



African Journal of Politics & Society

ajpsquarterly.org Volume 1 No.1 October 2015

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Editorial Suite

An idea is born. The maiden edition of the *African Journal of Politics & Society* is published as a scholar's digest for multi-disciplinary understanding of social, economic, political, historical, and above all *Africanist* perspectives on and of African conditions. In this edition, efforts are made to assemble multiple issues with historical, political and social data that have been carefully and methodologically researched.

Mudasiru's paper on the political economy of legislative corruption in Nigeria uses a contemporary analysis approach to dissect the controversial nature and dynamics of corruption in the national parliament in Africa's most populous democracy. The piece finds a corollary argument in the strongly worded piece by Nwanegbo and Odigbo whose sharp perspectives throw a needed light on the connection between corruption, misgovernance and developmental dilemmas in the country. The latter make a sound case for viable democratic institutions and good governance as a way for the seemingly elusive development.

For Salahu, development should start from the grassroots. And in order to achieve this, the local government must be empowered to deliver quality services to the people. On political advertising, Jacobs's brief but succinct analysis makes a case for improved, ethical and regulated professional practices amongst the media houses.

Two largely historical and data-rich pieces in this edition are commendable. The history of the recruitment of the Akimba people into the Nigerian military and their contributions towards maintain peace and security in Nigeria and West Africa in the past three centuries was written by Kware and Wara; just as Tsuwa made a frantic effort to historicize the settlement patterns of the Tiv People in the Quaan-Pan Local Government Area of Plateau State. Oseni, Fatai and Saka wrote on godfatherism and the connection between the phenomenon and the 'military legacy of force'. Beyond state capture and the anti-democratic elements of godfather politics, the trio calls for an understanding of 'neo-godfatherism' which may strike a debate about the mentoring aspect of the controversial political style.

All in all, these articles are refreshing and the diversity of topics and the multi-disciplinary backgrounds of the contributions make this edition a uniquely maiden one. Please do read, and do contribute.

Thank you.
Editor.



Current Issue Vol. 1 No1 October 2015

Table of Content

- **The Legislature and the Political Economy of Corruption in Nigeria**
Surajudeen Oladosu Mudasiru, PhD
- **Governance, Corruption and Crisis of Development in Post-Independence Nigeria**
Jaja Nwanegbo, PhD and Jude Odigbo
- **Local Government Revenue and Performance: A Study of Selected Local Governments in Kwara State, Nigeria**
Moshood Olayinka Salahu

- **A History of the Akimba Recruitments into the Nigerian Army C. 1750-2013**
Aliyu Abubakar Kware, PhD & Mansur Abubakar Wara

- **Settlement Patterns, Security and Development in Nigeria: An Investigation on Tiv People of Quaan-Pan Local Government Area of Plateau State**
John Tor Tsuwa, PhD

- **Political Advertising as a tool in sustaining Nigeria's Democracy**
Babafemi Jacobs

- **'How to shoot yourself into power': Godfather Politics and Military Legacy in Nigeria**
Tunde Oseni, PhD, Abiodun Fatai, and Luqman Saka, PhD



The Legislature and the Political Economy of Corruption in Nigeria

Surajudeen Oladosu Mudasiru, PhD

This paper examines the role of the legislature in the perpetuation of corruption in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic. It examines the role expected of a legislature in a democracy and the role towards consolidating a democracy. Ordinarily, the battle towards eradicating corruption in a democracy can hardly be won without legislation. Therefore, the paper analyzes the culpability of the National Assembly of Nigeria in the political economy of corruption in the country's Fourth Republic. The paper finds that the prolonged military rule is a major factor in the learning vacuum created between the aborted third republic and the fourth republic which culminated in a weak legislature that emerged in the fourth republic. The paper concludes that unless there is a drastic move to entrench a strong legislature with sufficient power to make laws and for these laws to be enacted and implemented, it would be difficult for the country to eradicate corruption in its socio-political and economic spheres.

Key words: Legislature, Politics, Economy, Political Economy and Corruption.

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Introduction

“The first sign of corruption in a society that is still alive is that the end justifies the means”¹

The challenge of corruption has been known as a major significant factor in the quest for growth in Nigerian society. Today, Nigeria socio-political and economic spheres have been characterized by democratic fraud and subversions, humans right abuses, violence and crisis riddle, leadership with questionable integrity and corrupt practices of all dimensions. The devastating effects of corruption in the nation have manifested in lopsided distribution of wealth, malfunctioned or decayed infrastructure and degrading living conditions among a great proportion of the citizenry. These have impacted negatively on all aspects of the developmental agenda. It is therefore imperative for the country to respond to both domestic and international

¹ Georges Bernanos, a French Author and a World War I Soldier



pressures to confront corruption with all possible strategies available². One way of getting out of this may be via the organs of government, particularly the legislature. This is because, the legislature is the main organ that is responsible for making laws and also has oversight functions over the ministries, departments and agencies under the control of the executive. Since the issue cannot be tackled without possibly resulting to law making makes the legislature to be at the centre of the solution to the problem of corruption in the country. However, the situation in Nigeria seems to have defied possible solution as the legislature, albeit other organs of government, is not only corrupt but also found at the forefront of corrupt practices.

Since the inauguration of democracy in Nigeria in May 1999 the legislature has been riddled with corruption and corrupt practices. It is important to note that the first issue that surrounded the House of Representatives in the first composed National Assembly of the Fourth Republic was the issue of forgery and perjury levelled against the then Speaker of the House of Representatives. Ever since then, the law-making body has been moving in a cycle of corruption and corrupt practices. As observed by Muhammed³, hardly does a year pass without the legislature being engulfed in one problem or the other bordering on corruption charges against it as an institution or its principal officers. This does not involve only the House of Representatives but also the Senate and Houses of Assembly of all the states in the country. It is against this background that this paper attempts to examine the role of the legislature as an organ of government in a democracy and its importance in democratic consolidation and eradication of corruption. What should be the role of a legislature in a democracy? How should the legislature be composed for it to ensure democratic consolidation in an emerging democracy like Nigeria? To what extent is the legislature corrupt in Nigeria? What is responsible for the corruption of the legislature in Nigeria? How can the country wipe off corruption from its institutions and structure, including the legislature? These and other questions are what this paper intends to find answers to.

The Legislature in a Democracy: Some Theoretical Issues

It is difficult to discern the origin of legislature or the business of law making in human history since the act of making law or rules governing human behaviour started with mankind. While it is an undisputable fact that the legislature is an essential constituent of a democracy, and a major factor in the growth and sustenance of the society where it operates, its existence predates the advent of modern democracy. However, attempts have been made by scholars of democracy to articulate the earliest sense of modest form of legislature in human history. As observed by Loewenberg⁴, the emergence of the legislature dates back to the twelve century and a product of

² Mojeed Olujinmi, A. Alabi and Joseph 'Yinka Fashagba (2010) "The Legislature and Anti-Corruption Crusade Under the Fourth Republic of Nigeria: Constitutional Imperatives and Practical Realities" *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 12. Pp. 1-39.

³ Rasheed Mohammed (2009) Legislative Corruption and the Challenge of Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007.

⁴ Gerhad Loewenberg (1995), "Legislatures and Parliaments" *The Encyclopaedia of Democracy*, USA: Congressional Chatterly International: pp. 736-746.



medieval European civilization but transformed in the age of democracy to suit the needs of a great variety of contemporary political systems. Also, Boynton⁵ notes that, 'before and after the Second World War, as colonialism failed and nations grew in number, constitutions incorporating a national legislature replaced extant governing institutions throughout the world while their influence continue to be on the rise as the twenty-first century approaches'. Therefore, defining the structures and forms of legislatures varies from one political system to another with different challenges.

The challenges facing democratic experiment in Africa is not peculiar to any particular country in the continent of Africa; it is a general problem which traverses the entire Africa continent. There is no gainsaying that a major scourge confronting democratic experiment in Africa is the issue of corruption. This is a paradox when juxtaposing a democratic rule with a military regime. This is because, in a military rule, all the structures that should militate against inhuman and uncivil behaviours have been undermined and decreed by fiat as against the use of constitutions and constitutionalism which characterises a democratic rule. However, the failure of democratic institutions to mitigate corruption and corrupt tendencies in a democracy is an indication of the failure of democracy in a society. The unspeakable aspect of this scenario is when the law making body, that is, the legislature, is contrived in the whole process of corruption in a democracy.

For practical purposes, every modern state usually comprises a relatively small number of individuals who formulate and enforce laws that affect a larger member of people, themselves inclusive. And it is usually taken for granted that all citizens are subject to such laws as they appertain to a modern state and operative within its recognized boundaries⁶. Since the time of Aristotle it has been generally agreed that political power can be divided into three main categories. The first categories, according to Harold J. Laski⁷, is legislative power, which is the power to enact laws by which a government regulates its activities while managing the affairs of a country whose citizenry, in an organized state, must be subject to the same laws.

The second category is executive power, which is the power to executive the laws enacted by the legislature, or to apply them to specific situations. There is, thirdly, judicial power, which is the power to regulate the manner in which the executive carries out its functions. Such regulation, usually administered through the courts, ensures that the executive does not operate outside the ambits of the laws enacted by the legislature. Thus the courts, in exercise of their judicial power, can overrule and call for the reversal of any act of the executive arm of government which they consider unlawful.

This process is a basic reflection of what scholars and students of political science have famously described as the principle of checks and balances, and whose original delineation is generally ascribed to Baron de Montesquieu. One basic fact about these categories of power is that they

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Arthur A. Nwankwo, "The Legislature as the Hub of Functional Democracy" being paper delivered at the Forum convened by the Enugu-Ugwu Professionals by the Leader of the People's Mandate Party (PMP).

⁷ Harold J. Laski, *An Introduction to Politics*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958.



were contrived by men in their quest to evolve orderly societies run by well-constituted governments. And such governments, as we can discern from the preceding sketch of relationships, are like tripods whose three “legs” are the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, respectively. Amputate any of the “legs” which is the conventional term and governance degenerates into a precarious and wobbly business.

It is not impossible to imagine all these functions of government being performed by a group of people or in the name of one individual. Even in contemporary democratic states the line between the categories mentioned above can be quite thin, and there are often overlaps of responsibilities among the entities that represent them. For instance, in any functional and flexible democracy, that is a democracy devoid of structural and ideological rigidity, the legislature can perform the functions of the executive, which may take the form of a national or state legislative house ratifying appointments proposed by the executive, among other possibilities.

It is common knowledge that the legislature is also invested with the responsibility to arbitrate between interest groups and so can be said to perform judicial functions as well. Such overlap of functions can also exist between the other arms of government, namely the executive and the judiciary. And it can conveniently be argued that in all modern states, that is states that are neither totalitarian nor feudalistic, the obvious distinctions between the arms of government exist to promote the ideals of liberty and good governance.

By the discussions above, we have generally come to accept James Madison’s remark, complemented by similar remarks by John Locke and Montesquieu⁸, that “the accumulation of powers in the same hands may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”⁹. The import of this remark is neither farfetched nor difficult to discern; which is that power, when not shared, is bound to be exercised dangerously; and that being by its very nature dangerous, even to those who exercise it, it needs to be circumscribed if it must be exercised safely; like a strong and rather erratic horse, it should be controlled with strong but flexible reins if it must be found useful.

In the words of Montesquieu on the principle of separation of powers, “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same persons or body, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to enforce them in a tyrannical manner”¹⁰. Furthermore, Montesquieu also opines that “were the power of judging joined with the legislature the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor”¹¹.

⁸ See John Locke (1632-1704) on his idea about state and its structures. Also, see Montesquieu (1689-1755) on his Doctrines of Separation of Powers.

⁹ Rodee, Anderson, Christol and Greene (1983) *Introduction to Political Science*, New York: McGraw Hill.

¹⁰ See Montesquieu, *Ibid*.

¹¹ *Ibid*.



It is therefore desirable to establish the three arms of government in such a way that each remains supreme in its traditional domain and in the discharge of its primary functions which is the essence of separation of powers. But separation of powers does not necessarily mean balance of powers. For if, for instance, the business of the executive is to lay down the principles for generating government policies, then it must have the confidence of the legislature to do that effectively; and the situation must entail the legislature being able to subject the executive to its will, exercised within the ambits of the law, which explains the relationship known as balance of power.

By right, the legislature can directly ensure that the substance of executive acts is suffused with what it considers its purposes, which also applies to the judiciary, but in a more indirect manner. The legislature cannot dictate to any judge the nature of the verdict to be given in any case, but it is entitled, in exercising the range of powers discussed hereafter, to make statutes to guard against the recurrence of a verdict with whose undergirding principles it is in disagreement. Even in situations where a particular decision is likely to result in injustice, a legislative compromise is not usually considered an unfair solution. It then follows that executive and judicial powers generally find their limits in the declared will of the legislature.

But there are situations in which the activities of the legislature are subject of close judicial scrutiny. For instance if the powers of the legislature are defined by a written constitution, then the authority of the legislature is confined to what the courts hold to be within the ambit of its powers. Also, in any federal state, even if the national assembly is not subject to such constitutional restrictions manifested in the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, the question of deciding the area of competence of the various elements of the federation falls under the schedule of the judiciary.

In modern states, with the exception of Britain, it has become fairly possible to define the powers of the legislature with some exactitude, which powers are normally embodied in the Bill of Rights.

Suffice to say that observance of the principles of separation of powers is necessary if societies must forestall the emergence of the [political] Leviathan as portrayed by Thomas Hobbes,” and that all other organs of government find their limits of their powers in what can be referred to as ‘declared will of the legislature’, by which it is meant the strength of character to serve as a check on the possible eruption of executive and judicial excesses.

In any democracy, the members of a legislature are usually elected or chosen by the people. But there can be a question as regards the method for choosing them and their relationship with the electorate. In addressing such questions, we must bear in mind that in a modern democracy there is no better alternative to universal adult suffrage. Universal adult suffrage puts at the disposal of all citizens the opportunity to attain their full political potentials. Citizens are entitled, as a matter of course, to vote and be voted for, so that they can express whatever their experiences enable them to express in the political sphere. There is also no better alternative to choosing the legislature by democratic means. Property as a basis for determining franchise, as specified in the 1922 Clifford Constitution, merely undermines the interest of the state to the benefit of the propertied class. Every citizen ought to be free to participate in the electoral process. Politics of



exclusion, as practiced in Nigeria during the Babangida era,¹² is antithetical to the logic of democracy and cannot guarantee the emergence or sustenance of a healthy legislature. It is also reasonable to expect some form of relationship to exist between the legislator and his constituency.

Similarly, it is worthy of note that a legislator can only be elected as a member of a political party or group. To an extent it is the party system in any state that determines the tenure of a legislator. Therefore political parties play a vital role in the composition of the legislature. They generate the issues around which elections are contested; and it is not unusual that, in a fast-changing world, political parties experience difficulty in selecting from a wide range of prospective candidates. But it is partly through such selection processes that they determine the composition of the legislature and other arms of government. The party acts as a medium for the brokerage of ideas. From the welter of opinions, sentiments canvassed by its prospective candidates, it chooses those it considers most suited for its electoral purposes and likely to have general acceptance. It deploys its agents and resources to advocate for its own position in relation to such opinions and sentiments. Such position therefore becomes the electoral issue from its own standpoint.

The influence of the political party enables it to field for election candidates who are willing to identify with its point of view. And since its opponents are likely to act similarly, the electorate is given the opportunity to vote in such a manner that decisions that would otherwise be chaotic are defined by some inner logic of coherence and consistency.

The Legislature and Nigeria's Democratisation in the Fourth Republic

That the Legislature is the institutional pillar of democracy is well recognised in both developed and transitional democracies. This arises from the critical role it plays within the framework of separation of powers. While its primary responsibility is of law-making, the Executive implements and the Judiciary plays the role of the adjudicator in disputes between the other branches of government. So critical is the role of the Legislature that it can be said without fear of contradiction that the history, growth and consolidation of democracy anywhere is intricately tied with the role of the parliament and how legislative assemblies attempt to give meaning to people's sovereignty. The task of consolidating democracy cannot be achieved without a strong and virile legislature. Therefore, the responsibility of the legislature in ensuring virile democratisation in Nigeria should be viewed from different contexts.

One of such contexts is the rising consciousness within the Legislature in Nigeria that it is relatively underdeveloped in relation to the Executive which has prospered throughout Nigeria's chequered political history, characterized by the frequent interruptions of democracy by the military. In this context, the task for the Legislature to build its own capacity to effectively carry out its constitutional mandate becomes paramount.

Another very useful context is the swearing in of Barrack Hussein Obama as the 44th President of the United States of America. This global and epochal event beamed into the homes of

¹² Arthur A. Nwankwo, Op. Cit



billions of people across the world drove home powerfully that the Legislature is the foundation of America's well cherished and celebrated democratic heritage. That the swearing-in took place on the Capitol Hill, the seat of the American Congress was not simply a symbolic gesture. It sent out a very strong message that the ceremony of swearing-in the world's most powerful leader is purely a legislative function.

The Nigerian Fourth Republic began on May 29, 1999 following the 'successful' conduct of a general election in April of that year and swearing-in of an elected civilian government headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. However, much of the politics and precursors to the Fourth Republic have been documented by scholars¹³. Prior to the current inauguration of the current legislative configuration in June, 1999, Nigeria had suffered so much as a result of military rule that preceded the democratic experiment. Before then, Nigeria had its first indigenous legislative house between 1960 and 1966, and a second one between 1979 and 1983¹⁴. The third legislative house was shortlived as it went with the aborted third republic in 1989. The above explanation has two implications for the current legislature and the Nigerian society in general. First, it shows that the current legislature, albeit other democratic institutions in the country, emerged against the background of a prolonged military rule. Second and also connected to the first, is that the prolonged military rule created a learning vacuum in the art of law-making through democratic processes as those powers which ordinarily belonged to the legislature were usurped by the military. Therefore, there was the need for a strong legislature that is well positioned to broaden the democratic space and shape governance through various media open to it as a weak legislature is incapable of exerting any influence in the political process of a state.

When Nigeria re-democratised in 1999, the challenges facing the country were enormous. Political instability, lack of national cohesion and economic crisis were some of the major issues which did not only defy solution under the successive military regimes but also constituted threat to the nation's existence. Similarly, on the global scene, Nnamani¹⁵ has rightly contended:

Nigeria has been unable to participate effectively in the global economy because of pervasive poverty, pandemic corruption, marginalization, the persistence of structural vulnerability and over dependence on oil, dispossession of the mass of the people, and the crippling burden of debt.

¹³ See Momoh, A. and Thovoethin, P.S. (2001) 'An Overview of the 1998-1999 Democratization Process in Nigeria: *DPMN Bulletin*; Olurode, Lai (2004), 'Prelude to the Elections' in Olurode, L. and Anifowoshe, R. (eds.) *Issues in Nigeria's 1999 General Elections*. Lagos, Nigeria: John West Publications Ltd and Reboniks Publications Ltd, pp. 9-33; Saliu, H.A. (2004) 'Dimensions of Democracy in Africa and the March to the South Republic in Saliu H.A.(ed.) *Nigeria under Democratic Rule, 1999-2003 Vol. 1*. Ibadan, Nigeria: University Press PLC pp 3-11; Yaqub, N. (2004) 'The Military, Democratic Transitions and the 1999 Elections' in Olurode, Lai and Anifowoshe Remi (eds.) *Issues in Nigeria's 1999 General Elections*. Lagos, Nigeria: John West Publications Ltd and Reboniks Publications Ltd.

¹⁴ Abdul-Rasheed Mohammed (No Date), *Legislative Corruption and the Challenge of Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007*.

¹⁵ Nnamani, C. (2003) "Globalizing in Poverty" being a Public Lecture Delivered to the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria.



There is no gainsaying in the fact that the social, political and economic conditions of Nigeria were at a de-humanizing, crisis point at the re-democratisation in 1999. The emerged institutions of democracy in 1999 were thus put under serious pressure. Especially, the National Assembly was under pressure to initiate actions utilizing constitutional provisions in order to lift the country out of the abyss¹⁶. In the renewed democracy, given the roles of law-making, oversight of administration (or administrative scrutiny), and representation, the Nigeria national assembly has effectively replaced the military as the law-making institution of government.

Using its law-making power, the National Assembly has passed several bills to drive some of the government reform agenda. Indeed, some of the bills included the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act, 2000; the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) Act, 2004; the Electoral Reform Act, 2006 and 2010; the Privatisation Law; and the Pension Reform Act, among others¹⁷. Despite the passage of these bills, particularly those that address the issue of corruption such as the ICPC and EFCC, corruption has continued to increase in the country with the legislature at the center of it. The involvement of the legislature in the corrupt practices in the country's fourth republic shall be dealt with in the next section of the paper.

The Legislature and Corruption in Nigeria

The inauguration of democracy in Nigeria in May 1999 marked a watershed in the history of the country. Not because the country has never witnessed democratic experiment before 1999 but because this experiments had never survived and sustained. The 1999 experiment was witnessed with much enthusiasm and promises. Therefore, people watched with much pessimism how the structures were put in place and how they were being driven to function, including the legislature, both at the national level and the state level.

Ordinarily, the major challenge facing the Nigerian nation and that has continued to cripple its developmental agenda is the issue of corruption. Several discussions and debates have been held to underscore the origin and reasons for corruption in Nigeria towards heralding its nature and combating the scourge. One prominent view in this regard is the school of thought that has attributed the origin of corruption in Nigeria to colonialism. According to this view, the nation's colonial history may have restricted any early influence in an ethical revolution. Throughout the colonial period, most Nigerians were stuck in ignorance and poverty. The trappings of flash cars, houses and success of the colonialists may have influenced the poor to see the colonialists as symbols of success and to emulate the colonialists in different political ways¹⁸. A view commonly held during the colonial days was that the colonists' property (cars, houses, farms etc) is not "our" property. Thus vandalism and looting of public property was not seen as a crime against society. This view is what has degenerated into the more recent disregard for public property and lack of public trust and concern for public goods as a collective national property

¹⁶ Joseph Y. Fashagba (2012) "The Nigerian Legislature and Social-Political Re-engineering in the Fourth Republic www.carllevan.com/fashagba-on-the-nigerian-legislature/apsa/2012-2

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Nigeria: Corruption Perception Index, 2010



Apart from this, there is also a cultural view of corruption in Nigeria. This view explains that the customs, traditions and belief of Nigerians to sustain the extended family lifestyle encourages corruption in all its ramifications. The fundamental argument of this school of thought is that a perceived working individual in a particular family is expected to be responsible to the needs and yearnings of other family members, even if his or her salary cannot be sufficient for such responsibilities. To most advocates of this school of thought, this is the beginning of corruption as the individual in question, in a bid to live up to expectation, engages in corrupt practices and live above his or her income.

Some writers have posited about the different potential causes of flagrant and pecunious graft that exists in the country. Many blame greed and ostentatious lifestyle as a potential root cause of corruption. To some, societies in love with ostentatious lifestyle may delve into corrupt practices to feed the lifestyle and also embrace a style of public sleaze and lack of decorum. The customs and attitudes of the society may also be a contributing factor¹⁹.

Corruption is not a recent phenomenon that pervades the Nigerian state. Since the creation of modern public administration in the country, there have been cases of official misuse of resources for personal enrichment. Today, Nigeria is ranked the 139th most corrupt country out of 176 countries in the world²⁰. In order to stem the tide of corruption in the country, there is a wide believe that the laws of the country strengthened and invoked against corrupt individuals or groups. This is where the legislature is important and required.

By the ordinary operation of the notion of government, the legislative arm of government practically acts like the watch dog and gate keeper of democracy and rule of law in any society. The legislature is the body empowered to make, amend or repeal laws for a nation or a unit of a nation. Apart from making, amending or repealing laws, one basic function of the legislature that can make or mar democracy is the oversight function. By oversight function it is meant as the supervision of the activities of other arms of government, particularly the executive. In literary terms, oversight denotes supervision or the failure to notice something or an instance of this. It is this void that a legislature fills when it performs the oversight function in a democracy. To show how crucial this function is, it can halt or serve as a catalyst for corruption in any nation. In Nigeria where most part of the independent year was spent under military rule, the principle of separation of powers was non-existent talk less of oversight function of the legislature. As noted by Kadir, “while the other two arms – executive and judiciary in whatever form existed, the legislature was absent”²¹. With its power of impeachment and genuine oversight functions, the legislature can whip the other arms of government into line. This is also the rule in Nigeria but the legislature in the country’s democracy is populated mainly by men and women whose primary concern is not the welfare of the people they represent but the fatness of their stomach. It

¹⁹ Wraith, R, and E Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Countries. Tribalism might as well remain the greatest obstacle to tackling official corruption in Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Affairs 1983

²⁰ Transparency International, 2012.

²¹ Abdul-Azeez A. Kadir, “Legislative Oversight Failure, Catalyst for Corruption”
www.gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8636.htm 8.51pm, 5 Oct., 2012.



could possibly be tagged “a legislature where everything goes” - a legislature that hates the nation and her growth.

Since the beginning of the democratic experiment in Nigeria in 1999, the legislature has been enmeshed in corruption and corrupt practices. There is every indication to show that the Nigeria laws on corruption are weak and ineffective. It was the realization of this fact that made President Olusegun Obasanjo to present a bill to the National Assembly on “the prohibition and punishment of bribery, corruption, and other related offences in 1999”. Obasanjo's regime has certainly fired the most critical shot at corruption in Nigeria in recent times. Not only this, the bribery scandal that involved the former Minister of Education, Fabian Osuji, and members of the Education Committee of the National Assembly distressed the President that he expressed in one of his speeches to the National Assembly that: “the legislature cannot wallow in corruption and expect the outside world to take our pleas for debt relief very seriously.” He added “corruption in such highly regarded political institution compromises national integrity, contaminates public morality and misguides those that look up to you for leadership.”²²

The act of corruption in the legislature started with the current legislative house since inception in 1999. At this time, it was discovered that the then Speaker of the House of Representative committed forgery and perjury. The certificate tendered by the then Speaker, Mr. Salisu Buhari, which was purportedly obtained from the University of Toronto, was found to have been forged by the Speaker. Not only this, the Speaker also falsified his age and claimed to be above 30 years of age in order for him to qualify for the position of Speaker of the Lower House²³. Initially, the Speaker refuted the allegations and promised to initiate legal action against *The News Magazine* that reported the forgery and the perjury. After much controversy that involved denials and counter accusations between the Speaker and the Magazine, the Speaker finally resigned his speakership and vacated his seat in the House when the truth eventually became blown open²⁴. This generated reactions from the members of the public who clamoured for his prosecution in the court of law. Consequently, he was tried and convicted by the court of law for forgery and perjury, and sentenced to one year imprisonment or a ‘ridiculous’ option of fine of 2000 naira. Despite the fact that this judgement generated sharp reactions from the public, still, he was given state pardon by the President in ‘the spirit of unity and national reconciliation’²⁵.

The support received by Salisu Buhari from his political party, the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) also contributed to how the case was handled. It is important to note that the case in question marked the beginning of the introduction of plea bargaining into the legal system and which has continued to be a source of soft landing for erring political office holders, mostly from the PDP. When it was obvious that Salisu Buhari cannot but be tried in the court of law, he was advised to plead guilty and with the support of the presidency, he was convicted and sentenced to

²² Victor Dike, The President Versus the National Assembly: <http://www.gamji.com/article4000/NEWS4437.htm>

²³ The News, June 6, 1999.

²⁴ Abdul-Rasheed Mohammed (No Date), Legislative Corruption and the Challenge of Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007.

²⁵ See Ola Ogundolapo (1999) “Buhari: The Jury is Still Out” *The Punch*, Lagos, August 11; *The Punch*, July 15, 1999; July 22, 1999; July 29, 1999; and May 25, 1999.



one year imprisonment with an option of two thousand naira only. After this, the notion of plea bargaining has become a popular instrument for the PDP to provide soft landing for its erring public office holders.

The above scenario marked the beginning of what later became legislative rascality and corruption in the National Assembly during the Fourth Republic. The dust of the Buhari saga had hardly settled when allegations bothering on perjury were levied against the Senate President, Evan(s) Ewerem by the *Tell* magazine. Among others, he was accused of being an ex-convict having being jailed abroad for stealing; document and age falsification and indictment for financial impropriety when he was on the board of the Nigerian Airports Authority in the Second Republic as well as when he was governor of Imo State between 1992 and 1993²⁶. He was also accused of discrepancy in his name which reads Evan in some of his documents and Evans in some others²⁷. He was eventually impeached on November 18, after the senate was convinced of the allegations. Although Ewerem lost his position as senate president, he remained a member of the Senate House until the end of the first phase of the fourth republic in 2003. Yet, this did not put an end to the issue of corruption in the National Assembly. This is because, Chief Chuba Okadigbo who succeeded Ewerem as Senate President was himself removed, barely a year in office, for corrupt practices, among other misdeeds. He was accused of financial impropriety including spending a whopping 75 million Naira to buy *Sallah* rams for some senators²⁸. Going by the number of senators (109), the above amount implied spending over five hundred thousand Naira to purchase a ram. Indeed, the level of corruption at the top echelon of the National Assembly is legendary. In addition, there were other forms of allegations against the Senate in particular and the National Assembly as a whole. These included the controversial jumbo furniture allowance which legislators paid to themselves; allegations of contract inflation and awards without legal agreements and the National Assembly's unilateral inflation of its own budget in 2002 among others²⁹. Expectedly, these allegations have not gone without sharp reactions from members of the public and the executive arm with the latter setting up probe panels in some instances. It was in this rowdy and cloudy atmosphere that the first legislative term of the fourth republic was concluded in May 2003.

The beginning of another legislative term following the successful conduct of another general election in 2003 was thought by many to hold prospect for a robust legislative regime for two important reasons. First, during the elections, some members were re-elected while some were voted out by their constituency including both leaders of the lower house and the senate. This coupled with election of some new legislators was expected to reinvigorate the house towards a purposeful deliberation. Second, while the first legislative term could be said to be immature, being the first after about sixteen years of non-existence as a result of military rule, the new legislature was expected to build on the experiences of its predecessor.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ See *Tell*, August 9, 1999; *The Punch*, August 3, 1999; August 6, 1999;

²⁸ See *The Punch*, May 1, 2000; May 10, 2000; July 25, 2000.

²⁹ See *The Punch* August 9, 2000; July 26, 2000; July 27, 2000 and *The News*, August 21, 2000.



Thus, Nigerians were confounded when this era showed no significant departure from the past in terms of corrupt practices and perversion of integrity. Hardly had the legislators settled down for business when in August 2003, allegations of sharp corrupt practices reared their head. First was the allegation levied against the deputy Senate President, Ibrahim Mantu and another principal officer, Dr. Jonathan Zwingina by former Director General of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, Nasir El-Rufai that the two senators demanded 54 million Naira from him to facilitate his clearance in the senate as a ministerial nominee. Sensitive and stunning as this issue was, it was dismissed by other senators for what they considered as ‘lack of evidence’³⁰. Then came the big bang. This was the allegation of bribery levied against the Senate President, Adolphus Wabara and other principal officers by the President in a nationwide broadcast. The president revealed that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) uncovered an act by the then Minister for Education, Professor Fabian Osuji who raised the sum of 55 million Naira which was used to bribe the Senate President and some other members of the senate and house of representatives in order to influence the education ministry’s financial appropriation in the 2005 budget³¹. This no doubt stirred a controversy with the executive and the legislature raising accusation and counter-accusation while members of the public pitch tent with the former³². But despite denials by all the alleged (with the exception of Senator Adhigije who later became government’s lead witness) and, the investigation panels set up by both houses of the National Assembly which were neither emphatic in admitting nor denying the allegations, all the actors including the Senate President and education minister are currently under trial for the offence. In the main, the Senate President bowed to public pressure by resigning his post while the president equally dismissed the education minister. Yet, attacks on allegations of corruption against the National Assembly have not come from the executive or the general public alone.

In 2004, a sitting senator, Uche Chukwumerije alleged that his colleague in the house, Senator Arthur Nzeribe, gathered some other colleagues at his official residence on 14 January with an offer of 5 million Naira for each to mobilize and support the declaration of an emergency rule in Plateau State. However, not convinced that the allegation is worth a hearing, other senators waved it off and asked Senator Chukwumerije to apologize to the house³³. Also worth mentioning is the declaration by a member of the lower house, Honourable Haruna Yerima at a public gathering that some committees in the house go about collecting bribe from ministries and parastatals to induce members into taking favourable decisions. He alleged further that the Chairman, House committee on communications does facilitate distribution of MTN recharge cards to honourable members. In his words:

Whoever tells you there is no corruption in the house is in fact corrupt.
Ministers and Heads of parastatals are often asked to bring money so

³⁰ See Weekly Trust, December 6, 2003; April 4, 2005.

³¹ Olusegun Obasanjo (2005) Text of National Broadcast to the Nation in *The News*, April 4, 2005. See also This Day, March 3, 2005.

³² The Punch, April 7, 2005; The Guardian (Lagos), April 8, 2005.

³³ See The News, April 4, 2005.



that their budgets can be passed. MTN bribes us every month. It brings recharge cards worth 7,500 Naira monthly to each member³⁴.

Ironically, rather than investigate the substance of the allegation, he was suspended for a month for using what the house termed ‘unparliamentary language’ and bringing the house into disrepute.

It is obvious in this sense that serial corruption is killing Nigeria by installments. This is a fact and it cuts across board and in all facets of our national life, be it federal, state or local government level, the story is the same. Nearly all operatives of the public service in any part of the country stink of corruption. It is for this reason that it is difficult to eliminate graft in the national life of the country. The question therefore is who will fight corruption in the land where everybody who should stand up and be counted among the righteous is also compromised? As observed by Okah³⁵,

“... in the public sector, there are only a microscopic few who can pass the true test of honesty and integrity in terms of handling the public trust. This is the major reason why corruption and bad governance may live with us for a long time to come unless something tragic happens in this country that will reverse this shameful and ignoble trend”.

By the ordinary operation of the principles of federalism, the legislative arm of government practically acts like the security dog and gate keeper of democracy and rule of law. With its power of impeachment and genuine oversight functions, it can whip the other arms of government into line. This is also the rule in Nigeria but the legislature we have today is populated mainly by men and women whose primary concern is not the welfare of the people they represent but the fatness of their stomach. A legislature where everything goes. A legislature that hates the nation and her growth. This description of the legislature played out during the second tenure of President Olusegun Obasanjo when majority of the members of the National Assembly voted for tenure elongation for the President. The idea started when the National Assemble proposed certain amendments to the constitution which later became an agenda for what was described as “Third term”. It was alleged that members of the National Assembly were divided along the lines of “Third Term Group” and the “Integrity Group”. In these groups were politicians from different political parties who made money available to members of each group in order to ensure their group prevails at the end of the day. Although the President denied ever sponsored any memorandum for tenure elongation, but it was observed that the denial from the President only came when the burble had busted and it became practically impossible to have tenure elongation as proposed by the constitution amendment committee. The “Third Term” imbroglio stayed with the Obasanjo’s second term till the end of the tenure.

³⁴ See The News, April 4, 2005.

³⁵ Henry Okah (2012) “Turly, Thieves in the Legislature” *National Network Newspaper*, 9(24), June 20-26.



Both the powers to make law and that of oversight functions have been abused by the so called legislators. The oversight function of the legislature should provide the necessary supervision and control of affairs of the nation. The legislative period under the Yar'Adua may not have much to provide in this regard as the tenure was affected by the bad health of President Umar Musa Yar'Adua until his demise in 2009. However, in May 29, 2011 President Goodluck Jonathan was inaugurated as the new President of Nigeria, having succeeded in completing the first term of Umar Yar'Adua as his Vice President. Shortly after his inauguration, President Jonathan presented himself to the nation as being in a hurry to make positive changes and impact by yielding to public expectations. One of the core areas that Nigerian were watching to determine his sincerity and seriousness is the anti-corruption war, which has a direct impact on good governance.

Almost at the same time, the National Assembly swung into action in its oversight function to ensure that government ministries, departments and agencies carry out their responsibilities in order to ensure that dividend of democracy was distributed to all and sundry. As it is the usual practice of the legislature, the House probed the Justice Salami/Katsina Alu face off in 2011, the Senate probed the Establishment and Public Service – Pension in 2012, the Senate probe the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) in 2012, the House probed the Capital Market in 2012. A discernible pattern exists in the life cycle of a typical committee oversight activity of the National Assembly. When a target institution is discovered, a motion of “urgent” national importance is raised during plenary to draw attention to the problem in the sector. The preliminary debate is thrown open and if the sponsors do their homework well, it is referred to the appropriate committee to investigate. The committee orders a public hearing³⁶.

During the hearing, the process goes through the assault stage where the invitees are pummeled to submission if they are not confident enough or made amenable to settlement, then comes the agreement stage and possible apologies; then the report is released with enough loopholes for the accused person to escape with most of his loot.

In the Aloysius Etok-led investigative committee of the Senate that probed the management of pension fund in the country, it was revealed that over N58 billion pension funds were missing while N273.94 billion is the difference between what was received and what was paid out³⁷. The Pension Reform Task Force, headed by AbdulRasheed Maina, was asked to refund N15,386,122.96, being the differentials between the claims of payment of pensions by the task team and the actual expenditure thereto. The committee further recommended that Maina, John Yusuf, B.G. Kaigama and all the members of the Pension Task Team involved should be arrested and prosecuted by the Police Force for the crimes, fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, misapplication, illegal virement, contract splitting, award of contract to non-existing companies, award of contract without appropriations and outright stealing of pension funds and the stolen funds should be recovered from them. However, the exercise became a drama and comedy when Maina and some members of his team, including a representative of Independent Corrupt

³⁶ See Tell Magazine, July 16, 2012.

³⁷ Ibid



Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), on the committee proclaimed the report as incompetent and a compendium of untrue statements³⁸. This is usually the case where the accused has refused to “play ball” or settle the committee members.

Another embarrassment in the oversight function of the legislature was the scenario created as a result of the investigation of the Capital Market where the Chairman of the Committee, Herman Hembe, was accused of seeking bribe from the Director-General of the Security and Exchange Commission. In this case, the legislature tried to buy public approval without its members, whose alleged actions caused a smear on the House, losing face. This made the Chairman of the Committee to announce the decision of the committee to step down from the probe of the Capital Market and an ad-hoc committee was set up to take over the probe.

As reported by the DG of SEC, the Hembe committee was hostile on her during the interrogation period because she did not give them the N44 million bribes they requested from her. She also accused Hembe of collecting an unspecified amount of money from SEC the previous year to attend a conference in the Dominican Republic, claiming that the legislator neither went for the conference nor did he refund the money³⁹.

This can of worms in the investigations of the National Assembly of the various government MDAs started with the Senate in August 2011 when it set up an ad-hoc committee to probe the sale of Public Enterprises since 1999. The committee, headed by Ahmed Lawan, conducted a public hearing on the privatization and commercialization exercise for seven days, which regaled Nigerians with shocking details of complicity in the failure of the privatization exercise.

The most embarrassing of the probes was the investigation carried out on the management of the fuel subsidy. There was no doubt that the committee headed by the most respectable Farouk Lawan did a good job and asked probing questions that revealed official cover-ups and sleaze in the management of fuel subsidy. The fuel subsidy probe committee got the commendation of many Nigerians and even the attention of the presidency. However, the table became turned against the committee when one of the individuals accused of malpractices in the management of the fuel subsidy regime, Femi Otedola, confessed to a bribe given to the Chairman of the committee. Initially, Otedola was not taken seriously as many Nigerians had so much trust in the person of Farouk Lawan due to his antecedents in the House of Representatives. As observed by Okah⁴⁰,

Farouk Lawan is quiet, influential, knowledgeable and possesses some commendable degree of leadership qualities. His contributions to debates on the floor of the House of Representatives make anybody easily notice his miniature frame and tiny voice. As a politician, I had thought that when the time comes in Nigeria for integrity and merit to

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ See Tell, April 2, 2012.

⁴⁰ Henry Okah (2012) Op. Cit.



count in the choice of who rules the people, the likes of Lawan from the Northern part of the country will take the front seat.

In order to continue to enjoy the trust repose in him by Nigerians, Lawan denied the allegation of collecting bribe from Otedola until after about three weeks of the incident when Lawan owned up on the floor of the House that he collected the money from Otedola in order to implicate him (Otedola) of bribery and to also expose Otedola. Many Nigerians feel saddened and disappointed by the betrayal that has consumed the small Lawan. In public life, the spirit of integrity has left him, leaving only his carcass.

It is therefore not surprising that members lobby to be nominated on committees where they have business or political interests, or purely for pecuniary interests. As reported in Tell, July 16, 2012: "...lawmaker admitted... that the committees are corrupt. It is all part of the rot in the country. Everybody is corrupt – the executive, MDAs, judiciary and even the private sector – and you expect the legislature to be saints!"

All that has been done in this section is to review the trend and dimensions of corruption in the Nigeria legislative arm. Indeed, the trend is pervasive both at the level of leadership and the generality of members that hardly would a year pass by in the last thirteen years of democracy that the legislature would not be engulfed in one major controversy or the other bordering on corruption.

Legislative Corruption and its Implication for Democracy in Nigeria

The thirst for material accumulation of the political class in Nigeria seems to be unquenchable as the trend has continued judging from the country's political process in general and particularly legislative processes. Three plausible arguments could be advanced for the pervasiveness of legislative corruption in the country. First is the legislature's institutional history. It is indeed not an understatement to say the legislature in Nigeria is underdeveloped. If anything, it is the most affected of all arms of government as a result of prolonged military regime in the country. This is because, while other arms (executive and Judiciary) under the military still maintained their existence, the powers of the legislature was usually usurped by leaders of the military regimes. Against this background, the legislature remains underdeveloped in terms of legislative practices and processes. Given the nature of this underdevelopment coupled with the fact that the fourth republic's legislature is composed of many new comers into politics, one cannot expect them to have quickly imbibed the doctrines of virile legislative practice and processes and, to appreciate the cruciality of legislative integrity towards democratic sustenance. Equally, the recklessness and pervasiveness of corrupt practices under the various military regimes may have affected the psyche of many Nigerian politicians who tend to see things as business as usual even under democratic practice. In this context, the use of official positions for personal aggrandizement becomes an attractive option for the average politician.

Second is the organizational character of the legislature. As mentioned earlier, the legislature is a peculiar arm of government in which relationship between members is not that of authority and subordination but one of equal partners. Even where leaders are appointed among members, such



leaders are only *primus inter pairs*. This is because each member of the legislature derives its authority from being representative of a constituency or section of the populace. The implication of this is that it makes internal control of each member problematic. At best, legislative rules can only permit suspension of an erring member for a limited period of time. Even at this, the reality of the Nigerian situation is that members of the constituency or representative area from which such a legislator comes often perceive such disciplinary action as an affront against them.

The third plausible explanation for legislative corruption as is currently being witnessed in Nigeria cannot be divorced from the pathological conception of politics that permeates the entire Nigeria's political landscape. In general, there is the tendency for politicians to conceive of politics in terms of end-means relationship. Politics is seen as a means to achieve some predetermined ends. That is, politics becomes monetized while the average politician sees what he/she has spent in the process as an investment that must be recouped (with interest). Thus the surest way to recoup the investment is to engage in corruption. This perspective was underscored by former Senate President, Adolphus Wabara, when he pointedly argued that:

Most of us came into the National Assembly with high expectations. It is an investment really to come to the National Assembly. When we go about campaigning and asking for votes, we don't get these votes free. You spend some money. Most of us even sold houses. You come in through legitimate means but you can't recoup what you spent⁴¹

Indeed, current happenings in the legislative houses are a vindication of the above arguments – a situation which portends serious threat for the legislature itself and the democratic process. One major consequence of legislative corruption in Nigeria is its erosion of citizens' confidence in the institution. There is no denying the fact that there is a declining confidence of citizens in Nigeria's democratic institutions - executive, legislature and judiciary. But the legislature has been worse off to the extent that Nigerians are more often suspicious of moves by the legislature. In a governance and corruption survey in Nigeria conducted in 2001, close to 60% of the respondents were skeptical of the legislature in helping to combat corruption. The trend of opinion indicates that the legislature in Nigeria is not helpful in combating corruption⁴² - a trend which cannot be divorced from rampant cases of legislative corruption in the country. Important however is that, nothing seems to suggest a change of opinion even till date. Thus, one must not expect democracy to grow in a situation where there is negative correlation between citizens' perception and expectation and, legislative practices.

In terms of legislative-executive relations, it is obvious that most of the strains and stresses between the two institutions emanates from allegations of corrupt practices. This include controversies over jumbo furniture allowance of the legislators in which they allege executive blackmail⁴³; row over budget inflation by the national Assembly and; the legislative-executive logjam when the latter exposed corruption activities involving the Senate President, Adolphus

⁴¹ See The News, April 4, 2005.

⁴² Nigerian Governance and Corruption Survey, 2003. Pg. 13.

⁴³ See *Inside Politics*, August 14, 1999.



Wabara. In fact, the acrimony generated by the Wabara-Osuji corruption saga was a major factor in the delay of passage of the National budget for 2005. The bottom line is that such acrimonious relation, if prolonged, is not only capable of crippling the economy but may as well result in democratic regression.

Perhaps another implication of legislative corruption for democratic growth may be seen in its impact on legislative processes. On the one hand, Nigeria's legislature has been spending much time on managing one crisis or another emanating from corruption tendencies. For instance, barely a month after the Buhari Saga in 1999, the Ewerem issue crept in, followed in less than a year by Dr. Chuba Okadigbo's saga and several others. Indeed, precious times wasted on these could have been more utilized in improving the quality of deliberations. On the other hand, legislative corruption affects the quality of legislative oversight. Oversight function is a constitutionally enshrined duty of the legislature to enhance the quality of service delivery to the citizenry by other arms of government. Needless to stress that, a compromised legislature is unfit to perform creditably in this regard. This is the paradox of the Nigerian legislature and flip side of threat to democracy and good governance. Related to this is that, the legislative institution may for long remain underdeveloped. This is as a result of instability of leadership. It is disheartening to note that between May 1999 and date - a period of about 7 years - the Nigerian legislature has had a total number of five senate Presidents. This apparently is not a healthy development for continuity sake and consistency in governance. Worst still, the rate of internal bickering within the legislature which at times degenerate into a 'slapping spree'⁴⁴ is a pointer to more troubles within the legislative arm.

Conclusion

The popular belief that the current legislature have been able to expose corrupt practices in Nigeria's socio-political and economic spheres, it is also important to stress that the culpability of the members of the National legislature, albeit state legislatures, in various corrupt practices leaves much to be desired for the country's democracy. There is no gainsaying that legislature plays a vital role in any democratic setting, the formidability and magnitude of commitment of this institution in consolidating democracy cannot be over emphasized.

Since 1999 when democracy was inaugurated in the country after a long period of military rule, the role and involvement of the legislature in corruption have spelt doom for the country's democracy. It could be said, at least from the analysis above, that the more the legislature decides to open corruption in different sectors of the Nigerian economy and society, the more it boomerangs and come back to them. There is hardly any probe report undertook by the legislature which did not come back to indict members of the committee that carried out the probe. This has made Nigerians to lose confidence in the ability of the legislature to sanitize the country of corruption and poverty.

⁴⁴ See *The News*, April 4, 2005.



While it cannot be disputed that the role of the legislature in tackling corruption as one of the major challenges of democratic governance was affected by the character of the Nigerian state, weak institutional capacity of the legislature, constitutional deficiencies, and lack of integrity by members of the legislature who have been indicted one time or the other; undue executive interference among others. In Nigeria, therefore, the effectiveness of the legislature in the resolution of democratic challenges hinges on the performance of its functions according to the rules and norms of democracy and the resolution of its internal crisis.

To be more effective in tackling political corruption as one of the challenging challenges of democratic governance, the paper supports deep institutionalization of the legislature as against its de-institutionalization, since legislative institutions are expected to be governed by laws and not by men. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that democracy can flourish in Nigeria and in Africa; if the capacity of legislatures- federal, state and local could be further strengthened to address critical issues relating to constitutionalism, corruption, poverty and national question, check the excesses of the executive, and collaborate with the judiciary to avert the consequences of “democracy by court order”, as well as empower and work with the civil society. In Nigeria, *stricto sensus*, a more pro-active National Assembly that is ready to set the priorities right as well as resolve its internal crisis democratically, is critically needed.



Governance, Corruption and Crisis of Development in Post-Independence Nigeria

Jaja Nwanegbo, PhD and Jude Odigbo

The paper examines the interplay of governance, corruption and development as the greatest undoing of the Nigerian State. Poor governance and corruption have immensely hindered sustainable development and can be fairly described as being mostly responsible for development crisis that has engulfed Nigerian state. The paper explains the connection between good governance and viable democratic institutions as a means for extricating Nigeria from the present development crisis. It notes the need to strengthen the anti-corruption crusades with clear mandate to the anti-graft agencies to avert undue influence of the executive arm of government. The paper relies on the sequential analytic approach in data analysis and adopted good governance model as a theoretical compass. It recommends stiffer penalties and strong democratic institutions capable of “just application” of rules as deterrence to corrupt practices. Similarly, we advocate for radical re-orientation and development of self consciousness to instigate the emergence of a vibrant civil society that will make leaders act responsibly in the discharge of their duties.

Keywords: Governance; Corruption; Crisis of Development; Nigeria.

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Introduction

The present global concerns on corruption have led to the adoption of United Nations Convention Against Corruption with the intention to provide effective control of the ever spreading phenomenon of corruption. Corruption seems to have become a major challenge to governance and development especially in Africa. Indeed, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Reports (2006: 92) observed that most corrupt countries in the world are still found in Sub-Sahara Africa. This observation has brought Sub-Saharan Africa into global focus with a view to reducing prevalence of corruption and repositioning governance perception in the region. Since 1960, when Nigeria became independent, one of the issues that have gained considerable attention at both public and private forums is corruption. Akindele (2005: 12) has aptly demonstrated through a retrospective analysis of politics from independence to date that corruption has permeated so deep into the fabrics of Nigerian society.



The first military coup in Nigeria six years after independence and subsequent military interventions are inextricably linked to the precarious impacts of corruption on Nigerian body politic. For instance, the leader of the first coup Major Nzeogwu remarked in his speech that; “our enemies are the political profiteers, soldiers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and V.I.Ps of waste” (cited in Iyare 2008:42). For him the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds (Iyare 2008:42) remained hitherto the stumbling block for Nigeria’s developmental quest. Even in the few sectors where some semblances of development appear to have occurred, they never became sustainable.

In fact, the Nigerian State is a victim of high level corruption occasioned by poor governance and weak institutions which as well retard national development and ceaselessly recycle political, religious and communal crisis in the State. The Nigeria’s economic and political landscape is pervaded by corruption and monumental abuse of office. Just as the National Planning Commission Report (2005:17) observed, systemic corruption and low levels of transparency and accountability have been the major sources of development failure. Unconventional and fraudulent trade, misappropriation or diversion of funds, kick backs, under and over invoicing, bribery, false declarations, abuse of office, collection of illegal tolls among other malfeasant practices, are forms and patterns corruption take in Nigeria. Poor governance and corruption seem also to have inflicted huge damage on Nigerian political system and the people. This is because corruption does not only seem to deny the people resources due for their well being, it also denies external assistance to the people.

With the return to civilian governance in 1999, the Obasanjo administration declared zero tolerance on corruption. One of the major steps taken by the government was the creation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The “New Order” to a large extent succeeded by



daring to arraign some high profile State officials especially ex-governors. However, political desperation and greed severely depleted the efforts of these agencies. State managers since 1999 have made efforts to substantially narrow scale of corruption mostly for opponents or perceived enemies. At the same time those favored have continued to flourish and re-establish new links and avenues unchecked. Undoubtedly, corruption now appears to have become a permanent feature of the Nigerian polity and seems to have become completely institutionalized into the realm of culture and value system of the country. Also, pathetic is the ever increasing number of energetic Nigerian youths roaming the streets. A report in 2009 revealed that the national unemployment rates for Nigeria between 2000 and 2009 showed that the number of unemployed persons constituted 31.1% in 2000; 31.6% in 2001; 12.6% in 2002; 14.8% in 2003; 13.4% in 2004; 11.9% in 2005; also in 2006 it was 13.7%; in 2007 14.6%; in 2008 14.9%; in 2009 19.7% (National Bureau of Statistics 2009:238). The Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report (2011) still revealed that unemployment rate rose from 19.7 in 2009 to 21.1% in 2010 and 23.9% in 2011 (cited in Ladan 2012:7). In fact, a situation whereby, there is a decade of strong real GDP of 6.5% economic growth, and in the same period, unemployment rate continues to rise annually from 11.9% in 2005 to 19.7% in 2009, and over 37% in 2013% (Ogunmade, 2013) is an indication that something is fundamentally wrong with the Nigerian state.

With this endemic unemployment problems, it increasingly remained difficult to separate or de-emphasize the impacts of unemployment to the present development crisis. The fact now is that unemployment seems to have overgrown the capacity of State and as well lures people to engage in illicit activities that stagnates progress. In the opinion of Salawu (2010:348), unemployment increases the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed for a given course at token benefit. This explains why the Country is virtually unsafe. The increasing number of criminality in the South West, ridiculous kidnapping in the South East, fresh threats by the Niger Delta militants and the religious crisis that incubates Boko Haram terrorist act in the Northern Nigeria indicate clear manifestation of our condition and are the greatest undoing of the post-colonial State. Of course, these manifestations of insecurity have further compounded the crisis of development in Nigeria and also appear to have disconnected the people from the State.



Considering its implications on quality of governance and overall development of the country, this paper seeks to establish the critical link between poor governance, weak anti-corruption policies of the state and the failure of the anti-graft crusade and the extent it has contributed to the present development crisis in Nigeria, and proffer solutions for tackling the menace. We acknowledge the need to investigate causes and implications of development crisis in post independence Nigeria beyond singular focus on corruption. Hence the paper empirically addresses issues linking governance and corruption to the present development crisis in Nigeria.

Governance, Corruption and Development: Conceptual and Theoretical Discourses.

There have been rigorous scholarly debates explaining the impacts of governance and corruption on the general development of a particular society (Ogundiya 2010; Kaufmann 2000; Oyovbaire 2007). Some of these attentions have recently turned to corruption because of a growing awareness of its dire consequences for good governance and democratic development (Kaufmann 2000:2). Governance is a complex concept and appears to be broader than corruption. This is because governance encompasses interrelated processes, institutions and people in the act of allocating state resources. Ogundiya (2010:202) presented governance as the process of allocating resources, through the instrumentalities of the state, for the attainment of public good. To him, governance includes institutional and structural arrangements, decision making processes, policy formulation and implementation capacity, development of personnel, information flows and the nature and style of leadership within a political system. For him,

Governance is related to politics, it is conceptually different. However, as a human phenomenon, governance is exercised within a given socio-cultural context and belongs to a broader department of politics. While politics is the authoritative allocation of values or who gets what, when and how, governance is the process and mechanisms of allocating the values without jeopardising the principle of equity, justice and fairness. Therefore, it is through the practical application of the authority and the processes of governance that the powers of the state acquire meaning and substance (Ogundiya 2010:202-203).

Similarly, Kaufmann (2000:3) earlier explained governance as the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good. Governance encompasses



the process of selecting, monitoring and replacing governments which includes the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions (Kaufmann, 2000). He is of the opinion that governance could be divided into three broad categories, each containing two components such as:

1. (a) Voice and accountability which includes civil and political liberties and freedom of the press, and (b) political stability and lack of violence.
2. (b) Government effectiveness which includes the quality of policymaking and public service delivery, and (b) the lack of regulatory burden.
3. (c) The rule of law that includes protection of property rights and an independent judiciary, and (b) control o corruption (Kaufmann 2000:4-5).

Thus, in the report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1999) governance is a complex mechanisms, process, relationships and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. Leftwich (1993) contended that governance focuses on the administrative and technical aspects of the exercise of public authority (cited in Ghana Center for Democratic Development 2001:9). In fact, governance has to do with the organization and processes of formulating and implementing state policies that are geared towards achieving the ultimate goal of the society. These processes involve initiating policies, managing public resources, securing and organizing people, directing institutions of the state (including private institutions) to ensure justice accountability and fairness in running day-to-day government business. Governance involves structures and processes as well as the proceedings of the structures and processes (Oyovbaire 2007:5). Adamolekun (2002:42) further puts it in a clear view, as the process of exercising political power to manage the affairs of a nation. For him, the main elements of governance are; rule of law, freedom of speech and association, free and fair election, accountability, probity and transparency and result oriented leadership.

Precisely, the Kratz's as in Nwanegbo (2009:7) definition of governance as "government in action" helps us in understanding that the process of acting out the policy of the state by the executive and its bureaucratic machinery, the public bureaucracy at all levels is also and can be seen as governance. As a process, governance may operate in an organization of any size: from a single human being to all of humanity; and it may function for any purpose, good or evil, for profit or not (see Nwanegbo 2009). Indeed, reasonable or rational purpose of governance might aim to assure, (sometimes on behalf of others) that an organization produces a worthwhile pattern of good results while avoiding an undesirable pattern of bad circumstances. Perhaps, the most moral or natural purpose of governance consists of assuring, on behalf of those governed, a worthy pattern of good while avoiding an undesirable pattern of bad. The ideal purpose, obviously, would assure a perfect pattern of good with no bad.

Natufe (2006: 1) conceptualized governance as the processes and systems by which a government manages the resources of a society to address socio-economic and political challenges in the polity. According to Kaufman in Natufe (2006: 1), governance on the other hand embodies "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good". In a closely related definition, the World Bank (1999: 2) stated that governance is "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development". The need for Governance exists anytime a group of people come together to accomplish an end and it relates to decisions that define expectations, grant power, or verify performance. It consists either of a separate process or of a specific part of management or leadership processes. From the above definitions, it means that governance is the use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society or the economy. This definition though looks good, but it is very broad in context. Instead of that, we may need to agree with the view that described governance as the collection of mechanisms that allow the organization to make the best decisions as fast as possible.

The explanatory descriptions of the above definition also expose us to the attributes of governance and should be the bases for assessing the definitions of governance. Thus, governance can also be regarded as the position of leadership throughout a given place for the actualization of common good (see Ikelegbe and Osumah 2007). This position can be collaborated taking the World Bank (1999:2)'s identified three key aspects of governance, which are:

- i. The form of a political regime,
- ii. The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development; and
- iii. The capacity of governance to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.

In general terms, governance occurs in three broad ways:

1. Through networks involving public-private partnerships (PPP) or with the collaboration of community organizations.
2. Through the use of market mechanisms whereby market principles of competition serve to allocate resources while operating under government regulation
- 3 Through top-down methods that primarily involve governments and the state bureaucracy.

These modes of governance often appear in terms of hierarchy, markets, and networks. Incidentally, one thing is clear from that, governance encompasses everything in the society and it has at the centre of it the controlling issues of administering, coordinating both the activities and the people and material towards the achievement of the desired end. Conceiving of governance in this way therefore, one can apply the concept to as large as a nation-state as desired, to corporations, to non-profits, to NGOs, to partnerships and other associations, to project-teams, and to any number of humans engaged in some purposeful activity. Governance is therefore a multi-faceted concept involving many aspects of managing the human existence and activities (see Nwanegbo 2009).



The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids with most of the real control at the top. They will be systems of interlaced webs of tension in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision plural. Decision-Making, will become an increasingly intricate process of multilateral blockage both inside and outside the organization which thinks it has the responsibility for making, or at least announcing, the decision. Because organizations will be horizontal, the way they are governed is likely to be more collegial, consensual, and consultative.

On the other hand, corruption of course is a universal problem, with complex causes; its net effect is commonly regarded as negative for all societies, especially developing countries (Ghana Center for Democratic Development 2001:6). Corruption is a common word and has become part of everyday usage (Adebayo 2004:19-20). In fact, in Nigeria corruption has become a household name hence, it appears to have been integrated into the national life. Huntington (1968:59), defined the concept as abuse of public office for private ends. For him, corruption is a behaviour of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends. Speaking at the Global Forum on fighting corruption, Al Gore argued that corruption is “a cold, vicious, often violent sacrifice of citizen security for a narrow, greedy, private, personal profit on the part of a crooked official” (cited in Iyare 2008:40). Corruption is a “behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status” (Khan 1996:12). Jean-François (1998) argued along the lines that corruption in Africa is closely associated with neo-patrimonialism and clientelism, and that the basis for the entrenched corruption in Africa is mainly the lack of distinction between public and private (cited in Andvig J, Fjeldstad O, Amundsen I, Sissener T and Søreide 2001:19).

Arguably, systemic corruption has over the decades in Nigeria appears to be more institutional and political in nature. This is because the ruling class has proved to be the major promoters of corruption, indeed; the continued high prevalence of corruption in Nigeria is as a result of the fact that beyond institutional weaknesses, leaders seem to have infiltrated escaping roots in the



making of anti-corruption laws. As a result, political corruption has been on its peak with overwhelming monumental negative effects and consequences in Nigerian political system. It defies conventional rules that guide the political system. Political corruption involves the manoeuvring of the state institutions and rules for the benefit of an individual or group of people. Political corruption is a deviation from the rational-legal values and principles of the modern state, and leads to institutional decay. Corruption promotes economic decay and social and political instability, perverts the ability of the state to foster rule of law, and eventually corrodes trust and undermines legitimacy (Ghana Center for Democratic Development 2001:6). It is the “behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains“(Nye 1967:416). In terms of security implications, former U N Secretary General Kofi Anam explained that corruption causes enormous harm by impoverishing national economics, threatening democratic institutions, undermining the rule of law and facilitating terrorism (Webb 2005 cited in Economic Commission for Africa 2009:209).

The combination of governance gap, corruption and other institutional and political contractions persistently fuelled the crisis of development in Nigeria. Indeed, conceptualizing development remains difficult. The concept appears to be in a state of flux since the end of the world war 11; with emphasis shifted from the economic growth perspectives (GDP) to measuring the well-being of “man” or empowering people to overcome their daily needs. As Chandler (2007:367) rightly observed development has been redefined, taking the emphasis away from traditional economic indicators of GDP and trade and broadening out the concept to take in psychological and material factors related to the measurement of human well-being. More importantly, it has concerned itself currently with driving the course of beneficial and positive advancement today without compromising the future of tomorrow. That is sustainable development, development of today that does not compromise further existence (see Nwanegbo, 2013). Certainly, governance and corruption are two different concepts but affect each other. A society that faces the challenges of poor governance and corruption would be far from development. In fact, governance and corruption are the bane of national development in Nigeria. And there seems to

be widespread consensus that present development crisis in Nigeria is strongly correlated with governance and corruption problems. The development crisis in Africa and indeed Nigeria forms major part of the debate that necessitated the use of the word “good governance”. Good governance model was used by the World Bank as a response to gross mismanagement by African Leaders which seems to be a major cause of development crisis.

This model is predicated on the assumption that effective and good governance could be a requisite for development. It would reduce corruption and reposition the economy for sustainability. For the World Bank, good governance model is a prerequisite condition for development. Good governance is characterized by improvement of public involvement and participation in governance; improved institutional mechanism; adherence to the ideals of the rule of law; enhancement of human rights; and transparency and accountability (Federal Government of Nigeria Report, 2002:111). In fact, the model stresses the notion that the absence or partial existence of the stated principles in any polity encourages corruption and also the fact that the quality of governance of a State plays a vital role in its capacity to deter corruption which indeed, determines the extent of growth and development. The good governance model is therefore predicated on its capacity to addressing institutional setbacks and evolving anti-corruption reforms to repositioning socio-economic and political fortunes of a Nation.

Anti-Corruption Governance and State of Corruption in Nigeria

Since independence, Nigeria has engaged several laws and institutions in an attempt to curb corruption and enthrone good governance. This necessitated the promulgation of some decrees and acts between 1966 and 1996. These include: the Public Office Investigation of Assets Decree No. 5 of 1966, the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, the Jaji Declaration of 1979, the “Ethical Revolution” of 1981-1983, the “War Against Indiscipline” of 1984, National Orientation Movement of 1986 and Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Recovery and Self Reliance (MAMSER) 1987 and the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC) 1996. Thus, the above could be described as eras in which various governments seek to establish a single agency that would assist address the incidences of corruption. However, politicization of



some of the agencies and highly centralized administrative structure that act at the behest of the chief executive hindered progressive fight against corruption.

By 1999 when the country returned to civilian rule under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo, several anti-corruption initiatives were established. Institutions and laws like the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (NEITI), the Money Laundering Act in 2004, institution of the Due Process Mechanism in public procurements, the freedom of information act 2011, are all institutions and laws aimed at tackling the menace of corruption. The EFCC between 2003 and 2010 has taken 700 cases to court, with a record of over 400 convictions, assets worth #1trillion forfeited, while some cases are still pending before the court and has till 2010 recovered over \$6.5billion (Waziri 2010:2). This surpasses the ICPC's 241 persons prosecuted in 127 cases from inception in 2001 to 2007.

Thus, the EFCC's effort may not be unconnected to the fact that the EFCC particularly was given a wide range of responsibilities that seem to have encroached into the responsibilities of other related agencies. For instances, according to the EFCC establishment act (2004:6-7) the commission is saddled with the following functions:

- (i) the enforcement and the due administration of the provisions of this Act;
- (ii) the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, etc.;
- (iii) the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority;
- (iv) the adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial crimes related offences or the properties the value of which corresponds to such proceeds;
- (v) the facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and technical information and the conduct of joint operations geared towards the eradication of economic and financial crimes;

- (vi) collaborating with government bodies both within and outside Nigeria carrying on functions wholly or in part analogous with those of the Commission concerning -
- (vii) the identification, determination, of the whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of being involved in economic and financial crimes,
- (iii) the exchange of personnel or other experts,
- (iv) the establishment and maintenance of a system for monitoring international economic and financial crimes in order to identify suspicious transactions and persons involved,
- (v) maintaining data, statistics, records and reports on person, organizations, proceeds, properties, documents or other items or assets involved in economic and financial crimes;
- (vi) undertaking research and similar works with a view to determining the manifestation, extent, magnitude, and effects of economic and financial crimes and advising government on appropriate intervention measures for combating same
- (vii) dealing with matters connected with the extradition, deportation and mutual legal or other assistance between Nigeria and any other country involving Economic and Financial Crimes;
- (l) The collection of all reports relating suspicious financial transactions, analyse and disseminate to all relevant Government agencies;
- (viii) taking charge of, supervising, controlling, coordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to the current investigation and prosecution of all offenses connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes;
- (vx) the coordination of all existing economic and financial crimes, investigating units in Nigeria;
- (x) maintaining a liaison with office of the Attorney-General of the Federation, the Nigerian Customs Service, the Immigration and Prison Service Board, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, all government security and law enforcement agencies and such other financial supervisory institutions in the eradication of economic and financial crimes;
- (xi) carrying out and sustaining rigorous public and enlightenment campaign against economic and financial crimes within and outside Nigeria and;



(xii) carrying out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on it under this Act etc.

However, in spite of the emergence of these institutions and laws, incidences of corruption have remained high. The duplication of the functions of ICPC by the EFCC act also contributes to the failure of these institutions to nib the problem from the bud. In fact, the conflicting functions of these institutions and the unhealthy politics that aids mediocres to assume vital positions in the institutions appears to have made the fight against corruption unachievable at least for the nearest future. Indeed, another major challenge is the selective and partial application of the laws. For instance, under the tenure of the former president Obasanjo the EFCC seems to have been used to witch-hurt opposition politicians while cronies and allies of the government were flourishing in corrupt practices. The implication is that the more the nation creates anti-graft agencies that are mainly dependent on executive control, conflicts and competitions among these agencies would always stall progress and provide escaping root for offenders.

Governance, Corruption and the Crisis of Development in Nigeria

Scholars have engaged several methodological and theoretical measures in the discourse of corruption, yet their submissions and observations appear not to have abated the ever increasing incidences of corruption. Indeed, corruption has remained so rampant at all levels of government in the post-colonial Nigeria. For instance, Ribadu (2006) gave a graphic summary of the situation. He termed the period between 1979 and 1998 “the darkest period” in Nigeria’s history of corrupt regimes. The civilian administration of 1979 - 1983 was bedevilled with profligacy, “wanton waste, political thuggery and coercion...disrespect for the rule of law...bare faced, free for all looting of public funds through white elephant projects” (cited in Fagbadebo 2007:30-31). According to him:

Corrupt public servants and others in the private sector bestrode the nation, masquerading as captains of business and power brokers with tainted and stolen wealth and demanded the rest of us to kowtow before them. The period of military regime was pathetic. Under them, corruption became the sole guiding principle for running affairs of state. The period

witnessed a total reversal and destruction of every good thing in the country (cited in Fagbadebo 2007:31).

Apart from Ribadu's observations, flagrant abuse of public office and misuse of public fund climaxed in the military regime of the mid 90s. As a result, between 1996 and 1997 Nigeria won itself unenviable position of the World's most corrupt Nation for the two consecutive years (see Transparency International, 2009). With the return to civilian rule in 1999, the Obasanjo administration established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The Ribadu led EFCC was reputed for the trial and conviction of former Bayelsa State Governor, Deprieye Alamiesiegha and former Inspector General of Police Tafa Balogun and other high profile prosecutions especially among the ruling elites. It is important to note that in spite of the EFCC's efforts, a return to civil rule is fraught with massive official corruption especially by the governors and other political collaborators and there were incidences of selective prosecution (as the case mentioned above). For instance, while Obasanjo was engaged in sanctimonious sermons of anti-corruption, his government was hugely mired in impropriety over privatization of public enterprises (Iyare 2008:47) and other situations. Iyare further explained that enterprises were sold to friends and acolytes of the regime in shady circumstances. In follow-up to this, Ndibe declared that:

Obasanjo has a lot to answer for. How was Nigerian's oil blocks sold during his watch? Can he affirm that the Nation's largesse was never conferred on foreign and local agents fronting for him, his relatives or friends? Where did he afford the huge cost of building his private university? How did his farm which was in a feeble financial state in 1999 turn into a juggernaut and cash mint, making a reported monthly profit of N30 million? How about the large farmlands he acquired in other parts of the country, how did the cash materialize? (Emphasis added, cited in Iyare 2008:47).

Indeed, under Jonathan Goodluck's, administration, Nigeria appeared to have been bedevilled with corruption. A Global Financial Integrity Report (2013) stated that Nigerian Leaders from 2000 to 2010 have stolen 3.047 trillion Naira placing the country 7th in the world's money laundering index (see Daily Sun February 15, 2013). The Nigeria's corruption perception index has remained higher even under democratic governance. For instance, table 1 below shows that



Nigeria is rated as one of the World's most corrupt Nation by Transparency International between 1996 and 2014.

Table 1: Nigeria's corruption perception index by Transparency International from 1996 to 2014

Years	Score	Position	Total number of most corrupt Nations
1996	0.6	54	54
1997	1.7	52	52
1998	1.9	81	85
1999	1.6	98	99
2000	1.2	90	90
2001	1.0	90	91
2002	1.6	101	102
2003	1.4	132	133
2004	1.6	144	145
2005	1.9	152	158
2006	2.2	142	179
2007	2.2	147	180
2008	2.7	121	180
2009	2.5	130	180
2010	2.4	134	189
2011	2.4	143	183
2012	27	139	174
2013	25	144	175
2014	27	136	174

Source: Adapted from Enweremadu (2010) with update by the authors.

From the table 1 above, it could be asserted that though the military junta of General Abacha in the opinion of Ribadu (2006) appears to be described as the “darkest” period in history of corruption in Nigeria, we emphasise that even the civilian administrations of Obasanjo and Jonathan with all their pretences performed below expectation in the fight against corruption. Haranguing Nigerians without exemplary character could not have been enough to checkmate the spread. Two years into Obasanjo's first tenure, Nigeria was rated 90 out of 90 most corrupt Nations (see Transparency International 2009). Hence, corruption took a very high position, especially during the first tenure of Obasanjo led civilian regimes (1999-2003), with huge

revenues, but wasteful spending, and nothing to show in terms of physical developments. Explaining this further Robinson (2004), noted that:

“Nigerian government exported 20 billion (US dollars) worth of oil in the year 2003, but its people still scrape by on an average wage of just a dollar per day—oil money has often been wasted in kickbacks and bribes. The country’s economy has struggled with years of mismanagement” (cited in Fagbadebo 2007:33).

The implication is that persistent increase in corrupt practices has also given rise to increasing poverty, crimes and instability making development virtually stagnated or even elusive. Oyewole (2010:3) observed that corruption also generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. For him, officials may increase the technical complexity of public sector projects to conceal or pave way for such dealings, thus further distorting investment. Corruption also lowers compliance with construction, environmental, or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure, and increases budgetary pressures on government. Kaufmann (2000) earlier synthesized the main economic costs of corruption using different studies from most corrupt societies to include:

- Misallocation of talent including under utilization of key segments of society
- Less domestic and foreign investment
- Distorted enterprise development and growth of the unofficial economy
- Distorted public expenditures and public investments, and deteriorated physical infrastructure
- Lower public revenues and lower prevalence of the rule of law as a public good
- Overly centralized government

Corruption appears to encourage unnecessary waste, divert resources and sustains ineffectiveness. For instance, Agbo (2009:55) explained that in Nigeria, more than \$400 billion has been reportedly stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1970 and 2007. With the return to civil rule in 1999, the program of stealing by the ruling class seems to have exploded from a brush fire into an all-consuming conflagration. There are several incidences of contract scam, bribery and abandoned projects both at the Local, State and Federal level. The

implication is that with this level of waste to corruption, the country is denied of investible and developmental capital which augments scarcity, need, pressure and struggle in the polity. Many a times, such struggle for artificial scarcity tends to be linked to the several conflicts in the country. In fact, the consequence is not only that developmental programs are impeded; it destroys and truncates the functionality of the existing structures, scares away investors and kills confidence in the country's possible investors. Societies of this typology may perhaps perpetually remain underdeveloped.

Governance and Development Crisis in Nigeria

There is an inextricable link between governance, corruption and development in Nigeria. Governance and corruption are two different concepts but affect each other in the process of achieving development in any particular society. Indeed, one of the major problems inhibiting development in Nigeria is governance and corruption (see Oyovbaire 2008; Okunade 2008; Achebe 1983). This situation “has given rise to abuse of power, brazen corruption, disregard for due process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process and the weakening of institutions (Harriman 2006:2) which negates the basic principles of governance. The ideal process of governance ensures that constitutionalism is strictly adhered to, this provides a conducive administrative atmosphere with less uncertainty and promotes the capacity of the State to dispense justice fairly, distribute and allocate values equitably which as well enhances speedy development.

In realization of the above, the civilian government of Obasanjo between 1999 and 2003 constituted two anti-graft agencies Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other Offences Commission (ICPC) in an effort to tackle challenges of poor governance that incubates corruption. But the fact that Nigerian leaders do not subject themselves and their actions to law seems to be a major challenge of these institutions in the discharge of their mandate. As a result, Nigeria appears to be facing crisis of governance that seems to have implication of development. Crisis of governance in the opinion of Inokoba and Kumokor (2011: 141-142), is

characterised by the following features: crisis of rising expectations because governance is not meeting popular expectations, with peoples' hopes of a better future increasingly being dashed; exclusive and restrictive democratic space; there is lack of accountability and transparency in many aspects of governance; there are still enormous threats to socio-economic and political stability; and there is increased mass poverty, which continues to constrain development.

As such, the consequence of governance failure is not only persistent poor quality of life, but also a development crisis that has assumed worrisome dimensions and indeed has affected virtually all sectors of the Nigerian political system. For instance, Adeyemo (2009), observed that in spite of over N85 trillion realised between 1999 and 2008, through unprecedented oil receipts, the states and federal government cannot fix collapsing and decaying infrastructures (cited in Inokoba and Kumokor 2011:145). Good governance encompasses effectiveness and responsiveness of leaders, groups, institutions and even individuals in the act of governance. It develops institutions that engineer development, narrowed down or chopped off avenues that allow corrupt practices. It is worthy to note that development would continue to elude any society (particularly Nigeria) that fails to fix its administrative processes in such a manner that it could curtail excesses of the rulers and the ruled.

Conclusion

From our analysis it has been established that two major drivers of development crisis in Nigeria are bad governance and the ever increasing official corruption in both private and public sectors of the economy. Indeed, huge revenues generated by the government could not be properly accounted for; most of which have found their ways to private pockets. With less institutional capacity to checkmate the trend, the speedy growth of corruption and poor governance has resulted to the present crisis of development facing Nigerian society. Even in some instances wherein sectoral growths have been claimed, it does not make any known impact on the entire system. More so, sustainability has never been achieved, hence, it does no reasonable impact as the growth is quickly stalled. We therefore conclude that addressing these development challenges is the only remedy to saving Nigerian democracy that is already witnessing serious cracks.



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Local Government Revenue and Performance: A Study of Selected Local Governments in Kwara State, Nigeria

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Grassroots development has always been a highly prioritized issue on the agenda of almost every nation of the world. In Nigeria, several efforts have been made by various administrations towards achieving this developmental goal. The 1976 Local Government Reforms was a great move in this direction. What actually distinguishes this reform effort from all other previous reforms in Nigeria was its formal and unequivocal recognition of local government as a distinct level of government. This was equally reinforced by several constitutional provisions in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions. Despite these great efforts which many believed would guarantee local government autonomy, there still exists a number of unresolved issues which hinders local government performance. In Nigeria, local governments get 20% statutory allocation, 10% from state's internally generated revenue, value added tax (VAT), excess crude oil 'windfall' couple with their locally generated revenue, yet, their level of project execution remain highly unsatisfactory to residents. It is therefore against this background, that this study investigates local government fiscal management and intergovernmental fiscal relations. It equally reviews statutory allocations and internally generated revenue of the selected local governments. The paper adopts the use of questionnaires to elicit data on the perceptions of local residents on the level of local government's performance. Result shows that a strong approach to expand the scope of local autonomy will have to come through a corresponding expansion in IGR mobilization, which implies that when local government assumes a level of fiscal self-reliance, autonomy expands and performance level begins to appreciate.

Key words: Local Government, Revenue, Performance.

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1.0 Introduction

Over the years, meaningful local government developmental efforts in Nigeria, have suffered a lot of setbacks due to excessive control of this level of government by the state and federal governments. This development has restricted the fiscal jurisdiction of local governments as well as negatively rubbed on their autonomy. As such, the financial resources available to them as a



level of government have continued to dwindle, hence, remain grossly inadequate to carry out the functions for which they have been created.

However, the first major attempt at comprehensively looking at the finance of Nigerian local governments took place in 1976, through the introduction of the 1976 guideline for local government reforms initiated by the Murtala/Obasanjo military regime. The reforms and the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria identified reasonably adequate sources of revenue for the local governments. These are the mandatory statutory allocations from the Federal and State governments, aside other internal revenue generation sources. The 1976 Nation-wide reforms of the local government system in Nigeria apparently provided a panacea for all the structural problems of this level of government.

But by 1989, most of the problems resurfaced. The catalogue of problems remained those of inadequate financial and other resources, frequent transfer of functions to and from local governments, lack of autonomy definable in terms of excessive control exercised by both central and state governments and inadequate involvement of the community in decision-making (Bello-Imam, 2007). All these, in one way or the other have seriously affected the financial autonomy of local governments in Nigeria, as well as their performances. The prevailing federal government revenue allocation formula stipulates that local government is entitled to twenty percent of the revenue accruable to the federation account and ten percent of the internally generated revenue of the state governments, in addition to their own internally generated revenue, which though, in most cases are usually small. The local governments are therefore in a situation where they depend almost entirely on the federal and state governments for funds for the performance of their statutory functions (Bello-Imam, 2010).

However, the problem of local government revenue management is traceable to the Nigerian federalism and this problem has been provoked by a number of factors. According to Akindele, (1995), these problems include overdependence on statutory allocations from both the state and the federal governments, deliberate tax evasion by local citizenry, creation of non-viable local government areas, differences in the status of local governments in terms of the rural- urban dimension, inadequate revenue and restricted fiscal jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the technical committee on the review of the structure of local governments in Nigeria in its report indicated that the third tier of government had failed in meeting the needs of the people going by the unaccounted huge amount of money allocated. The committee maintained that a wide gulf exists between allocated financial resources and their corresponding number of public works (The Punch, Nov.14, 2003: 1-2). In view of the above, this paper raises the following fundamental research questions:



- i. To what extent is the development of these local government areas commensurate with their revenue?
- ii. Are these local governments entirely dependent on external revenue from the state and federal governments?
- iii. Are the poor performances of these local governments, a function of mismanagement of funds or a function of the state-local government fiscal relationship? and
- iv. How can we raise the level of internally generated revenue component of the local governments?

Anchoring on the above, it is therefore the objective of this study to examine local government fiscal management and performance with specific focus on citizen's perception on local government service delivery; the pattern of inter-governmental fiscal relations, the existing fiscal structure and how they affect performances of these local governments. In an attempt to proffer solutions to the research questions raised above, and to assist the researcher in a feat to give direction to this work, the following propositions are hereby pinned down for consideration:

- i. The low level of project execution at the local government level is a resultant of the mismanagement of statutory allocations.
- ii. Tax compliance intent has a direct bearing on the impact of internally generated revenue (IGR) on the economy of the local government.
- iii. The state-local government fiscal arrangement, specifically, the operation of the Joint State-Local Government Account has continued to hinder the performance of local governments.

This paper therefore investigates the revenue and performances of the selected local governments- Ilorin West, Offa and Moro local governments for three years, (2009 – 2011); and appraises the same in order to weigh development against revenue. It also suggests workable solutions to the problem of revenue generation in local governments. The paper is divided into seven sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section explores relevant literatures with respect to the subject matter. The third section explains the key concepts as related to this study, while the fourth section deal with theoretical framework. The fifth section explains the methods of analysis, the types and sources of data. The sixth section presents the results of the research study, analysis and discussion of the findings, while the last section contains the conclusion and the recommendations.

2.0 Literature Review

For many years, the financial resources available to the local governments throughout Nigeria have not been related directly enough to the functions for which such bodies have been made responsible by the law. This unsatisfactory situation was commented upon by the Third National Conference on Local Government, which was held in December, 1970. In line with the conference resolution, the functions and responsibilities of local authorities must be clearly determined by the state government before firm decisions can be taken on the pattern and level of local taxation and local revenue. In other words, the financial resources made available to local authorities must be adequate to enable minimum acceptable standards of services to be provided (Aborisade, 1988).

It is worthy of note, at this juncture, to state that the 1976 reforms had as its building blocks, the recommendations of the Third National Conference on Local Government, which stated what type of relationship should exist between the state and local governments fiscally. Of equal note is the fact that the vital aspects of issues relating to local government revenue are largely located within the concept of federalism, fiscal federalism and local government finances in Nigeria. According to Aiyede (2004), *the reason for the adoption of the federal formula is often times attributed to pressures for larger political units, capable of fostering economic development and improved security, while at the same time providing for smaller political units that hold the expression of local distinctions*. In other instance, the adoption of a federal state is informed by the need to strike a balance between unity and diversity. Note that the Nigerian purpose and style of federalism corresponds to the latter than the former assertion (Mikhelovba, 2011).

In support of this position, Fatile et.al (2009), describe federalism as a common feature of contemporary nation state. It is the division of powers so that the general and regional government is each within a sphere coordinate and independent as defined by K.C Wheare (1940). This suggests that federalism involves contractual non centralization, and structural dispersion of powers among centers whose authorities are constitutionally guaranteed. Invariably, federalism involves *cooperation, bargain and conflict*.

From these various definitions above, there exists an intersectional fact, which suggests an existence of interactions among governmental units of all types and levels within a system. These interactions are intergovernmental. It is therefore imperative to submit here that intergovernmental relation is the central idea of federalism. With respect to this type of constitutional arrangement, Olugbemi (1980), argues that the objective of intergovernmental relation is the achievement of the purpose of the state through the division of work relationship among levels of public. However, on the pattern of relationship, Aiyede (2004) submits that this intergovernmental relationship can assume varying permutation or patterns such as Federal-



State, Federal-Local, State-Local, Federal-State-Local, Inter-State, Inter-Local, depending on the existing tiers of government.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the federal and local government either in a federal or unitary state is always a subject of debate, negotiation and in most cases tension. This could have accounted for Pritchard (1972:141) observation that *intergovernmental relations are in fact intergovernmental negotiations in which the parties are negotiating in dead earnest for power, money, and problem solving responsibility*. Souza (2002) argued that a stronger commitment to local government performance can be attained with a meaningful fiscal decentralization of the higher tiers of government as well as stronger efforts from constitutional provisions can create the enabling fiscal environment for local government. It is important to state at this point, that performance of local governments as perceived by Nigerians, always has to do with *on what* and *how* the local government spends money, which thus means that revenue is very crucial to local government performance and as such, it is also important for the Nigerian constitution to give or expand the fiscal jurisdiction of local government. However, the issue as it concerns local government performance is not that of a restricted fiscal jurisdiction but also relating to problems of corruption among politicians and local government career officers (Mikhelovba, 2011; Salahu, 2012).

In relation to local government in the United States of America, Ostrom (1988:189), observed that, *'financial resources from taxes, transfers from other governments, user charges, or borrowing are prerequisites for the functioning of any government. Local governments are no exception'*. According to him, the use of different revenue sources influences the ways in which local governments make decisions and provide services. In general, the more local governments rely on their own sources of revenue, the greater the incentives for elected officials to balance service benefits against the cost and to be more efficient in their operations. When outside revenues are relied upon, fewer incentives to be efficient are present. In the extreme, reliance on external sources seriously reduces local self-governance and turns local government into administrative sub-units of a state or the federal government.

Unlike Nigeria, Brazil is a federal country with a presidential system in which the municipalities (local governments) are not a creation of the state, but part of the federation together with the state (Souza, 2002). The Nigerian constitution is a direct opposite of the Brazilian in this regards, in that it confers on the state, the power to create and control local governments which has over the years amounted to undue interference of the state on local government affairs especially in the areas of fiscal control and monitoring. This has accounted for the local government near universal failure in developing nations of the world.



Despite this ugly interference that has led to the arrested development of local governments in the developing worlds, it is quite interesting to note that in Nigeria, local governments have never had the kind of financial importance they now recently enjoy. If this is the case, it thus appears as if the argument by the like of Souza (2002), that fiscal decentralization of the higher tiers and expansion of local government fiscal jurisdiction is beginning to lose weight as the problem of local government may not really be that of insufficient funding but probably that of mismanagement of funds or revenue. In Brazil, according to Souza (2002), attempts to readdress the financial and managerial limitations of local governments have been made by the federal government by introducing new policy designs and financial schemes aimed at the localization of two areas of responsibilities, health care and primary education. The reason for this was to create a national standard guaranteeing local citizens access to health care and education. But unfortunately, in Nigeria, responsibilities are often times localized without equal and appropriate increase in the revenue allocation.

However, what the Brazilian experience demonstrates is that responsibility transfer is not only a question of having more resources or constitutional mandate. Instead, the most important variable to ensure responsibility transfer seems to lie with policy design. Such policies are designed as a complex system of intergovernmental relations and transfer combining incentives and sanctions. This made the implementation of these policies to work in Brazil. A fiscal responsibility law and a law imposing criminal and administrative charges on public sector financial managers were passed in 2000 in Brazil. This strengthens the existing limits on spending and adds some new ones, such as punishment varying from three months to four years imprisonments over public sector debts or financial misappropriation.

In Nigeria, statutory allocation to local government has enhanced their economic fortunes and improved efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. On the other hand, the financial buoyancy of Nigeria local governments due to the incidence of statutory allocation has conditioned a systematic decline in their internally generated revenue (Bello-Imam,2010). Local governments are constantly faced with problems of restricted fiscal jurisdiction. In other words, the participation of state and federal components to often generate revenue from local environment encroaches on the fiscal jurisdiction of local government.

3.0 Conceptual Framework

3.1 Local Government: The idea of local government is intuitively self evident and simple. Hence most writers on local government pay little attention to the issue of its definition. This however does not guarantee mutual agreement on a definition of this concept. The absence of mutually agreed definition may not be explained as arising from the vagueness of the idea

conveyed by the concept but more significantly because of the series of postulations regarding the reason for the existence and objectives of local government (Akhaine, 2009).

Local Government is a political sub-unit of a nation, established by law. This level of government is usually vested with power over local affairs which include the power to impose taxes for the purpose of revenue generation. Viewed in a similar manner, William Robson (1949:574) defines Local Government as involving *the conception of territorial, non-sovereign community possessing the legal right and the necessary organization to regulate its own affairs*. In support of the above definitions, Barber (1975:4) defines the same as *'a system of geographical decentralization in which some functions and responsibilities of government are delegated to governmental units or bodies at the local level'*.

It should be emphasized at this point that local government is not absolutely local or independent as such. Although, individuals of a defined area are opportune to manage or have a say in their own affairs, but there exists a minimal, if not over riding control from the state and federal governments. Bello-Imam (2007:4) succinctly defines the concept as: *'a government at the local level'*. This according to him is different from local administration as operative at the local level. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while we admit the existence of different definitions as presented by various scholars from different perspectives, it is equally highly imperative to state categorically that none of these definitions is absolutely satisfactory. As such, scholars have virtually agreed in what should be the basic elements of local government. These elements put together portray local government as that unit of administration with defined territory, power, and administrative authority, which could be elected or appointed exclusively by the people.

3.2 Revenue: Since it is one of the main objectives of this paper to establish a nexus between local government revenue and its level of performance, it is therefore incumbent upon us to take the pain in going through the conceptual explorations of "Revenue" and "Performance". Since local government falls within the confines of the public sector, it will be more rewarding at the level of this study to also limit ourselves to what revenue means within the public sector domain. Revenue could be defined as the funds generated by the government to finance its activities. In other words revenue is the total fund generated by government (Federal, state, local government) to meet their expenditure for a fiscal year. This refers also to the grand total of money of income received from the source of which expenses are incurred. Revenue could be internal or external revenue (Adejoh and Sule, 2013).

Aborisode (1988), describes revenue as the total income generated from federal, state and local government. He states further that what makes local government a constitutional matter is the revenue sharing perspectives. Hepworth (1976) describes revenue as an income or funds raised

to meet the expenditure. He states further that revenue is a raising resources needed to provide government services. He also states that there are two aspect of finance – Income and Expenditure. In other words, finance encompasses both the sources of fund and its utilization. Specifically, Fayemi (1991) defines revenue as all tools of income to government such as taxes, rates, fees, fines, duties, penalties, rents, dues, proceeds and other receipt of government to which the legislature has the power of appropriation. He further classifies government revenue into two kinds – recurrent revenue and capital revenue.

In Nigeria, it has been largely established that local government depends very heavily on external source of funding especially from the federation account. This must have informed submission by Mbanefo and Bello-Imam (2010:180) submission that, “if the instability in federal government revenue as a result of the changing fortunes of oil price in the international market is not to be allowed to introduce greater instability in the budgetary process of the local governments, then, there is an urgent need for the local governments to explore and exploit their own independent revenue sources”.

3.3 Performance: The term performance has really suffered from the problem of acceptability of suitable criteria for measurement because it is a non observable construct which can be quantified if the nature of performance being measured is clearly defined. Nevertheless, its meaning tends to depend on individual scholar or author’s perception of performance. In theory and also in practice, it is almost impossible for us to measure performance, without recourse to efficiency and effectiveness (Mikhelovba, 2011). These two concepts are very germane in understanding or measuring performance of any organization or individual. According to Balogun (1972:21), Efficiency can be categorized into three typologies, these are: technical, economic and operational efficiency. However, his position on performance appears to be capitalistic as it attempts to measure performance per input-output ratio.

It is worthy of note to state that local government in a socialist-oriented state and even to a large extent, in a mixed economy state like Nigeria, may be performing without necessarily making profit margin, since the goals of such states in most cases are to provide welfare services for their citizens. In such states, effectiveness rather than efficiency comes into play. In most developing worlds, local government can only be assumed to be performing if and only if projects and services delivered meets the local demands of its citizens (Salahu, 2012). In essence, performance at the local government level could be measured in terms of specific developmental projects such as kilometers of rural roads constructed or rehabilitated, number of boreholes and deep well sunk. It could also be expressed in terms of improved quality of life the citizenry enjoy as epitomized in the primary health care programmes provided, procurement and distribution of fertilizers to farmers at subsidized rate; effective management of primary



education as well as quality of public enlightenment programmes provided and enjoyed by the citizens.

4.0 Theoretical Frameworks

This study relies on a number of relevant theories, developed by different schools of thought in examining the functional responsibilities local governments perform. It is quite imperative to state that these theories remain very central to the understanding of this work. These are discussed as follows:

4.1. The *Efficiency School*: The main thrust of this school of thought is that it believed that the existence of local government as a tier of government can only be justified when and if it provides services to the public. It also strongly emphasizes that the mere provision of such services notwithstanding, is not the issue but the effectiveness and efficiency in the provision. As viewed by Mill (1975), local governments are in position to efficiently provide close services that are essentially local in nature. He further observed that “if local government did not exist, it would have had to be created”. Local government’s role as an efficient provider of services is gradually emerging as the most important justification for its present day existence (Bello-Imam, 2010). According to Sharpe (1976), ‘of all the services which local government provides for its citizens, there are some for which they are the most efficient providers compare to other level of government’. Consequently, it becomes easy to uphold the argument of the efficiency services thoughts, as a reliable framework for the analysis of local government performances, despite the fact that it has its own lapses, which can be located within the issue of autonomy and fiscal jurisdiction.

4.2 *The Functional School*: The ideals of this school of thought happen to be the most central in the understanding of the subject of this study. This is chiefly due to the fact that this functional school’s ideals evolve from the integration of the efficiency and the developmental schools. This school splits the functional approach into two categories; these are: The General category and the Developmental categories. According to Ola (2010), ‘embedded in the general category are those ideals of democratic participatory and efficient service school, whose major functional items are: Democratic ideals, Political participation, Protective services, and Infrastructural services’. He went further to explain that the developmental category entails the following: National integration, Social and economic development, Manpower resources development. However it is important to state that these theoretical frameworks as discussed above are not mutually exclusive in any system, rather they are mutually reinforcing in most local government system.

5.0 Research Methodology and Design

The study was conducted within Kwara state, using three local government areas as case study. These are Ilorin West, Moro and Offa local government areas, each representing the three senatorial districts in the state. The study employed the use of both the quantitative and qualitative data. Questionnaires were used to elicit quantitative data on residents' perceptions on evaluation of the revenue and performances of these three local councils. Data were also gathered through secondary sources such as newspapers, textbooks, internet and journals. The research population covers the twelve wards in Ilorin West, the twelve wards in Offa and the 17 wards in Moro local government areas. According to the 2006 census, the three local government areas under study, Ilorin west, Offa and Moro have population figures of 364,666; 89,674 and 108,792 respectively. Samples were drawn from these population figures. Stratified sampling technique was adopted. This was used in this study to obtain greater degree of representativeness.

The purposive sampling method was used to select the three local government areas on the merit of the fact that their headquarters serves as convergent points for all other sections in each senatorial districts in the state. A simple random sampling technique was adapted to select the five wards each from the three local government areas. The fifteen wards were clustered based on the 2006 census enumeration areas (EA). Samples were drawn from these EAs, based on the Probability Proportionate to Population (PPP) sampling technique. A total number of 300 questionnaires were administered. There was a 100% response elicited and the response rate was considered adequate and satisfactory for analysis. The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics (simple percentage).

6.0 Data, Results, Analysis and Discussion of Findings

Since the central focus of this section has to do with the presentation of elicited data, analysis of results and the discussion of findings of the study, data collected from the three local governments are hereby presented below for further analysis. Table .1-3 below show the three years statutory allocations, VAT, IGR and Excess crude windfall for the three local governments.

Table.1: Statutory Allocations, VAT, IGR and Excess Crude for Ilorin West, Moro and Offa (2009-2011)

YEAR 2009 (JAN.-DEC)						
L.G	Statutory Allocation (Fed)	VAT	Statutory Allocation.(State)	IGR (Local)	Excess Crude Windfall	TOTAL
Ilorin W	1,587,023,908	225,112,536	31,812,572	36,922,980	316,344,454	2,197,216,452
Moro	951,305,394	161,347,473	18,896,161	17,099,401	191,519,057	1,321,290,223
Offa	752,163,640	152,473,221	15,226,732	16,141,642	149,930,190	1,085,935,426

Sources: Ilorin West, Moro and Offa local government secretariats.



Table.2. YEAR 2010 (JAN.-DEC)

L.G	Statutory Allocation(Fed)	VAT	Statutory Allocation.(State)	IGR (Local)	Excess Crude Windfall	TOTAL
Ilorin W	629,428,519	296,312,685	44,130,135	14,627,737	296,937,281	1,281,436,360
Moro	381,263,222	191,887,327	26,730,910	18,500,260	142,003,142	760,384,863
Offa	298,315,131	150,141,087	20,915,301	13,786,332	105,114,519	588,272,371

Sources: Ilorin West, Moro and Offa local government secretariats.

Table.3. YEAR 2011 (JAN.-DEC)

L.G	Statutory Allocation (Fed)	VAT	Statutory Allocation (State)	IGR (Local)	Excess Crude Windfall	TOTAL
Ilorin. W	970,971,292	363,883,452	51,042,126	15,116,964	81,150,810	1,482,164,644,
Moro	590,150,621	203,877,327	33,083,838	5,500,260	54,554,314	887,166,361
Offa	461,762,773	172,460,634	25,900,162	11,178,446	48,124,312	719,426,327

Sources: Ilorin West, Moro and Offa local government secretariats.

From table.1, 2 and 3, as presented above, the various sources of revenue open to these local governments under study can easily be analyzed, using simple percentage. Table.4 below shows the result of the various sources of revenue available to the three local governments with respect to the total revenue, that is the percentage of each item on the sources of revenue on the total revenue.

Table.4: Analysis of 2009, 2010 & 2011 Revenue to the Three Local Governments, Using Simple Percentage

Sources of Revenue	Percentage on Total Revenue								
	2009			2010			2011		
	Ilorin W	Moro	Offa	Ilorin W	Moro	Offa	Ilorin W	Moro	Offa
Statutory Allocation (Fed)	72.2	71	69.3	49.1	50.2	50.7	65.5	66.5	64.2
VAT	10.2	12	14	23.1	25.2	25.5	24.5	23	24
Statutory Allocation (State)	1.4	1.3	1.4	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.7	3.6
IGR (Local)	1.7	1.2	1.5	1.1	2.4	2.3	1.1	0.6	1.6
Excess Crude windfall	14.5	14.5	13.8	23.3	18.7	17.9	5.5	6.2	6.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Generated by the Researcher from Table.1.

From Table.4 above, it is evidently clear that the three local governments under study depend heavily on statutory allocation for the day to day running of their local areas. For the year 2009, Table.4 shows that 72.2%, 71% and 69.3% of revenue of Ilorin West, Moro and Offa respectively comes from statutory allocation (Federal). As for the year 2010, the percentage of their total income that were sourced via statutory allocation stood at 49.1%, 50.2% and 50.7% for Ilorin West, Moro and Offa local government areas respectively. It is also noticeable that the



same trend appears with respect to the same revenue item for the year 2011, which shows 65.5%, 66.5% and 64.2% for Ilorin West, Moro and Offa local governments respectively.

With respect to IGR, locally or internally sourced revenue remain highly insignificant for the three years, and across the three local governments, ranging between 0.6% and 2.4% of the total revenue for the three local governments. This clearly shows that these three local government areas heavily rely on the statutory allocations, especially federal allocation for running their local communities. It is however clear that because of the heavy reliance on statutory allocations; these local governments have refused to engage in vigorous drive towards sourcing revenue via the internally generated revenue, IGR. The implication is such that if there is a sharp drop in the statutory allocation, given the present distribution, an auto-trigger direct and negative impact on the level and rate of performance on the part of these local governments is expected.

6.1 Analysis of the Data Elicited Via Questionnaires (Section A)

Data elicited via questionnaires were collated. Analyses concerning respondents' demographic data are presented in Table.5, while data bothering on the residents' perceptions on issues pertaining to performance and revenue are presented and analyzed in Table.6, using simple percentage.

Table.5: Demographic Data, Presented in Simple Percentage

S/N	Characteristics	Frequency (f)	Percentage (%)
1	Gender Distribution of Respondents		
	Male	187	62.3%
	Female	113	37.7%
	Total	300	100%
2	Age Distribution of Respondents (Age bracket)		
	Below 20	54	18%
	20-30	193	64.33%
	31-40	46	15.33%
	41-50	6	2%
	51-60	1	0.34%
	Total	300	100%
3	Academic Qualification Distribution of Respondents		
	Primary	28	9.33%
	Secondary	19	6.33%
	College / Polytechnics	75	25%
	University Degree	175	59.34%
	Total	300	100%

4	Occupation Distribution of Respondents		
	Unemployed	22	7.33%
	Professional	52	17.33%
	Politician	33	11%
	Student	138	46%
	Civil/ Public Servant	49	16.34%
	Artisan, Trader & Technician	6	2%
	Total	300	100%

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2013.

From Table.5 above, it can be observed that 187 of the respondents which represent 62.33% are male, while 113 which represent 37.67% are female. This simply means that the difference in the political consciousness of male and female folks in the three local government areas is a bit wide, a difference of 24.66%. This suggests that, there is the need for government of these various local governments to raise the political consciousness of their women, through political orientation programmes. Also from this table, it is evident that majority of the respondents fall within the mature segment of the society, that is an age bracket that most often constitute the work force of any society. These age brackets are 20-30 years and 30-40years, which have frequencies of 193 and 46, a total of 239 out of 300 respondents, representing about 79.66% of respondents. This is indicative of the fact that the assessment of performance of these three local governments were mostly carried out by socially acceptable and responsible members of the society where judgment can be relied upon.

With respect to academic qualification, it can be observed from the above table that most of the respondents are university graduates, 178 representing 59.34% of a total of 300 respondents. The high number of graduates among respondents could be attributed to the fact that these three local government areas house the three top institutions of higher learning in the state. University of Ilorin, in Ilorin West, Kwara State University in Moro while Offa has the Federal Polytechnics Offa. It is believed that since these institutions churn out in large numbers, graduates every year into these communities, and by extension, influencing the level of literacy and political consciousness among the residents of these communities.

The table equally shows that majority of respondents are students, representing 46% of the total number of respondents. This may be attributed to the fact that most people who volunteer as respondents are students who are residents of these local government areas. This goes a long way to establish that young men and women from these areas are more politically conscious than the other segments of this distribution, even than the political segment, which has only 33 respondents, representing just 11% of the sampled population.

6.2 Analysis of Data Elicited Via Questionnaires (Section B)

Data elicited via questionnaires concerning the residents' perceptions on issues pertaining to performance and revenue is presented and analyzed using simple percentage. Responses to the ten questions under Section B are presented in Table.6 below.

Table.6: Data on Residents' Perceptions on Performance and Revenue.

Questions	Response	Frequency	Percentage
Q1: What is the level of government presence in your ward in terms of project execution and service delivery?	High	79	26.3%
	Low	175	58.3%
	Very Low	46	15.4%
Q2: Was any project embarked upon by your local government in your ward in the past three years, (2009-2011)?	Yes	194	64.7%
	No	41	13.7%
	I don't know	65	21.6%
Q3: Were these projects completed successfully?	Yes	164	54.7%
	No	73	24.3%
	I don't know	63	21%
Q4: Are these projects significant to the development of your ward?	Yes	174	58%
	No	56	18.7%
	I don't know	70	23.3%
Q 5: How will you rate your local government 's performance in terms of completed projects and Service delivery in your ward?	Poor	61	20.3%
	Fair	165	55%
	Good	74	24.7%
Q6: Will you comply if your local government introduces a compulsory system of Taxation?	Yes	113	37.7%
	No	141	47%
	I don't know	46	15.3%
Q7: Do you subscribe to the fact that allocations to local governments are sufficient but mismanaged?	Yes	207	69%
	No	49	16.3%
	I don't know	44	14.7%
Q8: Do you think that mismanagement of statutory allocation has negative impact on local government's Performance?	Yes	231	77%
	No	42	14%
	I don't know	27	9%
Q 9: Do you think internally generated revenue has any	Yes	227	75.7%

impact on local government performances?	No	38	12.7%
	I don't know	35	11.6%
Q10: Do you think that the operation of the state-local government joint accounts affect local governments performance?	Yes	207	69%
	No	51	17%
	I don't know	52	14%
Source: Researcher's Survey, 2012			

The above table, Table.6, shows that it is the opinion of 175 respondents, representing 58.3% of the sample population, (300), that the presence of local government in terms of performance is low while 79 respondents, representing 26.3% of respondents are saying that performance level is high, whereas 46 respondents, representing 15.4% opined that the presence of local government in terms of performance is very low. Comparing the combination of those who perceived that performance is low and very low (addition of 58.3% and 15.4%, which gives a total of 73.7%) and those that believe that performance is high, which is just about 26.3%, we come to realize that generally, respondents, and by extension local residents are not satisfied with the level of performances of these local governments.

From the same table, 194 people, representing 64.7% of respondents are of the opinion that projects were executed in their wards, 41 respondents; representing 13.7% said there was no project embarked upon while 65 respondents, representing 21.6% have no idea whether or not projects were executed within their wards. This statistics suggests that on the average, projects were carried out in these communities, since 64.7% opined in the affirmative. The table equally shows that 164 respondents, representing 54.7%, claimed that projects were successfully completed, 24.3% claimed that projects were not successfully completed, while 21% of respondents do not know whether project were completed or not. Put on a scale, it thus means that local governments in Kwara state perform above average in terms of completion of projects. Furthermore, 174 respondents, about 58% opined that projects completed in their wards are of developmental significance, while 18.7% of the population sample disagrees with that position, as 23.3% of respondents are not sure whether these projects have any developmental significance to their local government areas. Invariably, what this suggests is that most projects embarked upon by these local governments are of significance to the development of these areas.

In terms of rating, with respect to completed projects, 61, respondents representing 20.3% of the total number of respondents graded their local government's performance in terms of completed projects as 'poor', whereas 165 respondents, representing 55% of the same population believe that their performance is fair, while 24.7% graded their performances as good. If we weigh the combined responses of those who grade performance as 'good' and 'fair' with those who grade theirs as 'poor', which is 79.7% (55%+24.7) as against 20.3%, we cannot but agree that these

local governments have performed a little above average, in terms of completion of projects and service delivery.

On the table, 113 respondents, representing 37.7% of our sample population are willing to comply with a compulsory tax regime if introduced by their local governments. 141 respondents representing 47% are not willing to comply, while 15.3% is undecided whether to comply or not. It is clear from the above data that the difference between those who are willing and those who are not willing to comply is very slim, just 9.3% (47% -37.7%). It surely implies that if the local government can improve on their current level of performance, more people will be willing to comply. That is if the local residents see evidence on ground that the little money that comes into the local government is judiciously utilized for the development of the community.

Evidently it is clear from the table that most of the respondents believe that allocation to local government is sufficient but mismanaged which is indicated by the 69% of respondents confirming that statutory allocation are sufficient but that it is the mismanagement of this fund that brings about poor performance in local government. In the same direction, 231 respondents, representing 77%, believe that mismanagement of statutory allocation to local government have negative impact on local government performance. Going by this figure, it is clear that most local residents believe that mismanagement of statutory allocation has a great negative impact on local government performance. With respect to internally generated revenue-IGR, the data presented in the above table, suggests that internally generated revenue has serious impact on local government performance, as 227 respondents representing about 75.7% of the total number of our respondents confirm the same.

And finally, the table shows that 207 respondents, which is about 69% of our sample population, agree that the state-local government joint account is a barrier to effective local government performance. While 17% of the same population think otherwise, 14% of the total number of respondents do not know whether the joint account is a barrier or not to local government performance. This therefore shows that generally, residents within these local government areas are not in support of the operation of a state-local government joint account.

7.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

Based on our various findings as explained above, this paper concludes and establishes the fact that there is a lack of autonomy for local governments in Kwara state, particularly as it relates to the intergovernmental fiscal relations between the state and the local governments. An exception to this was discovered in the case of Offa local government which partially resisted the operation of the state-local government joint account and execution of joint projects. In addition to this, the



paper affirms and confirms our preliminary propositions, and concludes that the level of execution of projects in the local governments under study is relatively low; and that the low level of project execution at the local government level is a resultant of the mismanagement of statutory allocations. It further concludes that local residents are ready to comply with an introduction of a new tax regime, if performance at the local government level improves; and that tax compliance intent has a direct bearing on the impact of internally generated revenue (IGR) on the economy of the local government. The paper finally concludes that the state-local government fiscal arrangement, specifically, the operation of the State-Local Government Joint Account has continued to hinder the performance of local governments in the state.

7.2 Recommendations

For local governments to be able to function well as the third tier of government efficiently and effectively, adequate autonomy is required. This can only be achieved by local government if and only if necessary steps are taken to initiate moves to raise the level of internally generated revenue. This is one of many steps that local governments in Kwara state can take in initiating a major change in their level of performance. It should be noted that autonomy itself does not imply a complete absence of state or federal government supervision; but it largely implies a higher level of liberty given to local governments to initiate policies having local peculiarities which can effectively elevate and expand their fiscal jurisdictions in order to enhance their internally generated revenue.

It is also recommended that states should intensify efforts on their supervisory roles by creating mechanism for monitoring and doing periodic evaluation of local government administration performance so as to check mismanagement of revenue arising from the corrupt practices of both the carrier officials and political office holders in local governments in Kwara state.

The local government should embark on some meaningful commercial undertakings which could generate revenue as well as create employment opportunities for citizens, for example, poultry, farming, animal husbandry, small and medium scale industries. This is expected to grow the internally generated revenue. This is because deliberate effort is needed and must be made by local government councils in the state to improve on their IGR, if they intend to gain higher level of autonomy. Note that dependency on state and federal governments for revenue will always lead to a restricted fiscal jurisdiction and lack of autonomy for initiating meaningful projects. Since location largely determines the internally generated revenue of a local government because of the varying opportunities each location presents, it is therefore advisable, for the enhancement of IGR, that local governments in urban and semi -urban areas generate revenue largely from tax and rates from industries, while local governments in rural areas should exploit agricultural based strategies.



Because most of our respondents are against the operation of the state-local government joint account, as such, we recommend that the operation of such account be discouraged. Accountability and Transparency are very essential, and therefore needed by local government, if performance is to be largely determined by the level of revenue at the disposal of local governments.

On a final note, we must realize that although the clamour for local government autonomy is considerably high, we should equally appreciate that autonomy for local government is not a guarantee for performance. Good performance is attainable with or without complete fiscal autonomy. What local governments in Kwara need is not entire autonomy, but performance, efficiency and effectiveness that bring about good governance. However, this does not mean that autonomy is to be repudiated, but it is also important to know that a holistic autonomy does not exist for local government anywhere in the world, what is obtainable and needed is relative autonomy lubricated with rewards and sanctions, just as it is obtainable in Brazil.

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A History of the Akimba Recruitments into the Nigerian Army C. 1750-2013

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This paper examines the history of the Kambari military aspects and their pioneering contribution towards the establishment of the British West African Frontier Forces (later Nigerian Army), who were later used by the British colonialists in fighting the WWII (1939-1945). On the side of an Independent Nigeria and in West African sub-region, also used in fighting the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) as well as promoting global peace and security. The Kambari are said to have once established a kingdom of their own-Kambari land⁴⁵ where their sub-ethnic groups of the Awunci, Avadi, Agadi, Akimba, Agaushi and Ashen were administered. Therefore, the paper is certainly restricted to the Akimba.⁴⁶ However, with the paucity of secondary sources, oral information was largely used in reconstructing the history.

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⁴⁵ This sentence raises a fundamental question of whether or not there is, or there ever was, Kambari land. Kambari land could be described as the territory which the people of the Kambari ethnic group could call as traditional homeland to the exclusion of all others, just as the Hausa people regard Hausa land, Kasar Hausa, as theirs. Looking at matters in this way, one can say that there was Kambari land because up to the beginning of the 20th century there was a large chunk of territory which was occupied almost exclusively by the Kambari people. This territory was located on the east bank of the River Niger in the present Yauri and Kontagora Emirates. The only and non-Kambari people living in the territory were Hausa people who were concentrated in three towns only, namely Birnin Yauri, Agwara and Ngaski. The territory stretched for more than fifty kilometres to the east of the River Niger. However, this claim for Kambari land is challenged by the tradition of origin of the parent stock of the Kambari people that is the Awunci, which says that they, the Awunci, were migrants from Mecca in Saudi Arabia who left that area when Mecca was conquered by the Muslim forces in the 7th century A.D. How long it took them to get to where they settled finally in the Yawuri area is not given in the tradition. So the Kambari were not the autochthons of the territory they now occupied. They were immigrants at one stage in the past. For details see: A. Mansur, "History of the Akimba group of the Kambari people to the end of the 20th century", UDUS, M. A. Dissertation, 2010, p. 11

⁴⁶ The Akimba are said to have established seven towns along the eastern bank of the River Niger, some times in the middle of the 18th century or even earlier on. These towns were Wara now their political headquarters, Libata, Dakamala, Gwazali, Kure, Kwakwaran and Karoliya. They later became victims of resettlement after the completion of Kainji Dam in 1968. Later, their country was destabilized for many reasons already discussed in the paper. Alhaji Attahiru Giwa (over 70 years), the Village Head of Wara, interviewed at his palace on 25th December, 2007, from 11:01a.m to 12:30 p.m.

Introduction: Formation of the Akimba Society

Available oral evidences have shown that the formation of the Akimba society was no doubt an amalgamation of ethnic extractions from various Nigerian ethnic groups. They arrived sometimes in small groups and as individuals and settled near the Awunci Kambari as farmers, seasonal fishermen and hunters. The immigrants came as members of different ethnic groups (Hausa, Nupe, Barebari, etc) and of different religions (Islam and paganism). All the various immigrants who came in had to accept the over-all political control of Sarkin Maginga, the sovereign king of the territory. Through peaceful co-existence, the various immigrants were assimilated into the Kambari culture via Awunci. They developed a peculiar dialect similar to that of their host and threw away their original identities, consequent of which led to the formation of the Akimba ethnic group.⁴⁷

The major factor that attracted the Hausa, Nupe and other tribes into the area was environmental. The area was blessed with various streams that still made fishing possible. The town of Wara, the Akimba commercial and political headquarters, was an important fish market of the Kambari people. The area, especially the western side was also blessed with varieties of wild animals like elephants, hippopotamus, lions, leopards, bush cows, roans, hartebeests, water bucks, cobs, and all lesser species of buck were common. Thus, the environment has no doubt prepared the *Kambarin* Akimba to become skilful archers and musket shooters due to the consecutive hunting expeditions they engaged in. As proficient traditional snipers they later became fitted in the modern army.⁴⁸ Instead of retaining the original (Awunci Kambari) tongue, the new settlers in Wara and other established Akimba towns, developed a new Kambari dialect *Akimbançi*, which has some dialectical differences with the Awunci language.⁴⁹

Historical Origin of Akimba Heroism in War Fronts, their Subsequent Military Expeditions and Reasons for their Dispersal

The earliest historical accounts of the Kambari active military involvement into war-fronts could be dated back to the middle of the 18th century when the first ancient Akimba walled-town of Gwazali was said to have emerged on the Eastern Bank of River Niger.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ibidem

⁴⁸ A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *Gazetteers of Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, Vol. I, London, Frank Cass Publishers, revised edition, 1972, P.5.

⁴⁹ Alhaji Attahiru Giwa, Ibidem

⁵⁰ It needs to be known that Gwazali town was originally an Awunci settlement that was later dominated by the Akimba. The town was by far older than all the Akimba settlements. Following the consecutive massive persecutions which emanated from abrupt military attacks and raids of Nagwamatse, the ruler of Kontagora, against the Kambari land, the people of Gwazali, like those of other Kambari towns and villages, began to emigrate in search of secured environments that were free from such harassments. Since then, Gwazali town ceased to exist and another settlement was established called *Shiwate*. Today, those communities are found living together in parts or areas (Hausa, *unguwanni*) of some villages and towns of Magama Local Government Area of



The term Gwazali is a multidimensional concept among the Akimba clan of *Kakinei*. First, Gwazali as the name implies refers to a powerful deity that was worshipped by the people of that community. The deity was said to be very powerful or even mysterious in such a way that, not even the then most stubborn powerful political adventurers like Nagwamatse and his company would pass near the shrine that harboured the deity on a horse-back without certain calamities befalling the troupe.⁵¹

On the other hand, the communities of the clan were also referred to as Gwazali owing to the popularity of that powerful deity. However, the ideal name of the clan or community is “*Kakinei*”, meaning the residents of the river-rine area. Nevertheless, it is worthy of mentioning here that *Gwazali* or *Kakinei* clan was an amalgamation of ethnic extractions that came to settle together. Among the ethnic groups were the *Kagali* who originated from *Awuncin Agwara*, *Ntade* originated from *Awuncin Ngaski*, *Darwa*, an extract from the *Yalawa* clan and *Nlongon* group who originated from the Lopawa.⁵²

More importantly, the chief custodian of the Gwazali shrine was said to be titled Gwazali, who succeeded in bringing the diverse clans together under the influence of a single deity of worshipping, an event that brought about a strong national unity, state formation and establishment of standing army who were always led by such a heroic shrine leader. This led to the formation of a well-fortified town of Gwazali as defence mechanism.⁵³

Part of the Kambari celebrated history of their military expeditionary victories was perhaps, the killing of a Nupe leader Tsoede. Written sources made mention of a certain warrior called Gwazali who was said to have killed the first Nupe ruler, Tsoede during one of the greatest military expeditions at Gwagwade (also Gdagede), a Kambari village about 4 kilometres away from the town of Nasko in Magama Local Government Area of Niger State.⁵⁴

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a royal dispute sparked off in Ngaski town between members of the ruling family. The dispute resulted in a civil war in Maginga Kingdom. Macupa and Ngaski towns became the bases of the two worrying parties. The war broke out in 1859 during the reign of Sarkin Maginga Gisonku, son of Albarka (1854-1861). The entire Kambari of Maginga that comprised of Akimba and Awunci were involved on one side or the other, and were thus further weakened. However, there was pause in fighting in 1867 before it was resumed in 1872. When the Kambari were in their weakened position, Ibrahim, the Emir (Sarkin Sudan) of Kontagora, came into the area in his raiding campaign and captured the Kambari of Macupa

Niger State, mainly established and predominantly occupied by the Agaushi group of Kambari. Few among such Akimba-established areas are *Shiwate-Kwada*, *Shiwate-Auna*, *Shiwate-Mabira*, *Shiwate-Mazakari*, and *Shiwate-Mariko*. *Shiwate* means the area of ‘one bunch of palm broom’, which directly signifies their continuous cooperation.

⁵¹ Extracts from verbal interviews with Baba Gwara (88years) on 14/2/2004, at Mabira, from 6:30 to 8:00, pm

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Baba Musa Maigishiri (78 years), on 3/7/2008, at Shiwate- Auna, from 12:00 to 1:08 pm

⁵⁴ See: Ade, Obayemi, “States and Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence Area”, in I. Obaro, *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Books Plc., 1980, p. 157



and neighbourhood, and sold the captives into slavery. This contributed in depopulating the country.⁵⁵

Oral traditions show that the prime factor for the early Akimba disintegration and migrations was the Umaru Nagwamatse's (1864-1876) raiding manners over the vast Kambari population who were mostly the Avadi, Awunci, Agaushi and Akimba people. It is evident that Umaru and his son Ibrahim Nagwamatse (1883-1902) of Kontagora were not simply raiding the Kambari towns for slaves and booty, but were also burning their settlements and crops. It is said that shortly after he became leader, Ibrahim Nagwamatse had launched series of attacks on the towns of Ngaski, Makawa, Salka, Mamba, Anaba, Auna, Libata, Kure, Kwakwaran and Wara⁵⁶ where he succeeded in sacking the town of Wara in the 1890s.⁵⁷ However, subsequent Ibrahim's attacks on Wara were not successful. Un doubtfully, the era of the Nagwamatse (1864-1901), was one of the most disturbed periods in Akimba history and indeed the most exhausting. However, the Akimba eventually succeeded in weakening the military strength of Nagwamatse consecutively. The first Akimba encounter with Nagwamatse was through the effort of a certain renowned hunter of Barebari origin called Dogo Sala, who led a group of Barebari hunters from Borno to the Kambari area for hunting jaws. They later resided there permanently and constituted part of the Libata founders. Sala and his fellow archers joined the Libata forces that later confronted Umaru Nagwamatse and succeeded in killing one of his heroic Generals at Anaba. Consequently, the Anaba people attributed all troubles they encountered to Libata people, when Nagwamatse launched a severe military attack as revenge. Anaba was scattered and many were taken to Kontagora as slaves. This led to a serious long lasting enmity between the Kambari of Anaba and those of Libata, as even a highly thirsty Libata man, passing by, was never given drinking water at Anaba.⁵⁸

It was also evident that Umaru Nagwamatse himself was killed by a group of Akimba Kambari fighters from Libata along with the Awunci of Macupa in one of his raids at Mamba near Salka town. His brother Ibrahim Nagwamatse (1883-1902) launched a severe revengeful attack against Mamba and destroyed the village. Consequently, a long extreme enmity existed between Mamba and Libata, which no even greetings were exchanged and a Libata man was never offered water for drinking in Mamba. It is just of recent, that their relationship resumed.⁵⁹

A combination of the developments discussed above no doubt contributed to the Akimba degeneration, and eventually made them to undertake series of widespread migrations to different communities in present day Niger State, and at different times. Consequently, by the

⁵⁵ O. Temple, *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, Temple, C.L.(ed.), 2nd edition., London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1965, p.202. For detailed about the Maginga civil war, see M. Adamu, *The Rise and Fall of Hausa Rule in Yauri and Maginga Kingdoms from about 1425 to 1913*, ABU Press Ltd., 2013 (forthcoming).

⁵⁶ Attahiru Giwa, *Ibiden*

⁵⁷ *Ibiden*

⁵⁸ Interview with Alhaji Hassan Majidadi Libata (over 100 years), interviewed at his palace Libata town, 21/10/2008, time- 10:00-11:00 am

⁵⁹ *Ibiden*



end of the 19th century, many Akimba settlements were almost empty. The last migratory stimulant of the Akimba was the 1968 completion of Kainji Dam project and its resettlement exercises. Majority left in search of vast farm land.⁶⁰ They migrated to new places like Auna, Mazakari, Tungan Jika, Tungan Bako, Shagwa, Tungan Angulu, Sabongarin Sarkpa, Mariko, Nciniya, Marebeni, Zugurma, Ibbi, old Bussa, and Karabande. However, the migrations to these areas were not done in organized groups but by individuals, families and clans, and were carried out at different times. The emigration was gradual though it had diverse effect on the rest of the neighbouring Kambari groups, notably, the Agaushi and Abadi (Avadi) as well as on other non-Kambari tribes in both Yauri Emirate and other parts of Niger State like the Gungawa, Nupe and Busawa. For details on the impact of Kainji Dam on the indigenous people of Yauri Emirate particularly the Kambari and Gungawa, reference could be made to the PhD thesis and M. A. Dissertations of A. A. Kware, M. Abubakar and Y. Abubakar respectively.⁶¹

The British Conquest of Kontagora and its aftermath to the Kambarin Akimba and Rest of the Kambari

It is imperative to analyze the British conquest of Kontagora which took place on the 13th January 1901⁶² so as to put the study in rightful setting. It is important to note at this point that Kambari land was badly ravaged by the Nagwamatse raids at the time of the colonial conquest. In order to justify their conquest on Kontagora, the Europeans claimed that Ibrahim Nagwamatse was depopulating the vast area by engaging in slave raids and slave trade, consequent upon which the lands were almost left uncultivated. The Kontagora slave-raiding continued up to the time of the British conquest when Ibrahim Nagwamatse was defeated by the British army in 1902.⁶³

In January 1901, after the battle of Ilorin, the colonial forces under Colonel Kemball marched to meet the forces of Nagwamatse, which were estimated as consisting of 50,000 men, armed with

⁶⁰ Kainji Dam and the people: *The Story of the Dam – its Economic and Social Significance to the people of Nigeria*, Lagos, Nigerian National Press, 1969, pp. 37-39. During the resettlement the first batch commenced on 15th April 1968, followed by the second batch on 14th May 1968 and finally on 6th June 1968. Thus resettlement was completed. Attahiru Giwa, op cit. The issue of Succession dispute also contributed enormously to further Akimba migration into different areas in search of peaceful living. Example of such dispute was when the *Dakamala* royal families had a clash that finally resulted to their awkward disintegration. Many left wandering in search of a charismatic leader whom in such a critical situation would weld his disintegrated masses together. See: Mal. Mamman Yakumashe (over 100), interviewed at Karabande ward, New Bussa, 18th March 2010, 10:00-12:30 p.m.

⁶¹ Aliyu Abubakar Kware, "Poverty in Sokoto State: An Historical Study, 1976-2009", PhD thesis, Department of History, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2012, A. Mansur, "History of the Akimba Group of the Kambari People to the end of the 20th Century", UDUS, M. A. Dissertation, Y. Abuabakar, "A History of the Baresha (Gungawa) to 1968" M. A. History Dissertation, Department of History, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2011

⁶² According to the colonial evidences, the attack on Kontagora was led by Lieutenant Colonel Kemball with a total of 2 officials, 3 N.O.Os, 323 other ranks, 3 machine guns and 2 mini guns along with him. Obaro, *The Fall of Nigeria*, Longman, London, p.301

⁶³ R. Marjomaa, *War on the Savannah: The Military Collapse of the Sokoto Caliphate under the invasion of the British Empire, 1897-1903*, Saarijarvi, Gummerus Oy, 1998, p. 162. In 1896, a detachment of British troops from Jebba established a post at Yelwa and in 1901 the Kontagora expeditionary forces assembled at Ngaski and marched on Kontagora. Yelwa was abandoned as a military station in 1903. See: Kirk-Green, *Op.cit*, p. 19



local guns, bows, arrows and spears. The expedition was not mounted by just the constabulary troops but by those of the better equipped and trained West Africa Frontier Forces (WAFF). Instead of going to Kontagora straight, it was decided to circle around it from the west taking along reinforcements from the upriver garrisons and then cutting Ibrahim's escape routes towards Sokoto in the north before attacking the town itself. As this meant a march over 150 miles (240 kilometres), the combined fighting strength of the force was restricted to some 450 soldiers, two 75 millimetre guns and three machine guns.⁶⁴

Kambari Conscription into British Colonial Army and later Nigerian Army

On January 17th 1901, after a short skirmish battle, the Nagwamatse capital town of Udara was captured and his army that comprised of Kambari soldiers from Ibeto, Kwakwaran, Macupa, Ntade, Anaba, Auna and Rijau succumbed due to the powerful nature of the maxim guns in which they had no answer to. On 18th January 1901, Ibrahim Nagwamatse left Kontagora for self-exile to Zaria and the town was set ablaze.⁶⁵

Following the fall of Udara, some of his soldiers joined the British army rather than to remain under the Nagwamatse enslavement. Many of the Nagwamatse forces met their instant deaths, others were captured, imprisoned and later forced to serve under the colonial army. For instance, oral source mentioned some Kambari able bodied men like Turbe from Ntade, Agaba and Pashamayagi from Macupa among many others, who were raided by the Nagwamatse forces and turned into slaves at Kontagora. After the successful British conquest of Kontagora, the Nagwamatse armies surrendered to the British and made to join the colonial forces under the auspices of West African Frontier Force (WAFF). They also helped the British in fighting and pacifying the remnants of the stubborn Nigerian society. Similarly, they contributed in fighting the WWII. Following the completion of WWII, Pashamayagi and Agaba were said to have returned home fully dressed in their military regalia along with Qur'an and other Islamic texts on their shoulders. They later helped in promoting the spread of Islam among their tribe mates.⁶⁶ It is therefore imperative to note that, the Kambari were no doubt, constituted part of the early indigenous colonial forces that were retained and later used in the establishment of Nigerian Army after independence, thereby serving the nation to date in different capacity.⁶⁷

Akimba Material and Military Contributions in WWII (1939-1945) and Effects of the War on the Akimba

In preparations to the imperialist Second World War (1939-1945), the British Consul ordered some Nigerian chiefs and kings to recruit soldiers for that purpose. As a result, young Nigerians were hurriedly mobilized by their local rulers, and drafted into various military and paramilitary construction projects such as airports, harbours, barracks and railways. Apart from those ones,

⁶⁴ According to the colonial evidences, the attack on Kontagora was led by Lieutenant Colonel Kemball with a total of 2 officials, 3 N.O.Os, 323 other ranks, 3 machine guns and 2 mini guns along with him. Obaro, *The fall of Nigeria*, Longman, London, p.301

⁶⁵ B. Hamilton, *Gazetteer of Kontagora Province*, Frank Cass, London, 1959, Para 41, p. 30

⁶⁶ Interview with Malam Abubakar Barau Ngaski Village Head, aged 70, at his palace, 22/4/2013, 5:05-6:10 pm

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*



more than 100,000 others took part in direct combat and acquainted themselves heroically.⁶⁸ However, quite disheartening, many were buried there in the battlefields sooner they arrived when made to face the well-trained British adversaries.⁶⁹ Moreover every British colony was expected to contribute in cash and material to the British war effort. To implement this, the local chiefs embarked on imposing special levy on their subjects, and a lot was realized through this special taxation. In Northern Nigeria for instance, the Native Administration and Emirs donated the sum of £98,000 in addition to various food stuff. Assessment was also made on a population basis. A census was taken and a rate fixed for each adult male, dependent on the wealth of the village or community, its proximity to markets or caravan roads, fertility of soil and so on.⁷⁰

Famous among such traditional rulers that helped in mobilizing the WWII were, the Emir of Yauri Abdullahi (1923-1955) and District Head of Ngaski Abdullahi Dan Umaru (1921-1952) who was said to have menaced the Awunci and Akimba able bodied men. Abdullahi's basis for choosing the Akimba and Awunci was that, they were energetic people who could also withstand hardship at all costs. Those conscripted were later on sent to the battle field. According to Attahiru Giwa, many people among the Akimba had gone and were never heard of again. No doubt, this factor had posed a serious threat to the Akimba society and finally hundreds resolved to flee so as to free themselves from such forceful recruitments.⁷¹ Among such youths said to have left Old Wara during those days were Sarkin Makera and his son, Agwaru, who opened the way for others, followed by Dogo Makadi. Later on many others in the Akimba territory also followed their suit. By then, the destinations of many emigrants were unknown but believed to have moved eastward into the present Niger Republic. Their fleeing effort did not benefit them because they met a similar horrible incarceration of the French Colonialists there.⁷²

Akimba Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970)

Just like many of the Northern Nigerian society, the Akimba and other Kambari people were not unaffected from the activities of the Nigerian Civil War. On the eve of the outbreak of the war, some Akimba youths were said to have been conscripted into Nigerian Army and were later deployed to the Southeast against the Biafran army. According to late Sergeant Musa Mohammed (retired), himself and rest of his age mates trekked to New Bussa from old Wara willingly, in the early morning of 1967 and joined the military services with an attempt of having relief on the Kambari tedious traditional farm-weeding, which used to be conducted on daily basis. They were later taken to Ilorin for military training. Consequently, many Akimba from old Wara, Yadi, Libata, Tungan Bako and many others were enrolled into the Nigerian military but only few of them survived to retirement age, others having died in the battle fields.⁷³ Many disappeared from memory and never heard of, to date.

⁶⁸ Nigeria alone provided about 17,000 fighting men and another 58,000 service personnel: See: G. O., Ogunremi and Faluyi, Kehinde (eds.), *Economic History of West Africa*, Ibadan, Rex Charles Publication, 1996, p.137

⁶⁹ Shillington, Kevin, *Encyclopaedia of African History*, London, Oxford University Press, new edition, 2005, pp. 1103-1104.

⁷⁰ Other areas that contributed during the WWII were: Oyo £8,000; Ondo £3,000; Abeokuta £1,400; Ijebu £ 1,060; and Kano alone gave £ 10,270 in 1942. See: G. O., Ogunremi and Faluyi, Kehinde. *Op.cit.* p.138.

⁷¹ Interview with Attahiru Giwa-30/05/08, from 9:45 to 11:00 pm

⁷² Giwa, Ibiiden

⁷³ Late Sergeant Musa Muhammed (over 70 years), interviewed at New Wara, 1/2/2008, 12:00-2:00 pm



List of some Recruited Akimba People into the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War

S/No	Names	Place
1	Late Sergeant Musa Mohammed (Armourer): He served at 125 Battalion Nguru Barracks, Abakaliki and Ummuahia before his retirement in 1977. He died in October 2008 at New Wara town.	Wara
2	Late Alhaji Sule (Retired Sergeant): He also served at 125 Battalion Nguru Barracks before he died in October 2008 in a motor accident along Yauri-Wara road, while serving as a Clerical Officer at Ngaski Local Government Secretariat, Wara.	Wara
3	Late Dan Iya Aliyu (Retired Sergeant)	Wara
4	Late Labbo Aliyu (Alias Baba mai Alura, retired Sergeant): He died in 2010, while serving as Medical Store Officer, Ngaski Local Government Secretariat, Wara	Wara
5	Alhaji Ibrahim Jika (Retired Staff Sergeant): He served under the Religious Department as Assistant Imam while at Maimalari Barracks, Maiduguri and at Lagos. He is the current Village Head of Libata appointed in 1989 after he retired from the military service.	Libata
6	Dan Tsoho Sarkin Aski (Retired Sergeant) now living in Wara as School Sergeant at Government Secondary School Wara	Wara
7	Muhammadu Azolai (Retired Sergeant). He is still alive.	Libata
8	Labbo Akwala (Alias Baba Akwala, retired Sergeant): Now a Police Officer in Birnin Kebbi, which he joined after his retirement in the military service	Libata
9	Late Bala DogoYadi (Retired Sergeant)	Yadi. ⁷⁴

While some Akimba men refused to join the military for fear of spending their military life as petty guardsmen because they lacked Western Education, others were regarded as Akimba cowardice and run-away soldiers because they ran back home after completing their military training at Ilorin. They never went into the battle fields for fear of death. They were Aliyu Umar Tungan Bako, Muhammadu Katakala Tungan Bako, Muhammadu Dan Kano Tungan Bako and Muhammadu Mairiga Wara (Hausa), now the Chief Imam of Wara Central mosque. They were still alive.⁷⁵ Notwithstanding, today there has been increasing number of Akimba youths into

⁷⁴ The table was developed from the interviews held with Late Sergeant Musa and Liman Garba at New Wara, already shown above and below

⁷⁵ Malam Abubakar (Alias Liman Garba, Chief Imam Izala Mosque Wara, 67 years) , interviewed at New Wara,16/9/2013, 10:00 – 11:30 am



Nigerian Military service contributing their quota in promoting peace and security in and outside Nigeria. They are among the thousands of ECOMOG contingents taking part in several Peace-keeping missions in ECOWAS member countries and even beyond West Africa.⁷⁶

List of some Akimba People serving actively as at 2013 in the Nigerian Army

S/No	Names	Place
1	Lieutenant Abdullahi Ibrahim: now serving at Jibson Jalo Cantonment, Headquarter 23 Brigade Yola. He is the son of the Libata Village Head, retired Staff Sergeant who fought the Biafaran War.	Libata
2	Sergeant Sama'ila Rabi'u Yadi: Nigerian Air Force, Lagos Command	Yadi
3	Staff Sergeant Hamza Mohammed: Maimalari Barracks Maiduguri	Wara
4	Sergeant GarbaYakubu: Maimalari Barracks Maiduguri	Wara
5	Staff Sergeant Sanusi Umar Wara: Nigerian Army Lagos	Wara
6	Sergeant Mohammed Sahabi Saranmaje: Kaduna Command	Libata
7	Corporal Yakubu Musa: Kaduna Command	Libata
8	Lance Corporal Mohammed Yusuf Yadi: serving in Cross River State	Yadi
9	Corporal Ibrahim Sulaiman Wara: Nagwamatse Barracks Kontagora	Wara
10	Lance Corporal Musa Umar: serving in Cross River	Wara
11	Sergeant Mamman Tanko: Kaduna Jaji	Wara
12	Corporal Ja'afar Mohammed: Dodan Barracks Lagos	Wara
13	Corporal Shu'aibu Aliyu: Ikeja Cantonment Lagos	Wara
14	Lance Bombardier Bilyaminu Garba:Ikeja Lagos	Wara
15	Lance Corporal Adamu Yusuf Yadi	Yadi
16	Corporal Mohammed Zakariya'u Yusuf: 312 Artillery Kaduna	Wara
17	Corporal Dantanin Garba: Ikeja Barracks Lagos	Wara
18	Lance Corporal Muhammed Yusuf: Port Harcourt	Libata
19	Corporal Aliyu Yusuf: Ikeja Cantonment Lagos	Libata
20	Lance Corporal MurtalaTanko: Port Harcourt	Libata
21	Lance Corporal Bello Garba: Yola	Libata
22	Constable Mohammed Dauda: Dodan Barracks Lagos	Wara
23	Sergeant Mohammed Danbaba (Infantry): Cross River	Wara

⁷⁶ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975, now with its administrative headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. Economic integration of West African member States, at its inception, was its major concern. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is one of the major agencies entrusted with the restoration and promotion of regional peace and security. The ECOMOG Forces played interventional roles in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and now in Darfur region, Somalia and many others under the auspices of African Union (AU). For detailed information about ECOWAS, see: T. Falola et al, *History of Nigeria: Nigeria in the Twentieth Century*, Ikeja, Longman Nigeria Plc., 1991, Pp. 206-216. Also about AU, see *Ibid*, Pp. 216-228

- 24 Corporal Musa Mohammed Wara: Jibson Jalo Cantonment, Wara
Headquarter 23 Brigade Yola
- 25 Lance Corporal Ja'afar Mohammed Kwanga: Jibson Jalo Kwanga/Karoliya
Cantonment, Headquarter 23 Brigade Yola.⁷⁷

No contemporary history of the Kambari military prowess can be successfully accomplished without mentioning the audacity of a Kambari retired Lieutenant General Muhammadu Gado Nasko,⁷⁸ who championed the course of the Kambari military history. It was quite disheartening that the majority of the Akimba fallen heroes like their counterparts in other parts of the country have spent their post-military lives in an unpleasantly destitute situation. Many died while yawning, in anticipation of their retirement benefits, which still proved difficult to access. Only annual celebrations of special parades and gun-shots in respect of the *fallen heroes'* selfless service have been maintained by the Governments of our dear rich country. The procedure for the acquisition of retirement benefits needs to be reformed.

Conclusion


From the foregoing discussion it has been discerned that the Kambari people were and still are a force to reckon with in the Nigerian society. At the beginning, as indicated above, the Kambari were seen as peace loving people who lived in isolation, always in the bush cultivating and hunting. As time went on, the activities of some slave raiders particularly, Nagwamatse of Kontagora, disturbed the Kambari people and that changed their attitude toward becoming more self reliant, perseverant, hard working and resolute to protecting themselves. During the course of time, the Colonialists came with their power of domination, attacking and capturing various communities in the Nigerian areas, and at the same time making the use of some Nigerians such as the Kambari people in the process. The Kambari people thus served in the WAFF and later in the Nigerian Army, and specifically during the civil war in defence of one Nigeria. This single act of commission gave the Kambari people a lee way to become a force to reckon within in the annals of Nigerian Military. Just like their counterparts the Dakarkari, the Kambari people found a home in the service of the military in Nigeria. They made a good use of that opportunity and became recognized as one of the significant and ever ready ethnic groups in Nigeria to join the Military in order to protect the nation and maintain peace and security of not only Nigeria but also West Africa and even beyond.

⁷⁷ The list was extracted from the various interviews held with some Security Agents serving actively in the Nigerian Army and Nigerian Police Force

⁷⁸ Retired Lieutenant General Muhammadu Gado Nasko CON was born in 1941 at Nasko town in Magama Local Government of Niger State. He joined Nigeria Military Training School in 1962 and completed in 1963. He served as the Military Governor of Sokoto State (July 1978-October 1979), also became the Minister of Trade, Agriculture and Water Resources (1985-1989) and later became the Minister of FCT Abuja (1989-1993). He retired from the army in 1993, and returned to his hometown where began a new life as a farmer and a community leader. Nasko is recognized as one of the most respected statesmen in Nigeria. The former Gado Nasko Barracks, now Lungu Barracks, in Abuja, was named in his respect. More about Nasko see: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gado_Nasko, accessed 12/9/2013. Also see G. M. Nasko, *The Life of Kungulu and Madabe*, Kaduna, N.N.S., 1984. In this book, Nasko has narrated the origin of his ethnic group, the Kambari




A map showing the early Akimba settlements before 1968.




Source: Udo R. K, Geographical Regions of Nigeria, Ibadan University Press, 1981.

Culled by A. I. Tijani (GIS Lab. UDUS)



A map showing Akimba settlements after 1968



Source: Udo R. K, Geographical Regions OpCit

Culled by A. I Tijani



Settlement Patterns, Security and Development Question in Nigeria: An investigation on the Tiv People of Quaan-Pan Local Government Area of Plateau state.

By

John Tor TSUWA Ph.D

In the recent years, the Nigerian nation, has witnessed severe security challenges which have resulted to conflicts which in turn have exacerbated the development question of the country. Many factors have been deduced as been responsible for this phenomenon. This paper examines this phenomenon using both primary and secondary data and analyzing the data using the central settlement theory. The paper discovers that the Tiv people of Quaan-Pan Local Government Area of Plateau state are faced with high security challenge from their neighbours and herders because of the nature of their settlement pattern which is segmented in nature. It also discovers that the same settlement pattern has affected development not only as a result of the conflicts that lead to the destruction of developmental efforts but also as it makes it difficult to attract development to the area. To resolve this problematic and to ensure peace and development in the area, this paper recommends the establishment of semi- urban and urban centers by the Tiv people. This paper believes that this strategy will reduce the danger of the Tiv people been vulnerable to attacks and will also ensure collective development for the area thereby ensuring social inclusion of all in the Nigerian project.

Key Words: Settlement Patterns, Peace, Development, Migration, Conflict

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Introduction

The last hundred years of Nigeria's existence have witnessed dynamic inter-play of ethnic, group and identity politics and manipulations that have continued to shape the security and development nature of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian society has therefore become vulnerable to many ethno-religious and communal conflicts as a result of the manipulation of sentiments such as the settler/indigeneship imbroglio, migration and identity, land/settlement patterns and grazing issues. The Benue valley and particularly Quaan-Pan Local Government Area of Plateau state has also had its fair share of conflicts emanating from this inter-play of what can be termed



primordial forces. These conflicts have resulted into destructions and have therefore not only hampered the development of the area but have also exacerbated the security challenges of the area.

The above situation explains the dilemma of the Tiv speaking people of Quaan-Pan Local Government Area in Plateau state. The Tiv people in this local government have faced great developmental and security challenges not only by the invasion of their area by other groups that results to conflict but also by the lack of development in the area. Although many other reasons have been deduced as been responsible for this menace, this paper principally examines the settlement pattern of the Tiv in this local government and how it has affected the development and security question in the area.

Theoretical Underpinning

This paper adopts the Central Place Theory of the renowned German economist, Walter Christaller. He starts by arguing that the central place exists primarily to provide goods and services to its surrounding population. The city is in essence, a distribution center. According to Christaller, the central place which is virgin is usually surrounded by flat land that does not hinder migration by people into the central place of attraction. He argues that humans will always purchase goods from the closest place that offers the good and whenever demand for a certain good is high, it will be offered in close proximity to the population. When demand drops, so too does the availability of the good.

For Christaller, for the central place to remain active and prosperous there should be a minimum number of people that are required to reside and transact in the area. The level of goods distribution and profit accumulation is strictly based on location. So people migrate into need areas that they think they can participate in the distribution of goods and the accumulation of profits. Although the applicability of this theory here excludes the mathematical aspects of the theory, this paper believes that the theory best explain the dynamics that are involved in the settlement pattern of the Tiv in Quaan-Pan Local Government Area.



The centrality of the theory here is that: one, the Nigerian constitution has provided free movement of all its citizens in the country. This has accounted for why the Tiv had moved to the area and other groups are also moving to the area. Two, the Tiv migration into the area was for and remains for economic interest. They needed large virgin lands for farming where they got it and accumulated profits from the goods they produced. Three, the nature of their settlement into the area based on segmented arrangement was to provide a market place for each of their hamlet to control a particular space for easy benefit of the virgin farm land. Base on these issues, the Central Place Theory becomes apt for this paper to contextualize the nature and character of Tiv settlement in the area as well as the reason for the challenging nature of development and security in the area.

Tiv Migration into Quaana-Pan Local Government Area of Plateau State and Their Inter-Group Relations with other Ethnic Groups

Quaana-Pan Local Government Area is home to many Chadic ethnic groups and some few Bantoid ethnic groups. Ethnic groups such as Kwalla, Doemark, Injak, Pankshin, Berom, Mada, Bwall, Tiv amongst others are found in the Local Government. According to Monday Simon a youth leader and Parent Teachers Association (PTA) chairman in Namu the people of Quaana-Pan migrated from different places such as Bauchi, Nasarawa, Taraba, Benue and Borno to settle in various portions of the local government.

According to Jonathan Danlong, a University Lecturer of Doemark origin, the Local Government before its creation was under Shendam Local Government with Pan and Gomeai Chiefdoms. When Quaana-Pan Local Government was created, it had the Kwande and Pan Chiefdoms. Namu Chiefdom was created in 2001 but later cancelled because of political reasons and the continuous tussle for chieftaincy rights. Quaana-Pan is therefore divided into two; Quaana which is dominated by the Kwande-Goemeai people who trace their history as being part of the Kwararafa confederacy and are under the Longman of Goemei chiefdom. The other, the Pan Chiefdom is made up of ethnic groups such as Doemek, Muriam, Kwalla, Bwall and other minority groups such as the Tiv who have their districts but are answerable to the Longpan.



The Tiv in Quaan-Pan are said to have migrated from two sources into the area. The first group is said to have emigrated from Gboko in Benue State and the second group from Nasarawa State. According to oral narrations by Awaiké Aduna, a Kwalla man and John Bulus a Domeak indigene, all the migration of the Tiv into Quaan-Pan was in two streams. Tyoapine Chivir a wealthy Tiv man led the first stream from Gboko. According to this narration, just as in all other ethnic groups that are now settled in Quaan-Pan, when the Tiv arrived in the area, they were allocated portions of land by the Chief of Gomeai, Ayaru Gambo to settle and create their central place where they can carry out their activities. Tyoapine Chivir therefore settled and a town that became known for its rapid growth in population and farm products was established and called Chivir. It is argued that, this Tiv settlement that started around 1921 became so prosperous that, Tyoapine Chivir usually invites his Tiv brothers from Nasarawa, Benue and Taraba for festivals particularly during the new yam festival (*iyor bi hev*) with their cultural dances. At the end of these celebrations, gifts of yams, goats and native Tiv wears were presented to the Gomeai and Kwalla Chiefs in appreciation of their acceptance and recognition of the Tiv people as indigenes of the area. The second stream of the Tiv that moved into Quaan –Pan were led by Tarkumbur Iorpev from the Keana area of present day Nasarawa state. Tarkumbur also became successful and invited some of his brothers to the *inya dio* (fertile land). They were accordingly accepted and a new settlement known as Tarkumbur was founded.

According to oral narrations, the Tiv population in Quaan-Pan began swelling and more Tiv settlements such as Kundum, Jente and Iortim amongst others emerged and became recognized as Tiv villages with the Tiv as recognized village heads. According to Agyuwa Achela who was interviewed at Namu in Quaan-Pan, when the Tiv arrived in this area in the early 1920's and the second stream in late 1920's, they settled in virgin lands with the permission of the Gomeai Chief who first arrived in the area. Because the Gomeai people were not farmers, they instead settled in urban centres leaving large portions of land uninhabited. With this, the Tiv took over these virgin lands and their desire for fertile farmland to accommodate the head of the family and all his wives and children and their farms became fulfilled.



Furthermore, the agricultural successes of the Tiv in these virgin lands attracted other ethnic groups around the area to migrate into Quaana-Pan. All the sources earlier mentioned attest that, since the Tiv never had interest in chieftaincy affairs of the area but concentrated on farming and accepted being administered by their *orya* (compound head) who was answerable to the Chief of Quaana-Pan, they never had contestations with the other ethnic groups. Rather, the other ethnic groups such as Alago, Jukun and Fulani envied and were jealous of Tiv success. Despite this jealousy, there was no conflict between the Tiv and the other ethnic groups until the 2001 crisis. Prior to this crisis, any land, chieftaincy or political squabbles between Tiv and the indigenous Quaana-Pan people were settled amicably through traditional process. Some informants attested to the probability of the conflicts between the Tiv and Kwalla in Quaana-Pan as being not necessary as a result of land issue, politics and chieftaincy.

The Development and the Security challenge of the Tiv in Quaana-Pan Local Government

This paper conceives development as an expansion in the basic mode of production and the social relations of production which determines how people produce their livelihood in the central place and how the production is distributed and profits accumulated from same. Development is therefore conceived in line with Ake (1981:40) as the development of productive forces, a capacity where the economy reproduces itself for progress.

Similarly, Walter Rodney (1972:9) consider the issue of development from the tools with which men work and the manner in which they organized their labour as important indicator of development, argues that, development occur at both the individual and societal levels. At the level of the individual, he views development as increased skills and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. On the level of the society, Rodney considers development to imply not only increase in the capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships, but also the ability to guard the independence of the social group.



Security is conceptualized here within the context of guaranteed individual rights, justice and equality that will safeguard the individual from want, oppression and aggression. In this context, the society is secured only when human needs are met (Burton 1979:3). This ideology of security eliminates the militarized notion of security and places security mostly on the corridors of achieving development that will create an egalitarian society where might is not necessary. Security means the protection of life and property, a situation where the individual is not at risk in his environment.

The prominent Tiv communities or districts in Quaan –Pan local Governmnet are Kundum, Chivir, Takumbur, Jente, New Gboko, Chaiwa amongst others. These villages have witness low level of development in all areas. The development situation of the Tiv people in Quaa-pan has remained a worrisome issue. A graphic presentation of the Tiv society shows that the generality of Tiv villages in the area are dotted with mud huts, bush footpaths that stretches from these huts to the farms, the semi-circle markets that only farm produce are sold and minor household items are purchased. According to Unongo (1969:5) the underdevelopment of the Tiv nation is so pathetic that majority of Tiv babies are given birth to on green leaves in dark corners under unimaginable conditions. To him, 99.9% of Tiv villages have no pipe-borne water, health facilities, electricity and motorable roads. He painted the picture of the Tiv nation as a tortuous society that spells misery, injustice, intolerable abuse, and backwardness.

Although Unongo’s description of the development in Tivland was made many years ago, the situation has not changed drastically. Majority of the Tiv people still live in the same conditions he described. Apart from the level of education that has improved in Tiv land as a result of the establishment of tertiary institution, Tiv tradition values have remained same.

In terms of security, the Tiv areas in Quaan-Pan has in recent times especially after the Tiv/kwalla conflict in Quaan-Pan faced serious security breaches on its territories. The security challenge of the Tiv in Quaan-Pan can best be analysed from the base of the Tiv-Kwalla Conflict in Quaan-Pan Local Government of Plateau State. As earlier argued the Tiv migrated into Quaan-Pan and Shendam Local Governments Areas and became great farmers. According to



Azgaku (2006:82), the success of the Tiv farmers especially around Chivir, Jente and Tarkumbur areas attracted the influx of other ethnic groups to the area that was hitherto not inhabited by other ethnic groups because of its thick vegetation. On the arrival of the other ethnic groups, the indigenous people of the area and the Tiv feared that, sooner than later, there would be land pressure, a reality that soon emerged. According to the Report of Inquiry on the crisis in Quaan-Pan (2004:4), before the arrival of these ethnic groups, there was no competition over land between the Tiv and the indigenous people of Kwalla, Domek and Gomeai and since it was the Tiv that opened up these new lands, they were considered as indigenous to the place. However, immediately these other ethnic groups such as Jukun, Alago, and Fulani arrive the area, ethnic skirmishes relating to land became prominent thereby creating tension in the area.

This tension was exacerbated by the death of the Long Kwo Miskom Hoomkwap Sule II in 1988. The late Chief was the paramount ruler of the Kwo Chieftom who was in charge of regulating inter-group relations including the allocation and usage of farmland. After his death, there was breakdown in communication and an ego struggle between the District Head of Kwande and other village heads ensued. The District Head of Kwande was accused of bypassing the village heads in his dealings with the farmers and settlers. Findings from interviews shows that, instead of allowing the village heads to report to him on the issue of land in their domain, the district head was dealing with the farmers and settlers directly (Report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry 2003:6).

In this kind of situation, the district head without the requisite knowledge of the land and its occupants was allocating land to Fulani grazers and farmers arriving in the area without reference to the village heads that are at the grassroots and who know those who own what portion of land. Again, the vacuum created by the stool of Kwo Chieftom generated serious contestations that were largely unattended to thereby creating tension between the various ethnic groups in the area. These contestations created fertile grounds that were waiting for a spark to escalate into violent conflict.



It is wont to say here that, the Tiv being the only people that rejected being *hausanised* and who refused to lease their land to the ethnic groups that arrived later became a major target of all the arriving ethnic groups. This condition led to incidences that culminated into the struggle to annihilate the Tiv ethnic group in Quaan-Pan Local Government Area. According to Simon Monday in an interviewed at Namu in Qua'an-Pan local government, there was a conceived story in 1998 accusing the Tiv over the killing of one Ajai Agugwu, a Jukun man who was accused of raping a Tiv girl and taking away her yams in the farm. Although this story was not confirmed, the Jukun in Quaan-Pan had taken Tiv as enemies. When a prominent Kwalla farmer, Mr. Anthony Dajaan was reportedly killed by Tiv warriors, the sparked that was been awaited to ignite the flames of conflict presented itself hence the conflict in 2001.

According to Tiv, Domeak, Gomeai and Kwalla informants, Anthony Dajaan was a rich Kwalla farmer and a close associate of the Chief of Azara, Chief Musa Ibrahim of Nasarawa state. Because of their close relationship, the Chief of Azara was accused of conscripting Tiv indigenous farm lands and handing them over to Mr. Anthony Dajaan on the excuse that based on Alago traditional practices, all land belong to the Chief who decides whoever he gives the land to. According to Imbor Shien in an interview, the Chief advised the Tiv to respect Alago tradition or be annihilated. To make good his threat, the Chief requested Anthony Dajaan to relocate from Namu town to Kundum, a border Tiv village in Awe local government. In protest, the Tiv took the case to the Emir of Lafia.

According to Tyodzenda Mbapuun interviewed at Chivir, the Tiv got a surprise judgment from the Emir who only advice them to remain peaceful as Mr. Dajaan was not taking away the entire farm land. Akiwenu (2004:12) observed that, the incident that broke the camel back occurred in 2001. In 2001, the administration of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu in Nassarawa State created new development areas and villages for administrative purposes. The Chief of Azara not wanting the Tiv to be members of his Traditional Council made Mr. Anthony Dajaan from Quaan-Pan Plateau state the village head of the Tiv village of Kundum in Azara development area.



Oral accounts by the Tiv, Kwalla, Bwall and other groups in Quaan-Pan and Alago, Beriberi in Awe Local Governments during confirm that, the Tiv became angered by this attitude and when attempts to make the Chief rescind his decision failed in June 2001, the Tiv attacked and killed Mr. Anthony Dajaan and two members of his family. The killing of Dajaan by the Tiv was motivated on the ground that the Tiv believed he (Mr. Dajaan) was responsible for Tiv marginalization and maltreatment in the hands of the Chief of Azara due to his close relationship with the chief.

With the death of Mr. Dajaan, the Tiv provoked, first the wrath of the Kwalla people of Qua'an-Pan from where Mr. Dajaan hailed from. Two, they provoked the Jukun who were already embittered with the Tiv over the purported killing of Mr. Ajai who was considered as a close ally of Mr. Dajaan. Three the Tiv provoked the Alago people in Awe who were host to Mr. Dajaan. With this tripartite hatred and the inducement from the Chief of Azara to wipe out the Tiv out of "their land", the action to eliminate the Tiv in both Qua'an-Pan and Awe Local Governments Areas commenced. At this point, the Chief of Azara vowed that, since the Tiv killed his close friend on the land that belonged to him, the Tiv irrespective of their population and long years of inhabitation of the area must vacate all settlements in Awe (Report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry P.13).

According to the Report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the crisis (p.14.), all the ethnic groups within these areas had agreed that the Tiv should be annihilated and their land and properties confiscated. With this consensus, the mayhem and attacks on Tiv villages commenced on the 27th August, 2001. Monday Simon therefore informs that, there was a unified strategy by all the ethnic groups led by the Chief of Azara to eliminate the whole population of the Tiv people in both Awe and Quaan-Pan Local Government Areas. According to a statement presented by a 12 year old boy from Tarkumbur village interviewed by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry (p.14), many of them were around when the people that killed the village head of the Tiv village arrived. He stated that, when the armed men were killing people and destroying properties, they did not run because his mother told him that, the marauders were only looking



for the enemies who were Tiv, and since they were not Tiv, they had nothing to fear. According to the informants, the first village that was attacked by the masked men who were fully armed was Kundum village of Barkin Chiawa followed by Ugbajugu, Nyiesue and Jentau where they left scores dead and properties destroyed in their wake.

According to the informants earlier mentioned, the attackers went everywhere looking for Tiv population to eliminate. The villages of Sabon Gida, Jigawa and Ampia Burgu both of Barkin Chiawa area were all attacked. At Tarkumbur village, five people were killed including John Iorgurum who was the village head. According to Azgaku (2006:88) as supported by the people interviewed, the invaders were hired mercenaries outside Quaan-Pan. Others argue that the invaders were the Fulani that volunteered their services hoping that, the possible expulsion of Tiv from the lands would enable them have abundant land for grazing purposes. All the Kwalla people interviewed alongside other minority ethnic groups in the area were unanimous that, the fighters were not an extraction of the indigenous ethnic groups in Qua'an-Pan, but they came on the directives and connivance of the Chief of Azara. According to them, most of them were masked and the inhabitants of Kwande and Namu districts could not easily identify even the unmasked ones. Whatever the case, the report of the panel of inquiry acknowledged the usage of superior weapons such as G.3, AK 47, Mark 4 and double-barreled guns.

From the above, we can deduce that the, the central causality factor of the security challenge of the Tiv in Quaan-Pan is mainly on the issue of land which has been exacerbated by the nature of settlement pattern of the Tiv people and the level of poor infrastructural development in the area.

Settlement Pattern and the Development and Security Question of the Tiv in Quaan-Pan

The Tiv in Quaan-Pan practice a segmented settlement pattern where families are divided and settled occupying little portions of land giving room for large empty portions of land for farming activities. In most cases, a father separate from his children giving a gap of between 5-10 kilometers or even more. The implication of this on development is in many folds. One, with this highly segmented settlement pattern, it becomes difficult for government to situate projects such as hospitals, schools and also provide basic amenities such as electricity, water amongst others.



This is because the distance between these compounds or homes are so far that it is usually difficult to identify who to benefit as these projects in many cases are beyond the consumption of small households.

Two, the refusal by many of the farmers to give out their farm land for the siting of projects have continued to deny the people of basic amenities. In most cases, even when the projects are sited, the unwillingness of the locals to protect them over and above their farms hampers their effective utilization. Three, due to the nature of settlement, it is usually very difficult to access many of these individual households, a condition that makes it difficult for materials to be moved to these areas for construction works or for personnel activities. On the whole, the nature of settlement does not encourage effective accessibility to development as efforts are not coordinated through collective development but the people look at their development in terms of the amount of farm land they occupy, the produce from the farms, the number of wives they marry that will add to their farm and the number of children that they will have to help them cultivate their large farms.

On the security challenge, the settlement pattern has also become a major problem in many ways. One, as can be deduced from the case of the Tiv/Kwalla conflict explained in this work, the provisions of the Land Use Act of 1979 which mentioned the issues of “indigene” and “settler” contradicts the issue of inter-group relations. According to Tsuwa et al (2014) it has mentioned the concepts “indigene” and “settler” but failed to explain the basis for classification of “indigenes” and “settlers”. This has made people to lay claims to particular portions of land and to marginalize other groups on the basis of these concepts. This has become a major source of conflict between groups that consider themselves indigenes and others that are considered as settlers despite their long years of occupation of such lands.

Another cause of the security challenge of the Tiv in the area in question is the issue of the impact of climate change. Tsuwa et al (2014) argue that, climate change has resulted in the extinction of grazing areas in North Eastern and North Western Nigeria hence forcing



downwards, the migration of herdsmen hitherto not residing in the Middle Belt. Also, the impact of climate change has impoverished land for farming hence making larger proportions of farmers less willing to part with their lands. They insist that, the failure to reach a bargaining zone, this is an overlap between the minimum lands demanded by Fulani herdsmen for grazing and the maximum land that Tiv farmers are willing to part with, has resulted in coercive approaches by the former to acquire grazing lands; and the latter to protect their lands. We can therefore argue that, the increasing pressure and unhealthy competition for land is caused by bad governance. As a result of bad governance, a significant proportion of indigenous people have been relegated to non-skilled jobs particularly farming, grazing or fishing.

One of the grievances held by farmers is the fact that grazing compacts the land thus impoverishing the soil and further making it difficult for tillage activities to be carried out using manual implements like hoes. However, governance systems have failed to address the dwindling access of communities to improved farming inputs and technologies by farmers in states of Nigeria's Middle Belt particularly Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau.

Recommendations

The first recommendation is for the creation of semi-urban settlement by the Tiv people. This paper believes that this will create avenue for development in attracting projects in the communities and will also unite the people for collective security arrangement instead of the existing small hamlets that give to easy attacks. The paper also recommends that the contradictory aspects of the Land Use Act be amended to prevent illegal migration and the issues of indigene-settler crisis that has resulted to high level contestations over land which in turn has exacerbated the conflict situation between the various ethnic groups in the area be amended to give all Nigerians full rights in the Nigerian state. This paper also recommends the creation of ranches in the Northern part of Nigeria to provide for the herders. This will prevent their migration into the area and as such, will also prevent the scramble for land between the Tiv farmers and the Fulani herders which often results to conflict.



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Political Advertising as a tool in sustaining Nigeria's Democracy

Babafemi Jacobs

The change in government from military to civilian rule on May 29, 1999 has seen Nigeria have its longest democratic dispensation without any interference from the military. In its 16th year of continuous democratic rule, it is about to transit from one tenure to the other via elections. The independent national electoral commission has been able to conduct four different elections. The mistakes, errors, issues and challenges faced in conducting one election have been used as guide in conducting the next election. One issue that needs to be addressed is that of the usage of the media to promote political propaganda and disseminate information that are irrelevant to the electorate in form of political advertising, programmes and campaigns. This paper examines the role political advertising plays in influencing the decisions of the electorate in Nigeria. It also examines what advertising regulatory bodies in Nigeria can do to regulate political adverts and prevent wastage of creativity. This paper is hinged on the agenda setting theory of the media.

Keywords: Nigeria, Advertising, Democracy, Political Advertising, Electorate

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Introduction

Advertising is one of the genres of mass communication. Advertising can be defined as a form of commercial mass communication designed to promote the sale of a product or service, or a message on behalf of an institution, organization, or candidate for political office. The Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria (APCON) defines advertising as a form of communication through the media about products, services or ideas paid for by an identified sponsor. Adverts are expected to be legal, decent, honest, truthful and respectful of Nigeria's culture as mandated by APCON

Advertising comes in various forms and media. As such, it is classified based on the type of media and the purpose for which it is used. Hence, advertising types such as print advertising,



broadcast advertising, public service announcements, advocacy advertising, product advertising, political advertising and so on exists.

Political advertising is one of the various forms of advertising. Okwechime (2006:198) traced the origin of political advertising to 1952 when Rosser Reeves helped President Eisenhower to win elections through the placement of many spot commercials during his political campaign. Political advertising can also be used to promote political parties and candidates for political office. Political adverts, jingles or commercials help set the tone or agenda on what to say and make decisions on who to support or vote for on Election Day.

Political advertising can be linked to the agenda setting theory of the mass media. Political adverts in the newspaper medium are expected to pass the regulatory process of the Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria (APCON). This makes APCON a critical agenda setter in the society especially the political sector. This is because the regulatory body is expected to vet and approve every advert before it is published. The kind of information that is contained in a political advert can set the agenda for the electorate who are given what to think about as postulated by the agenda setting theory of the media.

Theoretical Framework

Maxwell McCombs and Donald L. Shaw propounded the agenda setting theory in 1972. This is a theory that postulates that the media determines what we think about. Severin and Tankard in Daramola (2003:60) explains that the newspaper is the prime mover in setting the territorial agenda. It has a great part in determining what most people will be talking about, what most people will think the facts are and what people will regard as the way problems are to be dealt with. The media has the power to elevate or down play the significance of any issue.

According to Edegoh et al (2013:379),the theory holds that most of the pictures we store in our heads, most of the things we think or worry about, most of the issues we discuss, are based on what we have read, listened to or watched in different mass media. This theory implies that the mass media through their content predetermine what issues are regarded as important at a given time in a given society.

Adverts of various kinds and purposes are part of the content of the mass media all over the world today. This theory affirms that the media sets the agenda through the rate at which a news item or information is presented, the level of importance attached to it, the degree of conflicts contained in the messages and its cumulative effect on the people overtime. Factors like ownership policy, profit, etc. influences how the media sets the agenda for the people on a daily basis.

Most bits of information do not originate from media houses even though they air or publish the information. Political parties knowing fully the impact that placing of political adverts in the media can have on the electorate ensures that the rate at which political adverts of aspirants are published is very high. They ensure that paid adverts of their aspirants are placed in various media forms with large audience to allow for more exposure and awareness. Thus, they set the



tone or agenda for electoral decision-making and choice with the myriads of adverts contained in various mass media forms in Nigeria.

Method of Study

The desk view qualitative method was used for this study drawing largely from books, journals and online articles. The researcher's observation of political adverts in the print was of immense importance and inferences were drawn from the contributions of scholars and online authors as gleaned from their articles relating to this study.

Political Advertising in Nigeria

Political advertising can be defined as the promotion of political candidates, aspirants, political parties' manifestoes, programmes and ideals, electoral body activities and political programmes of the government through advertisement placement in the media (Osho S.A., 2008). Political advertising enables candidates to convey their positions on important issues and to acquaint voters with their accomplishments and personalities.

Arens et al (2011:600) says 'political advertising is an essential part of the democratic process and can be an important means of helping the public understand the difference between opponents. According to Udeze and Akpan (2013:51), there are three categories of political advertising:

- Political advertisement: This gives only statements about the candidate and no explicit mention of the candidate's opponent(s).
- Contrast advertisement: This contains both positive and negative statements about the opponent(s).
- Negative or attack advertisement: This contains only negative statements about the opponent and nothing positive about the candidate.

Political advertising is more in the nature of a public relations campaign that aims to highlight certain achievements or upcoming programmes in politics. It aims at explaining policies, informing citizens and connecting people to their leaders. Political advertising does not stop politicians from speaking up on issues that affect the nation on other media platforms.

Edegoh et al (2013:376) says political advertising is one of several ways politicians and political parties mobilize the electorates. Political advertising can be done in several ways, such as television programmes, radio, newspapers and display of candidate's portraits, with several promising and persuasive inscription on the billboard, magazines and even the new media of communication. Part of the basic objectives of this political advertising is to gain attention of the electorates and for this reason, political advertising sometimes involves orthodox strategies to achieve its aim.



The past two decades have witnessed the increased use of political adverts in Nigeria as political campaign tool by politicians. Prior to this period, political rallies, personal contact and speeches have been popularly used for mobilizing electorates' support for elections (Olujide et al, 2011:181). Below is a cross section of political adverts from the Nation, the Guardian and the Punch in February and March 2015.





The political adverts above are just few of many adverts that have graced the pages of our print media forms sequel to the recently conducted March 28 and April 11, 2015 elections. Most adverts in our newspapers and magazines today do not have the regulatory stamp of APCON on them. Neither do they originate from advertising agencies, as there are no registration numbers placed at their edges to signify where they originate. As such, they cannot be said to have gone through the vetting process of the Advertising Standards Panel (ASP) of APCON. Independent or in-house graphic designers did the adverts. These adverts are however part of the election campaigns of various political parties and politicians who are connected to one medium or the other through ownership.

Effective political advertising is a critical aspect of any election campaign today. An electorate enjoying a literacy percentage of at least three fourths would absorb a well thought-out and well-meaning campaign easily and readily. For a developing country like Nigeria with a robust



democratic polity, and an electorate which is about three fourths literate and hungry for development, the scope of doing some really good campaigns is enormous. A campaign theme literally yearns for issues and no other field raises as many issues as politics does.

However, political advertising campaigns should be careful to cover issues that fire up the electorate's imagination more than anything else does. Hence, it is necessary to look at the existence and influence of political advertising on the Nigerian society as determined by Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria. Political advertising has thus become a key component of electoral campaigns in many countries hence the need to look at the rules guiding it in Nigeria.

History and Structure of Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria

Advertising in most countries is subject to both government regulation and industry self-regulation to prevent deceptive advertising or to limit the visibility of advertising. Advertising is heavily regulated in all countries but the regulations vary from country to country. For example, in Mexico advertising for tobacco and alcohol is limited to late evenings after children have gone to bed. France prohibits any reference to health in tobacco ads, and Italy allows alcohol advertising to promote the brand name but not product attributes such as 'cold filtered' or 'smooth tasting.'

Advertising regulations in other countries are often designed to protect culture and morals. In Nigeria, the apex regulatory body is known as Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria (APCON). As other regulatory bodies founded by the military and later democratized, it was established by Decree 55 of 1988, inaugurated on November 14, 1989 and amended by Decree 93 of 1992. It has zonal offices in major towns in Nigeria like Ibadan, Onitsha, Abuja, Lagos, Owerri, Kano, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Kaduna and Ilorin. It has its laws that it uses to regulate all forms of advertising in Nigeria. It is charged with the following responsibilities:

- a. Determining who are advertising practitioners
- b. Setting the standards of knowledge required of such practitioners
- c. Compiling and maintaining a register of practitioners
- d. Regulating and controlling the practice of advertising in all its aspects and ramifications
- e. Conducting examinations in the profession
- f. Other functions related to the above

APCON and Regulation of Political Advertising in Nigeria

APCON has so far been able to regulate advertising in Nigeria and can still do more. These two articles are part of what APCON as a regulatory body uses to control and regulate the kinds of political adverts that are designed and made available for public consumption. APCON also tries to ensure that political advertisements are standardized. This is itemized in page 32 – 33 of its code of ethics. The guidelines are:

1. Truth: political advertisements shall not be deceptive or misleading in words, photograph, film or sound.



2. False claims: political advertisements shall be issue-oriented and devoid of abusive statements or references. Furthermore, they (political parties/politicians) should not employ fake, distorted or unsubstantiated claims or misrepresentations.
3. Advertisers' identity: like any other advertisement, every political advertisement must clearly identify the sponsoring organization or individual visually or orally. Statements or attributions to anonymous sponsors like "committee of friends"; "concerned citizens" must be avoided.
4. Sectional interests: political advertisements shall not explicitly or implicitly exploit ethnicity, religion or any other sectional interest not strictly related to political issues under discussion as this can lead to unrests and riots in the country.
5. Agency conduct: advertising agencies that engage in political advertising must not produce or use any material that is capable of bringing the advertising profession into disrepute.
6. Equal opportunity: in being fair to all, media houses must give all political candidates and parties equal opportunity to buy space or air time. This means that each competing candidate or party must have equal access to comparable space/airtime (based on first come, first serve) at any media house whether it is government owned or privately owned.
7. Compliance: media houses, agencies, political parties, politicians and their agents must ensure that their political advertisements are in consonance with the provision of the APCON code. When in doubt concerning any of its guidelines, they can seek immediate clarification from APCON for better understanding.

One of the roles of APCON is to ensure that only registered practitioners with the body are contracted to design political adverts as such can help make sure that adverts that are ethical, truthful and fair are designed and aired to Nigerians. This is however not the case as most political adverts or commercials do not have the signature seal of APCON. Most political parties take their adverts straight to the media house, which publishes it because of money and ownership factor.

In a press release on 22 January 2015, the Registrar of APCON, Alhaji Garba Bello Kankarofi noted that a keen observer of electioneering campaign communications in recent times cannot but feel worried by the pedestrian, combative, provocative and insensitive messages, language and style of several of the campaign communications, which portend grave danger for Nigeria's democratic process and national security.

He further noted that the tendency by marketers (in this case, political candidates and their supporters) to abuse their freedom of speech and engage in spurious promotional campaigns that exploit the public and sometimes undermine societal harmony and wellbeing, necessitate the enactment and enforcement of various regulations to check the excesses of such marketers and protect the public from unsavory effects of unwholesome communications.

APCON therefore finds it expedient to remind communications consultants and their political clients of extant regulations on the design and publication/broadcast of political advertisements. These regulations require, among other things, that political advertisements;

- deal with issues (campaign manifestoes, promises, etc.) and avoid negative reference to political opponents, other than criticism of their policies;
- avoid the use of foul or abusive language as well as false, distorted or unsubstantiated claims or misrepresentations of facts;
- should not exploit or incite ethnic, religious or other sectional interests;
- should clearly indicate the identity of the sponsor of the advertisements (anonymous or unidentifiable advertisers are not allowed to place advertisements in the media);
- Like every other form of advertisement, political advertisements are required to be submitted for pre-exposure approval by the Advertising Standards Panel (ASP).

APCON in this press release warns that it will not hesitate to use the instrument of law enforcement agencies to forestall any tendency to plunge the country to avoidable anarchy through the irresponsible activities of political candidates, their supporters and consultants or the negligent self-serving actions of mass media organisations.

It must however be noted that APCON today has not meted out any disciplinary action against the Punch and Daily Sun newspaper that published a “deathly Be Warned” advert on 19 January 2015 against Muhammed Buhari, the presidential candidate of All People’s Congress. According to Mr. Femi Adesina, the editor in chief of the Sun newspaper and the president of the Nigerian Guild of Editors, the advert that was published was a ‘watered down’ one and was published because of media ownership and not for profit making.

Conclusion

Advertising as a form of mass communication is one that can have can critical impact on the society. Political aspirants who intend to use the newspaper medium to achieve their own agenda should be socially responsible in doing this. The media should not because of media ownership, political affiliation, profit, etc. publish adverts that are unethical and negative by nature.

A bit of information in a political advert is like a mosquito bite. It looks inconsequential but its impact is destructive. Negative political adverts and hate speeches can cause disorder in the otherwise peaceful terrain of a society. This can affect the democratic transition of Nigeria. The misuse of political adverts to pursue can cause a whole lot of harm to political aspirants Nigerians and the Nigerian society.

Hence, the need for APCON as an apex regulatory body to put its house in order to ensure that the right procedures and processes as outlined in APCON’s code of ethics are followed strictly by all stakeholders involved in political advertising in the Nigerian print media. The laws guiding political advertising must be fully effective. APCON should organize meeting platforms to educate political parties, politicians and their supporters on the dangers and consequences of negative political adverts on the Nigerian polity. This is important as gubernatorial campaigns in Bayelsa and Kogi States state will soon commence as a build up to the 2019 general elections.

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‘How to shoot yourself into power’:

Godfather Politics and Military Legacy in Nigeria

Tunde Oseni, PhD, Abiodun Fatai, and Luqman Saka, PhD

Successive military incursions into politics across the continent of Africa became rampant and pronounced from the mid-1960s. By the 1970s, these soldiers who ‘shot their way into political office in much of Africa’ (Adekanye 1993:1) already constituted what Mazrui (1973:1) termed ‘the Lumpen Militariat’ albeit ‘a new political class’. Adekanye (1993) forcefully argued that by the time military rule ended in Nigeria in the 1990s, the social, political, and economic structures of the country had been taken over by the retired military professionals. Using the foregoing as a point of departure, we argue that the military incursion into Nigerian politics consciously or subconsciously entrenched the ‘legacy of force’ into the psyche of the political gladiators, popularly known as political godfathers in the Nigerian parlance. Over time, however, a new form of godfatherism is becoming apparent by which the legacy of force is becoming not only unpopular but also rejected. The work compares the structural and agential opportunities and constraints of three popular godfathers who, until recently, relied largely on patronage and violence within the political terrain. Methodologically, we use the historical-descriptive case study design based on within-case and comparative perspectives. The qualitative analysis offered here is aimed at providing an in-depth understanding of the political behaviour of prominent political godfathers and how and why their political styles have affected democratic development in the selected case studies. This is helpful in two important ways. One, qualitative analysis offers a ‘critical interpretive approach’ to understanding research problems (Denzin & Lincoln 2000: xiv). Two, qualitative method fits in with our multiple case study approach, which allows an analysis of data gathered from different sources including documentary sources and interviews in specific details.

Keywords: Godfatherism, Military Legacy, Legitimacy, Democracy

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Godfatherism: Conceptual Clarifications

Godfatherism has become a ‘scary phenomenon’ (Ayoade 2006). It was indeed being firmly established as a guiding principle in contemporary Nigerian politics (Ibrahim 2003). Since 1999, Nigeria has witnessed almost the exact opposite of what democracy connotes: political processes were hijacked by a ‘personality cult’ of godfathers who became the ‘effective gatekeepers of the (parties) and *ipso facto* (controllers) of the political landscape’ (Ayoade 2006:78). As it were, the dreaded godfathers relied largely on the ‘legacy of force’ which is reminiscent of the military coup de tat. Political godfathers practically used the ‘coup’ tactics through the ‘political armies’ of the rank and file of road transport workers and unemployed youths in selected states of the federation. It was often the case that the godfathers preferred to sustain the military legacy of force by concurrently ‘recruiting’ and ‘deploying’ armed youths to dislodge and or impose the occupants of democratic offices. By reducing political contests to ‘do or die’ battles which must be won ‘by all means’ political godfathers and their clients have extended the military ‘legacy of force’ and the primacy of bullets (rather than that of ballots) into the era of political democracy which citizens had hoped would be a different epoch from the violent part of the recent past.

To be sure, godfatherism connotes elitism because it suggests the idea that godfathers belong to the top echelon of their political parties. In other words, political godfathers are seen as the gladiators in political parties or caucuses whose actions (and inactions) are largely possible as a result of their vantage positions in such institutions. As ‘a small circle of elite’ (Obadare 2007:111), political godfathers compare with the military oligarchy which seized power essentially for the benefit of the few. Basically, following Ayoade (2006), we locate the strictures and structures of godfather politics within the Robert Michel’s ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’. The Michelian hypothesis is that power abhors vacuum. Leadership often emerges that steers the course of any organisation. As Ayoade demonstrated, the emergence of such powerful individuals or cliques whittles down the prescriptive powers of the organisation. We can therefore argue that the powers of the godfathers, cumulatively acquired through access to



State resources and patronage networks, increased inversely as the hold of the political parties decreased.

Historically speaking, the hybrid term ‘political godfathers’ could be traced to the pre-world war II era when Chicago gangsters such as Al Capone⁷⁹, pursued his interests on the basis of the Machiavellian dictum of the end justifying the means (Ibrahim 2003). Like the Nigerian godfathers, earlier political godfathers in America manipulated electoral processes and results to get their candidates elected, and in return, established a patron-client relationship. Like the contemporary Nigerian political godfathers, the earlier American godfathers rendered citizens mere speculators and onlookers in electioneering processes. In the American political science literature these individuals are referred as the ‘party machines’.

In Nigeria, the rise in local notables and national godfathers can be traced to the immediate post-independence era when the post-colonial elite began to ‘sit atop vast, pyramid-structured patronage networks based on regular ‘cash and carry’ kickback relationships, such that every level of Nigerian government has its relevant Big Men and their supporters’ (Sklar, Onwudiwe & Kew 2006:105). Although patron-client relationships are not a recognized (formal) political institution in any democratic setting, the phenomenon has manifested itself albeit invisibly in the political structure of Nigeria during the First and Second Republics and become highly pronounced with the return to civil rule in 1999 (Apam 2010: 33). While it has become a political pathology that characterized politics especially under this present democratic dispensation political clientelism is not only a Nigeria political crisis. Khan (2005: 705) has noted that, ‘political contestation in developing states is organized through the mobilizations of patron-client factions, rather than through the mobilization of class or economic interest groups.

⁷⁹ Al Capone was America’s best known gangster and the single greatest symbol of the collapse of law and order in the United States during the 1920s Prohibition era.



Furthermore, political clientelism is intimately connected to the underdevelopment of economies and the inevitable social transformations being witnessed in most developing states. Informed by this, Khan (2005) asserts that it is imperative to understand the role of patron-client structure for any appreciable understanding of the challenges confronting democratization process in developing states. Yet, one can identify at least three enabling factors for godfatherism. First, political godfathers have always had access to the Nigerian State, as typified by the military oligarchy (pre-transition) as well as the presidency and the ruling party machinery (post-transition). Second, political godfathers have had unfettered access to state resources which positioned them to oil their variants of godfatherism. Third, the use of the ‘legacy of force’ in the manner of the ‘military technique’ of coup d’état tactics enhanced the capacity of the political godfathers to sustain ‘state capture’ ‘partisan abuse’ and patronage politics. The stratagem of violence, which contradicts tenets of electoral democracy, was, for the most part, a carry-over of the military rule of the no distant past.

Military Rule as the Basis for Patronage Politics in Nigeria

A quick glance at the structure of the Nigerian political economy reveals its precarious nature even though it is being rated as one of the leading economies in Africa. The most noted of the absurdities that have characterized the structure and nature of the Nigeria’s political economy has been the over reliance on the oil industry. The uncritical and non-creative mono-economy and the perpetual corrupt enrichment of the oil rents by the military rulers and their civilian friends and successors over decades of dictatorial and civilian rule has hampered the country’s development. In the same vein, the political economy cum history of post-civil war Nigeria has been riddled with the dominance of the military elite (*militariats*) that ruled the country from 1966-1999. Thus, more than any other issues, oil rents and the decades of military autocratic rule had impacted strongly on the nature of the Nigerian State, state-civil society relations and governance process during the military era and even after the return to civil rule in May 1999 (Saka and Fatima 2011: 60).



The Nigerian economy since 1985 has traced a parabola, from crisis to revival, back to stagnation and renewed crisis. Nigeria's economic malaise under military regimes has had far reaching consequences for popular welfare, and impacted strongly on the nation's social and political fabric. While the regime of General Babangida introduced reform process through the SAP, the inconsistency and ultimately the demise of economic reform under Babangida roughly paralleled the ambivalent path of political transition under the same regime. An intensifying dialectic of eroding reform was evident, as political change gave rise to greater pressures on economic policy, and unstable economic management aggravated the discord of political contention even among the top echelon of the emergent military class (Lewis 1994: 336).

The management of the national economy witnessed significant deterioration in the twilight years of General Babangida, worsening sharply in the midst of the political crisis generated by the annulment of the June 12 presidential election that culminated in the truncation of the transition process. After ousting civilian caretakers of the Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Sonekan in November of 1993, General Sani Abacha turned economic policy over to populist elements in his cabinet. Rather than reversing the degeneration of the reform process, the Abacha's regime economic management team quickly dismantled the vestiges of the adjustment programme, thus promoting further decay and consolidating the predation of the national resources. Macroeconomic uncertainty was accompanied by burgeoning corruption, widening social inequality, institutional and infrastructural deterioration, volatile market instability, domestic lawlessness, and international isolation (Lewis 1996: 79).

The economic adversities fomented by the Babangida regime and consolidated on by the regime of General Sani Abacha draw attention to a more fundamental change in the political economy of Nigeria under military autocracy. The change was characterized by the shift from prebendalism, or decentralized patrimonial rule, towards predation and the main manifestation was the



consolidation of avaricious dictatorship. The personalization and concentration of power under Babangida reflected a new tendency in Nigeria's political economy, and its hallmark was the concentration of state power in the hand of select few within the military oligarchy. State economic tutelage moved from a pattern of diffuse clientelism under comparatively stable (though weak) institutional auspices, to more arbitrary and debilitating control by a single ruler (Ibid: 80).

While this macabre transformation is reversible, however, it was significantly consolidated under the inglorious regime of the late General Abacha (Lewis 1996). Although the Abacha regime somewhat make attempt at partial return to liberalization, a combination of untenable policies, corruption, diversion of state resources and the state of political instability continued to undermined the basis of the Nigerian economy. It was in this state of economic disarray that Nigeria return to civil rule in May, 1999. Given the extent of the mismanagement of the national economy under successive military regimes it might be safe to conclude in the words of Amuwo (1995:3) that the political economy of Nigeria under military rule was largely characterized by personal rulership project designed to accumulate all powers and dispense all patronage within the military oligarchy and their civilian collaborators.

Essentially, therefore, the stratagem by the military oligarchs for 'capturing the state' is not different from the tactics often deployed by the violence-oriented political godfathers. The 'State' can be seen from both macro and micro perspectives. From a macro perspective, the State refers to Nigeria as a juridical sovereign nation headed by a popularly elected President. The State, in this sense, consists of all sub-national units commonly referred to as 'states'. In the micro sense, the 'state' refers to any of the thirty-six sub-national units headed by governors. In both senses, power, resources and patronage commonly define the essence of the state. Equally, in both 'States', control of governmental machinery has come to define who-is-who in the scheme of political relevance.



As a country under a prolonged military rule, both the military and their civilian allies have had unfettered access to the State. They have, individually and collectively, atomised and literally shared the state in a manner that required exclusion of the majority in their domains of influence. While the military rule lasted coup d'état took the form of violence. From 1999 till date, godfathers, like their military collaborators and predecessors, engage in violent struggles in a supposed democratic era.

The military stratagem and the godfatherist tactics of violence bear similarity both in method and execution. Aside the use of dangerous weapons by the 'foot soldiers' of the military coup plotters and political godfathers, both use the largesse of the state (money, contract and appointments) to reinforce their relevance and dominance. In most cases, with the exception of a few, both military and political oligarchs dislike legal order as both abhor constitutional principles. It is within this precept that Ayoade describes the political godfathers as 'political notables or dreaded political rascals who are recalcitrant to the deterrence of the legal regime (2006:78). The three personal examples of Lamidi Adedibu, Chris Uba and Olusola Saraki are here discussed as preceding sections before comparisons and conclusions.

Lamidi Adedibu, Chris Uba and Olusola Saraki: the fading faces of Godfatherism?

'If you pass through me, you would get anything you want in politics. So, if I say I dominate politics, I do' (Chief Lamidi Adedibu in Interview with *Tell* 17.09.2007, p.20)

In South-western Nigeria, Chief Lamidi Adedibu became a local political notable at 24 when he served as the Publicity Secretary of the Action Group (AG) in Ibadan Divisional Branch and later became the chairman of the AG Youth Wing at 26 in 1953. Although he contested elections into the Western Region House of Assembly on the platform of AG in May 1956 to represent Ibadan East Constituency but lost, Adedibu remained in the AG (founded by Obafemi Awolowo) until the military took over on 15 January 1966. He was later elected a councillor in 1976 and in



the Second Republic (1979-83) became the chairman of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in Ibadan/Ibarapa Zone.

According to Agbaje (2002:17), Adedibu belonged to the 'lesser educated elite' who supplanted well educated and formerly influential political leaders in Ibadan especially in the late 1980s and 1990s. Agbaje adduces three reasons for the emergence of the likes of Adedibu as political forces in Ibadan. First, some of the politically more experienced and wealthy Ibadan elite had been harassed, ridiculed, or banned from politics following the December 1983 coup for the rest of the 1980s and 1990s.

This gave the field to the 'lesser educated elites' such as Chief Lamidi Adedibu and Alhaji Abdul Azeez Arisekola Alao. The second factor was the religious affinity between Adedibu and the reigning generals, mostly northerners and Muslims. Third, the rise in the political relevance of Adedibu was the 'adroit manipulation of traditional compound and filial networks' with most of his supporters in Ibadan (Agbaje 2002:17-18). In essence, Adedibu's rise had been made possible as a result of his ability to oil the traditional and cultural connections for political patronage.

As at 11 June 2008 when he passed away, Chief Adedibu was the *Asipa* of Ibadan (third in command of the Ibadan Council of Chiefs) and was just three steps away from becoming Olubadan (the king of Ibadan). Yet, above all, his closeness to the military rulers in Nigeria positioned him as a strategically significant political godfather. As the protagonist put it himself:

At the Aso Villa [the state house in Abuja], I had the privilege to meet General Babangida [then head of state] we had face to face discussion. He said with all sincerity that he regarded me as one of his confidants in Yorubaland (Adedibu 1997:380)

The ‘victory’ of the PDP at both state and national levels in the controversial 2003 elections led to the eventual control of the party in Oyo state by Adedibu, who was described as the ‘father of PDP’ and the ‘Garrison Commander of Ibadan politics’ by President Obasanjo (*The Nation* 12.11.2007, p.5). Using food and violence as double stratagems for political mobilisation, Adedibu’s house was always full with several followers, many of whom were poor and semi-educated, who gathered to eat *Amala* and *Gbegiri*, a popular Yoruba delicacy. But Adedibu also used ‘political boys’ (drawn mainly from the rank and file of the national road transport workers union) who served as a mini-army around him.

As events unfolded, the political honeymoon between godfather Adedibu and godson Ladoja did not last. Ladoja told the Human Rights Watch reporters that Adedibu was indeed his godfather who helped him to ‘win’ elections in 2003, but that ‘once he was in office, he tried immediately to break free of Adedibu’s influence’. Ladoja alleged that Adedibu ordered him to turn over 25 percent of the government’s security vote-or roughly N15 million (\$115,000) per month-directly to him (HRW Report 08.02.2007).

In the South-eastern state of Anambra, Chris Uba , like Lamidi Adedibu of Oyo, adopted a similar pattern of control and hegemony over his clients. Unlike Emeka Offor who was humiliated by his godson (former Governor Mbadiniju) in his attempt to remove him from office, Uba practically chased out his godson-governor Chris Ngige out of power when things fell apart between them. To be more specific, Uba made his clients sign legal agreements which explicitly identified him, Uba as the “patron” and the person calling the shots in the relationship between the godfather and his clients (Olarinmoye 2008). This was in addition to oath-taking to abide by their agreement with him before priests of a dreaded local traditional shrine based in Okija, Ihiala Local Government Area of Anambra state (HRW, 2007:67) with a strong implication for his client in default.

For example, Governor Ngige was said to have agreed with Godfather Uba, among other things that he;

- i.) Recognize(d) the fact that God in using Chief Christian C. Uba to prepare me for this great task ahead through his sponsorship; I will never tell him lies but the truth at all times even if I am at fault; will never pick a quarrel with him unduly; will take a keen interest in Christian's welfare and the welfare of the family as long as the interest is not against the welfare of his state and will also accept and abide by those pieces of advice aimed at peace and progress of the state from Chief Uba as well as other wise counsel from elders of the state and beyond(Olarinmoye, 2008)
- ii.) The incoming government will revolve round the caucus leader, Chris Uba and where he so expressly (sic) directs, members of the caucus. The governor-elect must ensure he clears in advance all policy routine administrative issues including all contracts, appointments and decisions with the caucus leader, Chris Uba before implementation.
- iii.) To obey all instructions from Chief Uba and never disagree with him on any issue of state including my position as governor-elect/governor and the general administration of Anambra state...from now till the end of my tenure as governor in 2007 (HRW, 2007). Ngige also swore to exhibit utmost good faith with regards to any matter to which the agreement related and agreed that should he renege on the terms of the agreement without any acceptable excuse, the caucus leader may avenge himself in any manner adjudged by him as fitting and adequate including demanding for him immediate resignation from office of governor by the “administrator”, Chief Uba (HRW, 2007). Furthermore, all clients of Chris Uba agreed that any person in this caucus holding a public office must see himself as working for the caucus and the caucus leader and must therefore clear with him all matters of state interest and be completely loyal to Chris Uba and Mr. President and C-in-C of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (HRW, 2007). With such agreements, Uba captured the state and secured access to resources of the state and effectively undermined his political clients who were simply managing the state on his behalf.

It must be stressed that the condition by which the godfather have access to state resources and control are synonymous to the one that put the state for sale and personalize the state as the estate of the godfather. Since the godfather has absolute control over the godson, it then means that the state has been ceded to the godfather. Thus, in practical terms, both the godson and the state are

essentially under the control of the Godfather. One can therefore understand the dynamics of sheer desperation on the part of the godfather to protect and defend his acclaimed property. That is why in the event of violation, the ensuing struggle between the godfather and the son is a matter between life and death on one hand a clear attempt to ‘share’ the state on the other hand.

Similarly in the North-central state of Kwara, the institutionalization of political clientelism as the structure that underpins political processes became more pronounced and entrenched with the return to democratic rule in May 1999. At the peak of the pyramidal clientelist structure that controlled the political destiny and governance of Kwara state was Dr. Olusola Saraki, the Waziri of Ilorin, Nigeria’s former Senate Majority Leader in the Second Republic. Dr. Abubakar Olusola Saraki, a trained medical doctor, came into political limelight in the whirl of events that heralded the Nigerian Second Republic. Dr Olusola Saraki initially earned his modest wealth from medical practice and assiduously used his wealth to cultivate goodwill through philanthropist community service to the people of Kwara State Central senatorial district. This was to become a political investment which later translated to political and economic gains for the godfather as he entered into partisan politics.

Dr. Saraki contested for and won the Kwara state central senatorial district senate seat under the platform of the defunct National Party of Nigeria during the Second Republic. He equally deployed his goodwill and influence to secure electoral success for Alhaji Adamu Attah the governorship flag-bearer of the NPN in the state. The winning of the governorship office for the party and the general electoral success of the NPN in the old Kwara State in the Second Republic was a vivid demonstration of Dr Saraki’s emerging political clout and godfather status. Additionally, his emergence as the Senate Majority Leader in the second republic allowed him to play prominent role in the politics of the National Assembly and indeed that of the nation through his vantage position within the power bloc of the ruling NPN (Saka 2010: 366).



Since his rise to political prominence in the Second Republic Dr. Olusola Saraki had remained the towering figure at the centre of Kwara State politics. His ability to garner grass root political support and ensure electoral success for the party and candidates that got his backing within his turf has remained unrivalled by that of any politicians across Nigeria. While his support was critical for the successes recorded by former Governor Adamu Attah and the NPN in the 1979 general elections in Kwara State, Dr Olusola also demonstrated his political capacity to sway people's votes in Kwara State. This was attested to by his ability to install Chief Cornelius Adebayo of the Unity Party of Nigeria as the governor of the State in the 1983 governorship election while ensuring that the NPN recorded total successes in other rounds of electoral contest during the 1983 general elections (Saka 2010: 370). As Ayoade (2006: 84) asserted, the 1983 governorship election showed Senator Saraki as the clearly deciding factor as he demonstrated that whichever candidate got his support without recourse to party affiliation would definitely win any electoral position in his political domain.

In the Fourth Republic, Dr Olusola Saraki has shown that he is a political icon whose favour must be sought after by any office-seeking politicians in Kwara State. In preparing for electoral contests at the commencement of this republic, Dr Olusola first pitched his political tent with the All People's Party, APP (later renamed All Nigerian People's Party, ANPP). Using the platform of the APP, Dr Olusola worked for and ensures the installation of late Rear Admiral Muhammad Alabi Lawal as the governor of Kwara State and the election of her biological daughter Rukayat Gbemisola Saraki as an honourable member representing Asa/Ilorin West Federal Constituency in the House of Representatives. Using Dr. Saraki's political machinery, the APP cleared majority of the elective positions contested for in the 1999 general elections in Kwara State. However, history was made to repeat itself as the political relationship between Dr. Olusola Saraki (the godfather) and late governor Lawal (the godson) turned sour in the twilight of the administration of Governor Lawal (1999-2003) as was the case with former governor Attah in the Second Republic (1979-1983).



It is difficult to authoritatively ascertain the issues at the heart of the strain relationships between Dr. Olusola Saraki and the late Admiral Lawal. This notwithstanding, observers of political events then have noted that the clash of interest between the duo revolved around issues as varied as second term ambition of the late Lawal, the tussle for the control of the ruling party machinery in the state, appointment and dissolution of the state executive council, the filling of other important appointive positions in the state, recognition and upgrading of traditional rulers, the manner for the awarding of contracts, relations across inter-party lines among other (Lawal 2005: 218-221; Sambo 2005: 195). As relationships between Dr. Olusola Saraki and the late Admiral Lawal deteriorate the peace and tranquillity that Ilorin and indeed the whole of Kwara State was known for was thrown into the wind.

The political face-off between the godfather (Dr Saraki) and his godson (late Admiral Lawal) resulted in the polarization of the people of the state into opposing camps. The face-off and the waging of the political war resulting from it also witnessed the deployment of violent tactics by parties to the crisis in the state. With the benefits of hindsight, it has become publicly acknowledged that the duo of Dr. Saraki and the late Admiral Lawal utilized resource in their disposal to raise, finance and arm Youth gangs that were deployed to settle political scores. The ‘Akaje’ and the ‘Maja’ gangs under the payroll of the Saraki faction were deployed to protect and advance the political interest of the Saraki camp. In the same vein, the Lawal camp recruited their armed thugs from among cultists at Kwara State Polytechnic, members of the Odua’s People’s Congress in Kwara State and unemployed youth especially from Idi-ape, the homestead and headquarters of the late Admiral Lawal political group (This Day 2002: 20). Violent confrontations between the supporters of the power elites degenerated badly such that by March, 2002 trivial issues as the erecting and removal of political billboard and portraits often resulted in violent clash (Sambo 2005: 196).

Consequent on the strained relationships between the godfather and the godson, Dr. Olusola Saraki decamped from the ANPP (which was the ruling party in the state) to the opposing People’s Democratic Party, PDP. In a move never taken by any godfather in the political history of Nigeria, Dr. Olusola Saraki decided to field his biological son Dr. Bukola Saraki as the

governorship candidate under PDP for the 2003 gubernatorial election. This decision can be seen as representing Dr. Saraki's determination to stake all that he had got in his bid to ensure that he remained the godfather that could determine, to use the words of Abdullahi (2002), the course, speed, passengers and the person that captained the ship of Kwara State. The conduct of campaigns for the gubernatorial election and other round of elections during the 2003 general elections in Kwara State were acrimonious and riddle with violence to say the least. After the count of votes, Dr. Bukola Saraki was declared as the winner of the 2003 governorship election. Dr Olusola Saraki also succeeded in installing his daughter (Rukayat Fowora Saraki) as a Senator representing Kwara Central, while the PDP won all federal and state elective positions in the 2003 general elections in Kwara State. The political defeat of late Admiral Lawal and the displacing of the ANPP from office in Kwara State all facilitated by Dr. Saraki were avid demonstration of the importance of Dr. Saraki as the undisputed kingmaker of Kwara politics.

Dr. Bukola Saraki ruled as the governor of Kwara State without much publicized disputes between himself and his father for two terms of eight years. As his tenure drew to a close there emerged political crack in the fold of the ruling PDP in Kwara State. The main issue revolved around the succession struggle among contending factions within the party. On the one side was the show of interest by Senator Rukayat Saraki to succeed his biological brother as the governor of the state after the expiration of the latter 's two terms in May 2011. This ambition was staunchly supported by the Patriarch of the Saraki ruling dynasty and the godfather, Dr. Olusola Saraki. On the contrary, Dr Bukola Saraki was not favourably disposed to the idea of his blood sister succeeding him as the governor of the state. This ensuing fight within the Saraki family eventually tore the PDP in Kwara state into factions. As the 2011 elections drew near Dr. Olusola Saraki in his characteristic manner decamped with her daughter Senator Gbemisola Saraki to another party (Action Congress Party of Nigeria, ACPN) taking with him Senator Gbemisola supporters from within the PDP.

In the contest for the governorship position during the 2011 general elections Dr. Saraki confronted no one but himself as he made the decision to field and support his daughter for the governorship position under the platform of ACPN against Alhaji Fatai Ahmed the candidate of



the PDP supported by Dr. Bukola Saraki his son. Dr. Olusola Saraki force was routed at the poll as the PDP clinched the governorship position and cleared the National Assembly and State House of Assembly positions with the exception of two State House of Assembly seats won by the Action Congress of Nigeria. The defeat of the acclaimed Kwara Kingmaker by his biological son brings to an end to the reign of Dr. Saraki as the undisputed kingmaker of Kwara state politics. More than this, the defeat also resulted in the smooth transition of power from father to son as the kingmaker and godfather of Kwara politics. Thus, in essence, the routing of Dr. Saraki in the 2011 general elections was nothing but a symbolic defeat given that the structure that underpinned Kwara politics remains not only intact but also at the hand of the Saraki. For now, the control of the lever of politics and by extension state resource in Kwara remains at the hand of the Saraki political dynasty and no doubt it is too early to know whether or not the Saraki will remain in contention in the scheme of things in Kwara state beyond 2015.

Comparisons and Conclusion: Neo-Godfatherism as an Emerging Practice

In Nigeria, the correlation between elitism and power oligarchy becomes more clear when one looks at the mutually beneficial relationship between the military rulers and their civilian collaborators, who over the last decade of democratic rule used their ‘closeness’ to the state as a strategy for ‘state capture’ and partisan abuse. Like their military benefactors, political godfathers used the ‘legacy of force’ to maintain the firm grip of their political domains. As has been observed in Oyo, Anambra, and Kwara (particularly during the Saraki-Lawal power tussle) the godfathers used the motor park touts along with the security agents such as the soldiers and policemen to further politics of power grab.

The ebbs and flows of politics in Anambra, Oyo and Kwara states since the beginning of the fourth republic have never for once been devoid of patron-client relations. As shown above, it is the godfather-brokerage or its transformation to godfather patron that has become the dominant form of Godfatherism in Anambra. Unlike in Anambra, where the patron (Chris Uba) supplied the funds in favour of the client (Chris Ngige), the Oyo case saw the client (Ladoja) supplying the funds while the patron (Adedibu) deployed the political skills and ‘street soldiers’ for the patronage project. In Kwara, the patron (the senior Saraki) supplied both the funds and the skills.



In all the three cases, democratic processes were undermined, given the malfeasance of godfathers and the tactics they adopted in capturing the state as well as weakening the mandate of the people reposed in their godsons.

This development has not only induced organized violence as essential anti-democratic phenomenon in the struggle for the control of state power and its resources, it has at the same time become a lethal manifestation of elite politics in Nigeria (Anifowose 2003). In Oyo state in particular, as shown above, Lamidi Adedibu used the members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) to ‘sack’ a sitting a governor almost the same way that the military overthrew civilian regimes in the pre-1999 era. Specifically, in Anambra and Oyo, violence was used to rig the godsons in as governors. In both cases, similarly significant violence was employed to chase out the godson-governors. In Kwara, once the godfather and godson disagreed succession politics turned violent. In all the three states, godfather-godsons had turned sour, leading to uncivil use of violence and repeated cycles of the ‘legacy of force’.

In spite of the correlation between the military legacy of ‘force’ and the tactical deployment of violence by the political godfathers, recent developments, even within and outside the states examined above, it has been observed that violence-based political godfatherism is giving way to a more mentorship-based variant of godfatherism. Within this context, the passing away of strong-arm political gladiator (Lamidi Adedibu in Oyo state) and the less and less relevance of political heavyweights like the Uba Brothers in Anambra as well as the dwindling political fortunes of the late Olusola Saraki (if only by transmutation of power to his biological son Bukola Saraki) in Kwara have shown the inversely proportional relationship between ‘the legacy of force’ and the prospects for democratic consolidation. In this sense, the more the political system becomes reformed and sanitised the less capable will the impostor-godfathers to use the legacy of force to ‘shoot’ themselves and their clients into power’.

Perhaps, on a normative and positive note, godfatherism may not be fading but will be taking the variant of mentoring and strategic support by powerful and rich individuals for largely political reasons. In this sense, a former senator and two-term governor of Lagos State, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, might be said to represent a new face of what we can call ‘neo-godfatherism’. Unlike



Adedibu, Saraki and Uba, Tinubu is not known to use violence even though like all other godfathers, it is not unlikely that he himself would have 'youth wings' that may further his partisan interests. Yet, unlike Uba and others who oiled patron-client politics with violence and 'legacy of force', Tinubu is spreading his political tentacles through a whole geo-political zone (the Southwest) which means he has multiple godson-governors. While this may be reminiscent of some form of patronage politics the *modus operandi* of such interaction is not yet empirically clear. According to Tinubu:

I am happy he (Governor Mimiko of Ondo State) calls me godfather. My own godfather is not that of Anthony Anenih in Edo state. Mine is for the development and progress of South West states. My own godfatherism is mentoring reliable and dependable people in the South West states for progress and development (Vanguard 16.10.2012)

The Tinubu example will need to be studied over a number of years if it will make a difference from the Adedibu/Uba/Saraki kind of godfatherism. If what we call 'neo-godfatherism' will be anything different from the detestable violence-prone type that Nigerians have been used to, then democracy will not suffer relapse from political mentoring aspect of godfatherism. While Tinubu has equally been accused of politics of imposition (in which he gave a senatorial ticket to his wife and ensured his chief of staff got the governorship ticket of his party, thereby tactically choosing his successor; what he would rather call 'consensus politics'), imposition often becomes issue when it leads to violence. So far, political violence or the military legacy of force has not been expressly deployed by Tinubu as a godfather. Unlike other godfathers mentioned above, Tinubu is yet to join the league of powerful individuals who would violently impose state governors and national legislators against the wishes of the electorate.

Essentially, therefore, as 2011 elections signaled, and as 2015 elections portrayed, comprehensive electoral reforms and a re-orientation of the politicians would help deflate much of the potential vices of godfather politics. Since political godfatherism thrives mostly in political systems where violence and vote-buying predominate, free and fair elections would reduce the

overwhelming influence of extra-democratic features of godfather politics. Although godfatherism can be both a tonic and toxic for political democracy, the Nigerian experience has revealed that godfatherism has been more of toxic than tonic for democratic deepening. This is particularly the case since the political godfathers, at least the prominent ones analysed above, essentially used violence and patronage to perpetuate politics of 'state capture' and partisan abuse in the like manner that is reminiscent of the military oligarchy. Yet, with time, and at a more conceptual level, it would be possible to see a downward case of the old violence-oriented type of godfatherism as the military legacy of force continues to fade to be replaced with a more robust democratically inclined mentorship-based godfatherism which would be enhanced with more awareness of the masses and the agent-driven choices of the elite to play according to the rule of the game.

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