a plan to isolate them. They also opposed the deployment of peacekeepers for fear that President Yusuf would use them to pacify their turf, Mogadishu, which would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

The TFG became weaker and increasingly vulnerable to a coalition of local Islamic courts under the name of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) that owe its origin to an effort to restore order. Historically, the Islamic court system had been in existence as far back as the collapse of Somalia as a state. The courts were seen as a "governance experiment in a government vacuum" (Hull and Svensson 2008: 18). Since then, the Islamic court system had been providing, albeit on a limited basis, basic infrastructure such as building of schools and healthcare facilities. The court system implied that it had been providing, within its capacity, the basic necessities for maintaining law and order for the populations under its control, thereby making it easier for the governing body to command the allegiance of the local populations. By 2005, the courts had gradually become a "functioning and operating force," with financial support from the Mogadishu business community who were fed up with the predatory motives and extortions of the warlords (Kasaija 2010: 265. See also Weber 2008).

By June 2006, the UIC, with its militias, swept out of Mogadishu and gained power, after defeating the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a group of Mogadishu warlords.[23] Washington supported the ARPCT with the hope that the coalition would be able to counter threats of Islamic radicalism and terrorism in order to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for *al Qaeda* members. The rise of the UIC in Mogadishu brought positive changes to the city as security improved, while economic activities resumed despite the fact that the courts' administration was based on strict Islamic law. For the majority of Somalis, the courts seemed to be the much-awaited answer to the unending state disorder, as Mogadishu was now experiencing a form of governance that had eluded the country for close to two decades (Menkhaus 2007; Sanei 2014; Williams 2009b).

The courts' takeover of Mogadishu was not acceptable to Addis Ababa, which had been opposing the idea of Somalia being ruled by a radical Islamist regime that would, in Ethiopia's view, establish a theocratic Islamic state contiguous to its borders. Furthermore, Ethiopia's opposition to the courts was inflamed when the UIC leaders resuscitated the Somali irredentist claim to the Ogaden region located within Ethiopia (Seifert 2008). Amidst these tense security situations, coupled with UIC's threats to attack and demolish the TFG in Baidoa, the transitional administration invited the Ethiopian forces to help it defeat the UIC. Responding to the TFG's request, Addis Ababa endorsed (with US support) its military intervention in Somalia in August 2006 with its (Ethiopian) troops entering Baidoa to support the TFG and "protect a buffer zone in case more radical voices within the UIC gained the upper hand and incited irredentist violence in eastern Ethiopia" (Williams 2009b: 516). After fierce battles, the combined Ethiopian and TFG's forces defeated the UIC and installed the TFG in Mogadishu on 28 December 2006, while the city of Kismayo (the UIC's stronghold) fell in January 2007. With the UIC out of Mogadishu, its members regrouped and vowed to crush the Ethiopian occupying forces by mounting of a holy war (*jihad*) and reviving Somalia's irredentist claim to Ogaden.

IGAD's false start and the botched IGASOM's initiative

The idea of sending peacekeepers to support the TFG goes as far back as October 2004 to shortly after Yusuf Abdullahi was sworn in as Somalia's TFG president. Abdullahi requested the AU to deploy international peacekeeping forces to strengthen his government, which was then based in Kenya, and halt further destabilisation of Somalia. Unfortunately, the AU never carried out Abdullahi's request. In January 2005, IGAD's Heads of State and Government, after reviewing the security situation in Somalia, agreed to deploy IGASOM with the mandate to "provide support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the re-establishment of peace and

security."[24] Although, the AU endorsed IGASOM in February 2005, IGAD soon faced difficulties to implement its peace mission plan due to a number of factors.

First, IGAD is not empowered by its Charter to carry out a peacekeeping operation in a member state. Second, the authorised force strength of 10,500 troops was difficult to generate from among IGAD member states. Third, IGAD member states were biased, supporting some of the parties involved in the conflict. In fact, Eritrea, Ethiopia's archrival, objected to the IGASOM deployment. Fourth, IGAD lacks peacekeeping capacity. Fifth, IGASOM was believed to be a Washington-backed Western means to halt the growth of Islamic movement in Somalia (Kasaija 2010: 267; Mulugeta 2008: 177; Nduwimana 2013; Tadesse 2009: 6–7). These factors, plus the UN's reluctance to agree to the AU's request to lift the 1992 arms embargo, which would have allowed the government forces to restore security and help in the deployment of IGAD's peace mission, meant that the IGASOM was never deployed. Thus, the PSC deployed AMISOM because of the inability of IGAD to deploy peacekeepers and the continued unfavourable security conditions that prevailed in Somalia, especially in Mogadishu. Thus, I turn next to the analysis of the AMISOM mission in the rest of this chapter.

The African Union mission in Somalia

Establishment, objectives and mandate

Following the UIC's dislodgment from Mogadishu, some of its leaders were forced into exile, but the die-hard elements of the UIC vowed to fight on until Ethiopia withdraws its troops from Somalia. This strong UIC position on the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces as a condition for a peaceful Somalia resulted in the international community's call for an early Ethiopian military disengagement. Although it had become obvious that the continuing presence of the Ethiopian forces would complicate the conflict situation, the major problem here was that the departure of the Ethiopian forces – the TFG's life-support system – would create a security vacuum and return Somalia to the *status quo* of increased insurgency activities.

With this difficult situation and IGAD's inability to operationalise IGASOM, an AU peacekeeeping operation was imminent. Following the AU Commission Chairperson's Report on the fluid security situation in Somalia, the evaluation and recommendations of the AU Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (of 6 December 2006) that authorised "IGAD and Member States of the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia," the PSC decided to deploy AMISOM in January 2007 to replace the Ethiopian forces and simultaneously called upon the UN for support.[25] The UN Security Council subsequently endorsed the mission's deployment in February 2007 through Resolution 1744, and requested a Technical Assessment Mission to

study the situation in Somalia and report on transitioning AMISOM from AU to UN leadership.[26] AMISOM's deployment was for an initial six-month period with the intention that the mission will be rebadged into a broader UN peace mission after having worked to create conditions conducive for such deployment.

AMISOM is differentiated from other peacekeeping operations because its conceptualisation did not connect to any peace process. Dersso (2010b) attributed the birth of the mission to three important factors. I have explained the first two factors: the insistence on Ethiopian forces withdrawal from Somalia, and IGAD's inability to deploy IGASOM. The third factor is the lack of enthusiasm of the international community to deploy peacekeepers to Somalia, and the UN's concern about Somalia being captured by radical Islamic groups after Ethiopia's departure. However, from the AU perspective, the deployment of AMISOM is another sign of the continental institution's new pragmatic approach to addressing African conflicts and put the APSA into action. Thus, the operationalisation of the APSA adds value to the analysis that the African Union commitment is evidence.

AMISOM, with its authorised force strength of 8,100 troops, was initially mandated to support the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia.[27] To achieve this daunting list of objectives, the mission was to perform a set of operational tasks that included supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia; working with all stakeholders; providing, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure; assisting in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan for Somalia, particularly the effective re-establishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces. In relation to the training of Somali security forces, it is worth noting the programmes that were already being implemented by some of Somalia's bilateral and multilateral partners.

Other tasks for the mission involved providing technical and other support to disarmament and stabilisation efforts; monitoring the security situation in areas of deployment of its forces; facilitating, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs; and finally, protecting its personnel, installations and equipment, as well as exercising the right to self-defence.[28] Before going any further, a cursory look at AMISOM's mandate reveals not only its ambitious nature, considering the AU's lack of peacekeeping capacity and its organisational weaknesses (as evidenced in AMIB – see Chapter 4) and the dangerous conflict environment in which the mission was to be deployed, but also its lack of a civilian protection provision. Of course all these problems would obviously make it difficult for the African forces to have real impacts upon the security and humanitarian situations in a violent conflict as

complicated as the one in Somalia. I discuss the mandate problem in greater detail later.

The conceptualisation and deployment of AMISOM

Following the AMIB Model, AMISOM was conceptualised as a peace mission with military and civilian components. In term of the force size, the PSC agreed that the mission would include nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each, "supported by maritime coastal and air components, as well as an appropriate civilian component, including a police training team."[29] AMISOM's initial concept of operations (CONOPs) involved a 4-phase expansion throughout the mission area and an exit phase. The CONOPs involved the mission's initial deployment – controls and stabilises the security situation in Mogadishu in Sector 2, before spreading out to other Sectors indicated as Sector 1 and Sector 3. Phase 1 of the AMISOM operation, also known as the Initial Deployment Phase, was to be executed by the AMISOM Force Commander. The main tasks involved the deployment of three infantry Battalions to Sector 2, which is in the capital, providing security in and around Mogadishu as a prerequisite condition to the execution of Phase 2, which would enable AMISOM's Head of Mission (HoM) to relocate to Somalia from his temporary base in Nairobi, Kenya.

The establishment of the Force headquarters was to be completed during this phase. Phase 2, the Expansion of the Deployment Phase, envisaged expansion of the AMISOM operation, which would involve deploying military troops to other Sectors. This is to be followed by Phase 3, the Consolidation Phase, during which the mission's mandate and key operational tasks will be executed, as decided by the AU and the PSC. The Re-deployment/Exit Phase, that is, in Phase 4 AMISOM will give way to a UN peace mission. AMISOM is under the overall headship of an appointed civilian Head of Mission (HoM) the special representative of the AU Commission Chairperson who directs AMISOM's heads of civilian, military, police and administrative components. The HoM is assisted by a deputy and he reports to the Chairperson of the AU Commission through the Commissioner for Peace and Security.[30] Furthermore, the HoM is to support the efforts of the AU and the Somali authority, and solicit international support as well. Also, he is expected to ensure that the continuation of extant political conditions that threaten peace and security in Somalia are eliminated.[31] The PSC, in its Communiqué authorising AMISOM, stated that AMISOM's concept of logistics support should be based on the Burundi Model. This implies that "the AU Commission shall mobilise logistical support for the TCCs, as well as funding from AU member states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment, based on AU practice."[32]

Troop contributions to AMISOM were initially pledged by Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana and Malawi. Uganda pledged 1,800 troops, while Burundi,

Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi offered respectively 1,600; 850; 350; and about 1,000 troops (Hull and Svensson 2008: 27). AMISOM's deployment started with the arrival in Mogadishu of two battalions from Uganda in March 2007. Soon, troop generation became a challenge, as Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi failed to honour their promises. These failures to commit troops to the operation were attributed principally to the deteriorating security situation on the ground, which was aggravated further by the growing hostility of the Somali warring factions towards AMISOM, and also to the lack of peacekeeping capacity. Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008: 40) have argued that: "...the rapidly deteriorating security situation made other potential troop contributors hesitant about the mission in Somalia and technical obstacles should, to some extent, be seen as an excuse to avoid having to go into a highly dangerous mission area..." In August 2007, a small number of Ugandan soldiers were deployed to strengthen their initial deployment and, unfortunately for AMISOM, there were no troop contributions from other AU member states until December 2007. Burundi was delayed in deploying its troops due to lack of logistics. It was not until December 2007 that a small contingent of Burundian forces (numbering 192 soldiers) arrived in Mogadishu. By January 2008, AMISOM's force strength stood at 2,613 with the arrival of a battalion from Burundi (Hull and Svensson 2008: 28). This number of troops was still insufficient to make any meaningful contribution to ameliorating the Somali conflict trajectory.

Troop contributions to AMISOM remained a major challenge, for only Uganda and Burundi actually honoured their pledges as planned; not until December 2011 did numbers increase slightly when AMISOM welcomed the deployment of its third contingent from Djibouti. However, troop contributions to the AU peace mission in Somalia become more challenging because these TCCs were ineffective in terms of their lack of peacekeeping experiences and resources. The Burundians' experiences in joining the AMISOM force illustrated this point. The second battalion from Burundi was not deployed to Somalia until October 2008, despite the fact that the troops had completed their pre-deployment training some months earlier, but had to wait for the AU partners to donate equipment and airlift support.[33] The arrival of the second Burundian battalion increased AMISOM force strength to approximately 3,000 troops in October 2008. By April 2009, AMISOM's field strength increased to 4,300 troops (Williams 2009b) and later (in early 2010) it increased to 5,250 (2,700 Ugandan and 2,550 Burundians) (Kasaija 2010; Wakengela 2011: 384).

The tepid responses of the AU member states to contributing troops to AMISOM revealed a persistent problem, and highlighted the triangular area of tension that exists in deploying and running African peace operations effectively in terms of what is required: the AU's proactive stance in being able to tackle African conflicts. The glaring problem is that the AU member states lack political will to put their rhetoric into practice in relation to the

APSA and in supporting the AU's peacekeeping efforts as planned. The challenges of troop generation, in time and as stipulated, to the AU missions have been a recurring problem that makes AMISOM share similar AU peacekeeping experiences as took place in Burundi, where only three countries contributed troops to AMIB. The problem of troop contributions to AU peace mission happened again in Sudan (especially under AMIS – see Chapter 6). AMISOM operation lacks the *genuine* commitment of African governments, for the AU and its peace operations could only be as strong as what the institution's member states want them or allow them to be (Gelot, Gelot and de Coning 2012). Insufficient troop contributions to AMISOM is a clear evidence of how African states are not too serious about the APSA, despite their commitment to the security mechanism that looks better on paper than in reality.[34]

The initial authorised force strength of 8,100 troops for the mission was insufficient, because the proposed (and realistic) force strength was around 19,000. With a reduced force strength, the AU struggled for more than four years to secure this same number. AMISOM found it difficult to fully achieve its mandate since only two out of five countries that originally pledged troops actually honoured their promises for more than four years. The AU's inability to generate the authorised troop numbers in a timely manner impacted negatively on AMISOM's operational performance and capacity. The mission was restricted in its operations in every way.

Immediately after the arrival of the Ugandan troops, the mission started experiencing direct attacks and shelling from anti-TFG Islamist insurgents that resulted in the death of a number of AMISOM soldiers. The Mission Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General Juvenal Niyoyunguruza, was killed in a suicide bombing in September 2009 (Vines 2010). Between March 2007 and September 2011, AMISOM suffered about 750 fatalities (Norris and Bruton 2011: 29). The incessant attacks on the AU peacekeepers and the mission's insignificant impact on the conflict situation led to a renewed call by the AU Commission Chairperson for additional troop contributions from the AU member states. In response, Uganda contributed another battalion in March 2010, which increased AMISOM's force strength to 6,118 troops. An additional battalion from Burundi was also deployed after the needed equipment from donors was received. By December 2011, both Uganda and Burundi had deployed, and with the advanced elements from Djibouti, nearly 10,000 peacekeeping troops were in Somalia.

Furthermore, towards the end of 2011, AMISOM launched a number of assaults on/against *al-Shabaab*. First, on 16 October 2011, Kenyan forces entered Somalia and unilaterally launched a major military offensive against *al-Shabaab* in retaliation for its terrorist attacks on and kidnapping of foreigners in Kenya. Soon afterwards, in December 2011, Ethiopian forces re-entered Somalia and launched military interventions against *al-Shabaab's* positions, especially across Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions and extended its

operation into these areas. Then Kenya, Sierra Leone and Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding promising to join AMISOM during the first six months of 2012 (Nduwimana 2013; Williams 2013b).[35] Consequently, Sierra Leone deployed in 2012 and Kenyan forces re-hatted into AMISOM in the same year.

AMISOM's operational constraints and the above-discussed new developments in its theatre of operations necessitated a new CONOPs. Developed and adopted by both the AU and the UN, AMISOM's new CONOPs planned an increase of AMISOM's troops of nearly 18,000 uniformed personnel and expanded operation theatre.[36] The new CONOPs entailed a Force headquarters of approximately 85 officers in Mogadishu, four land sectors and a marine sector. The Ugandan and Burundian troops were stationed in Sector 1 to secure Mogadishu. Sector 2, home to Kenyan and Sierra Leonean forces, covered Southwest Somalia (Kismayo). The Ugandan and Burundian troops, supported by Ethiopian troops, were stationed in Sector 3 to stabilise Baidoa. Troops from Djibouti and Ethiopia controlled Sector 4 in the North (Williams 2013b).

With the new CONOPs and additional troops from Sierra Leone and Djibouti, as well as the re-hatting of Kenyan forces into AMISOM in 2012, the mission's troop strength increased to approximately 18,000. In October 2013,[37] the African mission together with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) forces made considerable progress in capturing the remaining parts of Mogadishu occupied by the militant groups. The Kenyan Defense Force had captured Gedo, Juba and Kismayo. AMISOM's mandate expired on 31 October 2014 and the UN Security Council requested the AU to increase AMISOM's troop strength from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel as part of the overall efforts to combat increasingly asymmetrical tactics of *al-Shabaab* rebels in Somalia (Nduwimana 2013).

Having analysed AMISOM's CONOPs and its deployment, I discuss its operational performance and constraints in the next section. In evaluating AMISOM, I assess its performance principally in line with its mandate and ability to contribute to Somalia's security. AMISOM's challenges are evaluated in relation to the AU peacekeeping capacity, conflict environment, among other elements.

Evaluating AMISOM: operational achievements and constraints

AMISOM's operational achievements

In the period covered by this study, AMISOM performed fairly well in terms of having real impact in managing the Somali conflict situation. The mission shared most of the challenges that are associated with African peace operations, especially when it is compared with AMIB and/or AMIS. These constraints made it difficult for AMISOM to fully realise its mandate during

the period covered by this study. As a result, the mission made significant, albeit, limited inroads into restoring peace and stability in Somalia. Seven years had passed since the AU authorised AMISOM. The tenuous security situation in Somalia does not allow the mission to permanently halt the violence or end the conflict. Instead, the Islamist insurgent groups had drawn AMISOM into the conflict and some Somalis saw the African mission as a party to the conflict because of its support for illegitimate and externally imposed transitional administration processes, and for the FGS. The attacks on the African peacekeepers are a calculated attempt to delegitimise AMISOM, and pressurise TCCs to withdraw and send their troops home, away from Somalia. What explains this scenario better is the two deadly bombings of a restaurant and rugby club owned by an Ethiopian by *al-Shabaab* in Kampala, on 11 July 2010. 76 people were killed in these deadly attacks (Center on International Cooperation 2011: 100). Although the twin bombings were to punish Uganda for its participation in AMISOM, they are a reminder of the volatility of AMISOM's theatre of operation.

The active war context in which AMISOM was deployed and the mission's questionable impartiality, initially forced the African peacekeepers to keep a very low profile as far as the performance of their mandated tasks is concerned. In realising its mandate of providing protection to the TFIs, AMISOM was initially stationed in a number of key locations in and around Mogadishu. The Ugandan troops were initially stationed and provided security to Aden Adde International Airport, the seaport, and Villa Somalia, the presidential palace. As the number of troops increased the mission increased its patrolling activities to other parts of the capital, including Kilometre 4 (K4) traffic circle district in the southern part of Mogadishu. The arrival of the main Burundian contingents helped AMISOM to extend its operation to other parts of the capital, especially to Mogadishu University and the Jalle Siad Military Academy (Dersso 2010b).

During the mission's first three years in Somalia, AMISOM's operational achievements were limited to patrolling Mogadishu and providing protection to the TFIs (Vines 2010). In March 2011, AMISOM aided the TFG forces in a military offensive to retake some parts of Mogadishu and to prepare the basis to implement the Phase 2 and 3 of its original CONOPs. Immediately after this military campaign, the AMISOM and TFG forces controlled seven of the 16 Districts of Mogadishu (Dharkenley, Wadajir, Waberi, Hamar Jabjab and Hamar Weyne), while three Districts (Yaqshid, Heliwa and Karan in northern Mogadishu) and six other Districts were, respectively, controlled by the insurgent groups and remained contested.

In August 2011, *al-Shabaab* withdrew from Mogadishu, leaving the TFG and AMISOM forces to control most of the capital, but they posed threats to civilian populations due to their capability of making intermittent attacks on Mogadishu. Through involvement of Kenya, Djibouti and Sierra Leone; the re-redeployment of Ethiopian troops; greater coordination between and

among AMISOM, Somali forces, and Ethiopian troops, AMISOM liberated Mogadishu on 9 December 2012 and most parts of central and southern Somalia (including Kismayo and Marka). This military feat enabled the African mission to gain control, since it denied *al-Shabaab* access to the main seaport and thereby curtailed the group's major source of income. Despite these achievements, the African mission found it difficult to stabilise the liberated areas from *al-Shabaab's* threats, let alone the whole of Somalia. The African mission had been able to collect weapons from some warring parties and provided escorts to humanitarian relief operations as well as helping in the distribution of relief materials to the local population and providing healthcare for the wounded and sick.

Since the early 1990s, the coast of Somalia has been known for rampart piracy, which has become a major concern for international trade and security (Kellerman 2011). In 2008, Somalia recorded the highest number of incidents of piracy in Africa, with 24 incidents against Nigeria's 18. Piracy off the coast of Somalia involves attacks on container ships, bulk carriers and tankers loaded with oil and chemicals (International Maritime Bureau 2013). The act of piracy has negative impacts on the Somali economy, as it has greatly reduced revenues generated from the seaports. The AU partnered with international organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation in its fight against piracy and armed robbery. Since 2011 when the AU PSC authorised the training and deployment of vessel protection detachments on board supply vessels for AMISOM, it has been conducting maritime operations, in coordination with the ongoing operations by international partners. Arora (2014) stated that "the VDP, a specialised military detachment of AMISOM has been designed to act as vessel security for supply which in future may embark on the ships providing logistic support for AMISOM shipping en-route Somalia's ports." AMISOM's Maritime unit has partially secured the Mogadishu coastline. This situation helped AMISOM to protect landing aircrafts and ships that wait to dock at Mogadishu and Kismayo seaports. AMISOM's Vessel Protection Detachment has been training with the European Union Naval force (EU NAVFOR), which is part of the comprehensive approach to improve AMISOM capabilities. As at late 2013, a total of 48 AMISOM troops out of 74 had benefitted from this training (see Arora 2014).

Despite all odds, AMISOM's intervention in the conflict has brought fragile peace to Somalia, while positive peace is yet to be achieved. The improved security situation has enabled the country to engage in democratic governance; a process that ended the transitional administration and ushered in a new political dispensation. Additionally, AMISOM has aided the federal government to establish local administration structures in the liberated areas (Nduwimana 2013). Despite AMISOM's achievements, more needs to be done in completely defeating all threats to peace in Somalia.

AMISOM's major challenges and constraints

The problem of a dangerous conflict environment

As already stated, AMISOM is operating in a conflict environment that was initially characterised by statelessness. The stateless nature of the Somali state is explained in this context in terms of state collapse with no identifiable government that represents the whole country and commands the allegiance of the entire Somali people. Although the TFG was accorded recognition by the international community to assume this position and it functioned as such, its inability to operate as a *de jure* authority in Somalia contributed to the suspicions towards external third-party interveners among the Somalis that were against the TFG. Thus, rather than restoring stability to Somalia, the imposition of the TFG on Somalia increased anti-TFG feelings and this also flared up hostility that added to further deterioration of the security situation.[38] In this kind of conflict environment, the African mission found itself with the dilemma of how to really function as a peace mission in the clear absence of a peace to keep The stateless order led to and increased weaponisation in Somali society, all in the quest of predatory, personal interests and lust for power of the leaders of the various warring factions (Wakengela 2011: 396). Militarisation of the society and clan politicisation, and also the splintering of the armed insurgent groups negatively affected any hope of forging national reconciliation, which is needed in order to achieve broader political consensus for peaceful resolution of the fratricidal war. The absence of effective and sincere political process makes AMISOM's complete operational success look utopian, at least in the interim. The failure of AMISOM and FGS forces to secure the whole of Somali territory and completely stabilise the liberated areas increases fears and uncertainty in the country. The dangerous security situation in other parts of Somalia, especially in rural areas, is slowing down the actions of would-be TCCs, and reducing their potential to contribute to AMISOM.

The problem of the AU peacekeeping capacities

The gap between the AU's ambition and its capacity in relation to peace operations as experienced in Burundi reappeared in AMISOM. The AMISOM operation also reveals the chasm between the AU's intent and the lack of capacity to do the job – thereby pointing to the organisation's problem in balancing the triangular area of tension in African peace operations. Apart from the problems of troop contributions that I discussed earlier, the AU lacked the logistical and financial resources for its peacekeeping operation in Somalia (Freear and de Coning 2013). I analyse the AU peacekeeping incapacities at many levels. Apart from the fact that only two countries initially contributed troops to AMISOM, the AU, as part of its organisational weaknesses and financial constraint, was beset by the strategic lift capability problem when it was obvious that both Uganda and Burundi would be unable to deploy their contingents without outside (i.e., non-African)

assistance. This situation is reminiscent of the AMIB operation where the Mozambican and Ethiopian contingents were deployed, respectively, by the United Kingdom and the United States.

In response to this strategic lift capability problem of the AU, NATO assisted in the deployment of the troops, while countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and France helped the mission with some logistical requirements. Besides, the TCCs when compared against countries like South Africa and Nigeria are poor, lacking adequate funds and resources, with no extensive peacekeeping experience.[39] This situation underlines the disturbing reality that the AU peace operations, especially AMISOM, are operationalised as an improvised arrangement of a few countries, and perhaps for this reason, the AU was initially unable to come up with a realistic force of adequate strength for AMISOM to do the job well in Somalia. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that these TCCs inundated with absolute poverty may be forced to withdraw earlier than they should. I illustrate this point further with the case of Burundi. It is a country that is struggling to deal with the problem of accommodating and paying for its larger than needed army, which is not the most capable or experienced in peacekeeping. For, whether it is a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, Burundi is not a country with the capacity to do this kind of operation in Somalia. So the real professional armies that could have come, that is, the robust type correlating with the tasks at hand are unfortunately not in Somalia to do the job that only they could do.[40]

Furthermore, despite the volatile environment in which the mission operated, AMISOM was not well resourced for its operational tasks. AMISOM was inadequately equipped to the extent that the troops lacked concrete shelters and bunkers for protection and consequently relied on sandbags even in very high-risk areas. The mission did not possess key enablers and force multipliers such as air assets (Freear and de Coning 2013). Although some of these logistical problems were addressed in 2008 when the equipment of the defunct UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) were scavenged and passed on to AMISOM, this assistance was not enough to adequately address the resources limitation of AMISOM (Williams 2009b, 2010a). Besides, while the AU and its peace operation in Somalia relied largely on non-African partners for finance and logistics support, AMISOM was plagued by the problems of insufficient military hardware and spare parts supplies. The problem was because the finance for the supply of military hardware was not within the agendas of many of the AU donors. AMISOM lacked the technology to combat the threats of IEDs and did not have defensive equipment required to combat roadside bombs and mortar attacks (Dersso 2010b).

Moreover, AMISOM's many challenges have revealed the AU institutional capacity deficiency in planning peace operations. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the AU Commission staff strength is small when compared to the magnitude of tasks they have to perform, especially for those at the Peace

and Security Department (PSD). The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has the gargantuan responsibility of planning and managing peace operations, but it is not sufficiently staffed. In addition, the PSC Secretariat is understaffed, with only few professionals or employees. At the strategic level, the AU Commission's weak bureaucratic structure has serious implications for its peacekeeping operations, because the workload at the AU Commission is far above what the present staff level can effectively handle. Given the scant resources at their disposal, and their small numerical strength, there is a limit to what they can achieve in terms of planning successful peace operations.

Nowhere has the AU's institutional capacity deficiency in relation to planning peace operations become more glaring than in the lead up to AMISOM's deployment. Despite the AU strong determination to develop the APSA, the African institution heavily depended on the UN and non-African assistance in the planning and deployment of AMISOM. The AU looked up to the UN for assistance in enhancing its strategic-level management in operationalising AMISOM. Following a formal request from the AU to the UN Security Council for assistance in the form of a grant or UN support package to the AU, the world body acceded by seconding a ten-man team of military, police and civilian experts to the AU Commission in January 2007, to be part of the newly established AMISOM Strategic Management and Planning Unit (SPMU).[41] The UN experts were also reinforced by four experts on civil engineering, human resources, budgeting and communications from the EU that were responsible for planning AMISOM and providing important strategic and technical advice and guidance to the leadership of AMISOM. These non-African SPMU experts helped the poorly resourced AU in revising AMISOM's initial CONOPs, and provided preparatory training for the Burundian reconnaissance mission that was sent to Mogadishu to prepare for the arrival of the country's first Battalion (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008; Hull and Svensson 2008). It should be stressed that AMISOM's SPMU had only eight of the 35 proposed staff in 2007 before the arrival of non-African experts (Pirozzi 2009: 15; Vines 2013).

The persistent problem of financing AU peace operations plagues AMISOM, as the AU is incapacitated; it cannot pay for the mission without an injection of funds. Taking cognisance of this difficult reality, the AU reintroduced the Burundi Model in its operation in Somalia, where it ruled that the TCCs should be self-sustained for the duration of the mission. Based on this model, TCCs are expected to provide/supply their needed equipment (contingent owned equipment – COE) during the operation with the understanding that the AU would reimburse incurred costs immediately when it secured funds from its member states and partners. This was the reassurance the TCCs were given, so that the AU would not place the peacekeeping burden on them forever.

At the beginning of the AMISOM operation, donors were not enthusiastic about providing the requisite financial resources to the AU peacekeeping

efforts because it was thought that the operation would be a failure in the long-run for three reasons: the controversial Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with the support of the United States, African states' lack of interest in the operation – exemplified by the low pace of troop contributions to AMISOM from African countries – and dangerous security, political and humanitarian situations within Somalia (Franke 2009: 260). At AMISOM's inception, the AU relied solely on bilateral support from donors – the United States, the United Kingdom and the EU African Peace Facility – to supplement TCCs support from Uganda and Burundi. Realising its financial constraints and the difficult environment in which AMISOM is deployed, the AU appealed to the UN to grant it a support package that will, as I mentioned above, involve logistical and technical support as well as $800 million in financial assistance.

Lack of consensus in the UN Security Council did not allow the UN to accede to the AU's demands. The absence of consensus in the council is because Russia, the United Kingdom, and France vehemently opposed the idea of using the UN's financial resources for backing the AU or other regional organisations' peacekeeping missions when the UN institution itself is overstretched with peacekeeping operations across the world. Rather, the UN Security Council favoured the establishment of a voluntarily Trust Fund for AMISOM as the mission's major source of finance. In spite of the fact that in April 2008, the UN Security Council through Resolution 1809 clearly expressed its recognition of the AU's security role in Somalia, it emphasised the fact that the UN would find it difficult to use the assessed contributions to support regional organisations, and that these institutions, (such as the AU) are responsible for providing their own institutions' needs.[42] It was not until January 2009 that the UN authorised, through the UN Security Council Resolution 1863, the establishment of the AMISOM Trust Fund in order to lessen the mission's financial burden. The UN Security Council Resolution 1872 eventually created a combined funding structure of UN Assessed Peacekeeping Budget, a Voluntary Fund for AMISOM, with a logistical support in the form of the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) with authority to use UN resources. Between 2009 and 2012, the Trust Fund received $77million and it was, initially, aimed at reimbursing TCCs for their equipment used in the operation and also to increase troop's allowances to that of UN peacekeepers. Despite these efforts, donations to the UN-administered Trust Fund were irregular and unreliable, leaving AMISOM in financial difficulties (Freear and de Coning 2013: 6). The Trust Fund could not cover the TCCs equipment and as a result, reimbursements were always in arrears.

In 2012 the funding structure of AMISOM improved. The improvement in AMISOM's funding structure is due primarily to the mission's changing need and an increase in force size. In February 2012, AMISOM's funding structure was modified and provided more regular and reliable funding to

the nearly 18,000 troops on the ground. Under the new funding arrangement, the cost of contingent equipment was covered by the UN assessed contribution budget (Gelot, Gelot and de Coning 2012). The UN has started now providing logistical package to AMISOM. Freear and de Coning (2013) argue that both the UN and donors' preference of the Trust Fund is due to the fact that finance can be earmarked for specific capabilities and it is believed that donors' fund will be properly accounted for by the African institution. Contrarily, AMISOM field commanders opined that Trust Fund delay their operation because of its unwieldy tendering process.

The problem of finding an appropriate exit strategy

AMISOM also confronted the problem of how to leave Somalia. After taking into consideration its organisational weaknesses, lack of peacekeeping resources and the constant attacks on its personnel from the Islamist armed groups, the AU struggled to find an appropriate exit strategy for the African mission. This problem becomes more embedded and chronic because of differing views of the UN and key Western countries on how to go about it, and the Somalis divisive opinion on the continuing presence of foreign troops in their country. During the transitional administration, while some shades of opinion saw AMISOM's deployment as supporting the stabilisation of the country, creating a conducive political environment for and assisting the TFG to establishing a functioning government and rebuilding the Somali state, others argued to the contrary; they saw the African mission as nothing more than the re-colonisation of Somalia and an infringement on its sovereignty.

Since then, finding an appropriate exit strategy has been a recurring problem for AMISOM. The AU Commission has, on many occasions, reiterated its intention of handing over AMISOM to the UN in line with the PSC's decision of 19 January 2007. However, the politics of the UN Security Council and lack of willing troop contributors, especially among key Western countries, to deploy their soldiers in Somalia, makes the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Somalia highly unrealistic proposition, at least for now. After an initial period of the UN's lack of enthusiasm on AMISOM's replacement, discussions gathered momentum with the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in August 2008. The agreement was made between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) led by Sheikh Sheriff Sheikh Ahmed; its (the agreement) relevance was boosted when Ethiopia withdrew its 3,000 troops from Somalia in January 2009. The Djibouti Agreement succeeded not only in bringing together the rival groupings, the TFG and the ARS-Djibouti, but it also resulted in the formation of the new transitional administration (TFG II), which paved the way for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces (Kasaija 2010: 262 and 274; Tadesse 2009: 2). Additionally, the agreement envisaged AMISOM's replacement when it called on the UN Security Council "to authorise and deploy an international

stabilisation force from countries that are friends of Somalia excluding neighbouring states."[43]

Now the question is: How, and to what extent, was the UN able to establish an international stabilisation force (ISF) to pave the way for AMISOM's exit? I address this question by looking at the UN Secretary General's failed efforts to establish and deploy an international mission to Somalia in supporting the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement. In November 2008, Ban Ki-moon, suggested the establishment of a two brigade-sized ISF and a strategy to deploy in four phases in order to create the right conditions for the UN peace mission. Despite the Secretary General's recommendations, responses to the creation of a multinational force were highly unsatisfactory. The poor response was such that out of the 50 countries contacted, only 14 of them responded to the UN Secretary General's request for contributions. Only the United States and the Netherlands, out of the 14 countries that responded, offered funding, while no state pledged troop contributions, nor were they willing to assume a leading role (Williams 2009b: 524; Williams 2010b).

When it became obvious that the idea of deploying a 6,000-strong ISF was not going to materialise, the UN Secretary General commenced efforts, do novo, to ensure that security prevailed in Somalia, especially after the envisaged military disengagement of Ethiopia from Somalia in January 2009. While the UN Scribe still believed in the contingency planning for deploying a UN mission as the best option for securing Somalia, he put forward three options, which on the authority of Williams (2009b: 524) could be summarised thus:

> First, AMISOM should be reinforced. This should be done through bilateral support to the troop contributing countries (Uganda and Burundi); support at the mission level in the area of logistical, medical and engineering capabilities; and the transfer of some $7 million worth of assets from UNMEE, ... Moreover, the UN should bolster its support for AMISOM by providing an additional logistic support package and continuing to assist AU planning and deployment preparations through its Planners team in Addis Ababa. Second, the UN should build the capacity of the Djibouti Agreement signatories to restore the security sector and the rule of law. In the short term, this should involve training and equipping 5000 joint TFG-ARS forces, a 10,000-strong Somali Police Force, and other justice and correction personnel. The third step was for the Security Council to consider establishing a maritime task force, perhaps as part of the ongoing anti-piracy operations. Not only could this support AMISOM's operations but it could host a quick-reaction force to support AMISOM peacekeepers and could serve as an operational platform for any envisaged UN peacekeeping operation.

Besides Ban Ki-moon's efforts, Washington (under the Bush administration) had also been at the vanguard of deploying UN peacekeepers to Somalia after having accepted the reality of an unrealisable ISF dream. The divisive politics at the UN Security Council, and also lack of consensus among the P-5 – on how to address the Somali conflict – remained as obstacles to bringing the Somali state out of incessant war. The UN Security Council's lack of unanimity was evident when one look at the scenario in the lead up to the council's adoption of Resolution 1863 in January 2009.

Washington was agitating fervently for a UN peace mission in Somalia to support the newly signed Djibouti Agreement and also to make up for the shortcomings of AMISOM, especially with respect to the troop contributions problem the African mission was facing. However, London was not enthusiastic and did not fully support the draft resolution the United States was putting forward. Consequently, after intense deliberations in the council, a compromise of sorts was reached which led to the UN Security Council Resolution 1863, which leaned more towards London's position. In the Resolution, the UN Security Council expressed its intention to establish a UN peace mission "as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision on the Security Council by June 1, 2009."[44] With Obama's presidency, there is seemingly a waning in Washington's efforts and interests to advocate for a UN peace mission in Somalia.

What followed from this situation could be described as a lack of consensus on and a lack of zeal to deploy a UN blue-helmet operation in Somalia among the majority of UN member states. Notwithstanding, Ban Ki-moon, in his Report to the UN Security Council on Somalia[45] proposed four options that would be helpful to the UN to achieve its goals of ending the conflict and achieving durable peace in Somalia. In political term, the options are to shore up the peace process and promote national reconciliation in its entirety. Second, the political and military dimension is to create an enabling environment through which the Somali state institutions could be rebuilt with a legal and effective reliance on Somalia's own national security apparatus. Third, the humanitarian and recovery dimension is to provide basic socioeconomic infrastructure for developing the Somali state (Report of the UN Secretary General on Somalia, 16 April 2009, para 7).

The UN Scribe's first option (Option A) also known, as a high-risk option was to transfer the baton of peacekeeping from AMISOM to the UN, with a 22,500-strong force and a Chapter VII mandate. Option B, also known as the pragmatic option, is for the UN to maintain its current course with the world body's support package for the African mission until the Somali national security forces could independently provide security for the capital. Furthermore, there was a prudent Option C, which could be described as Option B plus a "light footprint" in Somalia. This option was to provide a UN support package to AMISOM and also establish a UN Political Office for Somalia and a UN Support Office for AMISOM in Mogadishu. Option D,

known as the "Engagement with no international security presence" was a contingency plan in case AMISOM voluntarily or forcibly had to withdraw (Williams 2010b: 526). Ban Ki-moon believed that the UN would pursue and achieve its strategic goals through a gradual approach.[46] According to the UN Secretary General, Phase 1 would involve carrying out Option B, and Option C would be put into practice during Phase 2. During Phase 3, Option A would be put into practice and lastly, Option D would serve as the contingency plan in the event of an AMISOM withdrawal (Report of the UN Secretary General on Somalia, 16 April 2009, para 8.2). The already discussed problems associated with the UN peace operations, in particular the lack of unanimity among the P-5, have not been able to see this plan to fruition.

The problem of inappropriate and complex peacekeeping mandate

For all intents and purposes, AMISOM's mandate remained a major challenge to its operational tasks and achievements. First, the mandate is too ambitious, considering the AU's peacekeeping incapacities, especially during its first four years in Somalia. AMISOM's initial authorised force strength of 8,100 troops was highly insufficient and an unrealistic force strength to effectively perform the operational tasks enumerated in the mandate, given the volatility of the Somali conflict environment. The question is: How can AMISOM with insufficient troops and resources effectively undertake the broad and difficult tasks of providing security and maintaining order, supporting humanitarian relief operations, supporting dialogue and reconciliation, as well as carrying out disarmament and stabilisation efforts? Certainly, these are more daunting tasks since the Islamist armed groups have emphatically refused to participate in any peace process with the Somali authorities or any third (foreign) party. At another level, the mandate problem can be seen in AMISOM's security sector reform (SSR) and its tasks associated with strengthening the rule of law.

These are gargantuan tasks, which entail not just transforming the military force, but also the transformation of Somali society that has been embroiled in violence for so long. It is difficult for AMISOM to operationalise its (although still developing) strategies, policies and plan for the management of both captured and voluntary disengaged fighters. While AMISOM and the FGS forces have captured some *al-Shabaab* fighters in combat and also received a significant numbers of defectors, the lack of financial resources is edging the plan towards a failure. Despite *al-Shabaab*'s establishment of a 500-strong *Amniat* (Internal Security) force, principally to stop defections, AMISOM continued to receive an increasing numbers of disengaged *al-Shabaab* fighters. As of mid-January 2013, the FGS was holding about 1,500 disengaged *al-Shabaab* fighters, this is in addition to 250 fighters that were in AMISOM's custody (Nduwimana 2013; Williams 2013a&b). Like AMISOM, the FGS is incapacitated to facilitate the transition of these

ex-fighters. This situation has made it difficult for the FGS to fully disarm and demobilise ex-combatants, let alone reintegrate them into society, especially in a country like Somalia where its economy is in shambles.

Second, AMISOM's mandate lacked a civilian protection provision. The absence of a civilian protect provision in its mandate is a major problem for the mission. Instead, AMISOM's mandate calls for mission protection (personnel, installations and equipment) and can only use force in self-defence. Such a holy trinity principle of traditional peacekeeping embedded in AMISOM's mandate does not fit the Somali conflict scenario. The Islamist armed groups have been accused of targeting civilian populations, therefore the mandate ought to have moved beyond defensive peacekeeping to include the use of force to protect civilian populations and their livelihoods and human rights. With this existing weak mandate, the AU failed to heed the lessons from its peacekeeping experiences in Darfur, where the absence of a civilian protection mandate especially under AMIS I was one of the major challenges of the mission (see Chapter 6). This problem has been noted and efforts have now been gear towards mainstreaming protection of civilians into the work of AMISOM. The recommendations for civilian protection role for AMISOM are based on two pillars (1) Protecting civilians from harms during AMISOM operations and (2) Strengthening processes for civilian protection in AMISOM's areas of operations.

The third challenge dealing with mandate is that AMISOM is a regime supporting peace mission. This aspect of the mandate has made the African mission lose its status as neutral peacekeepers when the mission's impartiality becomes doubtful. Since the Somali authorities (represented first by the TFG and now the FGS) is one of the parties to the Somali conflict, AMISOM's support for Mogadishu simply means that it has automatically become a party to the conflict. Also relating to AMISOM's mandate and problematic argument, the mission was conceptualised to replace the Ethiopian troops (the insurgent groups' sworn enemy); and the fact that there is a linkage between Addis Ababa's goal to install the TFG in Mogadishu and AMISOM's mandate to protect the TFIs contribute to AMISOM's operational difficulties, because its neutrality had become questionable. Thus, AMISOM was operating, when it was first deployed, in "Ethiopia's shadow" (after Williams 2009b: 517), which did not give the Africa mission the opportunity to secure the consent and receive the cooperation of the Islamist armed groups. Therefore, AMISOM lacked one of the most important characteristics of peacekeeping: impartiality and neutrality. The UN Security Council Resolution 2036 of 2012 specifically authorised AMISOM to "reduce the threats posed by *al-Shabaab* and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia." This situation of no impartiality or neutrality proves that the timing of AMISOM's deployment was not appropriate but the deployment did take place on time, considering the difficult circumstances surrounding

its deployment; this is my evaluation despite Hull and Svensson's (2008) criticism of the mission's late deployment by the AU. Although, the international community recognised the TFG (during the transitional administration) as the legitimate authority in Somalia, this aspect of the mandate, in the eyes of the militant groups within Somalia, goes against the rules of a conventional peacekeeping operation. This situation has created huge problems for the AU peacekeepers, as they become targets of incessant attacks.

The problem of a peacekeeping operation not being part of an effective political strategy

AMISOM is also being challenged by the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, endorsed by the protagonists and other segments of the Somali society (civil society groups, diasporas, religious groups and traditional/clan leaders). As I have argued earlier, peacekeeping is a means to an end, and not the other way round. A peace operation needs to be conceptualised as a tool to accompany and support an effective peacemaking process and not be seen as an end in itself (Williams 2013a).

AMISOM's deployment was neither rooted in nor supported by any political process. It is an unusual peace operation that was deployed in a very dangerous and highly polarised environment. Hope of an effective political process associated with the 2008 Djibouti Agreement was dashed for a number of reasons. First, internal division within the ASR-Djibouti reduced the envisioned success of the Djibouti initiative. Second, the absence of any serious political process after the signing of the Djibouti Agreement made the TFG to loose the arm of friendship extended to it by Somalis and the international community. Furthermore, the TFG's inability to forge ahead and build on the Initiative reinforced the position of *al-Shabaab* in term of its military strength and territory it controlled throughout 2009 (Dersso 2010b; Tadesse 2009).

During the transitional administration, the TFG has very limited control over the country's security situation, which could be deciphered in the words of Menkhaus (2008: 7 and 10) who says that the: "TFG has never been functional ... has almost no capacity to govern ... (and) It is increasingly an entity that exist only on paper." Dersso (2009: 14) contends that the TFG's weak military position following the Djibouti Agreement made *al-Shabaab* emerge as the "most formidable armed group, apparently wielding more military muscle than TFG troops. As a result, a*l-Shabaab* came to believe that it was in a position to oust the TFG militarily and establish an Islamic state in Somalia." The *al-Shabaab's* formidable military strength, coupled with the international community's recognition of the organisation as a terrorist group, make the possibility of peaceful negotiation of the conflict a distant aspiration. Therefore, AMISOM was deployed in a conflict with no political strategy and the mission has become in the words of Dersso (2009: 14): "the primary means of international engagement in Somalia, taking

the place of an absent political process." As well, the absence of a viable and sustainable political process supported by all the protagonists and non-armed groups, civil society organisations is a major challenge to the new Federal Government of Somalia.

All these problems limit AMISOM's operational achievements, especially in creating conditions necessary for a successful peace operation that will lead eventually to transitioning of AMISOM to a UN multidimensional peace operation, as was the case with AMIB. Now the major question that needs to be addressed is: what factors explain AMISOM's operational limitations?

Contributory factors for AMISOM's operational limitations

(Un)timely deployment of a peace mission and at the (in)appropriate time

In the peacekeeping literature, the timing of a peace mission's deployment is as important factor for its success or failure as is the issue of whether the mission was deployed at the right time. Heldt (2001) contends that there is a high degree of continued warfare when there is a wide time gap between the start of the war and a peace mission's deployment. There is the likelihood that attention is usually paid to conflicts only when they have reached the crisis or war level, and at this (late) stage, the chances of successful resolutions by intervening outside actor(s) become very slim (Van der Lijn 2009). The reasons for the outside actors' limited chances of success can be explained if we consider the perspective of the Conflict Prevention Network (1999):

> First, at a stage of high intensity, the "policy tools" to positively influence the course of a conflict are limited. Second, since at such a late stage only little time exists to analyse the cause of conflict, there is a tendency to react to events, rather than to follow a proactive policy. It has, consequently, generally been acknowledged that the best prospects for successful outside intervention in a conflict is at the level of both stable and unstable peace, either during the pre-or the post-conflict phase.

Also, the chances of the intervening actors are relatively high at the pre-fighting phase with respect to negotiating a successful conflict resolution. At this stage the conflict has not yet "acquired its own dynamics" and hence there are still multiple measures that can be taken to address the underlying causes of the conflict. A somewhat different perspective has been put forward by Zartman (1995), when he argued that the best time to resolve a conflict is when it is ripe for resolution. The conflict is ripe for resolution when it has reached a "mutually hurting stalemate" on the battlefield, meaning that the

parties have to be tired of fighting for them to think of a pacific (political) settlement of the conflict. According to Doyle and Sambanis (1999), the UN's chances of successful resolutions of violent conflicts are high when the conflict (violence and fighting) has been going on for a long period of time. The kernel of Doyle and Sambanis's argument is that the possibility of war fatigue reinforces the belligerents' desires for peace.

It is therefore obvious that the AMISOM operation faced a number of difficulties because the timing of its deployment is questionable. First, on the question of whether AMISOM was a timely deployment, I argue that the circumstances surrounding IGAD's inability to operationalise IGASOM and the international community's seemingly unenthusiastic resolve in deploying troops to Somalia are both important considerations. The AU's decision to deploy AMISOM in January 2007, and the mission's eventual deployment in March of the same year, is the manifestation of the AU's commitment to its peace and security agenda, despite the fact that it was a deployment devoid of an environment where both stable and unstable peace prevailed. Second, the AU's pragmatism and pro-activeness on the Somali conflict has been overshadowed by the fact that AMISOM's deployment did not happen at the appropriate time, because its deployment was connected to Ethiopian military engagement in Somalia. The AU heeded Heldt's (2001) and the Brahimi Report's (2000) advice on the imperative of a prompt deployment of a peace mission for its success.

The timing of AMISOM's deployment was inappropriate, as the deployment of the African forces has raised suspicions about its connections with Ethiopia's interests and efforts to forcibly install the TFG in Mogadishu. It should be recalled that the Ethiopian-Somali interstate relations have been very tense for years as both countries have been at loggerhead over ethnic, land and other issues. The two countries have also supported insurgencies inside the other's territory. Thus, Ethiopia's military invasion of Somalia on behalf of the TFG was interpreted by the Islamist militant groups as being an affront to Somalia's sovereignty and seen as an attempt to impose an illegitimate regime. Addis Ababa justified its military intervention on two grounds. First, Ethiopia sees its military involvement (in 2006–2009) as a case of intervention by invitation; this is where the Somali "government" represented then by the TFG are seen to have invited Ethiopian assistance in accordance with the UN principle of collective defence (Williams 2009a; Yihdego 2007. See Article 51 of the UN Charter). Second, its intervention to support the TFG would help create a necessary political environment through which a functioning Somali state would be re-established. This would arguably save the country from being under the bondage of the UIC.

Despite Ethiopia's justifications for its intervention, majority of Somalis and the TFG's opponents believed that Addis Ababa's hidden agenda was to have a puppet regime in Somalia that would renounce Somalia's claim to Ogaden (Seifert 2008: 35). Within this context, AMISOM was authorised to

support the TFG. The identity between the goal of Ethiopia's armed intervention in Somalia and AMISOM's objective of protecting the TFIs is one of the reasons why the UIC and its allies could not regard AMISOM as a neutral peacekeeping force. Consequently, AMISOM's efforts to protect the "externally imposed" transitional government and its installations were rejected by *al-Shabaab*; the militant group completely refused to cooperate with AMISOM and asks for its withdrawal. Compounding this problem is that Islamist groups see AMISOM as an instrument to furthering Western interests in Somalia. This belief is rooted in Washington's support for Ethiopia and the labelling *al-Shabaab* as a terrorist group (see generally Bruton 2010; Samatar 2007: 158).

Consent, willingness and sincerity

The genuineness of a conflict protagonists' commitment to a peaceful resolution of a conflict is one of the prerequisites for a successful peacekeeping operation. That is, peacekeeping operations are more likely to be successful if the belligerents sincerely long for peace through the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, in genuine seriousness (Doyle and Sambanis 1999). Consent of the main parties plays a significant role in peace operations, because peacekeepers are left with no option other than using force to implement its mandate if and when they faced active armed resistance. On another level, if a peace operation loses its impartiality, then the warring parties would not regard it as a sincere peace arbiter, and consequently, the peacekeepers would automatically find themselves fighting a war (Bratt 1997; Pushkina 2004). Within the context of UN peace operations, consent of the parties is important and it is a function of "local perceptions of the impartiality and moral authority of the UN" (Durch 1993). Such scholars as Carment and Rowlands (1998), Pushkina (2004), Stedman (1997) and Wesley (1997) have all argued that the deployment of the intervening troops into active armed conflicts changes the situation on the ground, as the intervention compels parties to evaluate the costs and benefits offered by the third party's presence. The reason for the belligerents to recalculate their positions in this new context is related to the fact that parties will evaluate whether the third party's peace process and peace operation have the propensity to advance their interests. Equally, Van der Lijn (2009) asserts that:

> Each party will also question whether it views the UN as the best vehicle to travel the road it chose. Thus, the parties may view a peace process accompanied by a peacekeeping operation as a desirable alternative for war, but they can also see the mission as a threat to their security and interests. Nonetheless, even if an uncooperative party, or spoiler, chooses war, it can view the operation as an opportunity to manipulate or recuperate. In such a case, parties may be insincere and break their promises later on. The choice parties make are thought to depend, in large part, on

the design, the type and the configuration of the mission. If the operation offers a realistic peace they would be likely to react differently than if it is merely a token force.

In the Somali conflict, majority of the protagonists, first the UIC and later the *al-Shabaab* and also other Islamist militant groups, were averse to foreign intervention in their country, because such intervention would not serve their best interests and political objectives; hence they all opposed the proposed IGASOM deployment. The same reason accounted for the militant groups' oppositions to AMISOM's deployment. AMISOM is a peace operation that is devoid of the consent of the Islamist armed groups. In other words, the African forces were not welcomed as neutral peace arbiters. The TFG's (and later the FGS's) supporters, who believed that AMISOM has the ability to bring peace back to Somalia, expressed a different opinion. In spite of the fact that AMISOM is an AU-mandated peace operation with UN authorisation, the Islamist armed groups see the mission as a body of invading foreign soldiers in Somalia.[47]

The lack of consent of the main armed groups such as: *al-Shabaab,* other anti-Somali authorities groups, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRMLTM), a faction of the UIC, led them in February 2007 to link AMISOM with Ethiopian interests and vow that Uganda would be collecting the corpses of its soldiers in Somalia, and their families will be orphaned as a result (*Qaadisiya*, 22 February 2007).[48] The unwillingness of the militant groups to accept AMISOM's deployment as a peace operation explains why the first batch of 400 Ugandan peacekeepers were welcomed at Mogadishu Airport on 6 March 2007 with eight mortar rounds. Within the same week, AMISOM suffered its first causalities, as insurgents wounded two Ugandan peacekeepers. Therefore, AMISOM lacked the consent, willingness and sincerity of the militant groups. The absence of militants' acceptance of AMISOM explains why the mission faces challenges in its operation to date, as exemplified by constant attacks on and killings of African peacekeepers.

Cooperation from important outside actors

The level of cooperation and support that a peacekeeping mission receives from outside actors go a long way in determining its success or failure. When a peace mission lacks the support of the international community, as it should be, its tendency to succeed is not certain, while failure looms large in the horizon. The peacekeeping literature acknowledges the imperative of and the degree to which important actors (usually the international community and the P-5) provide the necessary support (economic, materiel and political will) to a peace operation (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Bratt 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 1999). Supporting this argument, Hampson (1996) asserts that only major powers have the resources and capacities to intervene

in internal armed conflicts. Further still, while the support of the international community is important, the role of belligerents' supporters is also a determining factor for success. The greater the level of support to warring parties (whether material, ideological or political) from outside backers, the more difficult it becomes for a peace operation to be successful, as the armed conflict is likely to continue intractably (Bloomfield and Moulton 1997; Carment and James 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 1999; Evans 1993; Pushkina 2006). Van der Lijn (2009), relying on the authority of Bratt (1997) and Wesley (1997), argued that the correlation between outside support to belligerents and war continuation is possibly one of the most significant mechanisms of influence on the success of a peace operation. According to Pushkina (2006: 141), there is a high correlation between external support to warring parties and a low success rate of peace operation.

In Somalia, support from important outside actors (the UN in particular) to AMISOM was, at the initial stage of the operation, not forthcoming. AMISOM is a donor mission since it relies largely on the goodwill of the international community for finance, technical and logistical support, against the backdrop of the AU's resource constraints. Although the mission received the UN's logistical and technical support in 2008, this support is not enough, as the mission lacks such important logistics as air support, aircrafts for battlefield reconnaissance, transport or ground support (Freear and de Coning 2013). Another problem with the AMISOM operation is that there was a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the UN in relation to a willingness to provide it with adequate funding, especially during the early years of the operation. The problem is that the mission's funding was initially based on voluntary donations. Furthermore, the low level of cooperation/support from the UN is glaring when one looks at the AMISOM Trust Fund that was established to collect voluntary contributions for areas not covered by the support package, especially those concerning the reimbursement of COE. This arrangement deviates completely from the standard UN transactions for peacekeeping *modus operandi*, where the rental cost of equipment is usually reimbursed through assessed contributions. It was only recently that the UN agreed that contingents equipment will be covered by the UN assessed contribution budget.

Apart from the inherent danger of unpredictability associated with the voluntary nature of the Trust Fund, it also comes with a lot of conditionality that may not be of immediate relevance to the mission. AMISOM's official publication put the problem of AMISOM Trust Fund in perspective, especially between 2011 and 2012. According to the publication close to 40 per cent of the $40.8 million donated to the Trust Fund by August 2011 came with a great deal of conditionality. These caveats have hindered the operational efficiency of the mission. Since March 2011, right up to January 2012 when AMISOM released its Report, the TCCs were not reimbursed, despite the fact that the fund was still available. The TCCs were not

reimbursed because the fund was meant for the mission's civilian and police components, which unfortunately could not fully make use of it because of the volatile security conditions in Mogadishu (AMISOM Review, January 2012). A comparison of AMISOM to other UN mission shows that the level of support from the UN to the mission, especially during the early stage of the operation, was not enough as officially confirmed by AMISOM itself:

> A rough comparison of operational costs of other UN missions reveals that in the financial year 2010–11, AMISOM was significantly under-funded. Though allowances are identical, AMISOM with 9000 troops receives almost a quarter less funding for operational costs than the UN Mission in Liberia (8,069 troops) and nearly 70 per cent less than the UN Mission in Sudan (9,450 troops). (AMISOM Review, January 2012)

With the new combined structure of UN Assessed Contributions, UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust Fund for Somali Security Forces, the AU Peace Fund and AU/AMISOM Partners, there is an appreciable improvement in the funding of AMISOM.

AMISOM faces challenges in Somalia because the support from the UN is not enough. The issue of the imposition of a no-fly zone over Somalia requested by the AU shows the level of seriousness of the situation. Since October 2010, the UN Security Council has not granted the AU's request for the imposition of a no-fly zone over the country, when it is obvious that the imposition of such a sanction would have helped the African mission enormously, for a no-fly zone sanction would have been able to prevent some of the atrocities committed by the armed groups in Somalia.[49] This situation is worrisome as suggested by the question raised by one senior AU official, in relations to a no-fly zone sanction, when he asked me why the UN was fast in applying a no-fly zone in Libya and not on Somalia.[50] It is a pertinent question that points to the identity of those putting their lives at risk in both situations. To all intents and purposes, the situation in Somalia is more complicated than the Libyan case during the uprising against the Gaddaffi regime in terms of volatility of the security situation and human catastrophe.

Comparing the criteria, the situation in Libya was not different from what happened in Côte d'Ivoire during its post-election crisis of 2010–2011. The UN and the international community rallied round to get involved in Libya and gave tacit approval to certain actions that were taken in other countries of North Africa during the Arab uprisings. The answers may lie in utility values and natural resource extraction potential: the major powers may have much less to gain from Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire than they do from Libya. If not for France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, it is arguable that Africa might have witnessed another Somalia, if not a Rwanda in that country. The international community and the UN (most importantly

the P-5) are more interested in helping in areas and situations where their strategic and economic interests lie, which may explain their low level of support to AMISOM. To stress this argument further, the UN's logistical support to AMISOM did not commence until 2008, while funding from the same source was initially largely based on its member states' voluntary contributions that are not predictable, in spite of being required. Under these difficult conditions, one would have expected the UN, after having taken into consideration that it was unable to deploy troops to Somalia to, right from the beginning, genuinely support AMISOM in the same way as it is supporting its other peacekeeping missions such as UNMIL, to realise the fact that AMISOM was deployed by an organisation (the AU) that lacks peacekeeping capacity in all its entirety, especially in dealing with the kind of volatile live war-zone environment in which the mission is operating. Besides, donors' financial support pledges to AMISOM are not being fulfilled on time, which limits the operational efficiency of the African mission.

Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures

The existence of effective command structures is important for a successful peace operation (Diehl 1994). The tenor of a peace mission is largely determined by the ability of its leadership, both civilian and military. While the character and ability of the mission's leadership increases the chances for success, so does the degree to which the mission is resourced with modern equipment. Peacekeepers perform effectively when they are provided with the needed equipment. AMISOM's chances for success are not largely enhanced because the mission lacks the participation of major African peacekeeping veterans with extensive peacekeeping experience, such as Nigeria, when taking into consideration the volatility of the Somali conflict. Also, the mission lacks state-of-the-art equipment to enhance the performances of its military personnel. The Brahimi Report (2000) provides the imperative of this factor for peacekeeping success in saying that good leadership is the basis for the implementation of a mandate and each policy tool of which the peacekeeping operation is comprised.

Conclusion: lessons learned from AMISOM and looking to the future

The discussion in this chapter considers AMISOM in order to uncover the AU's peace and security role and its capacity to deploy and sustain a complex peace operation, especially in a very dangerous conflict context devoid of an effective political process. This objective is achieved through locating AMISOM within the context of the Somali conflict environment, its mandate, the APSA and the triangular area of tension in African peace operations. I have argued that the commitment the AU has for peace and

security in Africa is evident in a positive sense, because the AU deployed AMISOM into a conflict context that most other security institutions have sought to avoid. But this commitment is not well supported by the AU member states' lack of political will and the resources/capacity limitations of the AU itself. Thus, AMISOM also demonstrates the persistent contradiction in African peace operations as well as the challenges it (the AU) faces in operationalising the APSA. Notwithstanding, a number of lessons could be learned from AMISOM for successful future AU peace operations.

The AU's peacekeeping capacity needs to be enhanced for future operations, especially in the area of mission planning. The problem of troop contributions to AU missions, as depicted by the AMISOM operation, raises the question of negative impacts of planning a peace operation with less strength than is required. The AU planned AMISOM with small number of peacekeepers based on its experience of the challenges associated with generating a force of adequate strength on time, as was the situation in AMIB. The AMISOM operation also indicates that insufficient troops could be a recipe for a peacekeeping failure as the operational tasks in AMISOM's mandate far exceeded the number of troops on the ground. This is the main reason why the AU constantly authorises an increase in AMISOM's force strength. This shows the imperative of planning a peace mission on realistic force strengths for successful peace operations in the future. Furthermore, the problems associated with the AMISOM Trust Fund have confirmed the unpredictability and unsustainability of relying heavily on external resources. Thus, the AU needs its own resources and, sincere commitment and political will of African states in order to be able to sustain its missions, pending the UN taking over.

Proper understanding of the local context of conflict and the culture of the people of the area where a peace operation is going to take place, go a long way in planning a successful peace operation, as this factor helps the peacekeeping authorising institution to practically assess the force requirements and capacity needed for the operation. In the Somali case, UNOSOM's problems were blamed on insufficient force strength, while its successors, UNOSOM II in particular, was embroiled in the conflict due to its deficiencies in the area of strategic response to the conflict's roots. It is on this basis that the Institute for Security Studies' organised a seminar on peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia where it was posited that: "These forces had a limited purpose and did not intend to stay in Somalia for long. Integrated peace support operations should be planned to extend over a sufficient period of time to permit a realistic impact to be made" (Report compiled by Dersso (2008: 17)).

AMISOM has equally revealed the dangers of deploying a peace mission in the absence of an effective political process. The Somali conflict and its dynamics are rooted in a complex web of endogenous and exogenous factors, and until a sincere and inclusive political process is on track that takes these

factors into account, AMISOM will continue to face difficulties. What is needed is for AU, UN, IGAD and the friends of Somalia to agree to a form of political engagement that is acceptable to all protagonists and non-violent groups in the Somali society, with provisions made for an enabling environment within which they can participate genuinely. Where AMISOM's problems in relation to executing its mandate effectively originated was that it did not deploy to complement peacemaking efforts endorsed by the belligerents. AMISOM, in reality, is a peace enforcement operation. Since clan politicisation is central to the Somali conflict, peacemaking efforts need to address this important aspect where clan membership as a route to power and state resources is discouraged. Had AMISOM been deployed to support a viable political framework, the mission's chances of complete success would have been far greater. It is an important lesson for the AU that its future peace missions needs to be deployed to complement a negotiated political settlement to the existing conflicts, rather than being its substitute.

6
The African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Introduction

The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has been going on for quite some time. However, with respect to the efforts of the AU, the UN, and the broader international community to permanently end the humanitarian catastrophe, the conclusion of the conflict still appears to be far from sight, due to the enormous challenges confronting the peace mission. Since its outbreak in February 2003, the conflict has produced hundreds of thousands of deaths. Furthermore, more than 2 million people are internally displaced (International Crisis Group 2014).[1] Because of the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis the conflict has engendered, scholars, analysts and human rights organisations have labelled it genocide (Elsea 2004),[2] while others, such as Jan Egeland, the former UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, referred to it as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.[3] Darfur has been a site of intermittent low-intensity conflicts for decades, but the current conflict is one of the most complex in the world today. It features a wide range of actors, multiple competing interests, and absolute disregard for international humanitarian law by all the protagonists: the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its proxy Arab militias, the *Janjaweed*, and the various rebel groups (Badmus 2011; International Crisis Group 2014; Mans 2004). Furthermore, the conflict has deepened mistrust between the people of Darfur and political leaders in Khartoum. The conflict has led to hatred and splitting Darfurian society into a state that is moving towards complete lawlessness, which is being expressed as multiple local conflicts (de Waal 2007a: 1039).

Darfur's conflict poses serious challenges to the international community, and it is also a test case for the AU in delivering on the APSA. The AU demonstrated its pragmatic stance in responding to the conflict by deploying a peace mission (the African Union Mission in Sudan – AMIS) under a Chapter VI mandate in June 2004. AMIS was deployed to support the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), signed in April 2004, between

the GoS and the original Darfur rebel groups (the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – SLM/A and the Justice and Equality Movement – JEM) and, also to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Many scholars considered the deployment of AMIS, together with that of AMIB in 2003, to be bold AU initiatives, reflecting the organisation's commitment to its non-indifference norm regarding African conflicts and "African solutions to African problems" agenda (Aboagye 2007b; Powell 2005).

Despite the AU's pragmatism in deploying AMIS, the mission was criticised as an operation that failed to accomplish its objectives. AMIS's critics blame its failures primarily on problems associated with an inadequate and restricted mandate, lack of requisite peacekeeping resources, and bureaucratic bottlenecks at the AU Commission, among other issues (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010; Holt and Berkman 2006; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011; Terrie 2006). Responding to the challenges confronting AMIS, the UN, through the UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007, established a hybrid mission – the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), with a Chapter VII mandate for an initial period of 12 months. UNAMID's deployment raised a critical concern as to whether the mission could improve on the shortcomings of its predecessor. Another important issue is whether UNAMID is appropriately resourced to accomplish its mandates. Other pertinent questions include: Is the hybridisation of peace operations for intervention in Africa's virulent armed conflicts, as exemplified by the transition from AMIS to UNAMID the best way to address post-Cold War African conflicts? What are the challenges to UNAMID? What are the necessary contributory factors for UNAMID's success or failure?

To objectively examine the AU and UN peacekeeping efforts and partnership in Darfur, I investigate the nature of the peace missions deployed and whether requisite resources were/are at their disposal to really accomplish their mandates. I also question whether the transition from AMIS to UNAMID is supported with enhanced capabilities to manage and improve the conflict trajectory and protect civilian populations in Darfur. I examine whether the AU, despite its previous peacekeeping experiences (both in Burundi – AMIB, and under the OAU regime), and those of Africa's sub-regional organisations (particularly ECOWAS peace and intervention operations in West Africa), failed to benefit from institutional memories and lessons learned in carrying out its peace operation in Darfur.

To develop this line of argument, the chapter falls into nine broad sections. Section one has an introductory function. For the purpose of historical context, the second section discusses briefly the context and specificities of the conflict by locating Darfur in the emerging Sudanese state, and clarifying how unequal relations between the region and Khartoum resulted in a struggle for increased political representation in government. Furthermore, the competition between the Arab pastoralists and African

farmers for scarce natural productive resources of pasture and water for agricultural and other economic activities resulting from severe droughts in the 1980s led to tensions which eventually developed into full blown internal armed violence of international interest (Badmus 2008b, 2009c, 2011). In the third section, I explore AMIS in order to establish whether the mission actually achieved its objectives or not, and to ask what went wrong with the peace mission in order to validate or deflect the criticisms of the AU's limitations in mounting and sustaining robust peace missions. In the next two sections, UNAMID is examined, and the question of whether it has been able to manage the conflict and fulfil its mandate is considered along with the degree to which UNAMID met important standards with respect to evaluating it in terms of the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions. This exercise provides the opportunity to examine whether a joint peace operation mounted by the AU and UN with a joint C2 structure is the best way to address post-Cold War African conflicts. I then examine the contributory factors for UNAMID's success or failures, all of which will help to uncover new lessons to be learned from the mission, which will be useful for planning and conducting future peace operations in Africa. Like AMISOM, UNAMID is an ongoing peace operation; therefore, the analysis of this chapter covers the period up to December 2013.

Darfur: the roots of a complex conflict[4]

> *One of the least known places in the world. Poor, remote, landlocked, and sparsely populated, [Darfur] was obscure even to the rest of Sudan*. (Daly 2007: 1)

Darfur, meaning "the land of the Fur," is a vast Sahel and desert region in the western part of Sudan. With a population of about six million people, the region has been neglected for decades, as Daly stated above, and it is not surprising that Flint and de Waal (2005: 16) described it as "a backwater and a prisoner of geography." Darfur presents a very complex Sudanese society, for it is composed of an ethnically and culturally diverse population that was made possible by decades of migration, intermarriage, and interethnic cohabitation of peoples of Arab and African origins. Nearly all Darfurians are Muslims, and because of many years of affinal relations, including cohabitation, majority of Darfurians have dark skin and African features that make the people of the region look alike in the eyes of outsiders (de Waal 2004; Power 2004. See also de Waal 2005; Flint and de Waal 2005).

Darfur has had a long history of being an independent, traditional Sudanese kingdom that originated in the mid-17th century (c. 1650) under the rule of indigenous non-Arab tribes (Harir 1994a: 151). While ruling greater parts of northern Sudan for many years, Darfur resisted Egyptian military invasions and foreign occupation. In 1874, the Fur Sultanate was overcome by Turco-Egyptian rule that brought it under foreign occupation. Then, the Mahdist

revolts terminated colonial rule in 1885 and the Islamic theocracy, propelled by the concept of Jihad and purification of Islam, was imposed on the evolving Sudanese state in 1885 (Daly 2007; Deng 1974; Theobald 1965). Darfur came under the rule of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium[5] in 1916 after the defeat of the Madhist state and the re-colonisation of the Sudan by the British in 1898. During this period, a system of native administration was introduced, under which the local tribal leaders were given some powers of self-rule in exchange for their allegiances to British rule. Prunier (2005: 29) criticised this system on the grounds that it was a "recipe for stagnation and for building a two-tiered society in which the natives, on the pretext of cultural integrity, were marginalised from the benefits of the modern world which the colonialists could monopolise for their own advantage." Therefore, Darfur was largely marginalised and became underdeveloped, as Condominium rule was very much preoccupied with devoting enormous resources to the socioeconomic development and agricultural production of northern Sudan, at the expense of other regions including the South and Darfur.

If Darfur's position in pre-independence Sudan can be described as one of marginalisation, the post-independence period did not improve in terms of development. Since independence in January 1956, successive Sudanese governments both military and civilian completely neglected Darfur. Khartoum supports a centralised Islamic-oriented government and dominates national political life for the betterment of Arabs of riverine extraction, whereas Darfur and other peripheries are subjugated, exploited and left wallowing in abject poverty. Therefore, the socioeconomic development of the northern part of Sudan left Darfur to become backward in terms of education, health, infrastructure development, and also its local economy (Brosché 2008: 7; de Waal 2007b: 4).

Darfur's conflict can be seen as a part of the wider Sudanese conflict vortex that even predated independence. In August 1955, a military mutiny at Torit in Southern Sudan was motivated by the fear of perceived Arab and northern domination of the South. While many northerners living in the South were killed and wounded by the southerners, Khartoum was able to contain the violence, but the mutiny later resulted in a rebellion against the Sudanese government that developed into a full-scale civil war with wanton killings and large-scale destruction of property (Collins 2008; Deng 1974; Douglas 2003; Eprile 1974). The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 put an end to the first Sudanese civil war, but before long, the country descended into another civil war in 1983, which was fought along the North/South divide. This war was fought between the government in Khartoum and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army – SPLM/A. They were fighting mainly over resources, power, self-determination and the role of religion. The second civil war ended in December 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that provided the southerners with the opportunity to decide their future via a referendum

with the option of either remaining in the Sudanese state or as an independent state on their own. The southerners preferred the latter option in the referendum of January 2011, so South Sudan was proclaimed Africa's newest state in July of the same year.

The marginalisation of Darfur had a negative impact on every facet of the region's life. Underdevelopment, coupled with ecological deterioration and famine, caused Darfur/Khartoum tensions to flare up and intensified tribal conflicts, as well as conflicts between African farmers and Arab pastoralists. Darfur's ecological deterioration exacerbated the biting effects of years of marginalisation, which was felt by the various identity groups and provided a fertile ground for intertribal and ethnic conflicts that reached their zenith in the mid-1980s (de Waal 1989; Harir 1994a&b). The drought that consumed the northern part of Darfur in the mid-1980s became unbearable as economic activities grounded to a near halt. By early 1985, the drought had forced many people to abandon their homelands in the desperate search for food and water. The drought induced an unprecedented movement of the pastoral Arabs and livestock into lands in central and southern Darfur, already occupied by African ethnic groups who were settled agriculturalists. The mass influx of the herders became problematic because land was not available to accommodate them, and as a result, interethnic showdowns became frequent (de Waal 1989; Harir 1994a: 163).

The massive migration of Arabs into the Fur areas was of a completely new character. It was obvious to the Fur and people of southern Darfur that the Arabs had come to live there permanently. The Arabs followed a different concept relating to access to land in southern Darfur since they (the Arabs) viewed themselves as Sudanese nationals who had equal rights to all available lands (Harir 1994a: 163). The conflict continued throughout this period, for the regional government in Darfur was paralysed because its officials were divided along ethnic and racial lines, so each group began supporting the position of one protagonist or another. With the lackadaisical attitudes of Khartoum regarding the conflict, and the partiality of the regional government,[6] the conflict became ever more brutal, with devastating consequences for the region as a whole. The protagonists knew very well the positions of both Khartoum and the regional government, and each group capitalised on them to get maximum support from their respective backers to sustain their respective struggles. As a result, the Fur/Arab conflict turned into an all-out war, where the Fur engaged the services of *Malishiat* militias while the Arabs massacred their Fur victims and burned down their villages, and their orchards were completely uprooted. Nor did the Fur spare the Arabs' pastures and livestock (Harir 1994a: 145).

The Arab/Fur conflict exposes the potency of both ideology and ethnicity, through which race became an instrument of warfare. The Arabs looked to Tripoli for arms and supplies. In addition, the conflict took on a religious dimension when this justification for war was used as *Jihad* to liberate the

Arab world. Consequently, the SPLM/A served as a role model for the ethnic Fur, who also looked to Chad, and via this channel, to the United States and Egypt, for arms. Their respective elites, who took sides in the conflicts, championed all these efforts. The protagonists also aligned with major political parties at the national level as a strategy to further their cause within the central government in their own favour (Harir 1994a: 145–146).

This was the situation in Darfur in the 1980s and through the 1990s, as the Fur and the Arabs remained at loggerheads for control of the available productive resource: land. As Khartoum/Darfur tensions mounted over the perpetual impoverishment of the latter, Darfur's own internal conflicts made its underdevelopment seem irreversible, a situation that made the region politically, economically and militarily vulnerable (Badmus 2011).

Resistance to the perpetual marginalisation of the region had started as far back as the early 1960s, and this led to the emergence of regional identity movements that became instruments in the struggles against what is referred to as a form of "internal colonisation" from the riverine Arabs. Consequently, educated Darfurians became the vanguard of struggle against Khartoum's domination and sought to promote Darfur's position within the riverine Arab-dominated Sudanese state (Harir 1994a). Resistance to Darfur's marginalisation by such groups as the Red Flame, Soony and the Darfur Development Front (DDF) was ineffective in the face of the superior firepower of Khartoum (Harir 1994a: 157. See also Brosché 2008; Hassan and Ray (eds) 2009; Mohamed Abuelbashar 2009: 345–347).

In May 1969, Sudan experienced a coup d'état that brought Gafar El Nimeiri to power. The new regime, in its attempt to promote national unity, proscribed all political parties, ethnic/tribal and regional organisations, while the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) became the only legal party. Thus, the demands of Darfurians were put on the back burner (Farrend 2009; Geldenhuys 2005; Harir 1994a; Hassan and Ray (eds) 2009). Also the effects of the military regime became a double-edged sword for the El Nimeiri government when it extended the famous Regional Autonomy Act, agreed to during the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, where regional autonomy was granted to southern Sudan, to cover the whole country in 1980, a move that was welcome by all Darfurians (Alier 1991; Geldenhuys 2005: 40). From another perspective, it is easy to understand that the euphoria of the people was short-lived simply because the governor who was appointed for Darfur by Khartoum was a non-Dafurian. Twelve months later, this situation saw the region again erupt like a sleeping volcano. The intensity of the upheaval, which was beyond the imagination of the Sudanese government, made Khartoum succumb to pressure and appoint a Darfurian of Fur background, Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, as the governor of Darfur. Hence, Darfurians were relieved when the internal colonisation ended in 1981 (Harir 1994a).

Internal political divisions among the political elite, and ethnic conflicts induced by ecological deterioration, coupled with the claims and

counterclaims of ethnic/tribal hegemony among the Arabs and ethnic Fur (Blacks) made Darfur a zone of death that eventually weakened and virtually grounded the regional government. The region's intellectuals attempted to surmount this problem by the formation of the National Council for the Salvation of Darfur (NCSD), a non-political organisation that did its best to resolve Darfur's internal problems. Unfortunately, just like the DDF, when the Revolution of National Salvation (RNS) staged a successful coup on 30 June 1989, it banned the NCSD, which vanished into oblivion (Flint and de Waal 2005; Harir 1994a).

Obviously, Darfur was highly unstable throughout the 1980s. This instability was compounded by its geographical misfortune, since it shares borders with Chad and Libya, two countries that were foes during this period, and then there was also an internal political crisis in Chad. In the 1980s, the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddaffi, intended to shift the "Arab belt" downward into Sahelian Africa – the "African belt" in which the main target was Chad – aiming to annex the Aouzou strip in the North, which is an oil-rich region of Chad (de Waal 2004; Flint and de Waal 2008: 47–48). Between 1987 and 1989, Libyan money, arms and ammunition, with the assistance of Sadiq El Mahdi's leadership of Sudan, found their destinations in Chad among the Chadian armed rebels that opposed the national government in N'Djamena. In this context, Darfur became a staging post for the Chadian rebels and the various dissatisfied Sahelian Arabs and Touaregs that were formed into Islamic Legions to fight a proxy war in Chad (Flint and de Waal 2008: 47–48; Gberie 2004b: 4). Therefore, arms proliferated in Darfur with negative consequences for the security situation, as they compounded and intensified Arab/Fur festering conflicts. The insecurity of the region continued unabated in the 1990s with Chad, Libya, and other interests competing for supremacy and hegemony in the region with the assistance of various identity groups (de Waal 2004; Harir 1994a).

The present conflict in Darfur is rooted in the signing of the Naivasha Peace Protocols between the GoS and the SPLM/A.[7] The agreement recognised the protagonists (GoS and the SPLM/A), while other actors and regions were regarded as irrelevant, their interests and grievances not addressed, and other conflicts, either in the North or South, were overlooked. Thus, Darfurians became apprehensive of the unfolding developments and weaknesses of the Naivasha Protocols, and took up arms against Khartoum to halt the age-old marginalisation process. An aggressive secular group named the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), later renamed SLM/A, mounted a series of armed attacks on government positions in Darfur and vowed to continue fighting until Khartoum acceded to its demands (Dunne 2009: 11; Gberie 2004b: 6; Wassara 2010). The SLM/A believed that their actions would attract the world's attention and correct the erroneous impression, which suggested that the peace deal with the SPLM/A was sufficient to resolve Sudan's multiple racial, ethnic, tribal, socioeconomic, military and

political crises. In quick succession, another moderately Islamist group known as JEM also took up arms against Khartoum (Badmus 2009c; Gberie 2004b).

The two insurgent groups then started attacking the Sudanese government forces' positions in earnest. Although Khartoum had earlier dismissed the Darfurian insurgents as mere bandits, clearly banditry is one of Darfur's perennial problems. The military feats of the rebels discredited Khartoum's claims and became a source of embarrassment when rebels attacked El Fasher airport and destroyed half a dozen military aircraft (Dunne 2009: 11; Gberie 2004b: 6; Wassara 2010). Facing the reality of the deteriorating security situation in Darfur and impending anarchy, and the threat to its own hegemony, Khartoum opted for courting the assistance of the *Janjaweed* militias. These militias, drawn mostly from the nomadic peoples of Darfur, who have been at daggers with their Darfurian sedentary farmers counterparts for years, were to fight with the adoption of scorched earth tactics. The *Janjaweed* militias were unleashed on local peasants and civilian populations. The involvements of countries like Chad, Eritrea, and China, through their financial and/or military support to one Darfurian group or the other, has added an international dimension to the conflict with serious tensions along the Sudan-Chad border.

In search of peace in Darfur: the African Union mission in Sudan

The trajectory of AU engagement in Darfur and the emergence of AMIS

The Darfur conflict is also one of the worst cases of a complex humanitarian emergency. Williams and Bellamy (2005) considered that the conflict represents a supreme humanitarian emergency that is described as a scenario where lives can only be saved by outside intervention (see also Bellamy and Williams 2006). According to these scholars, the situation in Darfur demands prompt intervention from the international community through invoking the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles as endorsed by the world leaders at the UN World Summit in September 2005. Conceptually, R2P defines the obligations of the international community to protect civilian populations in the face of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This is especially important in situations where the national government is unable or unwilling to protect its people, or is responsible itself for these atrocious acts (Bellamy 2009). Based on the report of the Canadian government's commissioned International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), state sovereignty is a responsibility to protect state citizens. Buttressing this argument, Evans and Sahnoun (2002: 101) contend that R2P is "owed by all sovereign states to their own citizens in the first instance [and] it must be picked up by the international

community if the first tier of responsibility is abdicated, or if it cannot be exercised." According to the ICISS report (2001), certain conditions must be met for invoking R2P to supersede traditional state sovereignty.[8] In the case of Darfur, there is consensus among scholars that the thresholds of "large scale loss of life" and "large scale ethnic cleansing" were met and hence legitimised external armed intervention (Bellamy 2009; Bergholm 2008; Mepham and Ramsbotham 2006; Powell 2005; Williams and Bellamy 2005). The situation in Darfur is a case for which the R2P was meant to apply. Therefore the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur meets at least some of the criteria to warrant outside intervention as contained in the ICISS report. In spite of the option to apply the instrument of R2P, the international responses were initially woefully inadequate. This poor response cast doubt on the sincerity of the commitments of the international community to the plight of the people of Darfur.

Many of the productive initial responses to the humanitarian crisis came from within Africa itself. The initial mediation efforts of Chad's President, Idriss Déby Itno, led to the signing of the first humanitarian ceasefire agreement between the GoS and the SLM/A in Abéché, Chad in September 2003, which, among other things, provided for a 45-day ceasefire and the cantonment of the SLM/A forces (Appiah-Mensah 2005; Ekengard 2008; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). The belligerents failed to respect the provisions of the agreement, and this worsened the humanitarian crisis further. Therefore another round of peace negotiations commenced in March 2004, also in Chad, but these political and diplomatic efforts did not improve Darfur's security situation, because the rebel groups were not united on their positions. The AU supported Chad's meditation efforts, and its involvement was seen as a sign of its commitment to the APSA's normative framework. Complementing N'Djamena's peacemaking efforts, the AU became involved and later took the lead in finding a political settlement to the conflict during the Sudanese Peace Talks in N'Djamena.

These initial actions for peace formed the basis of the much-publicised Inter-Sudanese Internal Dialogue on Darfur, held in Abuja, Nigeria, under the chairmanship of the AU. As part of the AU's peacemaking leadership role, the AU Commission's Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, on several occasions consulted with parties to the conflict on how to halt the festering conflict and the deteriorating humanitarian situation. The mediation efforts in N'Djamena produced the HCFA; its Article 3 provided for the establishment of a ceasefire commission (CFC) composed of two high-ranking officers from the parties to the conflict, Chad and the international community, which was accepted as being in line with maintaining the sovereignty of Sudan (Appiah-Mensah 2005: 7–8). Consequently, this provision provided the basis for AU's peace operation in Darfur, as the HCFA subsequently meant the "birth of AMIS" (Ekengard 2008: 13–14; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). The Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and

Deployment of Observers was signed in May 2004 in Addis Ababa; it recognised the AU as the principal international institution in Darfur. Three protocols were later signed in November 2004 during the Abuja Peace Talks to complement the HCFA: the Protocol on the Security Situation in Darfur, the Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, and the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur. The signings took place well before to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 (Murithi 2009a: 9).

After the conclusion of the HCFA, the African peace negotiators pushed for a comprehensive peace agreement, and this objective became the focus during the second and subsequent rounds of the Abuja Peace Talks. Between 1 September 2004 and 5 May 2006, seven rounds of peace negotiations took place in Abuja, which helped to produce the DPA. The DPA was envisaged to be a comprehensive peace agreement by the mediators, but it was flawed in many ways, so much so that the parties who did not sign the agreement never respected it (Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). The problem with the Abuja Peace Talks was that by the time they were concluded in May 2006, the SLM/A had been embroiled in internal fighting that saw its disintegration into several smaller armed factions with multiple leaderships. The splintering of armed groups created a problem – lack of cohesion – and this did not give the peace negotiators the opportunity to deal with a united SLM/A leadership.

Only the SLM/A faction, led by Minni Arku Minnawi, and the GoS signed the DPA, while Abdul Wahid al Nur's and other factions of SLM/A and JEM refused to sign the agreement and operated outside of it (International Crisis Group 2014: 3). Thus, the DPA was neither a comprehensive agreement, nor could it be regarded as the basis for achieving sustainable peace in Darfur. Apart from the splintering of rebel groups into smaller factions, the Abuja talks and its DPA were not successful because each armed groups were very confident of military victory during the period of peace negotiations. The head of the AU mediation team, Ambassador Sam Ibok (2006), lamented that when the peace negotiation was going on, the parties decided to continue fighting on the ground. This was an unacceptable situation, because it made it very difficult for humanitarian agencies on the ground in Darfur, who reached fewer people than they did when the HCFA was signed two years before.[9] Post-DPA Darfur saw a complete breakdown of law and order as hostilities increased with various armed groups at each other's throats for control of the region. Insecurity was heightened to the extent that IDP camps became both the targets of attacks and also served as a source for the rebel groups' recruitment of new fighters.

Contextualising AMIS

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) deployed an unarmed Military Observer Mission (MILOBs) of 60 personnel in June 2004 to operationalise

the CFC.[10] Before the deployment, the AU Assessment Mission visited Darfur to evaluate the situation on the ground based on firsthand information and also to negotiate the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with Khartoum (Ekengard 2008: 17). The MILOBs were to monitor compliance of the parties to the HCFA. Unfortunately, the presence of AU's observers did not improve Darfur's security situation as both the rebel groups and Sudanese army, as well as associated *Janjaweed* militias, all violated the terms of HCFA. The deteriorating security situation meant the AU observers saw with their own eyes human rights violations continue with impunity in an active conflict zone. Still, the PSC requested the CFC to advise on how to adapt the composition of the mission to the fast deteriorating security situation, the CFC under the chairmanship of a Nigerian General, Festus Okonkwo, advised the AU to strengthen the mission[11] (Human Rights Watch 2006: 14). Thus, a month later, the AU deployed a 300-person protection force from Nigeria and Rwanda to provide security for its unarmed observers and also to protect themselves; the deployment of this small force formed the foundation phase of AMIS (Ekengard 2008: 17; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011; Williams 2011b: 34).

AMIS was deployed at a time when the APSA was at the conceptual level, and the AU Commission was without effective peacekeeping structures for strategic guidance. This strategic capacity deficiency of the AU, or what Williams (2011b: 34) referred to as a "management gap," was addressed through the support of the UN and Western donor countries in terms of their planning assistance to the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. The AU's strategic capacity deficiency was exacerbated at the initial stage of AMIS because the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) within the AU Commission, which later coordinated the AMIS operation, was not established until early 2005. AMIS was mandated mainly to monitor and observe compliance with the HCFA and subsequent agreements, assist in the process of confidence building, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, and the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes. This was planned to help increase compliance by all parties with respect to the HCFA and thereby to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. Nerland (2011: 410) criticises this mandate as a compromise of sorts, for the AU traded off a stronger mandate for civilian population protection for the GoS's cooperation with its peace mission, which the AU Commission believed was indispensable to AMIS's operation. The restricted mandate empowered the African troops only to monitor the ceasefire and offer protection for the MILOBs as well as the Protection Forces.

Even with the consent of Khartoum, barely had the AMIS's deployment been completed before that mission started facing the stark realities in Darfur. While the presence of the African force minimized assaults against civilian populations, AMIS was unable to provide security for the whole of Darfur effectively. Besides, AMIS's operational challenges were also rooted in the AU's

inability to mobilise its member states political will and its organisational weaknesses and lack of peacekeeping capacity. AMIS's dangerous theatre of operations and its operational challenges may have prompted Murithi (2009a: 10) to assert that the AU needed a robust force to contain Darfur's unfolding "silent genocide." Faced with these operational challenges, the AU decided, in accordance with the report from the chairman of the CFC to the PSC, to increase the force level in October 2004. The CFC's recommendations were to guide the AU officials in making decisions on the composition of the expanded AMIS. Hence, the PSC authorised that the force level be increased to 3,320[12] under a new mandate that empowered AMIS (now known as AMIS II[13]) to be "prepared to protect civilians under imminent threats in the immediate vicinity, within means and capabilities in accordance with the rules of engagement" (AU Communiqué of October 2004).

This expanded mandate required African peacekeepers to perform more functions than monitoring the ceasefire agreement, and it apparently required increased capabilities in the areas of logistics, personnel and other important peacekeeping resources. Despite the increased force strength of AMIS II, its enhanced mandate, and the introduction of the civilian police (CIVPOL) component, ceasefire violations and human rights abuses continued unabated throughout 2004 and in early 2005.[14] The worsening security and humanitarian situations prompted the AU, the UN, the EU and the United States to dispatch a technical assessment mission to Darfur in March 2005 to get an assessment of the situation on the ground and also to recommend how to strengthen the African mission.

In spite of the volatility of the security situation in Darfur, the mission did not recommend changing the mandate, but recognised the command and control capabilities and logistics weaknesses of AMIS. It therefore recommended a phased expansion of the African mission. Specifically, the Chairperson recommended the "re-prioritisation of certain operational tasks, including focusing on improved humanitarian access, confidence building, and coordination with Sudanese police" (Human Rights Watch 2006: 20). Responding to, and in line with the Technical Assessment Mission's recommendations, the PSC expanded AMIS (now known as AMIS II Enhanced – AMIS II E). Accordingly, by late 2005, AMIS force strength stood at 7,730 (comprising 6,170 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police) (Ekengard 2008; Murithi 2009a; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011).

Judging by the active war context in Darfur prior to and during the active life of the mission, the AU should be commended for the deployment of AMIS. However, the institution's peacekeeping capacity deficiencies limited AMIS's operational effectiveness. Also, the refusal of JEM and other factions of SLM/A to sign the DPA meant that parties outside the DPA could not see AMIS as an impartial peacekeeping mission. All of these factors explained AMIS's operational constraints, which made it difficult, even after three years in Darfur, to fully achieve its mandate. Despite the fact that AMIS

presided over a decline in violence during its presence in Darfur, the mission could not deliver effective security to the defenceless civilian populations throughout the region, while both the IDPs and refugees were unable to return to their homes in the face of the GoS's forces and the *Janjaweed* militias' frequent military offensives against civilians whom they believed were sympathetic to the rebels' cause. Operational limitations aside, the AU's peacemaking efforts also failed to address the roots of the conflict. In the face of the challenges that dogged AMIS, the UN Security Council authorised UNAMID in July 2007, which was to operate under an African Force Commander UNAMID will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, but it is important to first examine AMIS's achievements and challenges in details, which I discuss in the next section.

AMIS's achievements and constraints

In spite of AU's efforts in Darfur, the longstanding problems associated with Africa's peacekeeping operations reappeared, because the AU Act remains mute on the actual nature of the proposed interventions in relation to the use of force. The AU intervened in Darfur amid this lack of mandate clarity. Birikorang (2009: 5) has argued that as the troops were deployed, it became highly confusing to delineate the type of operation AMIS was engaged in, because there was an increasing gap between the expectations of the mission and its mandate and capability. AMIS was originally authorised to perform traditional peacekeeping roles that did not fit Darfur's conflict scenario for three reasons. First, traditional peacekeeping is designed for interstate wars, but the conflict in Darfur is intrastate in character, with regional dynamics. Furthermore, AMIS also confronted difficulties in its operational responsibilities because of its reliance on the principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and minimal use of force. Despite the fact that the AU Act improves on the OAU Charter, respect for the state territorial integrity principle is still of high priority in the Act, where the consent of the host government is required before force can be used.

In the case of Darfur, securing the consent of the Sudanese government became difficult, as all evidence pointed to the fact that Khartoum itself was the perpetrator of human rights abuses and the violator of the ceasefire agreements. Therefore, AMIS could not use force to elicit compliance in the face of numerous violations of both the HCFA and the DPA (Powell 2005: 47; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). In addition, irregular forces and armed militias organised along ethnolinguistic and religious lines are typically the actors in intrastate conflicts, as opposed to the hierarchically organised regular forces hypothesised under traditional peacekeeping. Under the Darfur conflict scenario, with the multiplicity of combatants and splintering of rebel groups, the task of ceasefire monitoring became more arduous for the AU peacekeepers. There was also the erroneous belief that belligerents always totally commit to ceasefire agreements, which is a third reason why things did not

turn out as expected in traditional peacekeeping. In reality, this was not at all the case in Darfur, where the African peacekeepers became targets of rebels and government forces alike (Birikorang 2009; Nerland 2011).

Another problem of the AMIS's mandate was clarity, which became worse due to its changing nature, and this problem started building up by late July 2004 when the AU declared that its Protection Force would be mandated to protect civilians but only within the capacity of the Force (African Union PSC 2004).[15] The AU's position on AMIS's new mandate was rejected by Rwanda, as Kigali vowed that its contingents in the Protection Force would not fold their arms and watch civilian populations being killed by the conflicting parties. Rwandan President Paul Kagame said, "If it was established that the civilians are in danger, then our forces would certainly intervene and use force to protect civilians" (Associated Press 17 August 2004). Despite Rwanda's position, Nigeria still believed that the AMIS could only use force in self-defence. AMIS's mandate problem was further deepened when it was revised in October 2004. This problem was also related to its weak civilian protection provisions, which according to the PSC Communiqué of 20 October 2004 stated that the African mission should "protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within the resources and capability (of the peacekeeping force), it being understood that the protection of the civilian populations is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan," which was also to "protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities" (AU PSC Communiqué October 2004). A major flaw of this provision is the way it is worded. As Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 208) argued, its phraseology led to confusion, for it was difficult to implement.

Most of the mission's commanders were not certain how to relate with and handle GoS's forces and the *Janjaweed* militias any time they met civilians in imminent danger. Problematic as this was, the AU peacekeepers were also confused about which civilian protection tasks under AMIS's mandate were also within their resources and capability. Thus, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (ibid.) concluded that "In many respects this situation left AMIS in the worst of all worlds in as much as local civilians expected its personnel to protect them from the *Janjaweed* militias and government soldiers, for they had neither the force levels nor, indeed, a crystal-clear mandate to do so." What would have saved the situation is that the civilian protection tasks should have been the primary responsibility of the African force, since it is apparent that the GoS was persecuting its own people in Darfur. This shows the contradictions in AMIS's mandate, since it recognised Khartoum's primary responsibility to be protecting civilian populations, the same government that was responsible for continued human rights violations in Darfur. A more powerful mandate would have put a limit to the atrocities committed by the Sudanese forces and the *Janjaweed* militias.

During the AMIS operation, the African peacekeepers were the only line of defence between the government forces and the *Janjaweed* militias, and the civilian populations. While the mission's security provisioning efforts are acknowledged, AMIS's ability to provide security in the real sense was hindered in many ways. Probably the mission's biggest operational challenge was that it was grossly under-resourced throughout its lifespan. First, the number of peacekeepers deployed was not sufficient for the operation, given AMIS's theatre of operations (Masanray 2009; Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). Darfur is the size of France, and AMIS's force strength at its peak was just a little above 7,000, which was inadequate to guarantee security, as the AU peacekeepers were unable to cover the whole of Darfur in their patrolling role, thereby leaving civilian populations vulnerable to the atrocities of the belligerents,[16] because the number of GoS's forces and that of the *Janjaweed* militias in Darfur during this period were estimated to be between 40,000 and 45,000, and 10,000 and 20,000, respectively, for the two forces (Williams 2011b: 36). Based on the International Crisis Group's (2005: 9) calculation, between 12,000 and 15,000 troops would have been needed for the African mission to provide effective protection for the displaced people and the humanitarian operation.

Second, AMIS was greatly underfunded, for it relied heavily on donor support that was neither predictable nor guaranteed (Bergholm 2008; Kreps 2007; Nerland 2011). AMIS was a donor-driven and donor-dependent mission, for the majority of funding came from the African Peace Facility (APF) of the EU, which amounted to about €350 million by late 2006 (Mackie et al. 2006). Financial support was grossly inadequate. In terms of financing the operation, AMIS was operated on an ad hoc arrangement. The approval of funds was based on a short-term (three months) period, and after that, the AU/AMIS had to wait for more financial benevolence from their partners in order to continue the operation (ibid.; Masanray 2009). Unfortunately, this ad hoc system negatively affected the mission's long-term planning. Shortfalls in funding worsened because many AU member states did not contribute in a regular and timely fashion to the organisation,[17] and the UN was, in Darfur's case, reluctant to shoulder financial responsibility for a regional peacekeeping effort that it was not leading. Thus, the AU's dire financial situation affected AMIS's operation. Peacekeepers were often unpaid for months, and due to lack of resources, they were forced to conduct fewer patrols, which ultimately reduced their ability to provide effective protection to Darfur's civilian populations (Kreps 2007).

In spite of the enhanced mandate of AMIS II and AMIS IIE, the operation was still under-resourced, and peacekeepers were without the requisite capacity to perform many of the tasks enumerated in the mission's mandate. AMIS lacked important logistics and force multipliers to conduct effective peace operation. The strategic lift capability of the mission was near zero because the AU had no aircraft of its own, and as a result, the

mission was compelled to rely on Greek C-130s and US C-17s for airlifts, but only when they were available. In fact, the UN, the EU and NATO facilitated the deployment of AMIS I and also through bilateral relations, the Japanese and South Korean governments also assisted, according to Kreps (2007), who argues further that logistics and technical capabilities were challenging in AMIS:

> Fuel needed for operations and maintenance is limited because only seven trucks have been available to bring fuel to Darfur in spite of the increase in peacekeeping troops in the region. Troops lack data management system; including good intelligence on the *Janjawed* as well as an advanced command and control system for distributing information (O'Neill and Cassis 2005). Early warning or advance information on potential attacks or ambushes is therefore limited, as is any ability to distribute available information to those who may need it for defence of themselves or others. (ibid., 69)

This analysis points to the fact that the AMIS operation was logistically and financially constrained.

As I mentioned earlier, AMIS was deployed when the APSA was at the conceptual level, and hence the AU had no effective structure on the ground for peacekeeping operations (Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). This scenario explains why the African Union Mission in Sudan was not adequately planned. Guicherd's (2007: 4) statement that "AMIS was never planned; it just happened" reveals the poor state of the mission's pre-deployment and deployment planning situations. The African mission suffered from lack of proper pre-deployment planning, for its deployment was planned based on just a single week's assessment of the AU mission in May 2004 (Ekengard 2008: 17). Since the advance elements of AU's MILOBs were deployed in June 2004, there was no proper planning for a mission as complex and dangerous as the African Union Mission in Sudan. This shows a lack of proper pre-deployment training for peacekeepers on the mission's CONOPs.

AMIS II's police training took just four days and ignored such sensitive issues as local laws, the customs and culture of the people of Darfur, as well as human rights issues. According to a former AMIS sector commander, Appiah-Mensah (2005), the first three MILOBs deployed in North Darfur on 4 June 2004 were provided with one satellite phone to link them with the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. These observers had no vehicle, no operational and logistical resources, no proper accommodation, and no office facilities. It was even reported that in 2007, only four vehicles were available for 250 police (Kreps 2007: 69). Therefore, inadequate planning hindered AMIS's peacekeeping effectiveness. Although the deployment of African peacekeepers was commendable, the planning of a dangerous operation such as AMIS with minimal force strength and insufficient resources,

coupled with a limited mandate, is suicidal because it risks producing a failed peace operation.

Another important challenge to AMIS was that it lacked an effective political strategy endorsed by all parties to the conflict. The DPA is not a comprehensive peace agreement; its implementation made the African force, in the eyes of non-signatories to the DPA, a party to the conflict rather than peacekeepers. Thus, African peacekeepers were attacked from the outset of the mission. AMIS recorded its first causalities in October 2005, when ten of its soldiers were killed and several others wounded at AMIS's Haskanitan camp (South Darfur) on 29 September 2007 (Brosché 2008: 60; Wassara 2010). The killings is evidence of the volatile security situation that existed in Darfur and of the real dangers to peacekeepers. By the time UNAMID took over from AMIS in December 2007, the mission had lost more than 40 peacekeepers.

Nevertheless, some achievements can be credited to AMIS. Its presence and patrols improved security in some limited ways, as there were reductions in the number of clashes between and among the belligerents, which also explains the reductions in the number of attacks against civilian populations. AMIS was also able to provide some humanitarian assistance to the IDPs such as the provision of water and firewood patrols, escorts for humanitarian convoys, and the facilitation of access to medical facilities for people who needed it (Bergholm 2008: 32; Williams 2011b).

Following on from the above analysis, I argue that AMIS was unable to fully realise its mandate, despite its limited contributions to ameliorate the conflict trajectory. This position is supported by General Agwai (2008: 3), who laments an erroneous belief: accepting that AMIS was a failure based on the false assumption that the mission was a peacekeeping operation. Agwai, a retired General of the Nigerian Army and the first Force Commander of UNAMID, based his argument on the fact that AMIS was mostly an observer mission, which was constrained in many ways, and therefore not too much should be expected from such a mission. AMIS, throughout its lifespan, despite its many constraints, provided limited security in the areas it was able to cover and limited humanitarian assistance to the displaced populations, but the mission was unable to address the root causes of the conflict.

Both negative and positive peace initiatives were unrealised in Darfur during the AMIS operation.[18] Therefore, the AMIS situation shows that no matter the level of the AU's peacekeeping ambitions and efforts to manage conflicts in Africa, unless such ambitions are supported by political will and genuine commitments of African leaders – this is demonstrated by their unflinching financial support to the APSA – Africa's regional peace operations will continue to face similar problems in the future.

AMIS's problems and its inability to fully achieve its mandate point to the contradictions associated with Africa's failure to balance the triangular area of tension in African peace operations. Doubtless, AMIS's deployment

is evidence of the AU's ambition to police African conflicts through African capacity. However, the chasm between the AU aspiration and its capacity for peace operations is related to the fact that the commitments of the AU member states to the pan-African institution's security agenda were not absent during the operation. The gap became wider when the AU's peacekeeping incapacities became clear. The events in the lead up to AMIS's deployment established these contradictions, as only Nigeria and Rwanda contributed troops to the CFC. As one retired army general, who had participated in the AMIS operation, reiterated, "Without Africa's commitments to the AU and its security mechanism, and minus the adequate and guaranteed funding for APSA from within the continent, the mechanism will be a mere aspiration rather than produce an effective security architecture."[19] The difficulties confronting AMIS made its replacement by the UN mission imminent. The hope was that the succeeding mission would be able to improve on the shortcomings of AMIS. This explains the emergence of UNAMID, which I discuss in the rest of this chapter.

Towards UNAMID: UN Security Council Resolution 1706 and the proposal for a three-phased strategic approach

The road to UNAMID was a tortuous one. Its emergence was not deliberate, as Liégeois rightly argues (2009: 9): "The modality of UNAMID's hybrid nature was not deliberate. It resulted from the different constraints, interests and subtle compromises that ensued. It was not the preferred option of any of the players, and nobody claims to be fully satisfied with it. The history of UNAMID has, above all, been one of an aborted sequential cooperation." Thus, UNAMID can be described as a peacekeeping model necessitated by unusual circumstances occasioned by Khartoum's misgivings and strong opposition to the presence of the Blue Helmets in Darfur (Aboagye 2007b). Apart from the Sudanese government's apprehensions about a UN peace operation in Darfur, the UN Security Council was equally divided on the possibility of transitioning AMIS into a robust UN peace operation. In fact, no comprehensive peace agreement was in place.

These factors delayed the progression in the UN's taking over the struggling AMIS operation. Consequently, the UN first discussed the possibility of taking over AMIS in early 2006, and this move was in response to the AU Peace and Security Council's press release demanding support "in principle" for transition of AMIS to a multidimensional UN peace operation. While accepting the AU's request, the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1679 of 16 May 2006 agreed to a Joint AU/UN Technical Assessment Mission to Darfur to assess the necessities and requirements for strengthening AMIS and the likelihood of a UN takeover. Also, there was serious pressure by some members of the UN Security Council on the GoS to end its obstructions to the UN mission in Darfur. Based on the recommendations of the

Joint Mission – the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 (of 31 August 2006), based on the UN Secretary General's proposals of 28 July 2006 for a UN peace operation in Darfur. The resolution was passed with three abstentions: Russia, Qatar and China. The objections of these states were based on their opinions that more discussions with GoS were needed before the authorisation of transition from AMIS to a UN operation.

The resolution also provided for the strengthening of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to 17,300 military personnel, up to 3,300 civilian police, and up to 15 formed police units. As a mission with a Chapter VII mandate, it is empowered to use force in its theatre of operations to protect its personnel, facilities, humanitarian workers and civilian populations (Mickler 2009; Telalian 2008). With resolution 1706, the UN Security Council authorised the expansion of UNMIS. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan is a UN peace operation that had earlier been deployed under UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (of 24 March 2005) to support the implementation of the CPA that ended Sudan's North-South war. UNMIS's authority and operation were extended to Darfur with a strong civilian protection mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN also had to ask for Khartoum's approval to launch such a multidimensional UN peace operation in Darfur (Bah 2010). The extension of UNMIS's mandate to Darfur had the advantage of avoiding unnecessary duplication of structures and resources. The UNMIS headquarters in Khartoum, according to Liégeois (2009: 9), had the capacity to quickly ensure the C2 of the AU troops in Darfur, which would have equally guaranteed consistent action by the international community, but unfortunately Sudan's consent was not forthcoming. Accordingly, Liégeois stated:

> It would not be long before those largely behind the Resolution[20] realised that their apparent diplomatic success was no more than a pyrrhic victory. The abstention of China, Russia and Qatar during the vote on the Resolution, as well as Khartoum's inflexible position, left little hope that the provisions voted for by the UN Security Council would actually be implemented. (ibid.: 8)

While Khartoum was still not consenting to a UN peacekeeping deployment, the worsening security and humanitarian situations in Darfur led the AU to intensify its efforts to break the stalemate. Complementing Africa's peacemaking diplomacy, the UN Secretary General, after intensive consultations with the UN Security Council members, proposed a new strategic approach, which may have had a better chance of achieving peace in Darfur (Adebajo 2011: 209). The UN Secretary General's plan was to be put into action in a sequence of three major steps: a light support package (LSP) to AMIS, a heavy support package (HSP) to AMIS, and an AU/UN hybrid operation.

The LSP was intended to reinforce the management capacity of AMIS to help the mission establish an integrated C2 structures and would consist

of 105 military staff officers, 34 police advisers and 48 civilian employees as well as logistics at a cost of $21 million. The HSP was to support AMIS until the deployment of a hybrid mission and it would consist of 2,250 military, 721 police (including 3 units of *gendarmes*), 1,136 civilians, 984 support personnel, logistical materials and an air force unit of 6 combat helicopters and fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft at a cost of $287.9 million.

These intra- and extra-African peacemaking efforts culminated with a high-level meeting that was convened on 16 November 2006 at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. The meeting, at which the UN Secretary General and the AU Commission chairperson jointly presided, was attended by member states of the AU PSC, other African countries, the GoS, the P-5, the EU and the Arab League states. During this meeting, a final compromise was reached, through which the United Nations, the AU and other stakeholders agreed to the UN's support for AMIS as proposed by the UN Secretary General.

The agreement reached in Addis Ababa could be described as a temporary victory, for its implementation was seriously jeopardised by Khartoum's obstructions, and these were primarily concerned with the nature of the proposed hybrid force. Recall that the Sudanese government demanded that the international presence in Darfur should be absolutely African, and that the special envoy be jointly appointed by the two organisations and be an African acceptable to the Sudanese government. Furthermore, Khartoum insisted that the appointment of the hybrid mission's Force Commander and the questions about C2 should be the sole responsibilities of the AU, while agreeing to the fact that C2 could be reinforced by applying UN systems and structures, and the presence of UN advisors as long as these non-AU officials were lower in rank than the African commanders. These demands became burning issues during the PSC Heads of States meeting of 30 November 2006.

Central to the meeting was the composition of the envisaged hybrid mission, which had to be determined by both the AU and the UN taking cognisance of the prevailing situation in Darfur. The force composition was finally assessed after a joint UN/AU Assessment in February 2007 to be between 19,000 and 20,000 troops, 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units. Although the AU PSC ratified the UN's phased strategic approach agreement and simultaneously renewed the AMIS mandate, Khartoum's demands and obstructions slowed the deployments of both the LSP and HSP, and also put the successful implementation of the hybrid operation in jeopardy.

While the LSP was launched in January 2007 with the cooperation and coordination of the GoS, the endorsement of the HSP was not achieved until 16 April 2007 after the UN and AU undertook painstaking negotiations with the Sudanese authorities. The AU and other key actors such as China and the Arab League also applied pressure on Khartoum. Thereafter, the UN Secretary General was authorised by the UN Security Council to

initiate a course of action for additional UN support to the beleaguered African mission, which would continue until the hybrid mission plan was finalised and the force deployed. At this time, Khartoum was still very reluctant to acquiesce to the deployment of UNAMID and the hybrid's mandate, force composition and the issue of C2. Seven weeks after the endorsement of the HSP, the UN Security Council was provided with the joint AU/UN Report based on 16 November 2006 high-level meeting in Addis Ababa, which contained approved proposals for the hybrid operation's mandate and structures. While the efforts of the two organisations in this endeavour were recognised, there was controversy on aspects dealing with the issue of C2 with respect to the proposed hybrid operation. Specifically, the report declared that backstopping and C2 structures of the hybrid mission would be the UN's responsibility.[21] Khartoum finally agreed to the unconditional presence of a hybrid mission in Darfur on 11 June 2007 based on the terms of the Joint AU/UN Report (de Waal 2007a: 1042).

Contextualising UNAMID

The month of June 2007 was very significant for the AU's diplomatic and political efforts to realise the proposed hybrid mission for Darfur, which were intensified. As part of these efforts, the PSC in its communiqué called for the UN Security Council to authorise UNAMID. After extensive discussions in the UN Security Council and intensive consultations with the AU, as well as negotiations that led to the Sudanese government finally accepting, the UN Security Council at its 5727th meeting of 31 July 2007 adopted Resolution 1769 authorising UNAMID's deployment, and added that the operation would be fully deployed by 31 December 2007.

UNAMID is a peace enforcement mission operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its mandating authority calls for the mission to "take the necessary action" within its capabilities. In the area of its deployment, UNAMID's primary mandate was to protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence without prejudice to the responsibilities of the GoS, contribute to security for humanitarian assistance, monitor and verify the HCFA, and support the implementation of the DPA. Furthermore, UNAMID was authorised to assist in carrying out an inclusive political process and contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and to be involved actively in monitoring and reporting on the situations along the borders with Chad and the CAR.[22] To achieve its mandate, UNAMID's operation tasks involved security, humanitarian assistance, and support for the peace process and good offices, the rule of law, governance and human rights.

UNAMID, headquartered in El Fasher (capital of North Darfur state) with sector headquarters in El Geneina (West Darfur) and Nyala (South Darfur), subsector headquarters in Zalingei (Central Darfur), and further deployment

locations throughout Darfur, is also mandated to constitute about 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military personnel (including 360 MILOBs), 3,772 police and 19 formed police units of up to 140 officers each, and these numbers were to include AMIS's troops already operating in Darfur (Centre on International Cooperation 2010: 67).[23] Four key principles guided the organisation of UNAMID, including the requirement that the two institutions jointly appoint the special representative of UNAMID, that the AU appoint an African Force Commander in consultation with the UN, that access for UNAMID to UN backstopping and C2 structures and systems, and finally, that the UNAMID force level be jointly determined by the AU and the UN (Aboagye 2007b: 9). However, while both the UN and the AU agreed that issues of force generation of UNAMID be dealt with at the UN headquarters, they also agreed to develop a Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) between the two organisations. However, the UN had authority over strategic and C2 functions. Finally, it was determined that the UNAMID Force Commander would be responsible for the day-to-day operational control of the hybrid mission (Nerland 2011: 418).

Without doubt, UNAMID is the embodiment of a unique type of cooperation between the AU and the UN, and it could also be seen as an emerging peace operation model that involves burden-sharing in international peace and security efforts. In fact, the hybrid mission, together with UN Security Council Resolution 1769, is extraordinary, considering the UN Secretary General's statement to the UN Security Council following the adoption of the resolution. The Secretary General's contended that the establishment of UNAMID means "sending a clear and powerful signal of your commitment to improve the lives of the people of the region, and close this tragic chapter in Sudan's history." While calling the decision "historic and unprecedented," the UN Secretary General warned that it is "only through a political process that we can achieve a sustainable solution to the conflict."[24] UNAMID's ambitious nature, in terms of the magnitudes and complexities of its mandate and tasks, is not in doubt, but its conduct, in practical terms, had been fraught with a multitude of problems. Of note are those issues relating to funding, troop generation in the time stipulated, C2 arrangements, as well as lack of an effective AU/UN peacekeeping partnership, all of which are making UNAMID experience similar challenges that confronted AMIS, despite the fact that the UN's peacekeeping experience and resources are behind the operation.

Following on from the foregoing analysis, I revisit the question earlier posed in the introductory part of this book: Is the so-called hybrid operation, in which the AU and the UN institutions have a joint C2 structure in a peace mission, the appropriate strategy to overcome African security quandaries? In the specific case of Darfur, I answer this question by evaluating the UNAMID operation. Assessing UNAMID entails examining its performance in terms of achievements and constraints: that is, what it has been

able (or unable) to achieve and why. Again, the key benchmarks that I have adopted to measure the success of UNAMID are the degree to which the hybrid mission has been able to accomplish its mandate and also whether the operation is able to contribute to the creation of a stable and secure environment for the people of Darfur. I assess the African efforts in UNAMID in line with Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström's (2008) triangular area of tension in African peace operations. Thus, assessing UNAMID performances becomes my major task in the next section.

Evaluating UNAMID: achievements and challenges

UNAMID's performance and achievements

Since its deployment, UNAMID has been working assiduously to implement and realise its mandate in which civilian population protection is paramount. Conceptualised and deployed against the backdrop of AMIS's incapability to effectively conduct its operations, UNAMID's civilian protection mandate is broad and proactive. However, implementing this robust mandate requires adequate logistics and other requisite peacekeeping resources. Benefiting from the UN's peacekeeping experience and resources makes UNAMID more robust than AMIS. UNAMID has also been carrying out civilian community policing functions, which help to facilitate the humanitarian operations of UN agencies and other humanitarian organisations on the ground, as well as enhancing the security situation in Darfur (UNAMID 2012). Equally, the peace mission is credited with providing protection to women, children and the aged in local communities by enabling people to collect firewood, and facilitating local/tribal disputes through meetings with tribal leaders in communities in which disputes are occurring.

The mission has been providing medical assistance to the wounded and sick. According to the mission's official statement, in 2012 UNAMID conducted an average of more than 200 patrols daily, despite its many limitations and challenges. The aims, according to UNAMID (2012), are to "do everything in its power to protect civilians in Darfur, facilitate the humanitarian aid operation to all areas, regardless of who controls them, and to help provide an environment in which peace can take root." With these patrols, the hybrid mission has been able to partially ameliorate the volatile security and humanitarian situations in Darfur vis-à-vis its pre-deployment security situation. Equally fascinating is that the hybrid mission, as a matter of necessity, intensifies its efforts in engaging the belligerents through monitoring of the HCFA and providing support to the implementation of the DPA. Through its patrols, UNAMID has been able to monitor and support the HCFA and the DPA respectively, and it continues to proactively send its soldiers to ensure protection of its personnel, facilities, and equipment. These security provision efforts guarantee the security and freedom of movement of the mission's personnel and humanitarian workers.

A former UNAMID peacekeeper told me that the security and humanitarian situations in Darfur might be worse had UNAMID not been deployed.[25] Therefore, the UNAMID peacekeeper's statement means that UNAMID has deterred worse things from happening, as the mission continues to bring manageable peace to the region, in that there are now reductions in the rate of wanton killings of civilian populations and also in the harassments of women and children. Thus, UNAMID has brought a modicum of peace to Darfur, despite the fact that it was deployed in the absence of an effective political/peace process that is supported across the wide spectrum of armed and non-military groups.

A research professor of International Security buttressed this point:

> UNAMID has maintained a modicum of peace in Darfur, but it has not totally solved the issues that are involved. You can deal with the symptoms of conflicts and killings all that, but that is not what the people of Darfur really want. They want to be autonomous in how they relate with Khartoum. Have we solved that issue? So, if you have not solved those fundamental issues, you can intervene and maintain relative stability, but there is a way still that it will relapse into conflict again. Unless you maintain that relative peace, and you follow through to look at the core issues of the conflict, and you solve them. Then and only then can we have a durable, peaceful solution. The presence of UNAMID has maintained relative peace, but the fundamental issues are still there.[26]

In line with the peace process aspect of its mandate, UNAMID with the support of the UN, AU and other partners has been able to continue encouraging peaceful settlement of the conflict through its intensification of pushing the Darfur Peace Process forward. These efforts are noticeable, especially through its collaboration with institutions and bodies responsible for the All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference held in Doha, Qatar between 27 and 31 May 2011 (International Crisis Group 2014). As part of its efforts to achieve this aspect of its mandate, UNAMID (under the auspices of the AU and the UN), in conjunction with other stakeholders, have facilitated the signatures on the agreement between Khartoum and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) regarding the approval of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) on 14 July 2011, and they continue repeating the significance of both the DPA and DDPD as the basis for peaceful settlement of the conflict in Darfur (International Crisis Group 2014).

UNAMID's major challenges and constraints

The problem of a dangerous conflict environment

Similar to AMISOM, UNAMID is operating in an active conflict environment where there is no peace to keep. The situation in Darfur is a continued threat of violence: there is no ceasefire agreement as such, let alone comprehensive

peace agreements respected by all parties to the conflict. Neither the HCFA nor the DPA is respected, and both the GoS and the armed rebel groups have subjected the two agreements to constant violations. UNAMID was deployed when Darfur lacked an all-inclusive peace agreement. The security situation remained tenuous with a number of incidences of banditry, car hijacking, and violent assaults against civilian populations, including humanitarians, as well as UNAMID soldiers. Although the deployment of UNAMID has curtailed the scale of military engagements and deadly attacks on civilians, Darfur is not yet completely free from security threats. A senior researcher noted that, although the violence has reduced in Darfur, there is still a sort of stalemate, with regular attacks in many areas, particularly in El Genina, Tina and Kabkabiyah. There are many IDPs in Darfur and Darfurian refugees in neighbouring countries who have not been resettled.[27] Certainly, the weaponisation of Darfur and the splintering of the rebel groups, especially non-signatories of the DPA, make the UNAMID operation more challenging. It is therefore obvious that the mission finds it difficult to deal with fragmented armed groups with different political objectives and demands. Darfur's security situation worsens because of the intensification of intra-Arab and other localised tribal conflicts, which caused large-scale displacement of civilian populations within Darfur, as IDPs and people at risk were also spilling across borders into Chad and the CAR (International Crisis Group 2014). Also, lack of a workable political strategy has made UNAMID seem a party to the conflict, especially by those armed groups operating outside the DPA. The GoS offensive against the rebel groups increased the level of Darfur's insecurity. The security situation worsened despite Kharthoum's unilateral declaration of a cessation of hostilities. For example, aerial bombings were frequent, especially in late 2008 (Dunne 2009: 56; UNSC Report 781 of 12 December 2008: 6).

As a consequence of the deteriorating situation at the outset of the mission's deployment, UNAMID became an object of attacks. In response, the mission evacuated its staff and there was a reduction in humanitarian relief operations, with negative consequences for the civilian protection mandate of the mission. The hope that the newly signed DDPD will-lead to a durable peace is uncertain, because key armed groups were not included (International Crisis Group 2014). The GoS's forces continued aerial bombardment of suspected rebel locations and the killing of JEM's chairman, Ibrahim Khalil, by a government airstrike on 25 December 2011, indicated that Darfur's security situation was worsening.[28] In addition, armed confrontations between Arab militias against non-Arab civilians have been the norm, especially in the Kutum and Hashaba areas of North Darfur. Since 2010, there have deadly armed contestations between non-Arab tribes and Khartoum-supported non-Arab armed militias targeting Zaghawa communities, especially in eastern Darfur. International Crisis Group (2014: 1) reported further that in 2013 alone, three separate conflicts

between Arab tribes in three different Darfur states were the major causes of violent deaths and further displaced close to 500,000 people. These violent activities mean that there are real escalating challenges for UNAMID.

The problem of peacekeeping incapacities and logistics

Although UNAMID is authorised and supported by the UN, troop generation in the time stipulated was, at the initial stage, one of the mission's major delays in its build-up and ability to effectively realise its mandate. UNAMID's slow rise to power is a function of its inherited poor structures, when the UN took over AMIS. UNAMID's troop shortages became a major issue, especially during the first quarter of 2008, because of the inability of some of AMIS's TCCs to immediately replace their departed contingents at the end of their posting. The hybrid mission is expected to benefit from UN experience and resources, but the converse is that the UN itself is overstressed due to its many peace operations in different parts of the world. This situation affected the UN's ability to mobilise UNAMID's authorised manpower in the time stipulated.

To put this scenario in perspective, the first batches of UNAMID's personnel to be deployed were engineers, whose work involved setting up camps and other requisite infrastructure in preparation for the infantry and police units (Liégeois 2009: 15). Therefore, the pace at which UNAMID's military operational capability needed to increase to implement its mandate was not proportionate with the total number of peacekeepers deployed; in other words, the operation needed more peacekeepers to deploy much faster than they did. Two other factors explain the problem of force generation. The first is Khartoum's insistence on the "African character" as a requirement for its acceptance of the deployment of UNAMID. With this condition, the UN cannot draw troops from such countries as Pakistan and Bangladesh, which are major troop contributors to UN peace operations. The consequence is that the UNAMID is left with no other option but to rely on troop contributions from within Africa, which was difficult to realise in the short time frames stipulated. Relying on troop contributions from Africa alone has slowed down deployment, since African contingents need to be trained and equipped to meet the UN's standards, because only a few African states have well-trained militaries that meet all the UN criteria necessary for participating in UN peace operations. Even those African countries with competent militaries lack modern equipment, and these factors delayed their rapid deployments to Darfur. Thus, it took UNAMID two years to secure 68 per cent of its authorised strength (Diop, Peyton and McComville 2012). Its strength in mid-2011 stood at 90 per cent of its mandated number (UNAMID 2012).

Khartoum manipulated the requirement of the African character of UNAMID at the outset of the mission; this slowed down deployment. The GoS refused participations of some countries like Sweden and Norway, while it delayed the approval of the participation of countries like Nepal

and Thailand (Brosché 2008: 63). This calculated attempt to frustrate and halt UNAMID's power from rising very rapidly kept UNAMID weak (Adebajo 2011: 211). Besides the insistence on the African character, excluding the participations of countries in the West makes it very difficult for UNAMID to obtain modern and sophisticated equipment for peace operations. A former UNAMID peacekeeper described the situation. According to him, despite sustained diplomatic negotiations and painstaking discussions before UNAMID's deployment, the GoS tried, as much as possible, to frustrate the efforts of UNAMID to get in position for its operation. Even a simple thing such as the Status of Force Agreement (SoFA) took over five months of negotiation between the UN, and the AU, and Khartoum in order to reach agreement. This was a deliberate attempt to frustrate the operation from taking off. He stressed that lack of Khartoum's cooperation with UNAMID is entrenched to the extent that UN personnel are denied visas to enter Sudan.

Logistical difficulties also confront the UNAMID operations. UNAMID lacks requisite military assets such as the air support (i.e., aviation assets such as utility and tactical helicopters) needed to conduct effective peace operations (Adebajo 2011: 211) because of a lack of donor enthusiasm for providing this vital equipment. Nerland (2011: 420) contends that based on an interview she conducted with a Canadian official, the reluctance of donors to support UNAMID with attack helicopters is not enough to explain the mission's problem of logistics. Rather, she explained further, the UN rejected donations of certain aircraft, for according to the world body, the donated aircraft did not meet its standards. A case in point was the UN's rejection and non-use of the airworthy Skylink helicopters donated to AMIS from Canada, because the aircraft had some minor problems, so the UN found them unacceptable.

Another aspect of logistical challenges to UNAMID concerns transportation of its personnel, equipment and supplies. The dilapidated and inadequate facilities of Port Sudan, with its insufficient material-handling equipment, are logistical nightmares because the unloading of thousands of tons of UNAMID's equipment would take months. The geographical demands of Darfur compounding the problem of logistics further, making transportation of equipment from Port Sudan to the theatre of operations, a distance of over 2,000 km of desert along unsealed roads, very challenging. The poor quality of roads makes ground transportation very difficult, especially for the open-backed lorries carrying/moving heavy logistics. Darfur's roads are not motorable during the rainy season (August and September), a situation that makes travelling by air the best way of getting most of the equipment to Darfur. The problem that Darfur's poor quality roads created is that some of the UN equipment cannot be air freighted because they are heavy. (Diop, Peyton and McComville 2012). Air transportation is being offered now by a group known as the Friends of UNAMID, which has been helping with the strategic airlifting of UNAMID troops and COE directly from TCCs into the theatre of operations (Murithi 2009a).

The problem of finding an effective AU/UN peacekeeping partnership

The difficulty in finding a workable peacekeeping partnership between UNAMID's authorising institutions beset the hybrid mission right from the outset, especially during its transition from AMIS. Conceptually, the hybrid operation demands that the two institutions work together as equal partners, but this is not what happens in reality. The UN, relying on its experience, resources and standard operating procedures, does not want UNAMID to suffer a similar fate to AMIS's, which explains why it refused to rely on the structures that the AU had already put in place on the ground for AMIS. The UN's decision and efforts to build up UNAMID from the beginning meant that the world body disregarded the African (AU) peacekeeping experiences in Darfur. This is problematic because AMIS's experiences in such a volatile conflict environment as Darfur could have helped the UN in planning UNAMID by reflecting on the lessons AMIS learned in Darfur. In a sense, the decision of the world body to build up UNAMID from scratch is disrespectful of the AU. Rather, the AU/UN peacekeeping partnership proved difficult to maintain, and consequently important lessons and logistical arrangements were lost. I analyse this problem below at many levels.

The ineffective AU/UN peacekeeping partnership was rooted in the planning of the mission, for the concept of UNAMID was not only totally unclear, but also the problem of who was to perform what functions/roles and the procedures for cooperation were unclear. The Darfur hybrid operation is a new peacekeeping model, which cannot be compared to other co-deployments in terms of doctrinal analysis. Neither the UN nor the AU has previous experience to fall back on in relation to these type of shared responsibilities. This situation creates problems of cooperation – the basis of an effective peacekeeping partnership under a joint C2 arrangement. As a result, "the structures for communicating and working together had to be built from scratch, and the experience and goodwill to make those structures work was in short supply" (Nerland 2011: 420). Therefore, both the UN and the AU are working in an asymmetrical relationship where the African institution becomes marginalised in UNAMID's decision-making process and structures.

For example, the AU and the UN jointly appointed UNAMID's political and military leadership. Furthermore, the two officials are answerable to the AU Commission Chairperson and UN Secretary General through the AU PSD and UN DPKO respectively, while UNAMID's operational responsibilities lie with the UN. The dual or parallel accountability of the strategic aspect of the mission's structures is difficult because UNAMID leaders are challenged when they have to "identify exactly what is part of the strategic and operational remit in a continuous flow of information sent out by the Mission Headquarters in El Fasher. Given the urgency of the situation and standard UN practices, it is not difficult to understand how in practice, reporting tends to be solely to the DPKO" (Liégeois 2009: 12).

Thus, the parallel accountability becomes one of the challenges confronting UNAMID, for it marginalises the smaller or lower status partner (the AU) from UNAMID's decision-making structures. Although the two institutions agreed to establish a Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) as part of the UNAMID structures to make decisions that concern both institutions, and thereby avoid the marginalisation of one institution by the other; unfortunately, the JSCM was delayed for a number of reasons and was not established until November 2008, almost a year into the UNAMID operation. Therefore, the envisioned roles for a JSCM could not be realised, especially at the start of the mission. Even after the JSCM was established, it took months for it to be fully operational, because it was not adequately supported. The JSCM lacks all the necessary resources and support, such as clear competencies and appropriate personnel, that it needs to be successful. This situation makes it difficult for a joint coordination mechanism to play effective roles in UNAMID's structures.

In 2009, the Centre on International Cooperation reiterated that the problems facing JSCM and its eventual marginalisation in UNAMID's C2 and reporting structures should be seen as deliberate. According to the Centre in its report (2009: 42): "(the) failure to operationalise the Joint Mechanism (is) perhaps an indication of the UN's desire to maintain full control of UNAMID, partially undercutting the idea of a hybrid arrangement." The ineffectiveness of JSCM in UNAMID structures meant that the AU, as a partner with lower status, is increasingly being marginalised as the institution is being deprived of the information needed to jointly manage the hybrid mission's policy and strategy. The enormity of this problem for the African institution explains why its PSC called on the UN for cooperation between the AU Commission and UN Secretariat, and strengthening of the institutional mechanisms established to play that role, as with the JSCM and others.

The inter-institutional, asymmetrical relationship that characterises the AU/UN peacekeeping partnership in Darfur deepens further, because the sharing of peacekeeping resources between the two is lopsided, with negative consequences on the operational aspects of UNAMID. The unequal relations between the two organisations and the AU's unsuccessful peacekeeping efforts with AMIS made the UN not rely on the AU's logistical arrangements, which were already on the ground, or heed the lessons the AU had learnt from AMIS during the transition period. Therefore, the start afresh stance of the UN in planning UNAMID made the world body stop all the AU contracts without even securing other alternatives. For example, the UN cut the AU rations contract without making alternative arrangements, so African solders did not receive food deliveries for almost 15 days. The source of these problems was the UN's poor reading of the challenges of the peace operation in Darfur, especially the impact of Khartoum's obstructions and the limited dispositions of donors to make critical logistics available to UNAMID. These problems would have been averted had the UN considered

the AU as an equal partner, given its experience with the AMIS operation. On this basis, Nerland (2011: 422) concluded:

> Therefore, some of the challenges that UNAMID faces today are a function of a weak partnership between the two organisations. Even with the resources and experience that the UN brought to the mission, it still had trouble planning for the logistical aspects of the transition. Often the logistical needs of the mission were not taken into account when decisions about which equipment to keep from the AU force, and plans to replace equipment that the DPKO did not wish to keep were often inadequate ... However, there certainly were logistical arrangements in place for equipment and supplies, as well as political relationships that had been developed. By making more effective use of the existing structures and plans that the AU had established and operated, and by working more effectively with AU leadership, some of the operational and logistical problems that emerged might have been ameliorated.

The problem of the lack of an effective political strategy

Earlier, I alluded to the absence of an effective political process and strategy as one of the challenges facing AMIS. This situation continues under UNAMID, which is, therefore, a peace operation without a comprehensive peace agreement to implement. Besides, as discussed earlier, the provisions of both the HCFA and DPA are frequently violated and not respected by the conflicting parties. In fact, the possibility for the Doha Peace Process and DDPD to achieve peace in Darfur is highly uncertain, and its likelihood of suffering a similar fate as the failed 2004 and 2006 agreements is relatively high (International Crisis Group 2014). The escalation of violence in late 2012 and early 2013, involving the aerial bombardments of civilians by the government forces and rebel groups, limited humanitarians' and peacekeepers' access to the IDPs. In addition, the unlawful detention and human rights violations that took place reveal the precarious situation in Darfur and the serious challenges to the Doha Peace Process.[29] Internal divisions among the rebel groups, the failure to include key armed movements, the lack of respect for the provisions of the DDPD by the non-signatory rebels, and the purported recognition of the weak LJM as representing Darfurians in the Doha Peace Process, mean that the degree to which it can be the basis for peaceful settlement of the conflict is somewhat limited. For LJM is a coalition of ten small and weak rebel groups in Darfur that does not enjoy majority support from the people of the region. Therefore, Darfur needs a more coordinated, robust, and comprehensive peace process. The GoS, all the armed groups, and civil society groups both inside and outside of Darfur, and the international community, should all be part of this process. According to the Enough Project (2011: 2), "any peace deal achieved can only be maintained and consolidated if it is firmly grounded in the future

of all North Sudan, while recognising that Darfur still requires unique international attention."

Contributory factors for UNAMID success or failure[30]

Cooperation from important external actors

As I discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the level of support of important outside actors to a peace mission influences its outcomes. Literature on peacekeeping have revealed that a peace operation's chance of success is high when the international community fully supported it (Bratt 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 1999), although Pushkina (2006) has argued that the existence of this factor does not guarantee overall peacekeeping success. Peacekeeping success is also conditional on the level of cooperation the mission receives from the belligerents' external backers (Bloomfield and Moulton 1997; Pushkina 2006). The conflict in Darfur is internal in nature, with wider regional dynamics. Right from its inception, the complexity of the conflict is such that it features elements that are operating outside Darfur. Cross-border military confrontations by elements of the armed forces of Chad and Sudan and armed rebel groups are widespread along their common borders. This situation explains the cold relations between the two countries that are compounded by each supporting rebels in the territory of other state.

Equally, the CAR's relations with Sudan fare no better, for Bangui has been accusing Khartoum of supporting rebels inside its territories, which Sudan has repeatedly denied. Chad-Sudan diplomatic relations broke down in April 2006 as a result of Chadian rebels crossing the border from Darfur to attack Chad's capital, N'Djamena. The November 2006 declaration by Chad that it was at war with Sudan is evidence of the problems that confronted AMIS also posing challenges to UNAMID (International Crisis Group 2014; van der Lijn 2008: 31).

Furthermore, Sudan is situated in a highly unstable region, with its neighbours (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, the CAR, and, including, before the birth of South Sudan in July 2011, Uganda and the DRC) experiencing internal armed conflicts of varying intensity. Since African states are products of European colonialism, with artificial and porous boundaries separating ethnic groups into different states, it is not surprising that armed groups from these states seek refuge in Darfur and are also being called upon to intervene in the Darfur conflict in exchange for gaining some kind of rewards. Cross-border operations by Chadian soldiers and rebels in support of Darfur's conflicting parties means that the level of cooperation UNAMID receives from Sudan's immediate neighbours is related to the hidden agendas and interests of these states in the conflict, and their clandestine support to different armed groups. However, this assistance is not enough to see UNAMID succeed through these problems in its operations.

The divisive politics on Darfur, among the P-5, is not helpful to UNAMID. There is an obvious lack of unanimity, which could also be explained by their differing interests in the conflict. First, both China and Russia are pro-Khartoum and have on many occasions used their veto powers to block tough measures against Sudan. Moscow benefits from its arms trade with Khartoum, while Beijing consumes most of Sudan's oil (International Crisis Group 2014), as Sudan accounts for about 5 per cent of China's oil imports (Hackel 2012). Some changes are noticeable in China's position on Darfur, especially in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, with international campaign, majorly by the Western countries that branded it a "Genocide Olympics," but these international pressures have not had a fundamental impact on Beijing-Khartoum interstate relations or changed Beijing's foreign policy posture towards the Darfur conflict. The United States, France and Britain's opposition to the genocide in Darfur is clear, but the extent to which this opposition would be carried through is doubtful, because Washington and London, in particular, see Khartoum as an ally in the global fight against terrorism and organised transnational crime networks. Obviously, some semblance of unanimity in the UN Security Council led to the adoption of Resolution 1769, which established UNAMID. However, because of different hidden agendas of powerful states, and a lack of support for the hybrid operation from Sudan's neighbours, UNAMID is likely to face the same fate as AMIS if appropriate measures are not taken at the right time.

Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures

Following its Concept of Operations (CONOP)s, UNAMID is designed to operate on a unity of command and control structures. Superficially, with this design one would expect the peace mission to conduct its operations effectively and efficiently, since the UN is providing the C2 and also due to the mission's access to UN backstopping, which is based on the agreement reached in Addis Ababa. As mentioned earlier, the UN and the AU jointly appointed the leadership of UNAMID, while the AU, in consultation with the UN, appointed the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner. Additionally, UNAMID's HOM is answerable to both the UN Secretary General and his African counterpart at the AU Commission. Van der Lijn's (2008: 34) analysis sheds light on UNAMID's command structure:

> The operational leadership is located within the integrated structures of the headquarters of the operation. Part of this headquarters is, amongst other structures, the support division led by the UN Director of Administration. The force commander has command and control over the air support asset via the Joint Operations Centre and over the mission enablers via the Joint Logistics Operations Centre and the Chief

of Integrated Support Services. The overall management of the operation is according to the standards, principles and procedures of the UN. The AU and UN strategic headquarters of UNAMID is meant to consult effectively with the JSCM in Addis Ababa.

Conceptually, UNAMID's command structure may look simple and easy to operate, but in practice, the opposite is the case. The challenge with the C2 structure is such that it is intrinsically not strong enough, due to the reasons given above. In terms of the competencies of its leaders and the quality of its personnel, there is no doubt that the political, military and police leadership (both past and present) are experienced, professionally competent and respected Africans who excelled in their previous assignments, both nationally and internationally. Nevertheless, there are reports and allegations of inconsistencies and breaches of professional ethics against the first Force Commander for appointing friends and colleagues to higher positions and for unfulfilled promises to the armed groups regarding their MSA, all of which tarnished his credibility (van der Lijn 2008: 34). Besides, the African character of UNAMID also affects the mission to achieve more successes in its operations, as most of the peacekeepers are Africans. Most of the continent's infantry forces participating in UNAMID are not professionally competent for this kind of complex and dangerous peace operation. Western countries provide training to ensure that African peacekeepers are competent and up to the task, and meet UN standards.

However, this situation should not be compared to a peace operation like the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which has full participation of infantry forces from the West, due to their advanced military training and knowledge of using sophisticated equipment. UNIFIL had 11,989 personnel deployed as of November 2010; of these personnel, 40 per cent came from Europe and less than 8 per cent came from Africa. Equally, troops from the West are easily deployed and sustained without donor assistance. Therefore, UNIFIL is incomparable to UNAMID, where all African TCCs rely on external support for their participation. Reportedly, sometimes UNAMID finds it difficult to find enough qualified African personnel from the continent to fill the high-ranking positions of officers, because of the UN's higher criteria for employment (ibid.). Therefore, the joint C2 structure and limited quality (training, credentials and experience) of African peacekeepers participating in the mission is thus far a factor in UNAMID's limited success in Darfur.

Consent, willingness and sincerity

As I note in Chapters 4 and 5, the consent, willingness and sincerity of conflict belligerents to accept a peacekeeping mission is one of the conditions for a successful peace operation. The literature on lessons learned in peacekeeping states that the likelihood of success is high when the belligerents consent and are willing to support the mission (Coulon and Liégeois

2010; Doyle and Sambanis 1999; Fortna 2004; Heldt 2001). As was the situation under AMIS, UNAMID does not have the sincere support of Khartoum and the various armed groups. This is because the armed intervention was launched without the approval of all the main parties in conflict. This situation is better explained by the frequent fragmentation of rebel movements with multiple leaderships and the absence of an effective and all-inclusive political process to which neither the Sudanese government nor the various armed and non-armed groups in Darfur are committed. This problem is compounded because most of the leaders of the armed groups do not have diplomatic acumen and are also politically inexperienced. They lack the necessary skills associated with peace mediation and understanding of the importance of a peace process and/or agreements as the basis for peacekeeping interventions and sustainable peace.

Different interests of parties to the conflict make total cooperation with UNAMID more daunting. Let it be clearly understood that AMIS could not achieve much because the parties refused to support the mission. The rebel groups saw AMIS as an impartial peace arbiter and it thereby lost their confidence and a majority of civilian populations. The situation under UNAMID is not much better. The rebels believe that since UNAMID's mandate invited the GoS's consent, and accepted that the primary responsibility for civilian protection lies with the Sudanese government, the hybrid mission compromised its impartiality. The implication for this, as the rebels see it, is that UNAMID needs the cooperation of the GoS to operate and succeed in Darfur; therefore its coordination with Khartoum in the conduct of its operations should not be a surprise. This scenario makes many Darfurians and armed groups sceptical of the impartial character of the hybrid mission. This problem becomes embedded due to the feeling among some segments of the population in the IDP camps that UNAMID is not providing the protection that they deserve (International Crisis Group 2014). This is probably because UNAMID lacks full support and cooperation of the parties to the conflict.

The Doha Peace Process lacks the inclusion of key, armed groups, which is tantamount to failure. The rebel group that signed the Doha Agreement, the LJM, is more or less the creation of international mediators associated with the Doha Peace Process, because they were eager to unite as many armed groups as possible that would negotiate as a united front with Khartoum on behalf of the people of Darfur. Unfortunately, this was not effective, because the LJM is politically a weak movement that has little influence on the people of the region (International Crisis Group 2014; The Enough Project 2011). The inability of LJM to enjoy the support and allegiance of the majority of Darfurians makes the attainment of durable peace based on the provisions of the DDPD very unlikely. It is therefore apparent that for UNAMID to succeed, it needs the cooperation and support of the GoS and the rebels, without which the operation's success will be a mere aspiration rather than a reality.

Provision of sufficient sense of security to the parties

Like AMIS, UNAMID's mandate accords the primary responsibility for civilian protection to the GoS. But if the first tier of protection fails, the civilian protection responsibility becomes UNAMID's. The danger here is that the hybrid force lacks capability and is not empowered by its mandate to confront the GoS. With this scenario, the extent to which UNAMID is able to provide a sense of security to the armed rebels is limited. Since there is power asymmetry among the parties, the GoS does not need UNAMID's assistance for security provision because the Sudanese armed forces and police, in Khartoum's view, are capable of doing this without assistance. There is a perception among the parties, especially GoS's opponents, that Khartoum should not be trusted and that there is the compelling need to provide for the GoS's opponents' own security against the threats from the Sudanese forces. Van Lijn (2008: 3) has argued that for this spiral to be stopped, a peacekeeping operation must provide another source for a sense of security: "Parties generally perceive their security to increase if the ceasefire is monitored by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and robustly mandated force." Presently, rebels perceive that UNAMID is not capable of guaranteeing their security. The main protagonist, the GoS, does not feel threatened by the armed groups due to the power imbalance between them, coupled with its armed forces' frequent attacks on rebel targets. The rebels are not willing to cooperate with UNAMID in implementing its mandate, because they consider the mission to lack the power needed to confront Khartoum. Hence, the armed rebel groups perceive UNAMID to be a weak force that is unable to provide sufficient security; this makes it impossible for the mission to control the rebel movements in Darfur. It also becomes one of the factors in UNAMID's operational difficulties, for these same reasons.

Problems associated with the untimely deployment of a peace mission and at the inappropriate time

For all intents and purposes, UNAMID was not deployed rapidly at the right time, due to a number of factors explained earlier. A timely and correctly deployed peace mission can has a high degree of success. However, if the conflict situation has not reached a mutually hurting stalemate or is not ripe for resolution, according to Zartman (1995), a peace mission has a more limited role to play (also see Zartman 2011). Late deployment of peacekeepers risks the danger of a fairly stable conflict situation relapsing into a deadly conflict scenario, which may prove difficult to solve. This is why both the Brahimi Panel (2000) and Heldt (2001) emphasised the importance of keeping to the barest minimum the period between the signing of a peace agreement and peacekeeping deployment: in order to maintain an impetus for peace.

At the time of the signing of the DPA, JEM, Abdul Wahid al Nur's faction and others of SLM/A still believed in military victory. If a more robust peace mission like UNAMID had been deployed in the first place instead of AMIS,

it would have provided these armed groups with a sufficient sense of security than the thinly resourced AMIS, and then the parties would have been more likely to trust in the effectiveness of the mission. In other words, a more robust peacekeeping force at that time would have had credibility and the ability to implement its mandate, since the situation in Darfur was not yet as complex as it is currently. The late deployment of UNAMID contributed to the intensity and complexities of the conflict with the fragmentations of armed groups into various subgroups, which is having negative consequences on the hybrid operation. Thus UNAMID's deployment did not take place at a right moment because "such a possible moment passed when AMIS was deployed. At that time, the moment would have been ripe for an operation similar to UNAMID" (Van der Lijn 2008: 32). This makes sense because the situation at the time was relatively more stable. Furthermore, late deployment and the slow increase in power and capability of UNAMID made the conflicting parties, especially the rebel groups and the people of Darfur, very sceptical of the ability of the mission to succeed in implementing its mandate. This is why it lacks full cooperation of the armed groups.

Conclusion: lessons learned from UNAMID and looking to the future

In this chapter, I have examined UNAMID to ascertain the extent to which it has been able to achieve its mandate and provide security in Darfur and protect civilian populations. The idea of UNAMID as a hybrid operation came about because of Khartoum's vehement opposition to the UN peace operation (foreign force) in Darfur and the AU's peacekeeping ineffectiveness in really addressing the problems at hand. The persistent problems of African peace operations were visible during the active life of AMIS, which explains why the African mission did not fully realise its mandate. Under AMIS, the existence of the triangular area of tension in African peace operations is such that the AU's determination to operationalise the APSA in deploying AMIS was not genuinely supported by the AU's lack of peacekeeping capacity and the lack of political will of African states to fulfil their responsibilities as promised. Therefore, the logistical limitations and other problems that confronted AMIS are evidence of the problems of the AU's regionalised peace operations and its failure to learn from its previous peacekeeping operations and those of other RECs, especially ECOWAS. This conclusion is reached mainly because relying on or building on lessons learned from previous operations would have helped the AU to plan AMIS on a more realistic basis with regard to force strength and an achievable mandate. Thus, most of the challenges that confronted AMIB in Burundi also resurfaced in Darfur for AMIS.

UNAMID has improved on the capacity limitations of its predecessor and ameliorated the security and humanitarian situations in Darfur. Despite

these efforts and achievements, total peace has not been achieved, and the mission is yet to fully realise its mandate. The mission has achieved, to some extent, negative peace, while positive peace, as a function of addressing the roots of the conflict, has yet to be achieved. Lack of consensus among conflicting parties about how to address the underlying conflict is the main reason why positive peace remains elusive in Darfur. While the UNAMID operation looks promising as an effective peacekeeping model in Africa, especially in the ways it improved on the shortcomings of AMIS, the intrinsic problems of hybridisation of peace operations such as the institutional partnership, strategic authority, and unity of C2 issues make UNAMID a less than perfect peacekeeping model through which to address Africa's armed conflicts effectively.

Based on the UNAMID experience, future peacekeeping operations involving the AU and the UN need to take the following into consideration in order to avoid facing similar problems. First, at the operational level, the UN needs to incorporate more specialised capabilities that are lacking in the African forces. Part of the challenge for UNAMID is dealing with inadequate logistics and the provision of such capabilities. Strategic and tactical airlift capacity could help the mission to effectively defend civilians. Without these critical capabilities, such as transport and aviation assets, the mission is finding it difficult to quickly transport troops and equipment over its vast theatre of operations. The July 2008 ambush of a UNAMID convoy in which seven peacekeepers were killed illustrates this point further. In this regard, Diop, Peyton and McComville (2012: 2) stated that without helicopters to "stage a rescue or reinforcement mission, the convoy was left defenseless. Tactical airlift is needed to ensure that peacekeepers are, at minimum, capable of providing security for themselves, a prerequisite for defending civilians." Second, continuous and sincere funding from the UN and international community to any joint peacekeeping operation is equally important for the mission to effectively defend its mandate. However, this does not mean that the AU and Africa should sit by without honouring sincere financial commitments and contributions to such peacekeeping efforts. Part of the reason for the AU's marginalisation in the UNAMID structure is the organisation's inability to present itself as a serious peacekeeping partner, since its contributions to UNAMID are below expectations. The AU has not demonstrated enough commitment to running UNAMID. For example, as one respondent said, the UN officials visit UNAMID regularly than the AU officials in nearby AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. In a similar manner, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations regularly demands reports from UNAMID, whereas the PSC hardly ever does. A former senior UNAMID official raised this argument during my fieldwork when he said that when he was working with UNAMID, the mission hardly ever received directives from the AU Commission, and that it is very surprising that the AU is running a joint mission in this way. Therefore, a more committed AU

through the political will of African leaders is needed to support such operations as UNAMID with logistics and financial contributions from within Africa if the AU is to be seen as an effective and genuine partner.

Unlike the current situation in Darfur, future hybrid peace missions will be better and effectively operationalised if there is, at the strategic and decision-making levels, maximum cooperation between the partner institutions. The experience with UNAMID, where the AU was left out of most of the planning meetings during the transition phase, is not an effective recipe for running efficient and successful hybrid operations. As Nerland (2011: 421) stated, the AU is marginalised to the extent that most donor and planning meetings held at the UN headquarters, especially during the transition period, were without AU officials, despite the purported hybrid nature of the mission. Based on UNAMID's experience, it is obvious that proper consultation between the UN and the AU is necessary. This is also true for the RECs and TCCs and their full participation in the integrated mission planning process. Using these basic conditions at the planning stages of a mission and putting them into practice will help to identify and address the problems that are likely to ensue in the proposed hybrid mission at the earliest possible time, and avoid disastrous consequences later.

Conclusions: What Works, What Doesn't and Why?

The overarching objective of this study was to examine the African Union's peacekeeping role in African conflicts and also to learn from these operations in order to better understand how to build on these lessons to improve the outcomes of AU peace operations in the future. The review of the literature in the field of armed conflicts, peace operations and those international and African institutions designed to manage conflict, formed the basis for developing a framework for the study. Reviewing the literature also assisted with developing the research questions as well as in designing the field research instruments. The field research and the data analysis provided an empirical basis for the study. Moreover, the research questions were addressed by juxtaposing field data with the information gathered from the scholarly literature. This chapter will follow the structure of this book by revisiting the research questions and addressing them in relation to interpreting the results of the study.

By engaging in designing the concluding chapter, I am setting out to understand the designing of what works as opposed to what doesn't in relation to the planning and implementation of actions involved in the AU's peace operations, with respect to their bid to secure peace and security in Africa. Furthermore, I elucidated the issue of "success" of peace operations where I analysed and underlined the issues of the political success of the peace missions examined in this book (both the UN and AU-mandated operations) as distinct from the organisational and financial issues associated with peace operations. I demonstrated that despite the AU's organisational weaknesses and resource constraints, the pan-African institution has been able to demonstrate greater political flexibility in its responses to many threats to African peace and security, thereby making AU peace operations more timely, appropriate and adaptable.

One of the questions that I addressed in this book was: Considering the emerging patterns from recent African conflicts, what problems are associated with UN peacekeeping operations in Africa that have attempted to manage these conflicts? The UN is, undoubtedly, the principal custodian

of international peace and security, but a critical examination of its peace operations in dealing with post-Cold War African conflicts revealed many problems (both political and organisational), which accounted for its failures in such conflict contexts as Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s. These failures reinforced the belief of African leaders that UN peacekeeping was unreliable and could not guarantee African security.

My analyses of the various UN peace operations in Africa have made it evident that the nature of post-Cold War African conflicts constitutes the greatest challenge to the traditional peacekeeping model with its "holy trinity" principles. This is because the consent of conflicting parties is very difficult to secure. Also, most of the parties are non-state actors, predominantly fighting to achieve parochial interests.

The difficulties that lead to unreliable UN peace operations in African conflicts are deep-seated. First, in terms of the political issues and difficulties, the problem of the UN is clearly seen when there is a lack of consensus, mainly among the P-5, when it comes to the question of what to do when faced with some very complex and complicated African conflicts. The weight of politics at the UN as an institution, and at the UN Security Council in particular, delays organisational responses to African security challenges. This is particularly so when the strategic interests of the P-5 are not threatened or at stake. The UN is a very political organisation and the politics (among the P-5 in particular) behind most of the political and security issues in the UN make it difficult for the organisation to make prompt decisions. This situation is detrimental to successfully resolving African conflicts. The consequences of the excessive politicisation of issues are such that the deployments of UN peace missions in Africa are invariably delayed – as the experiences of UNAMID and ONUB (in Burundi) revealed – no deployment at all eventuates – as the present situation in Somalia illustrates – or there is a withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, as in the cases of Angola (UNAVEM III), Somalia (UNOSOM II) and Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the 1990s.

The problems with UN peace operations in African conflicts become inflamed because there is a general lack of political will to deal with or resolve some of the internal conflicts, especially those that occur within the context of so-called collapsed states. Equally, the major powers are not interested in sending their troops to UN peace operations in Africa. This situation is quite surprising because for many years African soldiers have been involved in UN peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world. It is noteworthy that between 1948 and 2008, African troops participated in 53 out of 63 UN peace operations. And troops from Africa accounted for 40 per cent of the peacekeepers deployed worldwide during the same period (Adebajo 2011: 17).

Turning to the second issue contributing to UN peacekeeping failures in some African conflicts, especially in the 1990s, these operations were sometimes challenged by a lack of required logistics. A high degree success is possible when peace operations are provided with the resources and

support needed. There is little evidence from this study that the international community genuinely provides assistance to UN peace operations in African conflicts, particularly in the immediate post-Cold War period. More often than not, these operations have faced enormous challenges. UN peacekeepers deployed in volatile conflict situations are not well supported in terms of provision of required capability when compared against other UN peace missions outside Africa. Those UN peace operations in Africa that achieved relative success, such as UNTAG and ONUMOZ, came at a tremendous cost to the missions. This argument extends to the UN's financing of AU-mandated peace operations. The level of the UN's assistance to the AU's peace operations is not encouraging. The substantial reduction to the AMIB budget by the UN Security Council and the slow disbursement of funds to AMIB support this assertion. The UN's financial assistance to AMISOM for example, was first majorly based on voluntary donations from member states rather than from the UN assessed budget. This lack of financial support at least partly reveals the level of the UN's unreliability as a peace guarantor in African wars.

Despite these challenges and the poor record of UN peace operations in some African conflicts, some credit could still be given to the organisation where it is due, because the world body has been able to contain and bring a few conflicts to an end. This was the case, for example, in managing the civil war in Liberia, where UNMIL is now in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. Another example of the United Nations' remarkable performance in African conflicts is in Sierra Leone, where UNAMSIL ended the country's civil war and transferred the responsibility for maintaining law and order to the Sierra Leonean authorities in September 2004.

However, the UN's peace operations have also not been able to resolve some other post-Cold War African conflicts. The problems associated with the failures of UN peacekeeping in Africa, especially with institution's inability to prevent genocide in Rwanda, have reinforced the African leaders' belief that the black continent has been given a lesser place in terms of gaining genuine assistance from UN peacekeeping. The consequence of the perceived marginalisation of Africa by the African leaders resulted in their quest to find solutions to the continent's problems through regional efforts. This is encapsulated in the AU's "African solutions" idea and agenda, and the APSA.

Furthermore, I have addressed the question of whether the APSA is an appropriate instrument for transcending Africa's security problems. I have established that the APSA is an appropriate security regime, judging by the way it is conceptualised. APSA was conceptualised to take full account of Africa's multilayered security challenges, and it incorporated the required response instruments to guarantee the continent's security. The APSA clearly epitomises the African leaders' resolution to prevent, manage and take greater ownership of the continent's security challenges. However, the

danger here is that the optimistic views embedded in the APSA's framework are not certain to eventuate. For example, there are chasms between the APSA's aspirations and the African Union's implementation capabilities. This expectations-capabilities gap makes the reliance on and the effectiveness of the security mechanism highly uncertain when it comes to addressing African security quandaries. Definitely, much effort has been expended on the APSA's development, and the mechanism's norms, values and standards have been applied on a number of occasions to tackle threats to African security. The security architecture is presently being confronted with many deep-seated challenges, such as the lack of African states' political will, resources (financial and human), and the AU's capacity weaknesses. This doleful situation is making the AU overly dependent on external donors for the operationalisation of its security architecture. Overreliance on donors outside the continent creates problems for African ownership of the mechanism. Consequently, the ability of the AU to maintain legitimacy and credibility in managing African security is far from guaranteed. As long as African states continue to depend excessively on external donors and fail to secure independent sources of funding for the APSA, the mechanism's objectives will continue to be difficult to achieve. On this basis, I conclude that the APSA offers a hypothetical but as yet unfunded solution to African security problems. However, the effectiveness of the APSA to guarantee African security is a function of the level of commitment and seriousness of African leaders. Their level of commitment, which are defined in terms of their strong political will and the resources they are willing to commit to realising the grand vision of finding African solutions to African conflicts.

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Are the AU regionalised peace operations adequate in managing and finding durable solutions to the post-Cold War African armed conflicts, especially in relation to AMIB, AMISOM and AMIS? The deployments of these peace missions provide evidence of the AU's commitment to the APSA and to free Africa from the scourge of virulent armed conflicts. The deployments of African peacekeepers in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia by the AU represent a political success for the organisation in its peace operations. The AU's proactive stance in dealing with these African conflicts clearly indicates its genuine bid to deal with violence and war in Africa, especially if one takes into consideration the UN's reluctance to get involved in the absence of peace agreements. In Burundi, the UN was unable to deploy because a comprehensive peace agreement was not in place, and in Somalia, the UN refused to deploy troops on the grounds that there is "no peace to keep." Apart from the fact that the deployment of AU peace missions shows the world the organisation's commitment to guarantee African security, the greater political flexibility associated with the organisation made these deployments possible. Unlike the UN Security Council, where the P-5 are veto-wielding states, the AU PSC's structure and operational procedures are designed to be flexible and adaptable to fast-changing security situations

on the continent. This factor continues to contribute to political successes in AU's peace operations, especially in the area of the organisation's prompt responses to African security challenges.

Despite the AU's pragmatism in resolving African conflicts and political successes in its operations, these missions are challenged in many ways. This brings to the fore the organisational and financial issues associated with AU peace operations. It is evident in this study that the AU's organisational weaknesses and financial constraints in terms of lack of logistics, funding and the low level of political will in many African states to provide adequate resources to AU peace operations combine to make it extremely difficult to conduct these peace missions as credible and effective operations that can fully achieve their objectives.

I have discussed these challenges under the APSA and also in the chapters dealing with AMIB and AMISOM. Further evidence points to the conclusion that AMIS was unable to completely realise its mandate, despite the fact that there was a decline in the level of lethal violence perpetrated when the mission was in place, and because of its challenges, the mission had to be taken over by UNAMID. Also, while relatively remarkable performances were recorded for AMIB, AMISOM cannot be seen yet as an operation that has fully achieved its mandate because of its many challenges; the fact is that this mission is still ongoing. The recent positive developments in Somalia – the inauguration of the new democratic dispensation that marked the end of the transitional administration – should be seen as a remarkable achievement for the African mission, but at the same time should not be interpreted yet as being a success for AMISOM. This is because the entire Somali territory is not yet free from attacks by the militant groups in opposition. Insecurity still prevails in Somalia, especially in the rural areas. Additionally, the deep-rooted causes of the Somali conflict have not been properly addressed, as external involvements are driven by various agendas, while peace processes follow a top-down (rather than a bottom-up) approach, which is somewhat problematic when searching for durable peace. Since the AU's (and the international community's) peacemaking efforts have not been able to properly address the roots of the Somali conflict and forge genuine national reconciliation, the political success of the AU peace operation in Somalia is not yet total.

The findings that reflected on difficulties involving AU peace operations revealed a number of issues aside from the problem of poor funding and lack of political will among African leaders. First, the AU's organisational weaknesses are such that its strategic capacity deficiencies or "management gap" was evident during the AMIS operation, while the UN and the EU assisted the AU in planning AMISOM. Therefore, the deficiencies of the AU result in inappropriate mission planning, inadequate and restricted peacekeeping mandates, and planning peace missions with unrealistically small force numbers: all ingredients for peacekeeping failure. And, as I stated earlier,

effective and sincere political processes do not support most of these operations. This factor is one of the reasons why AMIS could not fully achieve its mandate, while similar difficulty is presently being encountered by AMISOM. The AMIB operation had established three factors that are important for overall peacekeeping success: deploying a peace mission to support a political process, which the belligerents have agreed to allow; credibility and diplomatic acumen of the political head of a peace mission; commitment and resources from the lead nation on a peace mission. All are needed to make up for the capacity deficiencies of the AU, and they helped AMIB to achieve relative success in Burundi. However, these factors – with the possible exception of the second – are unfortunately lacking in AMISOM at this time. Therefore, the AU's peace operations promise to provide near-ideal solutions to the post-Cold War African conflicts based on the argument advanced by the optimists in support of regional peace operations. However, inasmuch as the problems confronting the APSA continue, and the peacekeeping capacities of the AU are still not fully developed, the African Union's peace operations will be facing the same kinds of problems in the future. Consequently, the AU's peace missions will not be able to guarantee peace and security in Africa, at least not in the foreseeable future.

The hybridisation of peacekeeping in relation to UNAMID was examined in this book in order to ascertain whether it offers the best alternative peacekeeping model to address armed conflicts in Africa. Generally, my analysis of UNAMID established that the joint peace operation efforts by the UN and the AU institutions in Darfur have, with the help of the UN's peacekeeping experience and resources, been able to address some of the problems of the AU's peace operations, especially those caused by the AU's organisational weaknesses and resource constraints. The security and humanitarian situations in Darfur, in relative terms, has improved, compared to how things generally were under AMIS. However, UNAMID is beset with the inherent problems associated with the hybridisation of peace operations, especially those relating to building an effective peacekeeping partnership between the institutions involved, and the issues of C2, among other things. Some of the problems facing UNAMID are rooted in the problems of most African peace operations. This is because the AU, due to its challenges, does not seem to present itself as a serious, equal and effective peacekeeping partner, if one considers how its contributions and commitment to UNAMID are far below expectations. This situation has become a problem, especially for the AU, due to the complex process involved in realising the parallel or dual AU/UN accountability embedded in the UNAMID concept. The outcome of this process is that the AU appears to be marginalised in UNAMID's structure. These problems of UNAMID notwithstanding, I have established that hybrid operations can improve the conduct of peace operations in Africa. Since the UN's peace operation in Darfur, there are major indications of improvement in the management of the logistical constraints and also in

addressing the technical capability limitations of the AU, although on a very small scale. This development has had a positive impact on the conduct of the UNAMID operation compared it to the efforts of its predecessor, AMIS. Despite the improvements in the conduct of the peace operation in Darfur, positive peace has not been achieved in the region. While I acknowledge the strengths of the alternative hybrid peacekeeping model, as well as some of its inherent problems, I argue that inasmuch as the AU fails to demonstrate strong commitments and has problems providing the needed funds and logistical support to any joint peacekeeping efforts with the UN – and even if these obstacles are removed – the African institution will continue to be marginalised by the UN. Thus, I conclude that the hybrid operation is not the perfect peacekeeping model for African conflicts, but it is substantially better than any other existing models at achieving more positive outcomes with respect to regional conflict management.

How should peacekeeping in Africa develop? From the analysis of the various UN peace operations in Africa and the three case studies – AMIB, AMISOM and AMIS/UNAMID – I have established firstly that any peace operation is a very delicate endeavour; it is also highly resource intensive. I have argued in this book that the UN is better placed, due to its resources and experience, to conduct credible and effective peace operations in Africa. However, the UN's internal problems have made it difficult on some occasions to reach a consensus and/or deploy peace missions in a timely manner, due to a lack of consensus among the P-5 of the UN Security Council. This inability to reach consensus about peacekeeping deployment, in at least some African conflicts, has made African leaders see the UN as an unreliable peace guarantor in Africa. Although the AU has demonstrated a strong resolve to conduct peace operations in a bid to manage African conflicts, it does not have the capacity to deploy and sustain complex peace operations. While these problems are acknowledged, and also taking cognisance of the fact that Africa is an impoverished continent, the AU still needs the genuine support of the UN to carry out its peace operations, in spite of the new pan-Africanisation of its security cooperation and prevailing approach to regional peace and security management. This revelation is related to the fact that the AU/UN peacekeeping partnership can make up for some of the AU's peacekeeping capacity shortfalls.

The AU/UN peacekeeping partnership does not necessarily mean the deployment of hybrid peace missions, but such partnerships should accentuate the continuing development and enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity. Building the status of Africans as competent peacekeepers and improving African peacekeeping capacity requires strong political will and resources from within Africa and also the genuine support of the UN and the wider international community. Future deployments of AU peace operations need to be structured in such a way that they can be built into the UN structure. This implies that African peacekeeping capacity needs to be developed

in such a way that the AU can rapidly deploy peacekeepers to conflict areas, due to the advantage of proximity, political success associated with its peace operations, and other benefits associated with regional peace operations. The AU should be able to sustain its peacekeeping missions pending the UN taking over or coming in to support the AU's activities, in a genuine partnership that respects African efforts to manage peace in their own neighbourhoods. While the APSA and its African solution idea is promising, the present reality in Africa is that it is doubtful and highly uncertain if the AU will be able to ever deploy and sustain multiple complex peace operations simultaneously through its independent efforts, as envisioned in its African Solutions agenda, without the support of the international community. This situation points to the fact that Africa still needs the UN for its peacekeeping capacity building. Therefore, the development of peacekeeping in Africa lies in the genuineness and strength of the AU/UN peacekeeping partnership. It is in line with this assertion that I would concur with Gorman (2008: 2) who argued that although regional peacekeeping operations can provide for some temporary solutions and relief during a serious humanitarian crisis that is ongoing, in the absence of improved and joint cooperation with and support of the UN, regional peacekeeping will not gain much ground with respect to realising durable peace and managing security.

Findings related to the five research sub-questions allow me to revisit the overarching research question for this book that: What can be learned from the African Union peace operations in the process of guaranteeing African security, and how can the AU build on these lessons to produce better peace outcomes from its peacekeeping in the future? The positive and negatives aspects of the AU peace operations in Somalia, Burundi and Darfur in terms of political success of the pan-African organisation's operations as well as the challenges confronting the organisation in developing the APSA have made it evident that the African solutions to African problems agenda – which has its origin in the OAU's "Try Africa First" approach to conflict management – reflects African leaders' good intentions. However, I argued further that it is overly ambitious for a relatively young organisation like the AU to pursue and achieve these goals independently without genuine international support taking cognisance of the present realities in Africa. What can be learned from all of the AU peace operations examined in this book is that the organisation needs much more time to develop its conflict management capabilities, including peacekeeping capacity and experience, in close partnership with the wider international community, for the AU to become a credible and effective peacekeeping actor. In the process of developing the APSA and collaborating with the UN, I argue that the AU is learning from the world body, and through this synergy of effort, the organisation will be able to conduct more successful peace operations in the future.

The research results I have reported in this book identify a number of policy implications regarding AU peace operations. Applying the lessons

learned about these implications could assist African security experts and peacekeeping practitioners, and especially policymakers and mission planners at the AU Commission, as well as the RECs in Africa to conduct credible and effective peace operations with more positive outcomes in the future. This study adds to knowledge and expands understanding of Africa's approach to security management, which is built on the APSA. The analyses of results yield insights into the nexus between the APSA, Regional Mechanisms, AU peace operations and their respective and collective challenges. First, African peace operations and the APSA are confronted with problem of African leaders' lack of political will. The absence of a total commitment from the political leaders on the continent to the AU's security management activities, in terms of matching rhetoric with action, has had a negative impact on AU peacekeeping efforts. Several research studies have shown that lack of political will is the foundation issue for most of the problems facing the AU in operationalising the APSA and building its peacekeeping capacities. African leaders need to be more committed to the AU and the APSA to achieve the objectives of the security architecture. To demonstrate full and genuine support for the APSA and AU peace operations, political leaders on the continent must not only provide financial resources, but they should also further contribute meaningfully by ensuring the readiness of the ASF through with whatever logistical backup they can provide when it is needed. This kind of support is also needed in other areas of the AU's main conflict management instruments, such as the CEWS and the PoW. In other words, African leaders must be committed to the idea and ideals of the APSA through practical actions, not only by words and promises.

Due to the developing nature of the African economy and the lack of commitment of African leaders to the AU, the organisation has had to rely majorly on external donors to fund its peace operations and the APSA. This is very dangerous in the sense that such funding is neither predictable nor guaranteed. Equally, overreliance on funding from outside the African continent creates avenues for donors to interfere with and influence AU decisions on the APSA and its peace operations; this makes the African ownership of the APSA uncertain. Lack of African finance for AU's peace operations, and the AU's overreliance on external donors' funds has meant that there is an absence of a strong, interlocking, indigenous system for planning and managing peace operations within Africa. Therefore, strengthening the AU Peace Fund is urgently needed. As well, the AU needs to look inwards and devise methods of generating financial resources from within Africa. The fund can be enhanced by repeatedly urging the AU member states to contribute meaningfully to the fund, perhaps based on a reasonable proportion of GDP for economies of individual member states. Other internal options and avenues can also be explored by the AU to enhance its financial resources for its peacekeeping and other security management activities. These internal options include taxes on minerals

and resources, companies, aviation, and sales of arms. The AU also needs to adopt the community levy approach, which worked for ECOWAS. In addition to the less-reliable annual contributions from member states, ECOWAS adopted a policy through which the institution imposed a 0.5 per cent levy on all imports and exports from its member states (known as the ECOWAS Community Levy) that mobilises about 80 per cent of ECOWAS's annual operational budget, while donors' contributions account for the remaining 20 per cent. This approach could work for the AU (Vines 2013).

Extending this argument further to support what I have proposed above, Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 22) argue that those who benefit and make more profit from security in Africa should be made to realise that they need to contribute more substantially to their security. Examples of such institutions and individuals are the multinational corporations (such as the oil companies and other extractive industries, big business, and telecommunications companies) and super-rich Africans who are famous for tax evasion. Sesay and Omotosho (ibid.) argued further:

> They should all be made to contribute a percentage of their annual profits, no matter how small, to the Peace Fund at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. However, collection and remittance of their contributions to Addis Ababa should be the responsibility of the Member States. In the interim, a special account should be opened in each country where the contributions would be paid into pending their transfer to the African Union in Addis Ababa.

Policymakers at the AU Commission and the African leaders need to ensure that the AU/UN peacekeeping partnership idea covers how the UN can use its assessed member contributions to fund AU peace operations with authorisation of the UN Security Council. The AU/UN partnership needs to cover important areas of UN's support for African missions with logistics and other technical capabilities. The partnership should also cover the UN's support for long-term AU institutional capacity building. Besides, since the EU is one of the principal partners of the AU in developing the APSA, the procedures and rules governing the EU's African Peace Facility (APF) mechanism need to be reviewed and revised. The revision of these rules and procedures will make them flexible, and as a result, the APF will be applied strategically to address immediate needs of the AU on the ground. The AU must be able to present itself to its partners as a credible organisation that can effectively administer funds. The AU should bolster its financial management systems in order to ensure appropriate mechanisms for the disbursement of funds and accountability.

While the AU has made significant efforts to operationalise its security mechanism, it is pertinent to review the level of development and readiness of the various components of the APSA's institutional framework,

and of course I do not mean only the ASF. While the ASF has received the desired attention and significant resources, the same cannot be said of the mechanism's civilian dimension. Currently, this aspect of the APSA is not as developed as its military component, and this lopsided policy on the part of the AU has been criticised by other studies of the security architecture (de Coning 2007, 2010). Policymakers at the AU Commission need to consider an increase in the amount of resources devoted to building up civilian capacities as part of the security mechanism. This is urgent because of the vital roles played by civilians in peace operations, as demonstrated by CIMICC in Burundi.

To further enhance the standing capacity of the AU for peace operations, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the pan-African organisation should take the issue of training seriously. It has established some partnerships with Africa's national and regional centres of excellence (police and military colleges at the national level, and peacekeeping training centres such as the Accra-based Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre). However, more use of these kinds of knowledge production organisations and better training programmes are needed for African peacekeepers to be more effective. The practical limitations and dependency on foreign assistance by these institutions need to be addressed by national governments in collaboration with the AU.

Also regarding the military component of the APSA, it is important that the ASF includes an aviation brigade. Its establishment would enhance the capacity of AU peacekeeping missions, especially in their aerial capabilities, as this will address the problems of accessibility in some mission areas such as Darfur where wide expanses in the interior of the continent are largely inaccessible by roads.

I have argued earlier that the AU Commission is deficient, and its incapacities have had a negative impact on its peace operations, especially in the area of mission planning. The main problems are inadequate staff strengths, especially at the Peace and Security Department, a weak bureaucratic structure, AU staff incompetence, a strategic capacity weakness or management gap and inadequate funding. The combination of these problems makes it difficult for the AU to effectively deliver on its promises of the APSA. For example, the management gap and lack of staff competence necessitated sending UN and EU officials to the AU Commission to provide strategic and technical guidance to AU officials in the process of planning AMISOM. Therefore, the AU should draw much more from the experience and competencies of other regional organisations with similar security agendas, such as the EU, which can assist the AU in effectively building its institutional capacity.

The AU and its PSC should consider a set of issues in planning and implementing future peace operations. The mandates of future peace missions need to be matched and supported with adequate resources. The

proposition is that the peacekeeping mandates should be issued after a full assessment of the situation on the ground. The assessment should identify the resources at the AU's disposal for effective mandate implementation. I have established that the AU peace operations suffered from a capabilities-expectations gap in the sense that peacekeeping mandates were most often drafted without a realistic assessment of the exigencies on the ground, and without considering whether adequate logistics are available for their implementation.

The AMIB experience offers useful lessons for decision makers and policy analysts at the AU Commission and the RECs. Recognised lead African nations with extensive peacekeeping experience and capabilities that are ready to commit significant resources to the success of the operations should lead future AU peace missions. Nigeria's leadership role in the ECOWAS's peacekeeping and intervention operations in West Africa serves as a model for this. The African Mission in Burundi highlighted the importance of the experience, skill, dexterity and credibility of the political head of the peace mission. The AU peace operation in Burundi's experience demonstrated that if a peace mission is not led by influential, skilled and credible special representatives of the AU Commission Chairperson, this would, in the long-run, challenge the credibility of the AU peacekeeping mission.

Based on the above discussions, I revisit Hull and Svensson's (2008: 4) argument: "To sustain and develop AU capacity to conduct PSOs (peace support operations) two things need to happen. Firstly, the organisation's institutional capacity needs to be strengthened in the long-term and secondly, AU member states need to be provided with the resources needed to enable their successful participation in AU PSOs." While these propositions are important, the second needs further explanation. Although the capacity weakness in African peace operations is noticed, I argue that no matter the level of international support to AU peace operations, if political will from within the continent is lacking, successful peace operations will not ever take place. Equally, long-term AU institutional capacity building should be given more priority than direct mission support. Problems internal to the AU obviously affect the full development of the APSA and African peace operations in negative ways. However, external assistance to the AU is sometimes misguided, as it has not always been the most appropriate with respect to matching its needs. Some countries have preferred to provide bilateral assistance through their own assessment of the AU's current needs and provide direct mission support. Despite the fact that such assistance is important, what Africa needs much more is genuine international support to the APSA, which will address such urgent problems as ill-equipped, ill-trained African troops and a lack of strategic lift capabilities. Certainly, external assistance is needed for strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities; however, the AU should not rely too much on this kind of support because it has not happened according to plan or expectations.

The examination of the AU's peacekeeping role established that the organisation's peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives are promising. The AU is a relatively young regional institution, and the challenges it faces have not enabled the pan-African organisation to fully develop its capability and institutional capacity for effective peace operations. This position is clear, judging from its experience in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan (under AMIS). My final thought is that the AU's peace operations are not totally effective due to the challenges confronting Africa's premier organisation (principally the AU's organisational weaknesses, financial constraints, and lack of political will of the African leaders). African peacekeeping cannot work well under the current conditions, independently and only with African efforts and resources. The case studies examined in this book showed that the AU's peacekeeping requires substantial inputs from the UN and the wider international community as well. There is an urgent need for the institutionalisation of genuine and joint international peacekeeping partnerships underlined by strong political support with coordinated capacity building between African and other international security and non-security actors. The AU could be an effective and credible peacekeeping actor if and when the UN, the AU (including the RECs) and the wider international community recognise and admit that peacekeeping is a global responsibility.

Although African leaders have shown interest in taking greater responsibility for managing conflicts on the continent, the present realities in Africa confirm that the continent still needs the UN when setting out to manage conflicts. As far as the AU's African solutions idea goes, African leaders need to play much more significant roles through their sincere commitments, actions and strong political will in supporting the AU. With evidence of strong commitment, resources, funds, expertise and manpower forthcoming from African countries to the AU, the institution will be able to garner more international political support for the APSA and AU peace operations. This security model should involve peace and security actors from Africa as well as the wider international community through the UN apparatus. However, Africa cannot continue to expect the majority of funding to materialise from outside the continent; it has to find ways and means of paying more for African peacekeeping with funds generated from within Africa. Otherwise, the cycle of insecurity and the need for peacekeeping will continue to feed a dependency pattern, which is not healthy for the aspirations of an independent AU working for African peace and security. Nevertheless, the mandatory assistance and support from the UN apparatus would still be needed in line with the global agenda for peace.

On this note, I argue that the former AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, is incorrect when, during the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in July 2012, he said, "The solutions to African problems are found on the continent and nowhere else." There is no doubt that the AU is determined to guarantee

African peace and security, but presently, the continent is deficient in many ways when it comes to conflict prevention and resolutions.

This situation demands that both Africa and extra-African peace and security actors have important roles to play in this endeavour. This is apparently the new trend in peacekeeping in Africa or new networked-patterned in the international security architecture and peace operations that involve close collaborations among national, regional and international security actors, as the present peacekeeping efforts in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) illustrate.

I underlined the importance of this security model in the introductory part of this book. Here, I examine this security model in some details with reference to the situations in Mali, the CAR and South Sudan. The regional and international diplomatic, peace and security interventions in response to the political crisis and security threats that engulfed Mali in early 2012 (the Islamist armed groups uprisings in the country's North and the subsequent coup d'état against President Amadou Toumani Touré) reflect this new networked pattern in the international security architecture, especially in African security management. The West African (ECOWAS) mediations led to the signing of a framework agreement that called for the establishment of a transitional government in April 2012. Consultations among ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and Mali's transitional authority resulted in the deployment of a UN Mission in Mali in January 2013 – a multidisciplinary UN presence under UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. Mali's deteriorating security situation, especially in the Islamist-occupied North, led France to deploy *Opération Serval* in mid-January 2013 to support the Malian armed forces. French forces were deployed against the backdrop of Africa's inability to field a credible intervention force in the country at the initial stage of the conflict. *Opération Serval* was followed by the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The combined African, French and Malian military operations improved the country's security situation, to some extent. After the offensive military operations, which saw the retreat of the Islamist armed groups in the North, France withdrew the majority of its forces. AFISMA was quickly absorbed into the UN mission: the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established by UN Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. MINUSMA was mandated to support the political process and stabilise Mali. *Opération Serval* provides a robust parallel force with MINUSMA. The EU deployed a training mission of 200 trainers to train Malian government forces with the objective of creating four battalions or approximately 3,000 troops.

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a country that has been challenged by decades of political instability and conflict. The CAR's current conflict started in December 2012 when the Muslim Séléka rebel group launched a series of attacks against the government. The rebellion spurred regional and

international mediation efforts that resulted in a peace agreement signed in the Gabonese capital, Libreville in January 2013. The Libreville Agreement failed to stop the rebels from seizing the CAR's capital city, Bangui, and subsequently unseated President François Bozizé in March 2013. Bozizé later fled the country, at which time a transitional government, tasked with restoring law and order throughout the country, was established. The transitional administration failed to live up to expectations, as the conflict grew brutal when the mainly Christian anti-Balaka movement took up arms and intercommunal clashes raged in Bangui. The conflict devastated the country, state institutions collapsed, many people lost their lives, and many were internally displaced and sought refuge in neighbouring countries (Dersso 2014: 6–7).

The UN has been very instrumental in finding peaceful solutions to the CAR's conflict. Before the current war, the UN has been maintaining a presence in the country, especially since January 2010, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) has been assisting in peace consolidation and strengthening the CAR's democratic institutions. Due to escalating violence and worsening security and humanitarian situations, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2121 (2013) in order to make the presence of BINUCA more effective on the ground. As part of the UN efforts to strengthen the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, Resolution 2121 amended the mission's mandate in five areas: BINUCA was to provide support for the implementation of the transition process, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance, stabilisation of the security situation, promotion and protection of human rights, and coordination of international actors involved in the implementation of those tasks.

By December 2013, the conflict had taken on a sectarian dimension; it became more brutal and threatened the continue existence of the CAR as a state. As a result, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2127 (of 5 December 2013), authorising the deployment of an AU-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) and the French-backed peacekeeping force, *Opération Sangaris*, to put an end to the violence. The Security Council also mandated BINUCA to support MISCA and called on the UN Secretary General to "undertake expeditiously" contingency preparation and planning for the possible transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping operation. MISCA and *Opération Sangaris* helped, to some extent, to reduce the scale of violence, particularly in Bangui, and saved lives, but the vast geographical area of the CAR, the scale of the crisis, and inadequate number of peacekeepers deployed did not enable the missions to cover their theatre of operation in patrolling activities. The challenges that confronted MISCA and the French forces on the ground later made the security situation tenuous, with human rights violations and violence continuing unabated. The deteriorating situation compelled UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to call for a comprehensive and integrated response to deal with multifaceted

political, security and humanitarian situations in the CAR. Consequently, in February 2014, Ban proposed to the council a six-point initiative that he believed would end the conflict. As part of his proposal, which he referred to as a bridging measure pending the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, Ban called for the quick strengthening of MISCA and *Opération Sangaris* and the deployment of additional troops and a police component, provision of logistics and financial support to the African forces, the coordinated command of international forces, a rapid infusion of tangible support to the government of the CAR, and the acceleration of the political and reconciliation processes in the country, among other things.

As part of its effort to see the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to the CAR, Ban, in his report (S/2014/142) submitted to the UN Security Council on 3 March 2014, recommended the deployment of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with civilian protection as its major priority. The proposed UN mission would be composed of MISCA troops and additional willing TCCs. Furthermore, Ban Ki-moon believed in the important role of other actors (national, regional and international) when he said that the conflict would not be solved in the absence of continued engagement of the CAR's neighbours and the broader international community. He urged regional and international actors to increase their efforts to support the country, recognising their respective comparative advantages. Following Ban's effort, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2149 (of 2014) and established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for an initial period until 30 April 2015. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the council authorised MINUSCA to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. The UN Security Council tasked Ban with subsuming BINUCA into MINUSCA from the date of adoption of Resolution 2149 and smoothing the transition from BINUCA to MINUSCA. Upon successful completion and the expiration of MISCA's mandate, and in line with the letter of Resolution 2149, MINUSCA officially replaced MISCA on 15 September 2014. Before this date, especially from April 2014, MINUSCA performed its tasks through its civilian component, while MISCA continued to implement its tasks in line with Resolution 2127. It was not until 15 September 2014 that MINUSCA started implementing its mandate through its military and police components, while the French forces are to, from the commencement of the activities of MINUSCA until the expiration of the UN mission's mandate, use all necessary measures to provide operational support to elements of MINUSCA. The French soldiers are to perform their mandated tasks within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment.

The responses of regional and international security actors to the conflict in South Sudan have shown the importance of the issues of the complexity of

some of the post-Cold War African conflicts. Complexity and intractability of some conflicts on the continent demand the involvement of many actors in peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions. South Sudan's hard-won political independence in July 2011 was, unfortunately, followed by a civil conflict between the government of South Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) opposition faction. As part of the regional and international mediation efforts, the UN, AU, and IGAD, among others, have been very instrumental in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. In January 2014, the warring parties signed two documents on the (1) cessation of hostility and (2) status of political prisoners. Despite reports of many ceasefire violations, the warring parties signed a follow-up document of "Implementation Modalities" for the ceasefire in February 2014 in the presence of IGAD's mediators. On 13 March 2014, the 25th Extraordinary Summit of the IGAD Heads of States and Government in Addis Ababa deliberated on the political and security situation in South Sudan. In the summit communiqué, the IGAD leaders said the summit "authorises the prompt deployment of a Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) from the region with a clear mandate and operational guidelines as part of the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan." The PDF is to protect military observers themselves as well as infrastructures in South Sudan.

Since IGAD's authorisation of the PDF, the organisation has been negotiating with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the kind of relationship that will exist between the African PDF and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), for the PDF is supposed to operate along UNMISS and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). UNMISS is a successor mission to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and it was deployed in July 2011 to help Africa's newest nation, South Sudan. UNISFA was authorised by the Security Council with the adoption of Resolution 1990 (of 27 July 2011) due to escalating violence and population displacement in the Abyei area. it was established based on the agreement reached in Addis Ababa between Khartoum and the SPLM to demilitarise Abyei and allow troops from Ethiopia to monitor the area (Digest, Peacekeeping Missions Update, International Peacekeeping 2012). The mission was mandated to monitor the flash point border between north and south Sudan and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. It was authorised to use force to protect civilian populations and humanitarian workers in Abyei. UN forces in South Sudan are expected to assist with monitoring the ceasefire between Juba and SPLM/A opposition. UNMISS's relationship with the proposed African PDF is a function of the outcome of the discussions at the UN Security Council on the adjustment of the UNMISS mandate. Thus, as Freear and de Coning (2013: 2) stated,

> The number of actors and the variety of different development, diplomatic and security interventions thus make for a complex and often

> unwieldy network of international peace and security actors. However, in both Mali and Somalia, this complex network of international and regional actors, and the total cumulative effect their combined efforts are able to generate, are indicative of the shape future international interventions are likely to take, namely a networked-pattern of multi-stakeholder cooperation and partnerships.

Therefore, this new development in peacekeeping in Africa may have prompted Vines (2013) to say, "Some of these security challenges are African problems that need international solutions; and the RECs, AU and UN all have important roles to play." And while responding to Jean Ping's statement above, Vines concluded, "Not all of Africa's peace and security problems can be solved by Africa alone but APSA does provide a useful vision framework by which to seek entry points for Africa and international partnership."

On the basis of this argument, new developments in international security management, and particularly peacekeeping in Africa, I take a slightly different position from Sesay and Omotosho's (2011) when, in proposing an alternative conflict management framework for the AU, they argued for it to do away with the ASF and instead allow the RECs to carry out this task. The scholars based their argument on the advantages that the RECs have over the larger AU in terms of regional peace operations. Sesay and Omotosho contend that the AU could instead perform the role of "unifier," "bridge builder" and "mobiliser" (ibid) in supporting RECs in their conflict management efforts. The major flaw of this proposition could be deciphered in their statement that, "This alternative is more realistic since some of the regional economic communities, RECs, already have more advanced and credible mechanisms that have been tried and tested" (2011: 18). While it is undeniable that both ECOWAS and SADC have developed their conflict management capabilities, thanks to the existence of their sub-regional superpowers Nigeria and South Africa respectively, the situation is not the same across RECs, as Sesay and Omotosho have themselves admitted; not all the RECs have credible and operational security mechanisms.

The danger of this proposition is that in some of the RECs, in North and East African regions for example, it is difficult to identify a pivotal state or states that can commit resources to ensure the operational readiness of effective security architecture. The question is, what will happen to the North African subregion that does not have an operational security mechanism in case of deadly armed conflicts in the subregion? Should the AU pay only sparse attention to North Africa? This is an unsustainable proposition. Therefore, the AU will still have the major role to play as a security actor in Africa in close collaboration with other regional and international security actors, so the APSA needs to be fully developed and supported as soon as possible.

Thus, the ideal pathway for future development of peacekeeping in Africa is that the AU will continue to develop its conflict management capacity and experience to effectively deploy stabilisation forces to conflict zones within Africa. When the African peacekeeping capacity is developed further, the AU will be able to keep peace in dangerous environments via rapid deployment and maintenance of its forces before the UN forces (and forces of other international security actors) are brought in to support their efforts. This situation is applicable to all the RECs because the UN is often overwhelmed in its peacekeeping activities across the world. What this scenario suggests is that for the foreseeable future, the UN will continue to rely on both the AU and the RECs for managing armed conflicts in Africa. The future peacekeeping trend on the continent requires the UN to continue supporting the AU in its efforts to develop its conflict management capability, while Africa also needs to contribute more to this endeavour, no matter how bad the state of the continent's economy. The AU and the RECs should expect more peacekeeping roles in the future since conflicts (of different intensity) are still prevalent in Africa. Furthermore, many more wars will undoubtedly erupt in Africa in the future unless its leaders deal with the problems associated with human security, in terms of socioeconomic development and well being of its people, which are linked to political stability. The future role of the AU in security management will be enhanced if it was to focus more on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy as a dissuasive strategy rather than have to engage all the time in actual peacekeeping deployment, which is very capital intensive, and also involves the loss of lives of valued peacekeepers.

In conclusion, the AU's pivotal peacekeeping role and its coordination with the RECs in managing African conflicts are not in doubt. However, the continent still needs the UN and the international community to support its peace and security initiatives. The AU/UN peacekeeping partnership needs to be developed further to deal with the problems confronting the APSA. Accordingly, AU peace operations should be addressed through the adoption of all-encompassing strategies that help it to move towards an independent position from which it can operate with confidence to manage violent armed conflict on the continent with full backing of its member states, without which it will not be able to deliver African solutions to African problems and it will continue to be overly dependent on major outside funding. Socioeconomic development is the key to liberal peace in Africa. Managing violent armed conflict in Africa is a means of creating secure space in which such socioeconomic development can take place. It is also a step forward in cultivating a durable positive peace.

Notes

Introduction

1. The Protocol was signed in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002 and entered into force in December 2003.
2. The APSA comprises the PSC and its supporting institutions, namely: the African Union Commission (AU Commission), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Peace Fund, and the African Standby Force (ASF) and its Military Staff Committee (MSC).
3. Between 2004 and 2008, the AU authorised four peace operations in the Comoros – MIOC (2004), AMISEC (2006), MAES (2007–2008) and Democracy in Comoros (2008).
4. UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility", A/59/565, 2 December 2004.
5. UN Security Council Resolution 1809, S/RES/1809. 16 April 2008.
6. UN General Assembly and Security Council, "Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations", A/63/666-S/2008/813, 31 December 2008.

1 Conceptual Framework and Some Background Issues

1. The UN peacekeeping operations failed woefully in such African conflicts as Angola, Somalia and Rwanda. Piiparinen (2010: ix) argues: "Rwanda of 1994 was the ground zero of a country and an organisation ... It also shattered the credibility of the UN conflict management system." In fact, the Rwandan crisis is regarded, probably, as the worst failure of peacekeeping.
2. It should be noted that while the two chapters have the same goal of maintaining international peace and security, Chapter VI authorised the two organs – the United Nations General Assembly and the UN Security Council – to deal with potential breaches, while Chapter VII empowered the UN Security Council to address the situation when international peace is actually breached.
3. Note that this kind of situation is not necessarily or always driven by altruistic ideals.
4. UNEF II was created in October 1973 when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.
5. Between 1945 and 1988, the UN conducted 13 peacekeeping operations, and during this period, the organisation gradually developed its peacekeeping principles (Lyons and Samatar 1995). Between 1978 and 1988, no peacekeeping operation was authorised by the UN (Weiss 2007: 39).
6. It is reported that at the height of the war, Cuba maintained close to 50,000 troops in that country. See Badmus (2003).
7. UNSC Res 435, S/RES/435 29 September 1978.
8. The case of Somalia is discussed extensively in Chapter 5. The review of the UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement experiences in Somalia is just to highlight the enormous challenges that confronted its peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts in the country.

9. It was believed the implementation of the agreement would jeopardise the position of Habyarimana's party and his Hutu ethnic group.
10. ECOMIL was assisted by 200 US soldiers stationed off the coast of Monrovia. These troops provided ECOMIL with logistics.
11. By early 1995, the RSLMF had become a larger-than-bloated, ill-trained organisation and had become part of the country's problem.
12. The mission was expanded to 11,000 troops through UN Security Council Resolution 1289 of 7 February 2000 and later to 20,000 troops.
13. See "Fifth Report of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone." S/2000/751, 31 July 2000, p. 9.
14. The rebels were *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire), *Mouvement Populaire du Grand Ouest* (the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West), and *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (the Movement for Justice and Peace). The rebels later formed a common front known as the Forces Nouvelles, which later became the Republican Forces and supported Gbagbo's political rival, Alassane Ouattara.
15. Author's confidential interviews with a research professor of international security, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, February 2011.
16. Angelov (2010: 603) states that the Charter established a framework for UN/regional agency cooperation, but failed to prescribe a clear role for regional agencies. He asserts that such a scenario should not be unexpected and unsurprising, for as Hummer and Schweitzer (1994: 687) have argued, the Great Powers deliberately avoid granting regional agencies "undue legitimacy and attributing to them too much weight by entrenching them any further in the Charter."
17. The Charter refers to them as regional arrangements/agencies.
18. Boutros-Ghali first favoured regionalisation of peace operations, but he later argued against the approach.

2 The Rise of African Union Regionalism

1. The post-Cold War period has been described as the second wave of regionalism in Africa. The first period is associated with Pan-Africanism and the decolonisation process in Africa. For an excellent discussion of the two periods, see BØås (2001).
2. Interesting literature on regionalism includes Best and Christiansen (2008); Farrell, Hettne and van Langenhove (eds) (2005); Fawn (2009); Grant and Söderbaum (eds) (2003).
3. This is true particularly for a regional hegemon.
4. During this period Egypt was known as the United Arab Republic (UAR). The UAR, which existed between 1958 and 1961, was a political union between Egypt and Syria.
5. Algeria was represented by its provisional government, as its independence only came later – in July 1962 – through armed struggle.
6. The Brazzaville group – comprised mainly of a number of Francophone African countries of West and Central Africa – met in December 1960 and preferred to safeguard their territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to maintain close cooperation with France. This group came to be known as conservative because they rejected communism in Africa. On the other hand, the Monrovia group included also some of the conservative governments and countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, Dahomey (now Benin Republic),

Ethiopia, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and stuck to a model that was mid-way between the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups by accepting the Pan-African unity idea but favouring a gradual approach to its realisation.

7. The security challenges to Africa during this period included the mutiny in Tanzania in 1964, mercenary invasion and seizure of Kisangani in Zaire in 1967 and Portuguese invasion of Guinea in November 1970. The OAU Defence Commission was nowhere to be found.
8. See Proceedings of the first meeting of the Defence Commission, Proposal by Ghana. DEF 1/Memo 3, Accra, Ghana, 31 October 1963.
9. DEF 1/Memo 3/Revised, Accra, Ghana, 31 October 1963. Revised proposal by Ghana co-sponsored by Nigeria.
10. CM/Res. 635 (XXI), Resolution on the Inter-African Force of Intervention.
11. "AIDS in Africa." Retrieved from http//: www.globalchange.com/aidsafrica.htm (accessed 24 October 2010).
12. Some of the arguments in this section build on Isiaka Badmus "Africa: In Search of Security after the Cold War", *Africana Studia: International Journal of African Studies,* vol. 11, 2008a, pp. 203–245. .
13. Memberships included the states of the outgoing and incoming OAU chairmen. This was important to provide for a flawless transition.
14. These scholars are correct according to the limited available OAU financial statistics. As of June 1998, the debt of the organisation stood at $48 million, while only 20 member states met their financial obligations. The organisation's finances worsened in the subsequent years. In May 2000, only 22 of the 53 members paid in full, and the total arrears amounted to $48.8 million. See Berman and Sams (2000: 65). For analysis for the 1997/98 OAU fiscal year, see Vogt (1999: 319).
15. These countries are also hegemonic states in their respective subregions.
16. Khalifah Fhimah was acquitted in January 2001, while Abdelbaset Ali al Megrahi died of prostate cancer on 20 May 2012.
17. Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, the Comoros, Liberia, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Seychelles are some of the countries that Libya helped to pay their arrears to the OAU.
18. Mbeki was the deputy president of South Africa during this period.
19. The CSSDCA redefined security in Africa where there was a conceptual shift from regime security and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference to that of human security.
20. These principles are discussed extensively in Chapter 3.
21. Though under different name, the Executive Council mirrors the OAU Council of Ministers. See Articles 10–13 of the Act and Articles XII–XIV of the OAU Charter.

3 The African Peace and Security Architecture

1. This situation, together with Somalia's, reinforces the argument that the international community, especially the West, is not concerned about African problems. See Ba (2006), Kioko (2003).
2. Aning (2008: 9) argues that the growing number of UN Security Council Resolutions and presidential statements adopted and the frequency of issues considered by the AU PSC that are subsequently referred to the UN Security

Council attest to the burgeoning AU/UN partnership, especially in the area of peace and security. In fact, the APSA is conceived to facilitate partnerships among the UN, the AU and the RECs.

3. PSC Protocol, Article 2 (2).
4. Article 3 (a) to (h) and Article 4 (d) of the Act spelt out the imperatives of and the need for a CADSP and eventually called for its establishment. In line with this, the meeting of the African Ministers of Defence and Security (AMDS) at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in January 2004 adopted a draft framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy while the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the AU Heads of State and Government held in Sirte, Libya in February 2004 officially adopted the Solemn Declaration on the Common African Defence and Security Policy as Africa's 'blueprint' or conceptual framework in the continent's search for peace and stability (Neethling 2005a: 1). The CADSP, which is largely based on the concept of human security, identifies common African security threats as well as principles, values and objectives of such a policy. Furthermore, it elaborates on the mechanism and the building blocks of the CADSP. See Touray (2005).
5. The Act, Article 9 (g).
6. Article 5 (2) of the Act allows for, in addition to the principal organs of the AU, the creation of "other organs that the Assembly may decide to establish."
7. Article 22 of the PSC Protocol replaces the Cairo Declaration and supersedes the resolutions and decisions of the OAU relating to the OAU Mechanism.
8. PSC Protocol, Article 3 (a) and (e).
9. At the launch of the PSC, Africa's leaders were highly optimistic that its establishment "marks an historic watershed in Africa's progress towards resolving its conflicts and the building of a durable peace and security order" (African Union 2004: para. I).
10. The inaugural member countries of the PSC were elected during the 4th Ordinary Session of the AU held in Addis Ababa between 12 and 16 March 2004.
11. This is in accordance with Article 8 (13) of the PSC Protocol.
12. This is in line with Article 8 (9) of the PSC Protocol.
13. PSC Protocol, Article 5 (2a–j).
14. The first members of the PSC were Gabon (Central Africa), Ethiopia (East Africa), Algeria (North Africa), South Africa (Southern Africa) and Nigeria (West Africa). Those elected to serve for two years were Cameroon and Congo (Central Africa), Kenya and Sudan (East Africa), Libya (North Africa), Lesotho and Mozambique (Southern Africa), Ghana, Senegal and Togo (West Africa).
15. Williams (2010a), using different sources, argues that seven members – Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Rwanda and Zimbabwe – are not free according to the 2010 Freedom House's Report. Six of them – Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania and Rwanda – are autocracies based on the Polity IV Global Report 2009, while two – Chad and Nigeria – are sites of protracted armed conflicts based on the Heidelberg Institute's Conflict Barometer 2009.
16. The term is borrowed from Williams (2010a).
17. The AU Policy Framework was approved in 2004.
18. These foundation documents were adopted by the ACDS and approved by the AMDS.
19. These consist of mapping exercises (MAPEX), command post exercises (CPX), and field training exercises (FTX).

20. EURORECAMP is the EU action plan to strengthen African capabilities.
21. "AMANI Africa: Promote and Protect Peace and Security in Africa". retrieved from http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/news/amani-africa-"promote-and-protect-peace-and-security-africa" (accessed 21 July 2011).
22. "The Peace and Security Department." retrieved from http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/psd (accessed 7 July 2011).
23. Ibid.
24. The division also deploys liaison officers and special ambassadors, supports regional peace efforts, and assists in the reconstruction efforts, among other responsibilities.
25. "The Peace and Security Department." Retrieved from http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/psd (accessed 7 July 2011).
26. PSC Protocol, Article 12 (1).
27. See PSC Protocol, Article 12 (5).
28. PSC Protocol, Article 11 (1).
29. In 2010, the AU Assembly expanded the PoW's composition. The body now includes an appointed group named, "Friends of the Panel of the Wise." This group is appointed on the same criteria as the PoW. Between 2010 and 2013, the members and friends of the PoW were Ahmed Ben Bella (North Africa) (Member, Chairperson; 2nd and last term); Mary Chinery-Hesse (West Africa) (Member, 1st term); Salim Ahmed Salim (East Africa) (Member, 2nd and last term); Marie-Madeleine Kalala (Central Africa) (Member, 1st term); Keneth Kaunda (Southern Africa) (Member, 1st term); North Africa (vacant, Candidate to be announced. Status: friend); Elisabeth K. Pognon (West Africa, 2nd and last term); East Africa (vacant, Candidate to be announced. Status: friend); Miguel Trovoada (Central Africa) (Friend, 2nd and last term); and Brigalia Bam (Southern Africa) (Friend, 2nd and last term).
30. Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Appointment of the Members of the Panel of the Wise, taken at the 8th Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 29–30 January 2007 (Panel Assembly/AU/Dec.152 (VIII)). Retrieved from http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2007/January/summit/doc/Decisions%20and%20Declarations%20-%208th%20Ordinary%20Session%20of%20the%20Assembly.pdf (accessed 9 October 2009).
31. The modalities detailed key roles of the PoW and how the panel mandates are to be carried out.
32. Although members of the PoW were selected in January 2007, its inauguration was delayed because of the disagreement among the PSC members concerning the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel. Article 11 (7) of the PSC Protocol empowers the Chairperson of the AU Commission to draft the modalities and have them approved by the PSC.
33. PSC Protocol, Article 21 (1). The fund provides the needed financial resources for peace operations and other operational activities.
34. PSC Protocol, Article 21 (2).
35. The AU's external partners can be categorised into bilateral and multilateral donors. Bilateral donors include United States, Canada, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Japan; the EU and the UN are multilateral donors.
36. The summit declared: "It is critical that AU Member States meet their financial obligations, so that the organisation's dependency on external aid is reduced, and that sustainability and ownership guaranteed. It is also true that the

implementation of APSA is taking place at (a) time when demands on the (AU) organisation increase exponentially. In a context where capacities are stretched to the limit, and where organisational development, training and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions and sustainability of APSA are many."

37. Of this amount, "€126.4 million came from each African country's contribution of 1.5 per cent from its allocated envelope, while the remaining €123.6 million were transferred from unallocated resources (reserves) of the 9th EDF."
38. The last replacement was financed through additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) from EU member states, as funds under the EDF were no longer available.
39. Author's confidential interview with a senior researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
40. Author's confidential interview with a senior AU official, African Union Liaison Office, Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
41. Author's confidential interview with a UN Official, UNMIL Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
42. Author's confidential interview with a colonel and former ECOMOG peacekeeper, Nigeria Army Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, February 2011.
43. Author's confidential interview with a Colonel and former ECOMOG peacekeeper, National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2011.
44. "Evaluating the Readiness of the ASF: AMANI Africa-Cycle Complete." Retrieved from http://www.the-african.org/blog/?p=37 (accessed 27 June 2011).
45. Author's confidential interview with a lieutenant colonel, UNMIL Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
46. Author's confidential interview with a Lieutenant Colonel, African Union Liaison Office, Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
47. Author's confidential interview with an AU official (political analyst), Peace and Security Department, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
48. Author's confidential interviews with a colonel and former UNAMID peacekeeper, Nigeria Army Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, February 2011, and a senior research fellow, African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, Abuja, Nigeria, April 2011.
49. The existing eight RECs are (1) The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), (2) The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), (3) The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), (4) The East African Community (EAC), (5) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (6) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), (7) The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and (8) The Southern African Development Community (SADC).

4 The African Mission in Burundi

1. See Communiqué of the 20th Summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, November 2003. According to the Communiqué, AMIB serves as a "shining example and model of African solutions to continental security challenges."
2. AMIB was preceded by South Africa's military deployment in Burundi – the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD).
3. See "The World Factbook: Burundi." Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html (accessed 22 August 2011).

4. The pre- and post-colonial histories of Burundi and Rwanda are intertwined. Both were ancient kingdoms with similar ethnic composition and social structure. Rwanda and Burundi gained independence from Belgium in 1962. In 1890, the Tutsi kingdom of Urundi and its neighbouring Ruanda were colonised and incorporated into German East Africa. Germany lost control of its colonies in Africa after its defeat in the First World War. As a result, the administration of the two kingdoms was entrusted to Belgium as part of the League of Nations Mandated Territories. As part of the Belgian Colonial Empire, Ruanda and Urundi became a UN Trust Territory after the end of the Second World War. In 1962, Urundi was separated from the Belgian-administered UN Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and became an independent monarchical state under King Mwambutsa IV (Lemarchand 1970, 1995; Weinstein and Schrere 1976). Since Burundi and Rwanda were previously part of the Belgian-administered Ruanda-Urundi Territory, events in either of these countries shape the post-colonial politics of the other and vice versa.
5. The pre-colonial Burundian society was characterised by socioeconomic inequalities that were further strengthened by European colonisers. During the colonial period, power distribution and traditional authority were left intact as they were in the pre-colonial period, and traditional authority became an ally of colonial power. Furthermore, Weinstein and Schrire (1976: 8) have argued that the colonial rule emphasised each individual's identity, and then attributed social values to each tribe. Thus, the Tutsi were recognised as innate rulers, wily and aristocratic, and Burundi's history was believed to be – and equated with – the history of the Tutsi. On the other hand, the Hutu were seen as boorish workers who feared and respected the Tutsi as their masters. Then the Tutsi became involved in colonial administration. (Also see Manirakiza 2005.)
6. Soon after independence, special commando units were created under Captain Michel Micombero, a Tutsi officer. Afterwards, the Burundian army was fractured along ethnic lines. After independence, the Burundian army became Tutsi-dominated.
7. Burundi was under four successive governments during this period.
8. The violent intra-Tutsi squabbles were between the Tutsi-Hima from the South and the Tutsi-Banyaruguru from the North. Micombero and the majority of his ruling clique were Tutsi-Hima from the Bururi province.
9. The US Committee for Refugees described the tragic event as a "slow-motion coup" (cited in Bellamy and Williams 2005).
10. Ntibantunganya was the Speaker of the National Assembly at the time of Ntaryamira's death and served as the interim president of Burundi to October 1994.
11. These armed groups further splintered into four principal groups. The original CNDD-FDD was under the leadership of Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, while Charles Nkrurunziza headed the major CNDD-FDD faction. Agathon Rwasa led the major faction of the FNL, while a small faction of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL was controlled by Alain Mugabarabona.
12. These odds included the accusation that Mandela was biased to the Hutu cause.
13. The Arusha agreement provided for a political transition by an interim government to lead to democratic elections; the creation of a Senate and amendments to the composition of the National Assembly; judicial and military reforms to reduce Tutsi domination and facilitate the reintegration of rebel forces into the army; establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee; an international military force to assist in the management of the transition; and an independent investigation into alleged crimes of genocide.

14. The decision was taken at the ambassadorial meeting of the Central Organ. Before the meeting, AMIB's deployment had been approved by the heads of state meeting of the Central Organ at its 7th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 3 February 2003.
15. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm[XCI]. "Communiqué of the 91st Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level," Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2 April 2003, Para. 5[ii].
16. The third deputy from Uganda did not deploy.
17. See "Report of the UN Secretary General on Burundi," S72004/210, 16 March 2004.
18. Aboagye (2004: 15) gives details of the contributions and pledges as follow: (1) AU Peace Fund: $300,000; (2) Italy: €200,000; (3) EU: €25 million, earmarked for Burundi, with the understanding that unless peace was restored there, any investment would be wasted and would not achieve its desired ends; (4) United States: $6.1 million for airlift of Ethiopian contingent and 60 days' sustainment in the mission area; (5) UK: $6 million for the Mozambican contingent; (6) South Africa: funding for the Mozambican contingent; (7) Denmark: approximately $1 million for insignia and medals; (8) Germany: €400,00; and (9) other unspecified commitments when redeemed.
19. Author's confidential interview with a lieutenant colonel, Nigeria Army Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, February 2011.
20. Author's confidential interview with a senior official of the United Nations University for Peace (Africa Programme), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
21. See UN (2000), *Basic Facts About the UN*.
22. Pushkina (2006: 140) has argued that this factor is not a major determinant of a successful peace operation as there is no substantial correlation between the involvement of a major (or a permanent member of the UN Security Council) leading a UN peace operation and its success. According to this scholar, major powers led UNTAG to success, while the same cannot be said of UNOSOM II and UNAVEM III. Pushkina concluded: "The results are less conclusive when it is noted that the two successful missions (ONUMOZ and UNTAES) had no definitive political leadership from any member of the Security Council."
23. Author's confidential interview with a senior AU official, Conflict Management, Resolution and Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
24. Ibid.
25. Author's confidential interviews with a senior official of the United Nations University for Peace (Africa Programme), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011, and a colonel and former ECOMOG peacekeeper, Ghana Army Headquarters, Burma Camp, April 2011.
26. Author's confidential interview with a senior AU official, Conflict Management, Resolution and Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
27. Joint Operations Plan.
28. See the edited version of the interview granted by AMIB's head of mission, Ambassador Mamadou Bah, in *Conflict Trends*, no. 2, 2005.
29. Relying on the resources of lead nations in peace operations, if not well-planned, may result in such nations' influence and pursuit of their agendas within the mission.

30. Author's confidential interview with a colonel and former ECOMOG peacekeeper, Nigeria Army Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2011.
31. Author's confidential interview with a senior official of the United Nations University for Peace (Africa Programme), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
32. Author's confidential interview with a colonel and former ECOMOG peacekeeper, National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria, April 2011.

5 The African Union Mission in Somalia

1. The conflict has displaced about 1.5 million people; half of the country's population are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, while more than 500,000 people have fled to other countries as refugees.
2. The transitional administration ended in August 2012 and the FGS was inaugurated in September 2012 under the leadership of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Prior this period, the Islamist militant groups opposed the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG's supporters included the *Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa* (The People of the Sunna and the majority), a Sufi clan-militia that opposes *al-Shabaab*'s interpretation of the Sharia Law. The *Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa* also supports AMISOM.
3. al-*Shabaab* was a youth-dominated militia of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in the early 2000s. As at May 2011, the group's troop strength was estimated at 14,426 militant (Nduwimana 2013).
4. *Hizbul Islam* is a coalition of four Somali factions: the Hassan Dahir Aweys's led Eritrea faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS-Eritrea); the Hassan Abdullah Hersi' Al-Turki's led *Ras Kambooni* Brigades/group; the Mohammed Ibrahim Hayle's led *Jabhatul Islamiya* (Islamic Front) and the *Mu'askar Anole* (Anole School). These groups have one common purpose – they fought against Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia between December 2006 and January 2009. See Botha (2010) and Kasaija (2010).
5. IGAD is a sub-regional organisation that is composed of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. Eritrea left the organisation in 2007 in protest against Ethiopia's military presence in Somalia (Mulugeta 2008).
6. Ethiopia supported the TFG while Eritrea is believed to have been supporting some Islamist armed groups especially *al-Shabaab*.
7. See Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 19 January 2007.
8. AMISOM is preceded by AMIB (2003–2004), AMIS (2004–2007) and AMISEC (2006).
9. The Italian Somaliland is presently covering the central and southern Somalia.
10. For many Somalis and the Somali Government, "Greater Somalia" represents their true nation that encompasses Somalia, Somaliland, and the Somali speaking regions of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.
11. The clan groupings of the Somali people are important social units, and its membership plays a crucial role in the culture of the people of, and politics in, Somalia. Clans are divided into sub-clans, sometimes with many sub-divisions. The main clans are the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq, Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle) and Meheri (Sabala 2011: 116).
12. The first post-independence Somali government was dominated by the people from the south of the country, while their northern counterpart became marginalised. The president of the first government of the Somali post-colony was from

the Hawiye clan from the South, while Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, a Majertan, was made the Prime Minister. The government was made up of four Darod; three Hawiye; three Sab and two Isaaq. Besides, only two clan families, Hawiye and Darod, dominated politics during this period. Also, during this period, elites from specific clans dominated political power and the Somali economy (Bongarzt 1991: 14).

13. In composition, Barre's government was made up of half Darod (primarily Maheeran Darod) mostly from the Ogaden region and other members were from the Hawiye clans from south Somalia and Kenya, and from the Isaaqs of western Somalia and Djibouti.
14. It was clearly stated in the SRC's maiden foreign relations statement to the nation that the new military regime was determined to defend the people's right of self-determination and that it would "support…liberation movements whose peoples and countries are under illegal occupation" (African Contemporary Records 1969–1970: B175 cited in Spears 2010: 134).
15. The regime later reverted to clan politics and favouritism.
16. The Somali armed forces had become Barre's personal militia.
17. The analysis of the insurgencies that ended Barre's dictatorship is beyond the purview of this study. For a detailed account of the various opposition groups and armed insurgencies against Barre, see Gardner and El Bushra (2004).
18. I have discussed the challenges to the three UN-authorised peace operations in Somalia in Chapter 1.
19. UNSC S/REC 733 (1992) "Imposition of Arms Embargo", 23 January 1992.
20. Sahnoun later resigned in October 1992 consequent on the disagreement with the UN Secretary General over UN tactics in Somalia. For details, see Adebajo (2011).
21. Efforts at re-establishing a functioning Somali state started in earnest following Barre's departure. The Arta Peace Process was preceded by international and regional peacemaking initiatives such as the Djibouti I & II Peace Processes (1991–1992), the Addis Ababa Peace Conferences (1993–1995), the Ethiopian-organised Sodere Process (1996), and the Cairo Conference (1997). For details on these peacemaking efforts, see Abraham (2002) and Menkhaus (1997).
22. Although the TNG was agreed to rule for three years, the president extended his term of office.
23. The ARPCT, formed in February 2006, was a coalition of nine Hawiye clan-militia leaders and it was supported by the US government to counter terrorism in the absence of a functioning government in Somalia. See Menkhaus (2007).
24. *Report of the 24th Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers*, Nairobi, Kenya, 17–18 March 2005.
25. AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007.
26. UN Security Council Resolution, 1744, S/RES/1744, 21 February 2007, paras 4,9.
27. AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007.
28. AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007.
29. AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007, para 9.
30. AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007.
31. See "Fact Sheet for AMISOM." Retrieved from http://www.premium.silobreaker.com/fact-sheet-for-amisom-5_2262330090920607744_4 (accessed 5 October 2011).
32. AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007. In the Burundi model, TCCs will be reimbursed for the cost of their deployment and self-sustained for the

duration of the mission with the promise of eventual reimbursement by the AU (see Chapter 4).
33. The support included transportation and communications equipment promised Burundi by the United States and France.
34. Author's confidential interview with a senior political officer, UNMIL Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
35. Ethiopia first intervened in August 2006 and withdrew its troops in January 2009.
36. AMISOM's new CONOPs was, respectively, adopted by the AU PSC and UN Security Council in January and February 2012. See AU PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCVI), "Communiqué" (306th meeting of the PSC), Addis Ababa, 5 January 2012, and UN Security Council, S/RES/2036 (2012), 22 February 2012.
37. As at October 2013, AMISOM's field strength of approximately 18,000 included: 5,432 Burundian, 999 Djiboutian, 4,040 Kenyan, 850 Sierra Leonean, and 6,223 Ugandan soldiers. Ethiopia maintained 4,395 troops in Somalia during this period.
38. Author's confidential interview with a Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
39. Author's confidential interview a colonel and former UNAMID peacekeeper, National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria, April 2011.
40. This argument is based on my interview with a senior AU official, Conflict Management, Resolution and Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
41. The SPMU, with proposed staff strength of 35 personnel from the UN, EU and AU, is the planning cell at the AU Commission that is responsible for planning AMISOM. See Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General," S/2007/204, 20 April 2007.
42. UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1809 (2008), 16 April 2008.
43. See para. 7a of the 2008 Djibouti Agreement.
44. *UN Secretary General Report on Somalia*, para 4.
45. Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 16 April 2009.
46. *UN Secretary General Report on Somalia*, para 82. Also see Williams (2009b).
47. Author's confidential interview with an AU official (Political Analyst), Peace and Security Department, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
48. See "Full text of Somali Insurgent Statement Warning African Peacekeepers." Retrieved from http://www.benadir-watch.com/2007%20News/0222_Warning_to_mercenaries.pdf.
49. Author's confidential interview with an AU official (Political Analyst), Peace and Security Department, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
50. Confidential interview with a senior AU official, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, May 2011.

6 The African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

1. The UNHCR puts the figure at 2.8 million (see International Crisis Group 2014).
2. Governments, international institutions and human rights organisations have interpreted the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur differently. While Physicians for Human Rights and UK-based campaigning group, Justice Africa, argue that the atrocities committed by Khartoum in Darfur and the sufferings of the people

of Darfur fulfill the legal definition of a genocide, other organisations such as Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group have argued that both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the *Janjaweed* militias are responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The Bush Administration, after the unanimous vote by the US Congress, termed it genocide.

3. See also: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Mission to Chad, 5–15 April 2004; UN 2003. Press Release, December 12, AFR/789 IHA/840.
4. This section is based on Badmus, I. A. (2011) "Contesting Exclusion: Uneven Development and the Genesis of the Sudan's Darfur War," *Journal of Alternatives Perspectives in the Social Sciences,* 3(3): 880–912.
5. The Condominium was an international agreement between Britain and Egypt for the administration of the Sudan. The agreement was signed in Egypt on 19 January 1899.
6. The regional government completely lost its credibility due to its partiality in the conflict. Since it was a Fur-dominated government, the Arabs in particular rejected the government force as being neutral.
7. The Naivasha Protocols (in Kenya) led to the signing of the 2005 CPA that ended the Sudan's second civil war.
8. According to the ICISS report, armed intervention of any kind undertaken on the basis of responsibility to protect must fulfil the following six criteria for the intervention to be justified as an extraordinary measure: (1) The Just Cause threshold (large-scale loss of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing), (2) Right Intention, (3) Final Resort, (4) Reasonable Prospect, (5) Proportional Means, and (6) Legitimate Authority.
9. Cited in Ekengard 2008.
10. This number was later increased to 80.
11. Author's confidential interview with a retired general of the Nigerian Army, Jos, North-Central Nigeria, April 2011.
12. This number included I, 703 Protection Force, 815 Civilian Police, 450 MILOBS and 352 other staff (International Crisis Group 2005: 5).
13. Appiah-Mensah (2005) labelled AMIS II an "enhanced observer mission."
14. Author's confidential interview with a retired general of the Nigerian Army, Jos, North-Central Nigeria, April 2011.
15. African Union, 2004 "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/Comm.[XIII]), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 July 2004, para. 8.
16. Author's confidential interview with a warrant officer, Logistics Company Limited, Nigeria Battalion 25 (NIBATT 25), Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
17. Only 5 countries – South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Gaddaffi's Libya – paid about 75 per cent of the AU Budget (Bergholm 2008: 29). Additionally, the African TCCs for the AMIS operation were financially incapacitated to deploy and sustain their troops.
18. Author's confidential interview with a colonel and former AMIS peacekeeper, Nigeria Army Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, February 2011.
19. Author's confidential interview with a retired general of the Nigerian Army, Jos, North-Central Nigeria, April 2011.
20. That is Resolution 1706.
21. In paragraph 63, page 17 of the report, it was stated that "bearing in mind that unity of command and control is a basic principle of peacekeeping, further clarity and agreement on the UN role in command and control will be required

by UN troop- and police-contributing countries in order to provide personnel for the hybrid operation."

22. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007).
23. UNAMID 2012 "Background" http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10998&language=en-US (accessed 5 July 2012).
24. UN Darfur Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/NEWs/dh/infocus/sudan/fact_sheet.pdf (accessed 25 September 2010).
25. Author's confidential interview with a warrant officer, Logistics Company Limited, Nigeria Battalion 25 (NIBATT 25), Monrovia, Liberia, May 2011.
26. Author's confidential interview with a research professor of International Security, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, February 2011.
27. Author's confidential interview with a senior researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2011.
28. See "Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment: Darfur Peace Process," Retrieved from httrp://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-darfur-peace-process.php (accessed 28 July 2012).
29. See "Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment: Darfur Peace Process," Retrieved from httrp://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-darfur-peace-process.php (accessed 28 July 2012).
30. A number of interesting sources of literature on the conditions for peacekeeping success and failure have been reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. Therefore, the analysis in this section focuses on the extent to which UNAMID fulfils these benchmarks without revisiting most of these sources again, to avoid repetition.

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